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Introduction
This book tries to stage a dialogue between the histories, concerns and abstract ideas 
of cultural studies and of the anti-capitalist movement. By the anti-capitalist move-
ment, I mean primarily the World Social Forum and the campaigns, projects, strug-
gles and ideas connected to it.
There are good reasons for wanting to stage such a dialogue because cultural 
studies and the anti-capitalist movement have some deep affi nities. The both have 
their intellectual and spiritual roots in the radical movements of the twentieth cen-
tury, they both tend to be informed by egalitarian, pluralist and libertarian critiques 
of contemporary societies, and they are both interested in the multifarious forms of 
contemporary and historical power relationships.
Here is a brief outline of what follows.
The fi rst two chapters of the book make up a partial, idiosyncratic, political his-
tory of cultural studies, whose argument runs something like this: cultural studies 
began life as a self-consciously radical discipline which was infl uenced by its prox-
imity to, and its dynamic relationship with, the politics of the British labour move-
ment. Cultural studies wasn’t, in itself, a revolutionary political project or a substitute 
for any other kind of political activism, but it tried to look at issues like literature, 
social history, popular culture and political change as all connected to each other, and 
it attempted to look at them all from the point of view of an understanding of society 
and a set of values broadly derived from the traditions of the workers’ movement. At 
the same time, it always sought to generate new insights into the present and historical 
workings of culture and power that might challenge or transform some of the received 
assumptions of the labour movement. In particular, cultural studies emerged from the 
concerns of one strand within that movement, the so-called New Left. As it evolved 
during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, most research in cultural studies continued to be 
engaged with those concerns. At the same time, the ideas and priorities of the New 
Left themselves also evolved. Most importantly, the emergence (or re- emergence) 
of movements such as feminism, anti-racism and gay liberation brought new sets of 
concerns and priorities. In particular, these movements brought to light new forms 
of power relationships which cultural studies scholars had to take into account in 
their various investigations, but they also brought new risks and problems for the 
political Left which many of those scholars sought to confront. These investigations 
within cultural studies intersected with a much wider theoretical interrogation of left 
thought, which the chapter outlines under the heading of the anti-essentialist turn.
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Despite the intellectual richness of this moment, by the 1990s most of the or-
ganised Left—from the socialist and communist movements to the New Social 
Movements—had ceased to be viable as coherent, consistent projects for social 
transformation. The defeat of communism, the dispersal of the women’s movement 
and the hegemony of neoliberalism all consolidated a situation in which there simply 
were no such radical movements for cultural studies to maintain such dialogues with. 
This has not prevented cultural studies from growing, proliferating and extending its 
project and its reach. Nor has it prevented the best work in the fi eld from continuing 
to offer incisive analyses of contemporary culture in its many aspects. But it does 
mean that cultural studies has not had the benefi t of that dynamic dialogue with radi-
cal political movements that was the source of some of its energy in the past. The 
second chapter therefore suggests that a dialogue between cultural studies and the 
anti-capitalist movement might be a good thing.
Chapter 3 outlines and refl ects upon the emergence of this movement, which is 
sometimes called anti-capitalist or anti-globalisation or global-justice or altermon-
dialiste. Since the early 1990s a range of projects and institutions have arisen around 
the world which try to challenge the global dominance of liberal capitalism, and 
which are informed by a set of libertarian and egalitarian values very similar to those 
which typifi ed the New Left. This anti-capitalism is different from the traditional 
labour and socialist movements in ways which were to some extent prefi gured and 
called for by the ideas of the New Left, and by the ideas of philosophers and theo-
rists associated with the anti-essentialist turn. The chapter therefore argues that this 
movement can be said to be radical democratic in its aspirations, provided that we 
clear up some common confusions as to what the term radical democracy means. On 
the other hand, this movement is informed by, at best, some woefully simplistic ideas 
about culture and political strategy. It is precisely this poverty of thought which the 
best cultural studies work of the past has often tried to remedy in radical movements. 
As such, Chapter 3 contends that it is worth thinking through some issues about cul-
ture and political strategy from a position informed by the legacy of cultural studies 
and the concerns of anti-capitalism.
Chapter 4 considers a range of different ways of conceptualising the relation-
ship between capitalism and culture, and it considers reasons as to why one might 
or might not want to take up a political or analytical position which is explicitly 
anti-capitalist. Although it rejects a classically Marxist anti-capitalism, it fi nds good 
reasons for taking up a position which sees capitalism in general—and neoliberalism 
in particular—as inimical to any democratic culture, and worth opposing on those 
terms. It concludes, however, that the anti-capitalism of the movement of move-
ments might have to be mobilised under names less abstract than anti-capitalism if it 
is to prove politically effective in concrete contexts.
Chapter 5 tries to think about what would be involved in developing such a posi-
tion, by comparing the theoretical ideas of a number of philosophers who have writ-
ten in a spirit close to that of both New Left cultural studies and of the anti-capitalist 
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movement. This chapter is unashamedly abstract in its approach because getting be-
yond the kind of simplistic thinking about culture and politics which often typifi es 
the anti-capitalist movement demands some rigourous abstract thought. The chapter 
expounds some of the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, Laclau and Mouffe and Hardt 
and Negri in terms that will be comprehensible to a reader with no great prior famil-
iarity with their work; the chapter also offers some rigourous comparison of those 
ideas. The chapter organises its discussion of these ideas partly in terms of a number 
of themes which are central to cultural studies—creativity, complexity, power and 
hegemony—because one of its aims is to think through what the use of those ideas 
might be for engaged cultural analysis. The chapter largely concludes that, despite 
the tendency of these writers and their supporters to polemicise against each other, 
their ideas can all be deployed very usefully in the attempt to think through what a 
contemporary, radical democratic, post-Marxism might be both for cultural studies 
and anti-capitalist politics.
Chapter 6 takes some of these ideas and tries to use them to make an analysis of 
key confi gurations of power in contemporary British culture. Ultimately, it asks what 
scope there might be for effective opposition to neoliberalism in the United Kingdom 
today, by looking at the ways in which neoliberalism is both implemented and destabi-
lised in the current context. I would argue that it is this kind of so-called conjunctural 
analysis which is the core task of cultural studies, and that this is what cultural studies, 
at its best, can do for a radical movement such as anti-capitalism; to try to map its ter-
rain and warn it of obstacles. I don’t claim that such a task can be undertaken with any 
authority by one person in one chapter of a largely theoretical work such as this one. 
I would also argue that a great deal of current work going on in cultural studies already 
does this—although it may not be explicit or even conscious about for whom the work 
it being done. The point of the chapter in itself is therefore not to offer a defi nitive 
analysis, but to illustrate the kind of thing that cultural studies can do with the kinds of 
theories outlined in the previous chapter.
Chapter 7 continues the effort to think through the major obstacles to the success 
of any contemporary anti-capitalism, but it does so in a largely theoretical register. 
This chapter tries to deconstruct what it calls ‘the activist imaginary’. Put simply, 
‘the activist imaginary’ is an attitude which makes a fetish of the so-called outsider 
status of activists: this attitude prevents activists from really engaging in the kind 
of risky politics which might produce real change (because real change would ulti-
mately threaten the outsider status of activists). The chapter discerns elements of this 
activist imaginary in elements of contemporary political theory and tries to decon-
struct them on their own abstract terms, which takes a while, but is necessary. It ulti-
mately argues for the importance of an anti-capitalist partisanship which is not tied 
to any political or social identity, and for a strategic orientation in radical-democratic 
thought and practice which is not tied to any singular homogenous strategy. Once 
again, it fi nds that the polemics between supporters of Deleuze and Guattari and 
Laclau and Mouffe tend to obscure important points of agreement between them, 
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which might be better treated as opportunities for mutual-intensifi cation as opposed 
to sterile sectarianism.
The conclusion offers a nice little polemic and is very short.
I am now going to offer some problematic clarifi cations of terms which I will be 
using, mainly in the fi rst two chapters: the terms cultural studies, cultural theory and 
politics. Readers with strong opinions about the proper uses of these phrases should 
read this section carefully, lest they become annoyed by the way I use these words 
later. Readers who are indifferent to such issues, or fi nd semantic quibbling frustrat-
ing, should probably just skip ahead to chapter one.
Some Terms of Reference
Although the overall aim of this work is to set up a dialogue between cultural studies 
and anti-capitalism, much of it is centrally concerned with questions of cultural and 
political theory. This is because theory is the zone in which ideas derived from appar-
ently quite different sets of concerns and activities (for example, political activism 
and cultural analysis) can reach a level of abstraction at which they can be effectively 
compared and exchanged.
As such, much of the substance of this book is concerned with the relationship 
between cultural theory and politics. But the book is also concerned with the history 
and potential of cultural studies.
So it seems like a good idea to explore, very briefl y, the relationships between 
these terms, before going any further.
Cultural Studies and Cultural Theory
Firstly, I want to clarify my understanding of the relationship between these two 
terms: cultural studies and cultural theory. Why do I want to do this? Simply because 
there is quite a widespread tendency today to regard these terms as interchangeable, 
and I don’t want this book to contribute to that confusion.
So what is the relationship between cultural studies and cultural theory? These are 
themselves both quite loose terms, and I am not going to try to offer fi nal defi nitions 
of them. But thinking about their relationship is important.
Cultural theory as the phrase has come to be used today is a capacious term 
which includes large chunks of what might otherwise be called philosophy, social 
theory, political theory, psychology, anthropology or linguistics, but it does not in-
clude everything in any of one those fi elds. Would it be possible to offer a coherent 
abstract defi nition of what it actually is and what it actually does? I don’t think so: 
largely because within the fi eld of cultural theory there is no agreement on what 
either culture, cultural or even theory necessarily mean. That doesn’t mean that we 
can’t recognise cultural theory when we see it. Rather cultural theory is defi ned by 
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how it is used, by whom and for what. Put very simply, cultural theory is the set of 
theoretical tools—of abstract ideas and particular ways of deploying them—which 
is used within the discipline of cultural studies.
This produces a rather odd situation, in which we can say that the existence of cul-
tural theory as a recognisable fi eld is dependent on the existence of cultural studies 
as a discipline, even though, having identifi ed it as such, we could say that cultural 
theory is actually much older than cultural studies. This is partly because cultural 
studies has always used ideas which pre-date its own formation as a distinct disci-
pline, but also because, once the discipline of cultural studies emerged, it became 
possible to look back and see earlier thinkers as having been concerned with similar 
issues even though they could not have seen themselves as engaged in cultural stud-
ies or cultural theory because those terms were not in use. The result is that one could 
write a history of cultural theory which traces it back to the work of Vico (1999) or 
even Plato or Lao Tzu, but one could not begin a history of cultural studies as such 
any earlier than the 1950s, and it is only within this time frame that it can be strictly 
accurate to talk about cultural theory as a coherent fi eld. In other words, many of 
the elements which make up cultural theory are much older than cultural studies, 
but their existence as part of a set of ideas and debates called cultural theory is a by-
product of the emergence of cultural studies.
So what do we mean by cultural studies? Countless attempts have been made 
to offer a fi rm defi nition of cultural studies, and they not only disagree over what it 
is, but over what kind of thing it is. For some, cultural studies is simply a discipline 
concerned with the study of contemporary culture, whatever that might mean, and 
by whatever means a given researcher fi nds congenial. For others, cultural studies is 
a disciplinary project aiming to break down old disciplinary boundaries and perhaps 
to establish a whole new concept of useful knowledge. For some, cultural studies is 
particular methodological approach to the study of culture or its various manifesta-
tions which tends to stress the importance and relative autonomy of signifying prac-
tices and their inseparability from power relationships across a whole range of fi elds 
(from cinema to particle physics). For others, cultural studies is a straightforward 
political project, almost a movement in its own right, to further socialist, feminist 
and anti-racist ideas in universities and elsewhere.
In offering a partial history of cultural studies in Chapters 1 and 2, I am going to 
allow some credence to the fi rst and simplest of these defi nitions, but I want to stress 
that it does not necessarily exclude any of the others. Commentators often object to 
calling cultural studies a discipline because this seems to overlook cultural studies’ 
radically interdisciplinary character: that is, the fact that it has always borrowed from 
various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities rather than emerging from 
just one of them, and that it continues to do so rather than fi rmly distinguishing itself 
from other disciplines. However, my response to this is simply to point out that all 
disciplines have always existed in an unstable relationship with others: sociology 
could never be fi rmly separated from economics or history, or biology from physics 
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and chemistry, for example. Disciplinarity is itself an inherently unstable condition. 
There is nothing particular to cultural studies in its instability. At the same time, any 
discipline, especially a relatively new one, will to some extent amount to a project 
simply insofar as the constitution and perpetuation of that discipline will require 
some active and ongoing intervention into the general fi eld of academic knowledge 
and the institutions which legitimate it. Any new discipline has to be a project simply 
in order to emerge, carve out some space for itself, and survive. What’s more, any 
discipline at given points in its history will have one or more prevailing methodolog-
ical approaches, and there may be moments when one such approach is so dominant, 
so distinctive to the discipline in question, and so widely applicable that people come 
to think of the discipline and its prevailing methodology as identical; conceptually, 
however, they are not.
Finally, we come to one of the big questions for this book; the status of cultural 
studies as a project for the furtherance of left-wing political ideas. To a large extent 
this is what the fi rst two chapters will be about. For now, however, let us be clear 
about the approach that I am going to take to this question, which is a resolutely 
historical one. Historically, cultural studies was pioneered and largely dominated by 
people who were themselves deeply committed to left politics in everything they did, 
including cultural studies. They wanted cultural studies to contribute as far as pos-
sible to the wider and deeper development of left politics, which is why although cul-
tural studies has often been critical of received ideas and practices on the Left, it also 
helped to disseminate leftist ideas in the wider society. While the aim of their work 
was often to develop analyses of culture which were to some extent impartial and 
objective, those analyses were always being produced in the hope that they might 
ultimately be of use to particular political projects from the progressive Left. All of 
this does not mean that the very idea of cultural studies is inherently leftist, but it 
does mean that there is a very widespread identifi cation of cultural studies as a whole 
with the political tradition to which most of its key contributors have belonged; the 
tradition of the New Left. However, we can only fully understand the political rela-
tionship between cultural studies and this tradition if we separate them conceptually, 
recognising that there is nothing inevitable about the association between cultural 
studies and left politics.
So that leaves us nicely back where we started: cultural studies is that discipline 
concerned with the study of contemporary culture, whatever that might mean, and 
by whatever means a given researcher fi nds congenial. As with any discipline the 
meanings of even its most fundamental terms (culture, for example) and the means 
appropriate to it are subjects for debate within it, but with that proviso, the defi nition 
of cultural studies as a discipline concerned with the study of contemporary culture 
can hold.
Or can it? The trouble with this defi nition is that it leaves us open to the situa-
tion in which cultural studies is more-or-less whatever anyone does who claims that 
they are doing cultural studies. Stuart Hall, for example, has argued that this very 
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open defi nition allows people to claim to be practising cultural studies who have no 
interest at all in basic issues—such as the question of the imbrication of symbolic 
relationships with power relationships—which pioneers, such as Hall himself, have 
regarded as fundamental to their own researches (1997).
So now I want to do justice to Stuart Hall’s repeated injunction that cultural stud-
ies shouldn’t mean just anything, and I also want to do justice to a particular tradition 
of writing which has been at the heart of the cultural studies tradition. The work of 
fi gures such as Hall, Raymond Williams, Angela McRobbie, Paul Gilroy and Law-
rence Grossberg has touched upon many areas: philosophy, political commentary, 
anthropology, art criticism and literary criticism, for example. Yet I would argue 
that there has generally been one objective, whether explicitly central or obliquely 
tangential, to whatever they were doing that might be called cultural studies. That 
objective is simply to make sense of the precise confi gurations of power which shape 
contemporary life, without prior assumptions as to the relative importance of eco-
nomics, politics or the arts. It is this attempt to analyse conjunctures—complex con-
fi gurations of power relationships—using whatever conceptual tools are necessary, 
which I think characterises the central project of cultural studies (Grossberg 1995). 
This should not be regarded as a prescriptive defi nition, however.
Many kinds of work today go on under the rubric of cultural studies, from phe-
nomenological art criticism to ethnographies of the media industries to speculative 
philosophy and broad social commentary. Cultural analysis—the wide-ranging at-
tempt to understand the power relations which organise contemporary life—is very 
far from being the only thing that goes on within this open fi eld. But insofar as all of 
this work has anything to do with cultural studies as such, it at least has some pos-
sible use in the pursuit of such analysis. We might conclude then, that while cultural 
studies is a name for a very broad fi eld of work in which elements of contemporary 
culture are studied, the core tradition of cultural studies is always concerned with the 
analysis of power relations within and through that culture.
The cultural studies which I am going to examine the history of in the two chapters 
that follow is therefore a fi eld which is very broad and loosely defi ned—including 
cultural criticism, political sociology, various strands of philosophy, ethnography, 
social theory and psychology—but whose elements all interconnect and intermesh 
in various ways with this core tradition of conjunctural analysis, most strikingly 
represented by the work of Stuart Hall.
Politics and politics
The other key term to consider here is politics. Now, it is especially diffi cult to offer 
a concise defi nition of politics in this context, because one of the premises of almost 
all cultural studies to date has been the idea that the concept of politics needs to be 
expanded way beyond the traditional focus on contestation for state power between 
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organised groups. Indeed, some might say that, along with the other defi nitions of-
fered above, cultural studies simply is the result of a radical expansion of the concept 
of politics within the humanities and social sciences. This expanded conception re-
gards politics as involving all those processes whereby power relationships are im-
plemented, maintained, challenged, or altered in any sphere of activity whatsoever. 
Given that important traditions in philosophy and social science—which have both 
infl uenced cultural studies and been infl uenced by it—regard power relationships as 
infusing all aspects of human existence, and in some cases all aspects of all existence 
whatsoever (Nietzsche 1968: 297–300; 332–47), it seems like it might be possible to 
describe almost any situation in so-called political terms. This, in fact, is one of the 
great sources of anxiety within recent debates over the nature and practice of cultural 
studies: if everything is political, then does that mean that nothing is specifi cally po-
litical, as some commentators seem to fear (Eagleton 2000)? Is there any difference 
between offering a political analysis of a situation and a non-political one?
This, once again, is a highly controversial area to which several whole books 
could be devoted without exhausting the range of possible positions. However, it 
is also a debate within which this book will have to take a tentative position before 
it can proceed any further. For the sake of argument, then, I am going to propose a 
distinction between two levels of political engagement: the political and the micro-
political. With the phrase micropolitical, I am referring to that level of interaction 
at which all relationships (even those between non-human entities such as animals, 
plants or even, arguably, sub-atomic particles) might be described as political insofar 
as they can involve relative stabilisations, alterations, augmentations, diminutions 
or transfers of power. At the level of human culture, for example, even such a lo-
calised and historically insignifi cant incident as a university deciding not to offer a 
degree course in modern French might be understood as the outcome of micropoliti-
cal processes involving confl icts, disagreements and decisions over the allocation 
of resources, or the relative prestige attributed to different disciplines within the 
university, and so forth.
In the next two chapters, I am going to use the term politics, on the other hand, 
in the more widely understood sense of the general fi eld of public contestation be-
tween identifi able and opposing sets of ideas about how social relationships should 
be ordered. Politics in this sense is the sphere in which social movements, political 
parties, large-scale ideologies and powerful institutions (such as governments and 
corporations) struggle to determine the outcomes of the big questions about what 
kind of societies we want to live in. In this sense, the struggle to keep open our 
university French department would only be political to the extent that it located 
itself in a wider context of struggles against public service cuts, ‘dumbing down’, 
xenophobia, or something beyond the immediate career concerns of its staff. I could 
use the term macropolitics for this level of engagement instead, and it might be more 
accurate, but it would sound clumsier and take up more space. Now, the relationship 
between these two levels is clearly unstable and at times conceptually  problematic. 
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For example, if we take to extremes the molecular perspective associated with think-
ers such as Gabrel Tarde, Michel Foucault and Félix Guattari, then we can argue that 
all political processes are simply the aggregate outcomes of micro-political ones—
so, for example, elections which produce changes in government are only really the 
outcomes of millions of individual decisions over how to cast a vote—and as such it 
is micropolitics which is really important and really worth paying attention to. How-
ever, I don’t think that any writer (certainly not these three) has ever actually taken 
such a simplistic view. Were they to do so, it would be possible to reply to them that 
it is only once certain micropolitical processes coagulate into political ones that they 
take on any wider historical importance (so, for example, no one cares how particular 
individuals voted and it doesn’t matter: what matters is who got elected and what 
they will do).
Of course, in fact, the two perspectives are clearly not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. On the one hand, we can say that micropolitical processes are fundamentally 
constitutive of all social reality (and perhaps all material reality; Delanda 2006); on 
the other hand the (macro) political outcomes of those processes can go on to have 
real and concrete effects in their own rights and to condition the contexts within 
which further micropolitical processes take place: so while it is true that the outcome 
of the election is the result of millions of individual decisions, those decisions are 
taken in the context of the consequences of the policies pursued by the existing gov-
ernment, whose election was itself a macropolitical outcome of prior micropolitical 
processes, and so on, and so on . . . Of course, there is nothing at all original in this 
understanding, which is arguably identical to Marx’s famous assertion that people 
‘make their own history, but they do not make it . . . under circumstances chosen by 
themselves’ (Marx 1934, p. 10).
We will return to some of these issues later. For now, it is important to be clear 
that what we are going to be looking at in the fi rst part of the book is the relation-
ship between cultural studies and politics. I suggest that the core tradition of cultural 
studies has derived great dynamism from its relationship to wider political contests 
outside the academy; not merely from its micropolitical endeavours to open up new 
disciplinary spaces within the academy (as valuable as they may be in their own 
right) but from relationships to wider political contests.
I should be clear that I am not trying to establish a moral hierarchy between these 
different types of engagement, rather I would like to make a useful (if necessarily 
unstable) conceptual distinction. Effective micropolitical interventions are clearly 
more useful than empty political gestures. Finally, I would add that many of the 
types of engagement which I am here designating micropolitical might also be un-
derstood as not political but nonetheless ethical engagements. In this, I am perhaps 
in agreement with Joanna Zylinska’s recent suggestion that much of cultural studies’ 
practice has always been primarily ethical rather than political (Zylinska 2005). In 
another register, the level of analysis that I am designating ‘micropolitical’ might 
be called ‘ecological’ (Guattari 2000; Fuller 2005), insofar as it is often concerned 
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with the symbiotic dynamics of relatively discrete systems. Such analysis is clearly 
extremely important, even where it has little to say about the relationship between 
those discrete systems and wider formations of power.
So I am not saying that politics is more important than micro-politics or ethics or 
ecology. I am not saying that any intellectual project that aspires to real radicalism 
has to engage with politics as conventionally understood. I am not saying that at all. 
My only contention is that the relationship between cultural studies and politics is 
worth thinking about.
Having thought through some of these preliminary terms, the next two chapters 
will look at the history of the relationship between cultural studies and politics. The 
story of cultural studies is very well known. Whether we think of it as an academic 
discipline, a looser tradition of ideas and texts, a particular methodology, a political 
project or movement, or a vague name for almost any kind of contemporary work 
in the humanities and social sciences, there already exist numerous accounts of its 
emergence and subsequent history. What is interesting is that the widespread shared 
account of cultural studies’ emergence and development tends to stress the impor-
tance of the macro-political context and the political commitments of the key partici-
pants to the early formation of the discipline but tends to pay less and less attention 
to this set of issues as it brings its attention closer to the present. Cultural studies is 
generally seen as emerging from the context of the British labour movement and the 
New Left in the 1950s but tends to be depicted as evolving increasingly according 
to its own endogenous logic as it developed as a discipline, especially after the late 
1970s (e.g. Lee 2003). The main purpose of the following two chapters is to correct 
this emphasis, examining the development of cultural studies up to the present in 
terms of the ongoing relationship between its disciplinary formation, the various 
micropolitical interventions which constituted it, and the political context in which 
they occurred.
– 11 –
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A Political History of Cultural Studies, 
Part One: The Post-War Years
Cultural Studies and the Labour Movement
Cultural studies fi rst emerged as a recognisable discipline in England at the end of 
the 1950s, with the publication of a number of key works. In their very different 
ways, these books were all concerned with questions of class, creativity, culture, his-
tory and power, and of the complicated relationships between different elements of 
social life. Richard Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy (1957) and Raymond Williams’s 
Culture and Society (1958) were closely followed by Williams’s The Long Revolu-
tion (1961) and E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class (1963). 
All of these emerged partly from the climate of discussion and commentary around 
journals such as New Reasoner and Universities and Left Review in the late 1950s.
This context was itself the product of a complex interaction between a number 
of different intellectual and political tendencies of the time. In particular it emerged 
out of the work of scholars, both as teachers and writers, who were working at the 
boundaries between formal higher education and institutions and organisations 
strongly associated with the British labour movement. Specifi cally, they were in-
volved with the movement to provide education for working-class adults who had 
not had the opportunity to experience higher education, a phenomenon which was 
widely understood as one element of the broad project of the labour movement to 
establish institutions and forms of self-organisation which could improve the lives of 
working people, either through expanding public, state-funded institutions—the core 
elements of the so-called welfare state—or through forms of autonomous collective 
provision by working-class organisations. It’s worth noting at this stage that the mid-
dle decades of the twentieth century saw a general tendency for working-class political 
movements—socialism, communism and their many variants—to move away from 
the tradition of autonomous self-organisation (that had produced institutions ranging 
from the cooperative retail societies of the United Kingdom to the workers’ councils 
of revolutionary Russia), towards a strategy focussed on expanding centrally con-
trolled universal state provision of a whole range of services, from education and 
health to transport and energy supply, and state control of a range of key industries. 
On a very small scale, cultural studies emerged in the space in between these two 
traditions of working-class political activity. On the one hand, many of its early 
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practitioners were involved with the Workers Educational Association, a democratic 
organisation funded largely by trade unions and dedicated to providing a range of 
education to working-class people. On the other, many of them were involved with 
the extramural departments of leading universities; those departments set up in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to meet the growing demand that people 
from outside the traditional professional and aristocratic elites be given access to 
some form of university education (Steele 1997).
Despite how politically different the Workers Educational Association and the 
extra-mural departments were from one another, they tended to be staffed by teachers 
motivated by similar political, ethical and pragmatic commitments. In fact many teach-
ers worked for both groups. Their commitments involved not merely extending the 
opportunity for working people to access the same kinds of education as their more 
privileged peers but also developing new types of curriculum in the humanities which 
would be relevant to their experiences and which were informed by the socialist values 
which teachers and students in these contexts were presumed to share. This involved 
not only transferring the established university curriculum into new contexts but also 
interrogating the established boundaries and values of that curriculum. It has now be-
come rather commonplace to observe that so-called humanities curricula have tended 
to promote the values and achievements of privileged elites down the ages (Williams 
1977; Bourdieu 1986), but in the 1950s, when the received wisdom still held that the 
job of humanities scholars was to preserve a ‘Great Tradition’ (Leavis 1948) of ‘the best 
that has been thought and said’ (Arnold 1960), this itself was a highly subversive sug-
gestion. The idea that, instead of simply reproducing the assumption that bourgeois 
high culture was self-evidently superior to the rest of the surrounding culture, and was 
inherently worthy of study for that reason, one might undertake a less hierarchical 
study of that culture as a whole or in different manifestations, a study which looked at 
the relationships between cultural, social and economic practices from a perspective 
informed by the egalitarian and collectivist values of the labour movement, emerged 
as a critique of those assumptions relevant this specifi c situation. It was this idea that 
eventually gave rise to cultural studies.
The point that I want to draw attention to here is that for all of its micro-political 
novelty and innovation, what marked cultural studies as different from other such 
interventions, and what has lent its story a certain heroic glamour ever since, was the 
fact that its disciplinary, pedagogic and intellectual innovations were all informed 
and motivated by a clear commitment to the political objectives of the British labour 
movement. Now, this on its own is a fairly uncontroversial statement. Things start 
to get more complicated, however, as soon as we have to address two facts. Firstly, 
there is the fact that the so-called British labour movement was never a singular 
homogenous entity, and it clearly never had a single coherent set of objectives. Sec-
ondly, there is the fact that most of the key fi gures responsible for the emergence 
of cultural studies were actually committed to one quite specifi c project within that 
movement. Let’s try to deal with these one at a time.
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Firstly, the British Labour movement. Of course, no movement is ever really 
homogenous, and movements of all kinds are often made up of a number of quite 
different and at times mutually antagonistic traditions and groupings bound together 
by diffuse and weakly defi ned goals. Comparatively speaking, the British Labour 
movement since the early twentieth century has been fairly easy to pin down as a 
recognisable entity with clearly defi ned parts, as British labour politics has been 
characterised by an unusually tight relationship between trade unions and a single 
political party. The Labour Party was created by the trade unions and a number of 
socialist societies during the fi rst decade of the twentieth century and to this day 
has been the only political party which any major union has offi cially supported 
(apart from the National Union of Mineworkers, which briefl y supported the Social-
ist Labour Party of Arthur Scargill), while continuing to rely on the trade unions for 
fi nancial support. Of course, at any time during that period, there have been vast 
differences between the political and practical agendas and aims of different sections 
of the labour and socialist movements, and the offi cial aims of the Labour Party have 
also changed drastically over time. For example, in 1983 its aim was to establish a 
socialist Britain, independent of the United States and Europe, in which a democratic 
state controlled the commanding heights of the industrial economy. By 2005 its aim 
was to equip Britain to face the rigours of global competition by subjecting as much 
as possible of social life to the competitive logic of market economics and by effec-
tively dismantling the public sector altogether. Yet at each of these moments there 
were voices to be heard within the party supporting the agenda which dominated at 
the other moment. Despite these differences, at any given instance, the vast majority 
of socialists and trade unionists in Britain have been members of organisations which 
offi cially subscribed to the stated values and nominal objectives of the Labour Party 
at that time.
In the 1950s—although there was just as much fi erce disagreement between dif-
ferent sections of the left as at any other time—it is worth bearing in mind that the 
vast majority of its partisans would have subscribed to a particular set of assump-
tions that today would be regarded as highly marginal, and extremely left-wing. 
Almost all of them would have agreed that capitalism is a social system with an in-
herent tendency to generate social instability and inequality which has to be reigned 
in by democratic institutions. Indeed, even many politicians of the mainstream right 
would have agreed with this view at the time. People of different political persua-
sions would have disagreed on the question of whether the regulation of capitalism 
by democratic institutions should mean simply regulation of certain key areas of 
industrial policy by civil servants, gradual extension of public ownership over more 
and more of areas of economic life, establishment of new kinds of cooperative con-
trol of core services such as housing and manufacturing (intended gradually to dis-
place the old, hierarchical systems typical of industrial capitalism), or revolutionary 
overthrow of the bourgeois state and the creation of a soviet republic. While most 
would have agreed that capitalism was a great source of economic and technical 
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progress and innovation, those who did not regard it as also, basically, a problem, 
to be dealt with by institutions composed of or representing the wider community, 
were at that time in a tiny minority. Thinkers like Hayek and Friedman who were to 
become so infl uential after the 1970s had no infl uence at all at this time. A power-
ful tradition within British conservatism had itself always been rather sceptical as 
to the value of unregulated capitalism, recognising the threat that it posed to social 
order, aristocratic privilege and the security of the poorest people. This tradition was 
represented in the twentieth century by those so-called One Nation Conservatives, 
who took the reforming Victorian prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, as their model, 
and this strand was dominant within the Conservative party from the 1940s until the 
late 1970s. Mainstream sections of the Labour Party, therefore, were not considered 
terribly extreme when they expressed the fi rm conviction that the long-term goal 
of their movement was to replace capitalism altogether with a social system in which 
the means of production, distribution and exchange were collectively owned, as the 
constitution of the Labour Party continued to state until 1995, even though the right-
wing of the party wanted to abandon this commitment from the 1950s onwards.
What all this means for us is that we can say with some confi dence that as partici-
pants in the labour movement who were clearly not supporters of its extreme right 
wing, the pioneers of cultural studies all shared a very broad but very profound set of 
political beliefs and objectives which assumed the basically destructive, exploitative 
and undemocratic nature of capitalism, in particular its tendency to undermine all 
forms of community; and that the historic mission of the Labour movement was to 
replace it with a socialist democracy within which collectivist and democratic values 
would dictate the direction of future development. It was the desire to work through 
the implications of these assumptions for scholarly and pedagogic work in the hu-
manities which was really the founding impulse of cultural studies, and which has 
had a profound infl uence on its development ever since.
Cultural Studies and the New Left
More than this, however, most of the early cultural studies writers were committed to 
a particular set of ideas about the direction which leftist politics in Britain and in the 
rest of the world ought to take and the values which ought to inform it. Indeed, sev-
eral of these fi gures had a signifi cant profi le within the wider intellectual left which 
was by no means dependent upon their status as pioneers of cultural studies (which it-
self would not be fully recognised as such until at least the 1970s). It was as members 
of the so-called New Left, as much as innovators of a new fi eld of scholarship, that 
fi gures such as Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall and E. P. Thompson would come to 
prominence. The stories of the New Left and of cultural studies are so intertwined 
that they are often thought to be just one story about one thing. My contention will 
be that they are not. In fact, we can only really understand the complex relationship 
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between them, which was the defi ning relationship in shaping the political character 
of cultural studies until well into the 1990s, if we can conceptualise them as related 
but distinct entities.
So what was the New Left? Well, once again this is a term we have to be careful 
with, as it has been used in slightly different ways over time and rather differently in 
the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the fi rst group to be identifi ed 
with this label, the grouping that is now sometimes referred to as the First New Left 
(Kenny 1995), was a small number of intellectuals of two generations who coalesced 
around the journal New Left Review, founded in 1960 out of the merger of New Rea-
soner (edited by E. P. Thompson) and Universities and Left Review (of which Stuart 
Hall was one of the editors). Exactly how far these intellectuals represented anything 
but themselves and how far they were articulating the concerns and aspirations of a 
whole new generation of left-wing citizens is a matter for historical debate, which it 
is impossible for us to address with any authority, although we can say that at certain 
points in its history the New Left did seem to be broadly in tune with upcoming and 
infl uential strands of the wider political left. What is important for us at this stage is 
that they had a fairly specifi c and coherent set of ideas about what political course the 
organised left and its supporters should follow, and these ideas directly related to the 
values and priorities which they brought to the nascent discipline of cultural studies 
(Dworkin 1997). To understand these values and priorities, we have to understand 
the situation in which they emerged.
After the Russian revolution of 1917, the overriding fact shaping left politics 
across the world had been the existence of a nominal workers’ state in the USSR, 
governed by a communist party supposedly committed to world-wide proletarian 
revolution; a party which also commanded the second most powerful military ma-
chine in the world. The USSR had suffered losses and hardships during the Second 
World War compared to which even the ordeal of the British people seemed mild, 
and the military organisation of the Red Army was without question one of the key 
factors in the global defeat of fascism. Despite this, both before and after the war, 
the USSR had been subject to ongoing pressure from the great capitalist powers such 
as the United Kingdom and the United States, pressures which included military 
intimidation, economic embargoes and the political harassment of communist sym-
pathisers in those countries. It had always been claimed by anarchists, by followers 
of the exiled former Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky, and by liberal and right-wing 
opponents of the USSR that Stalin had built a horrifi c totalitarian regime instead of 
a workers’ paradise, but many dismissed this as propaganda. For many on the left, 
therefore some kind of loyalty to the USSR was a sine qua non of any effective radi-
cal politics. In countries like France, Italy, China and many others, the largest party 
of the left was the Communist Party, offi cially affi liated to the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union. Even where the Communist Party was small, as in the United 
Kingdom, it was the natural home for many activists, trade-unionists and intellectu-
als who saw the more moderate socialist parties (such as the Labour Party) as too 
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willing to compromise with capitalists, liberals, conservatives and US imperialism 
to be able to bring about lasting and far-reaching social change.
In the late 1950s a number of developments converged to change this situation. 
Most famously, in 1956, the USSR both offi cially admitted the extent of state ter-
ror under Stalin (who had died in 1953) and suppressed a democratic revolution 
in Hungary against single-party communist rule (a revolution supported by many 
Hungarian communists). These fi nal proofs of the extent of Soviet militarism and 
authoritarianism permanently damaged the credibility of the communist movement 
in the West and led many to leave the communist parties. At the same time in Britain, 
a new kind of political movement was becoming the focus of activity for many 
middle-class activists and young people. Founded in 1958, the Campaign for Nu-
clear Disarmament was an organisation which attracted support from many sections 
of society and which sought to use peaceful but high-profi le forms of protest to turn 
public opinion against the stationing of nuclear missiles in Britain; its supporters were 
not drawn from any one political party or social group. The Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament sought to withdraw Britain from the cold war military confl ict between 
the United States and USSR, in which Britain was clearly on the side of the United 
States in allowing US military bases to be located on the British mainland, but it also 
opposed the militarism of both the US and Soviet states. In this, it was largely moti-
vated by an ethical, humanist critique of both American-led industrial capitalism and 
Soviet authoritarianism (Taylor 1988).
Another great event of 1956 was the Suez crisis: the botched attempt by France, 
Israel and Britain to take control of the Suez canal, which had recently been nation-
alised by the left-leaning Egyptian government and was a strategically crucial route 
for shipping in the region. This is often remembered as the moment when the reality 
of post-Imperial geopolitics was brought home to the former Great Powers of West-
ern Europe: France and Britain were thoroughly humiliated when it became apparent 
the United States would not back their plan and that as such it could not succeed. 
However, this was only one moment in the traumatic history of de-colonisation. The 
Algerian War was raging at this time: the experience of colonialism in Algeria and 
the French government’s determined and bloody attempt to retain control of this 
colony would leave its mark on a generation of Parisian intellectuals (Foucault, Der-
rida, Lyotard, Bourdieu), not to mention Frantz Fanon, the godfather of postcolonial 
theory; all of whom would later become important infl uences within cultural studies. 
At the same time, the post-war period saw the fi rst great wave of migration from the 
former colonies to the United Kingdom, bringing with it, amongst others, a young 
Stuart Hall from Jamaica to Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship. The questions of na-
tional identity, neo-colonial power and racism which the break-up of the old imperial 
system raised could not always be answered within the terms of traditional socialist 
thought, and this would provide a powerful impetus to the emergence of a new set of 
political sensibilities. At the same time as all this, the dynamics of class and culture 
within British culture were clearly changing in unexpected ways. The emergence of 
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a consumer society and a comprehensive welfare state radically altered the condition 
of working-class people, changing the very meaning of working class, while the im-
pact of American cinema, music, fashion and television on different sections of the 
population was provoking visible forms of cultural change which could not be easily 
dismissed as superfi cial or short-term.
This was the context which produced the New Left, which consciously sought 
to distance itself from both the communist tradition and the increasingly institution-
alised and ineffectual mainstream labour tradition (the British Labour party, having 
won a historic victory in the 1945 general election which is still widely seen as hav-
ing transformed Britain for good, had completely failed to build on this success, and 
was out of power for 13 years between 1951 and 1964). In particular this involved 
the investigation of socialist ideas from outside these traditions: the members of the 
New Left tried to break the hold which Soviet communism had had on the imagina-
tion of the radical left for decades by excavating the history of native radicalism in 
England, and by looking to the ideas of those communists who had been marginalised 
and suppressed by the dogma of Stalinism. Williams and Thompson both turned to 
the legacies of English radicalism—most notably the utopian, proto-ecological writ-
ings of the English socialist William Morris—for inspiration, and Hall and others 
would soon begin to take an interest in the writings of continental thinkers such as 
Gramsci, Lukacs, and Lucien Goldmann (Dworkin 1997). In many ways these twin 
impulses—to fi nd elements of radicalism in one’s own culture that could be built on 
in the future, and to discover those radical philosophers from other places and times 
who might have been neglected—have driven the development of cultural studies 
and cultural theory ever since.
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies
The fi rst key institutional moment in the story of this development is the founding 
of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in 
1964. The fact that the centre was founded, and the term cultural studies was coined 
by Richard Hoggart, is signifi cant for our story here. Hoggart is normally cited along 
with Williams and Thompson as one of the three founding fi gures of cultural studies. 
Hoggart was never clearly identifi ed with the New Left—although it was he who em-
ployed Stuart Hall as a researcher in the new centre—and his classic work, The Uses 
of Literacy, was informed by a far more conservative concern to preserve elements of 
British working-class culture than was that of Williams and Thompson, with whom 
Hoggart shared a general identifi cation with labour politics but not the intellectual 
and political ambition that was to characterise their interventions. Without Hoggart, 
there would have been no cultural studies, but his long-term infl uence on the disci-
pline has been less than that of either Thompson or Williams, arguably because his 
infl uence was restricted to the micropolitical context of the university and had no 
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substantial relationship to a wider political context. Incidentally, 1964 also saw an 
important publication by Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel: The Popular Arts (Hall & 
Whannel 1964) was a ground-breaking study of the new popular culture which cin-
ema, popular publishing, the recording industry and broadcast media had made pos-
sible. The study argued for educators to make discriminating but sympathetic forays 
onto the much-derided landscape of so-called mass culture.
The wider political context itself changed dramatically in 1964. Three years after 
the youthful liberal John F Kennedy was elected US president and the oral contra-
ceptive pill was introduced, the fi rst Labour government since 1951 was elected in 
the United Kingdom, the globalisation of Beatlemania occurred and a widespread 
expectation of further social and cultural liberalisation emerged (accompanied by a 
growing anxiety as to its degenerate and destabilising consequences). Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson was elected on a promise to modernise Britain rather than to imple-
ment democratic socialism, and while his government did introduce some lasting so-
cial reforms, it was a disappointment to the radical left before it had even been elected 
(Anderson 1964). Interestingly, Wilson himself was eventually to regard his own 
major achievement as having been the creation of the Open University, an innova-
tive adult-education institution using broadcast media and distance learning to make 
formal university qualifi cations available to a similar constituency to that previously 
catered for by the Workers Educational Association and the extra-mural departments, 
which would become the intellectual home of cultural studies in the 1980s. The 1960s 
also saw a major expansion of ordinary university provision and the creation of a 
generation of new universities (such as the universities of Essex and Sussex), which 
would come to be key centres of intellectual infl uence for the New Left.
In the United States, the term New Left is generally used by historians today to 
refer to the student radical movement which emerged in the wake of the Civil Right 
campaigns in the mid-1960s (McMillan & Buhle 2003). Centred around organisa-
tions such as the Student Nonviolent Co-ordinating Committee and Students for a 
Democratic Society (Gitlin 1987) inspired by black struggles and increasingly ap-
palled by America’s sordid intervention in Vietnam, this New Left was, like its Brit-
ish namesake, mainly based around clubs and groups based at universities. Arguably 
it was better organised and more numerous than its British equivalent, but at the 
same time it never developed the distinctive programme of theoretical innovation 
and political analysis which characterised the New Left in the United Kingdom and 
which came to overlap so strongly with the emerging fi eld of British cultural studies. 
However, what both versions of the New Left shared was a tendency to widen out 
the fi eld of political analysis and intervention from localised issues (the failures of 
the British state’s management of capitalism in the United Kingdom; the political 
marginalisation of black communities in the Southern states in the United States) to 
make broader critiques of systems of power, and a strong commitment to democracy 
against centralisation and hierarchy in their own organisations and in existing social 
institutions.
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1968
Despite such reforms and some very signifi cant measures to liberalise British cul-
ture, such as partially decriminalising both homosexuality and abortion, the Wilson 
government never initiated major changes to the socio-economic structure of Brit-
ish society, and to the dismay of that generation of activists motivated by Cam-
paign for Nuclear Disarmament, it passively supported the US war in Vietnam. By 
1968 it was clear that neither the New Left nor the emergent youthful counterculture 
was going to have any serious infl uence over its policies. Figures such as Williams 
were roundly ignored despite the wider impact of some of his publications. The new 
manifestations of youth culture were condemned and legislated against wherever 
they could not be directly co-opted. Wilson’s government offi cially honoured the 
Beatles in 1965 and the premier was very happy to be photographed with them, but 
this didn’t prevent the 1966 criminalisation of LSD or moves to shut down so-called 
pirate radio by the Labour government. In retrospect, then, it is perhaps no coinci-
dence that the researchers at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies began to 
take an interest in new forms of youth culture not long after the moment when the 
First New Left made one of its last coherent interventions into wider political debate. 
The May Day Manifesto (Williams 1968), published fi rst in 1967 and updated in 
1968, was essentially a long essay on the condition of the United Kingdom and the 
British left under Harold Wilson, edited by Raymond Williams and contributed to 
by fi gures such as E. P. Thompson, Stuart Hall and Terry Eagleton. Incidentally, this 
was not Williams’s fi rst foray into public politics. His book Communications (1966) 
concluded with a fascinating set or proposals for the reform and expansion of institu-
tions which could make a critical public culture possible and healthy, although he 
obviously had no more idea as to how they might be implemented than to hope that 
maybe a benign government would undertake to carry out his plans.
While the world of corporatist capitalism that the May Day Manifesto describes 
may have largely disappeared, the frustration of its authors with a Labour govern-
ment willing to deploy a hollow rhetoric of modernisation to justify abandoning 
egalitarian goals, and apparently serving the interests of capital unquestioningly, is 
depressingly familiar to anyone who lived through Tony Blair’s premiership. Inter-
estingly, however, the book is extremely vague about what the independent, vibrant, 
modern, democratic left that it would like to help will into existence might actually 
look like, and what tendencies in contemporary culture might feed and sustain it. 
The reader today comes away with little sense that the authors had a handle on the 
dramatic implications of the emerging trends of youth culture, the sexual revolution 
and the incipient crisis of post-war politics: it’s intriguing to note that several of its 
authors would spend much of the subsequent decades addressing these issues, one 
way or another, and that cultural studies as we know it would be the result.
The relationship between the May Day Manifesto and the more famous events of 
May 1968 is instructive. 1968 saw an international wave of often violent rebellions 
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against many elements of the prevailing order—from US imperialism to conserva-
tive university curricula—the most famous of which involved a national wave of 
strikes, factory occupations and protests against de Gaulle’s presidency and the en-
tire regime of corporatist capitalism in France in May of that year. While it was only 
in France that the famous events seemed to bring the country close to revolution, 
radical students in Germany, the United States, Italy, Mexico, Argentina and many 
other places engaged in sustained militant activity, sometimes in alliance with radical 
sections of the labour movement. In the United States, many felt anger and frustra-
tion at the assassinations of radical leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr and at the 
imperialist war in Vietnam, famously culminating in the riots which accompanied 
the Democratic national convention in Chicago. Even in prosperous and relatively 
sedate Britain, the wave of student protests against the authoritarianism of universi-
ties which had been building since 1966 took on new momentum, and the protests 
against the Vietnam war—most famously at the US embassy in Grosvenor Square, 
London—attracted tens of thousands. The authors of the May Day Manifesto, how-
ever, didn’t see this coming at all; in the words of Hall and Michael Rustin (two of 
its key authors): ‘It completely blew us away’ (Bird & Jordan 1999: 213).
Determining just what the signifi cance of 1968 was for global left politics and for 
the New Left and cultural studies is not a simple task, but there is no question that 
a great number of different histories converged to make that year into a symbolic 
landmark of immense importance. In the United States, this was the year when King’s 
assassination convinced many in the Afro-American community that there was no fu-
ture for peaceful politics, leading to the intensifi cation of black militancy represented 
by the emergence of groups such as the Black Panthers. At the same time it was the 
year of the emergence of the women’s liberation movement in the United States and 
the historic strike by women working at Ford’s Dagenham plant in East London that 
demanded equal pay with men. It was the year when those elements of youth culture 
which caught the media’s attention were not the peace- loving dropouts of Haight-
Ashbury or the fashion-butterfl ies of Carnaby Street but the revolutionary militants 
occupying the London School of Economics and protesting at the Miss America pag-
eant. At the same time, however, it also was the year when the clearest signs of an-
other new political force began to be seen in those countries. This was the year when 
the British Conservative politician Enoch Powell gave his notorious ‘rivers of blood’ 
speech, arguing that urban unrest could be the only result of black and white people 
living side-by-side in English towns. It was the year when Richard Nixon was elected 
to the US presidency on a promise to represent the ‘silent majority’ who supported 
the war, despised protestors and hippies alike, and espoused the ‘traditional’ values 
of American suburbia. In France, the revolution stalled and petered out, having been 
actively opposed by the Communist Party, who distrusted its anarchistic tone and the 
refusal of its partisans in the factories to submit to union discipline. In Prague, soviet 
tanks rolled in to crush a move towards democratisation, which had been led by the 
Czech communist leadership itself, in an awful repetition of the events of 1956.
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This convergence of events and their long-term consequences can be understood 
in a number of different ways, and any such assessment must look at 1968 from the 
perspective of what we know now about subsequent history. On the one hand, we can 
see at this moment the fi rst major manifestations of a range of political movements 
and projects which would have serious impacts on global society in the decades to 
come. Clearly, the opportunities which women and young people, and in many cases 
non-white people, have today for education on their own terms, for self-expression in 
many spheres of life, for different kinds of creative and fulfi lling work, would have 
been almost unimaginable in 1965, except to a few socialist visionaries, and many 
of these gains could not have been made without the utopian militancy for which 
the term 1968 has become a by-word. On the other hand, these things have not been 
won in anything like the way that the radicals of 1968 expected nor have they been 
won without considerable costs. Gains in opportunities for all have nor come about 
through a radical democratisation of the social democratic gains made in the middle 
of the twentieth century, and they have certainly not come about through the aboli-
tion of capitalist social relations. Instead, on the whole, they have come about in the 
context of a world-wide shift in the structures and patterns of capitalism itself, which 
has enabled people to live in far more diverse and fl uid ways than at any time in the 
past. This has produced a situation in which people increasingly relate to themselves, 
to each other and to all social institutions solely as autonomous individuals rather 
than as members of communities, families, identity-groups, national groups, classes, 
unions, genders, or anything else. In the process, many of the gains which the labour 
movement made in the middle of the twentieth century have actually been lost. It is 
often forgotten now, but the right to a steady job with predictable working patterns 
and a guaranteed income, which would enable someone to plan a family and to plan 
the course of their life, was one of the great prizes which working people fought 
for during this time and for a hundred years previously. The promise of the welfare 
state to eradicate poverty and insecurity for all citizens has been withdrawn in most 
advanced societies today. The very existence of a public sector and a public sphere 
not governed by the logic of the market in the media, in education, in the areas of 
healthcare and other types of social provision is under serious threat. The freedom 
which students demanded in May 1968 may have been won, but it often seems to 
have been won at the expense of any hope of a society based on values of social 
solidarity, equality and democracy.
It is clearly no coincidence that these changes have been accompanied by massive 
declines in trade-union membership, as industrial manufacturing has been largely 
relocated to those parts of the world where labour organisation is low, and so labour 
is cheap; by the collapse of Soviet socialism; and by a general decline of mass par-
ticipation in the political process, either through membership of political parties or 
through simply voting in elections (Crouch 2004). For many Marxists, the decline 
of social democracy and the wider crisis of democracy as such is a direct result of 
the defeat of the organised working-class in the developed world in the 1970s and 
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1980s. At its most pessimistic, this view can give rise to the observation that perhaps 
the Communist Party was right to oppose the students in France in 1968: for in the 
end, what did the radicals achieve in France or the United States or even the United 
 Kingdom but to frighten the majority of people into support for the nascent New 
Right, paving the way for the eventual victories of Thatcher and Reagan, and the 
all-out assault on the left that they would make? From this perspective, the so-called 
68-ers may have temporarily believed themselves to be anti-capitalists revolu-
tionaries, but in fact they were merely the harbingers of a more advanced form of 
unregulated, consumer-led capitalism in which every demand for diversion and self-
 gratifi cation could be met (many of the slogans of the French students demanded 
‘fun’ and opposed ‘boredom’), but in which the poor—a group which does not in-
clude very many university graduates—would still suffer as they always had.
A completely opposed view of the historic relationship between 1968 and the 
new form of capitalism which would emerge in subsequent decades is that associated 
with the Italian autonomist school of Marxists, the most famous of whom today is 
Antonio Negri. Negri’s perspective is no doubt infl uenced by the fact that Italy was 
arguably one of the places where sustained militant activity by both students and 
workers had a long-lasting impact on political culture, unlike France or Britain, but 
his perspective is not a merely national one. For Negri, it is certainly true that a new, 
dynamic, innovative, fl exible form of capitalism emerged in the wake of 1968, but 
that does not mean that the militancy of that year was merely a harbinger of that new 
capitalism. Rather, it demonstrates that the success of 1968 was to force capital to 
change its modes of operation in order to meet the demands of students, women, and 
so forth; demands which the so-called offi cial labour movement and the communist 
parties were incapable of representing, incarnating, or making effective (see Negri 
1988: 235. I heard Negri make this case at its most forceful when he spoke at the 
2004 European Social Forum in Paris). In many ways this view is endorsed by the 
detailed researches of Boltanski and Chiapello (2005).
However, while this view is opposed to the preceding one in terms of its under-
standing of historical causality—of whether 1968 was the cause or the effect of a 
new kind of capitalism emerging—even Negri (who was eventually forced into exile 
by the right-wing administration which took power in Italy in the 1970s) would not 
argue that the period following 1968 was one of unqualifi ed success for progres-
sive forces. To take such a view, one would have to take up a position which was 
not allied in any way to the historic socialist project of the labour movement. Only 
an anarcho-capitalist, right-wing libertarian (e.g. Hoppe 1989) who cares nothing 
for issues such as equality, social solidarity, or the protection of the environment, 
could take such a position. There are people who do take such a position, drawing on 
rather perverse readings of philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze to support their case 
(e.g. Land 1992: 13), but they have nothing but antipathy for the New Left, the Old 
Left or any kind of cultural studies. At the same time, one can only regard 1968 as an 
unqualifi ed disaster if one takes a socially conservative view, be it from the right or 
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the left, which regards the advances made by women and young people since 1968, 
the proliferation of new cultural forms and experiments in lifestyle and social being, 
as damaging and destructive; either breaking down the traditional fabric of society 
or dissolving the solidarity and political discipline of the organised working class. 
Again, there are people who do take such views—many on the right, and a dwindling 
number in traditional communist organisations—but they have had no infl uence at 
all on cultural studies.
Taking neither of these positions, the politics which has informed different strands 
of cultural studies has all, one or way or another, had to deal with the fact that 1968 
represented both success and failure. It was a success in that it saw the emergence 
of a whole new set of democratic demands and utopian possibilities into the pub-
lic sphere which were never to go away and which were to have profound and 
worldwide social effects. What’s more, it is worth bearing in mind that the tone of 
these demands—which sought to escape from the formality and hierarchy of of-
fi cial socialism and soviet communism—was very much in keeping with the tone 
of Williams’s and Thompson’s advocacy of a bottom-up view of history, in which 
change can only occur under a radically democratic form of socialism rooted in the 
working-class traditions of co-operation and community organisation and a utopian 
vision of a future of creative fulfi lment for all. However, it was arguably a moment 
of failure in two ways. For the traditional left it was a disaster which arguably dem-
onstrated the redundancy of traditional Marxist politics and priorities: the offi cial 
Left had opposed the students and done little for the women’s movement, and had 
advanced into no new ground of its own as a result. The Soviet suppression of the 
Prague Spring was for many the fi nal confi rmation that the Russian Revolution had 
in fact ended in a totalitarian nightmare worse than the most brutal forms of capi-
talism. But it was also a moment of failure from the point of view of the emergent 
counterculture of hippies and radicals. A radical Democrat was not elected President 
of the United States: Richard Nixon was. In Britain, dock workers (thought to be 
in the vanguard of proletarian consciousness since the great London dock strike of 
1889) demonstrated in favour of Enoch Powell’s racist anti-immigration policies, 
and the Ford women did not win equal pay. There was no revolution in France: the 
fragile alliance of workers and students did not last into the summer, and the Gaullist 
right won the national elections later that year. In the several years that followed, the 
Vietnam war would continue, right-wing juntas would stage a wave of successful 
coups in South America, and the Italian left would be completely destabilised by 
a campaign of intimidation and harassment from the state and paramilitary forces, 
with left-wing leaders imprisoned or effectively exiled. None of this would have 
been possible if the new radicals had succeeded in winning over those sections of 
the populace who did not spontaneously share their view of the world. They did not, 
and more importantly, from a historical vantage point there does not seem to be much 
evidence that they tried. Instead, they simply asserted their ‘new’ vision loudly and 
proudly, at best hoping to unite different marginal strands of the culture, and they 
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were met with incomprehension, hostility and often violence by the state and the 
‘silent majority’.
What did come out of this moment was a much more widespread identifi cation 
with a politics akin to that of the New Left than had been visible before. Indeed, 
the term New Left came to be used in the United States to refer to the whole swathe 
of so-called new social and political movements—such as Women’s Liberation and 
in particular the radical student movement—and has been described persuasively 
by Katsiafi cas as a ‘World-Historic movement’ in the period from 1968 to 1970 
(Katsiafi cas 1987: 17–27). Ironically, just as this was happening, internal disputes 
at the house journal of the British New Left, New Left Review, led to a marked split 
between Williams and Thompson and a younger coterie of writers such as Tom Nairn 
and Perry Anderson who were more directly infl uenced by the austere philosophi-
cal rigour of French Marxist theorist Louis Althusser than by the English tradition 
of Romantic Humanism—a split which was severe enough for this younger group 
to come to be referred to as the second New Left. To make matters more confus-
ing, the term New New Left is sometimes used for this group of intellectuals and is 
sometimes used to refer to the entire generation of radicals who came of age in the 
later 1960s, especially in the United States. There is a considerable literature on these 
different developments, and the historical details need not trouble us too much now. 
From a wider historical perspective, I would argue that what the New, Old, First, 
Second, British and American New Lefts had in common was immeasurably greater 
than what divided them. They were all committed to radical social transformation 
informed by values that were at the same time libertarian and egalitarian, collectivist 
and pluralist. For all of these groups the idea of democracy as a key value and one 
which should be expanded and promoted in the social, economic and cultural spheres 
as well as the conventional fi eld of politics was axiomatic (Williams 1961: 332–43; 
Miller 1987: 23). They all defi ned themselves against the authoritarian collectiv-
ism of the Old Left and its tendency to place issues of economic equality above all 
others, against the social conservatism of the political right and the traditional left, 
and against the possessive individualism of the classical liberal tradition. As such, 
we can talk about the New Left as a discursive formation, or, in Williams’s terms a 
‘structure of feeling’ (Williams 1977), which was fi rst given public expression in the 
English-speaking world by Williams, Hall et al but which had an implicit resonance 
with much wider tendencies in the societies of the Western world. This resonance, 
however, did not form the basis for any real political victory.
The Left in Retreat
Despite its widespread resonances with various constituencies, the New Left never 
emerged as a coherent political movement, and historians only tend to designate 
it as such during the brief period of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament’s public 
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prominence in the United Kingdom at the end of the 1950s (Dworkin 1997: 45–78), 
or during the period of international activism around 1968 to 1972 (Katsiafi cas 1987). 
In some countries, actual political parties informed by the politics of the New Left 
emerged to play a role in public politics; most notably the German Green party. In 
small countries with long liberal and egalitarian traditions like the Netherlands and 
Denmark or in isolated politically advanced municipalities in the United States and 
the United Kingdom (such as London in the early 1980s; see Hall & Jacques 1989), 
the politics of the New Left had a clear impact on areas of public policy. For the most 
part, however, the New Left had little immediate impact on the sphere within which 
the political life of most people was shaped and lived; that of electoral politics, state 
institutions, national and international corporations and large-scale collective actors 
(unions, political parties, the mass media, etc.). As Katsiafi cas writes ‘the New Left 
proved itself incapable of consolidating a popular base’. Instead, the counterculture’s 
challenge to accepted norms contributed to a general sense of public disquiet 
emerging from the end of the historic post-war consumer boom, the fi rst rises in 
unemployment in the United States and United Kingdom since the 1930s, and a wave 
of anxieties over the urban politics of race in both of those countries (Hall, Critcher, 
Jefferson & Clarke 1978: 247–0). The result was not the realisation of utopia, but the 
widespread victory of the right in the early 1970s, a victory that would be consolidated 
at the end of that decade with the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 
There was a brief radical upsurge around 1973–4, when a wave of trade union mili-
tancy brought down the conservative UK government and the United States was fi nally 
forced to withdraw from Vietnam, but the broad trend was inexorably to the right.
This is the context in which cultural studies developed, during its most famous 
period of institutional consolidation and intellectual innovation; the period of Stuart 
Hall’s leadership of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in the 1970s. This 
story is normally told in terms of the internal development of the Centre for Contem-
porary Cultural Studies’s theoretical understanding of culture and ideology via the 
engagements of Hall and others with the work of Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas, 
and the break between the culturalist humanism of Raymond Williams and the struc-
turalism of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (e.g. Lee 2003: 73–107). 
However, looking at this work and its most potent results from a historical vantage 
point, the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies now looks like a 
logical response to the historic failure of the New Left(s) to win the wider public 
battle of ideas, despite some spectacular short-term achievements. For it was at just 
this moment that intellectuals of the New Left seem to have been looking back to that 
other great moment of left-wing defeat, the 1930s. The Western Marxist tra dition had 
produced its fi rst great theorisations of ideology and culture at that time, in the wake 
of the defeat of the communist movement by fascism in much of Western Europe. It 
was in exile from Hitler’s Germany and in an Italian fascist prison cell that Adorno 
and Gramsci respectively developed the fi rst fully developed bodies of work on the 
politics of culture written from a socialist perspective. Despite their very different 
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conclusions, both were to some extent motivated by the same question: how had the 
barbaric forces of fascism won the battle for hearts and minds and why had the com-
munists lost it? Whether or not they were conscious of any such motivation, it seems 
logical now to conclude that at some level, it was the defeat of the radical promise 
of the 1960s which was motivating some of the most creative minds of the British 
left to reactivate this tradition in the 1970s, translating Gramsci into English for the 
fi rst time (some short texts had been translated in the 1960s) and engaging with those 
more contemporary continental thinkers who seemed to be in the same tradition, 
such as Louis Althusser.
To understand the relationship between this political context and the internal evo-
lution of cultural studies, it is worth refl ecting on how widespread the turn to Gramsci 
was in the 1970s. The English edition of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks was published 
by the Communist Party of Great Britain’s house publisher, Lawrence and Wishart, 
at a time when the political infl uence of the Communist Party of Great Britain within 
the labour movement was considerable (Andrews 2005: 105–77). Gramsci was 
widely read by large sections of the left and the labour movement at this time, and 
his infl uence was suffi cient that the man who came to lead the Labour Party between 
1983 and 1992, Neil Kinnock, would routinely cite Antonio Gramsci, an Italian com-
munist who died before he was born, as the greatest infl uence on his political thought. 
Gramsci did not only shape cultural studies; his thought infl uenced an entire genera-
tion of the British left in the 1970s and 1980s.
For the pioneers of cultural studies, Gramsci was pivotal to their evolving project 
to generate a new discipline for the study of contemporary culture. The ideas set out 
so allusively and often incoherently in his prison notebooks seemed at once to offer 
a more satisfactory theoretical framework for doing cultural studies than had been 
available before, and to offer justifi cation for the importance of cultural studies’ 
intellectual project to the wider left. Gramsci had worked as a journalist and news-
paper editor as well as a full-time political organiser, and in his notebooks he wrote 
explicitly about the value of undertaking a systematic study of contemporary popular 
culture with the aim of better understanding the political terrain of mass democratic 
politics and intervening in it more effectively. He argued that this was an important 
task for the left because it was only by winning the struggle to persuade large and 
various sections of the population to accept at least partially its view of the world 
that any political group could win enough support to effect social change. Gramsci’s 
description of the ‘war of position’, the metaphorical trench warfare which socialists 
would have to wage in advanced democracies, sounds rather like the battle between 
the counterculture of the 1960s, with its sympathisers in the media and educational 
institutions, and the conservative forces of the right. The observation that any group 
which hoped to win such a battle would not just have to create its own autonomous 
culture, but would also have to work on the terrain of popular culture as it already ex-
isted, must have seemed timely indeed in the mid-1970s, as the counterculture spun 
out into ever more extreme experiments in alternative living while fascists began 
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to attract signifi cant votes in local elections in Britain for the fi rst time since the 
1930s. (For a detailed if strangely grumpy account of the story of Gramsci’s recep-
tion within cultural studies, see Harris 1992).
Of course, Gramsci was not the only thing happening to cultural studies in the 
early and mid 1970s. The discipline was developing creatively in a number of di-
rections, marked by several key publications. Stan Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics (1972) was a pioneering work which prefi gured many of the later concerns 
of cultural studies across a number of different areas. In the long term, its infl uence 
was felt most by those researchers who tended more towards critical media studies 
than towards ethnography and social anthropology. Its suggestion that the mods and 
rockers—youth subcultural groups who were the object of considerable press atten-
tion in the mid 1960s—were largely media fi ctions has remained a touchstone for this 
current of thought. The collection edited by Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson Resistance 
Through Rituals (1976) was an innovative collection of work which also investigated 
the emergent phenomenon of youth subcultures, this time from a more anthropologi-
cal standpoint. Contrary to the caricature which some later critics of this work were 
to draw, the books’ authors never did romanticise youth subcultures as forms of re-
sistance to the dominant culture, but offered a very complex account of the structural 
dynamics and contradictions shaping the contexts into which subcultures emerged 
and to which they constituted responses. If anything, they were, by contemporary 
standards, excessively sceptical about the value of working-class or middle-class 
youth subcultures, operating as they were within a framework which still implicitly 
judged the value of such formations in terms of their potential contribution to the 
long-term project of working-class revolution. Having said this, they rejected any 
simplistic account even of the middle-class counterculture which merely condemned 
it for its complicity with emergent trends in capitalism (even while they recognised 
that complicity), acknowledging the problems which it—like working-class youth 
cultures—could pose for the dominant culture. Paper Voices (Smith 1975) was a de-
tailed textual study of The Mirror and The Express newspapers over several decades 
of the twentieth century, analysing the consistent assumptions about the readership 
which shaped the tone of both papers. Paul Willis’s Learning to Labour (1977) was a 
classic piece of detailed ethnography, examining the lives and attitudes of a group of 
working-class boys in their last years of school and considering the extent to which 
their values and expectations were conditioned to prepare them for lives as manual 
workers. Between them, these works demonstrated the wide range of methodologies 
and topical concerns which was to characterise cultural studies in the future.
The Structuralist Turn
At the same time, work at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies was pro-
foundly infl uenced by the widespread interest in structuralism. Broadly speaking, 
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this was a movement in thought which started from the work of the Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1916), and from his observation that linguistics itself could 
in the future come to be seen as merely one element of a wider science of signs, or 
semiotics. Saussure had revolutionised linguistics for many by arguing against the im-
portance traditionally accorded to philology, and for an approach to languages which 
studied them synchronically, as they functioned at one given moment rather than as 
they changed over time. Saussure’s attention to the underlying structures of languages 
as sign-systems, and his insistence that the relationship between signs (e.g. words) and 
their meanings was entirely arbitrary, with no natural ‘motivation’, had a profound 
infl uence on many thinkers during the twentieth century, especially in France. In the 
1960s and 1970s these ideas came to have a powerful infl uence on several strands of 
work in the Anglophone humanities and social sciences. In particular, they made it 
possible to study a range of cultural phenomena—from novels to advertisements to 
clothes—as ‘texts’, objects which were understood to be meaningful because they 
deployed particular systems of signs, while also insisting that the meanings of those 
texts were entirely a function of their location in a wider system of social meanings. In 
one stroke, this made it possible to analyse a vast range of cultural phenomena in use-
ful ways, and it also broke with the assumption that the meanings of texts were simply 
an expression of the intentions of their authors. Structuralism also often seemed to au-
thorise a kind of relativism which made it necessary to accept that social differences 
were socially and linguistically constructed, although the ethical dilemmas raised by 
that observation have never ceased to bedevil cultural studies ever since. Structural-
ism was infl uential way beyond the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, and it 
is important to remember that some of the most important works to appear at this time 
and were later to infl uence cultural studies were produced by writers not connected to 
the Centre. For example, Judith Williamson’s Decoding Advertisements (1978) com-
bined structuralist semiotics with Althusserian and Lacanian theory to offer detailed 
analyses of particular adverts and adverts in general. Williamson produced the book at 
Berkley, a long way from Birmingham, but was clearly working to a very similar 
agenda as the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies researchers. The structuralist 
psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan was central to the wider emergence of feminist cul-
tural theory: Laura Mulvey’s seminal essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ 
fi rst appeared in the journal Screen in 1975 (Mulvey 1989), offering a sophisticated 
theorisation of the place of women in the erotic economy of Hollywood fi lm. Like 
Juliet Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974), published the previous year, it 
proposed that Freudian ideas could be of great value to feminist analysis, contrary to 
the views of those feminists who saw in Freud only a patriarchal ideologue.
By the early 1970s, the generation of French radical thinkers who have come to 
be central to the development of Anglophone cultural theory (Derrida, Deleuze, Guat-
tari, Kristeva, de Certeau, etc.) were mostly reacting against some of the problems 
generated by post-war structuralism, and so these writers came later to be known in 
English-speaking world as post-structuralists. Several of the most important thinkers 
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of this period (Lacan, Foucault, Barthes) themselves moved away from the structural-
ism of their own work of the 1950s and 1960s. However, at institutions like the Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies, both structuralist and post-structuralist ideas were 
being absorbed at much the same time, and what emerged was really something in 
between, infl uenced both by the structuralist Marxism of Althusser and the structural-
ist semiotics of the early Roland Barthes and by the post-structuralist semiotics of the 
later Barthes and Julia Kristeva. In his accounts of the take-up of these ideas, Stuart 
Hall has stressed the issue of what it was that the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies researchers wanted to do with them. In particular, he has emphasised the 
importance for them of the idea of culture as a fi eld of ‘signifying practices’ which 
had some autonomy from each other and from the social and economic processes of 
the wider society. Signifying practices are activities by which groups and individuals 
make meaning, using whatever tools are available to them. So, for example, while 
the earlier work on youth subcultures at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Stud-
ies tended to see the emergence of groups like the skinheads as a social but uncon-
scious reaction to wider social changes, by the end of the 1970s Dick Hebdige (1979) 
was stressing the idea of style as a deliberate signifying practice whereby youth 
groups more-or-less consciously intervened in the social world of cultural signs. Hall 
has remarked on the difference between this approach and that found in the work of 
Raymond Williams, in which all aspects of a culture and a society are seen as related 
to all other aspects, to the extent that it becomes diffi cult to differentiate meaning-
fully between different elements of the social totality, or to locate sites of agency for 
specifi c groups or individuals (Hall 1997). However, the idea that this should mean 
a move away from considering the interconnected nature of cultural, social, political 
and economic phenomena was never part of Hall’s agenda. Indeed, as we shall see, 
the struggle to hang on to the idea that all such phenomena are connected, without 
reproducing a simplistic notion of totality, was to become one of the key tasks of 
cultural theory and cultural studies.
This is a crucial point for understanding the evolution of cultural theory. Con-
sider Hall’s stress on the importance of according some autonomy to ‘signifying 
practices’, as compared to Williams’s emphasis on social processes as constituting 
‘expressive totalities’ and belief that modernity could be understood as a coherent 
and broadly progressive ‘long revolution’. We can see a parallel here between Hall’s 
theoretical move and a growing political emphasis on the fact that social change 
often happens in complex, piecemeal, ambivalent and unpredictable ways. Such an 
approach required the refi nement of analytical tools which understand the relation-
ships between different elements of a culture as complex and unpredictable. I think 
that, consciously or otherwise, it was this realisation that was driving many of the 
theoretical innovations and appropriations of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies in the 1970s, just as it was to drive the major theoretical innovations of re-
lated theorists such as Lalcau and Mouffe in the 1980s. Most importantly, I think we 
should stress one point here. Once we come to see history and politics as complex and 
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 unpredictable, whatever side we think we’re on, it becomes very important to be able 
to think strategically about the nature of power relationships in any given situation 
and the possibilities for intervening in them. Broadly speaking, I would contend that 
most of the radical innovations in cultural and political theory which we will look at 
in this book, including the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies’s move away 
from Williams, have been driven by the need for democratic, egalitarian and libertar-
ian forces to formulate new kinds of political strategy in the wake of the failures of 
communism and social democracy and the emergence of new forms of capitalism, 
new ways of living, new political antagonisms and new potential solidarities.
New Movements, New Capitalism, New Right
Given this level of intellectual innovation, we can’t say that the New Left was entirely 
in retreat during this period. At the same time as the right was in the ascendant politi-
cally, the very continued existence of cultural studies in a publicly funded institution 
was testament to the localised successes of the New Left. Many believed that the 
‘war of position’ against capitalist hegemony would necessarily entail a ‘long march 
through the institutions’1 as more and more of the infl uential organs of civil society 
came under the infl uence of the Left. As such, bringing leftist perspectives to bear 
on scholarly work within the institutions was seen as in itself a contribution to this 
struggle, a struggle which the New Left saw as slowly bearing fruit as the agendas of 
some of the new social movements began to infl uence public opinion. By the end of 
the 1970s, for example, legislation outlawing discrimination on the basis of gender or 
ethnicity had been passed in the United Kingdom and in many countries around the 
world, which was clearly a great political victory in many ways.
Furthermore, the concerns and practices of cultural studies itself were radically 
transformed by the impact of the new social movements. Feminism, anti-racism 
and the public visibility of nominally political strands of youth culture brought a 
concern with power structures and social divisions other than those of class and 
political objectives other than those of simple social democracy to cultural studies. 
The key fi gures to emerge from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in 
the 1970s—such as Angela McRobbie, Paul Gilroy, Lawrence Gossberg and Dick 
Hebdige—all made their names taking up perspectives informed by feminism, by a 
concern with the politics of race and by an interest in the radical potential of youth 
culture, and much of the work done at the centre was informed by such concerns. 
For example, Women Take Issue (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies Women’s 
Studies Group 1978) was a ground-breaking collection which included theoretical, 
historical, literary, media-studies and ethnographic essays from a feminist perspective, 
although it also illustrates the theoretical dependence of the Centre for Contempo-
rary Cultural Studies on a broadly Althusserian framework at that time. The evolution 
of this perspective is well illustrated by the career of Janice Winship, whose Centre 
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for Contemporary Cultural Studies occasional stencilled paper ‘Woman becomes an 
 individual’ (1981) takes a mainly Althusserian approach to the ideological function 
of women’s magazines. By 1987 her book Inside Women’s Magazines adopted a more 
historical and refl exive approach while retaining a strong critique of the competitive 
individualism exemplifi ed by magazines such as Cosmopolitan. The politics of anti-
racism also had a clear impact. The Empire Strikes Back (Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies Race and Politics Group 1982) was a collection of essays deepening 
or inspired by the analysis of the popular racism pioneered in the earlier study Polic-
ing the Crisis (discussed in detail below). From a historical vantage point, however, 
perhaps the most signifi cant contribution to the multi-authored volume was one which 
made no reference at all to that analysis. Hazel Carby’s ‘White Woman Listen! Black 
Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood’ raised an explosive set of questions over 
the relationships between feminism, anti-racism and class politics which would set 
the tone for many debates over identity politics, the nature of political solidarity, and 
the problem of essentialism for much of the subsequent decade. Hebdige’s Subcul-
ture: The Meaning of Style (1979) was innovative in many ways, but most notably for 
its investigation of the importance of complex interactions between so-called black 
and white youth cultures in the post-war period, a harbinger of later anti-essentialist 
work on race and ethnicity. Overall, issues which had fi rst been raised publicly by the 
new social movements had become central to the work of cultural studies.
It’s important to note here that most people studying and practising cultural stud-
ies at this time would probably have regarded themselves as socialists and would 
have seen the limited social, cultural and politics gains made by women, non-white 
peoples and youth at this time as unlikely to be extended very far without major 
changes to the economic organisation of the society they inhabited. In this, they were 
descendants of the 1968 generation, as well as of the longer radical tradition which 
had fed into that moment. One of the animating beliefs was the assumption that 
the mono-cultural tedium, the gendered power relations and the marginality of non-
white people in post-war culture could only really be challenged by the overthrow 
of existing relations of production. The choice between taking up a liberal position 
which condemned all sexism and racism without challenging such economic struc-
tures, and a socialist position which argued for their necessary transformation, would 
probably not have seemed a very meaningful one to them.
In many ways, these assumptions were correct. Capitalism as it existed in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century could not deliver the opportunities for per-
sonal fulfi lment and public recognition that women and many other groups de-
manded. However, those who believed that an attack on the so-called traditional 
nuclear family, or the racist hierarchies of Western culture, was therefore also an 
attack on capitalism as such (and vice-versa) have turned out to have been deeply 
mistaken. In fact it was only the very specifi c form of ‘Fordist’ capitalism (Gramsci 
1971) which had been in place during the middle decades of the twentieth century 
which generated such a hierarchical and conformist culture, and it was about to be 
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displaced. The transformation of global capitalism in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s has 
created a world of fast-moving, highly differentiated markets and systems of pro-
duction which can accommodate a vast range of cultural differences and individual 
lifestyles, which the slow-moving corporations of the post-war economy, heavily 
dependent on national state institutions and typically centralised and hierarchical 
in structure, could not. The idea that serious inroads can be made against sexism or 
institutional racism in a society which is still resolutely capitalist is one which most 
post-war radicals, including the 1968 generation, largely discounted, but it is an idea 
which is today indisputable. Capitalism has shown that it can accommodate itself to 
the demands of women, non-white people, youth and so forth, by transforming its 
institutional and technological apparatuses but without altering its most basic pat-
terns of exploitation. The problem of coming to terms with this fact has turned out to 
be one of the great theoretical and political problems for the left (new or otherwise) 
since the 1970s. In many ways, in fact, cultural studies has always been nothing more 
or less than the attempt to come to terms with it (Grossberg et al. 1992: 277–86).
The other such problem has been its obverse: the rise of new forms of politics 
which are inherently hostile to the traditional aims of the left, be they communi-
tarian or libertarian, but which do not look or behave like the traditional forms of 
conservatism. We can broadly understand these in terms of two main developments. 
On the one hand, the decades since 1970 have witnessed the apparently inexorable 
rise of neoliberalism, a set of political ideas and practices which revives the core as-
sumptions of nineteenth-century liberalism: that the individual in competition with 
other individuals for resources is the irreducible unit of human experience; that the 
fi rst purpose of politics is to protect the autonomy of the private individual; that the 
right to accumulate, possess and dispose of property at will is the most fundamental 
right of such individuals; that the role of the state is therefore to ensure that nothing 
interferes with the capacity of private individuals to accumulate and enjoy property 
 (Harvey 2005). The political implications of this philosophy are far-reaching and 
include, for example: the assumption that governments should work to lower taxes 
wherever possible, even if that means cutting forms of welfare provision that promote 
social cohesion; the idea that high levels of public spending are justifi ed on institu-
tions like the police and the military which may be required to protect the capacity 
of individuals to enjoy their property unmolested; the idea that corporations (which 
should be recognised either as individuals or as temporary contractual collaborations 
between individuals) should be largely free to behave as they like; the assumption 
that trade unions should be severely restricted in the types of activity in which they 
are permitted to engage, none of which should infringe the aforementioned rights 
of property owners or corporations. At the international level, the implications of 
a highly developed neoliberal agenda have come to include the assumption that in-
ternational law should prevent national governments from interfering with the rights 
of corporations to pursue profi t within their own borders by such unfair means as 
maintaining a state monopoly over the provision of essential services like education 
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and water supply (Whitfi eld 2001). It is these ideas and policies which have been 
relentlessly pursued by successive US administrations and their allies at every level 
of government around the world, from small municipalities to the leadership of the 
World Bank.
The other key development has been the rise of new forms of authoritarian col-
lectivism, which have tried to promote one particular way of life to the exclusion of 
others. These so-called fundamentalisms include the right-wing Christian conserva-
tism which has grown into a major political force in the United States (Grossberg 
2005), the militant Islamism which now appears to pose the most immediate threat 
to peace and security in the West, the militarist Zionism which convinces millions of 
Israelis and their supporters around the world that they are justifi ed in their decades 
of oppression of the Palestinian people because God said that the land between the 
Nile and the Euphrates was theirs; the new forms of ethnic nationalism which tore 
apart central Europe in the 1990s; and the rise of Hindu nationalism in India. In 
many cases these tendencies derive in part from older traditions of social conserva-
tism and authoritarian populism, traditions which have undergone a parallel renewal 
in countries like the United Kingdom and France where, in particular, hostility to 
cultural change has crystallised around hostility to immigration. In other cases there 
are almost entirely unprecedented developments, as in the revolutionary Islam of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers.
At fi rst glance these two set of developments might seem to be logically contradic-
tory. On the one hand, neoliberalism tends to promote a general deregulation of most 
areas of social and personal life, the better to enable capital to pursue the invention 
of new commodities and new sources of profi t. The immediate policy goal of neo-
liberalism is generally the spread of market relations to as many spheres of human 
activity as possible, by modelling many kinds of social relations (such as those be-
tween workers and employers, between teachers and students, even those between 
members of families) on the relations between customers, traders and competitors in 
an open marketplace. Neither ancient traditions nor modern egalitarian ideals are of 
much use in encouraging the spread of market relations beyond the limited spheres 
in which they been have historically obtained. For example, immigration from poor 
countries to rich ones is a phenomenon which is directly encouraged by the global 
deregulation of both travel and labour markets, and will tend to produce the effect of 
both raising the real wages of immigrants while lowering the general cost of labour 
in the host countries. For neoliberal economists this is an all-round win-win situation. 
Conservative resistance to immigration is therefore not to be encouraged from such 
a perspective. Conversely, there is no reason for social conservatives to support an 
overall economic programme which, like that of neoliberalism, tends to disrupt the 
coherence of established communities. Nonetheless, in many cases since the early 
1970s, they have done just that. In some contexts, such as Iran, social conservatism 
has been linked to more predictable policies of state regulation of the economic as 
well as the social and cultural spheres. At the same time in the West there has always 
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existed a small minority of right-wing libertarian thinkers and politicians who have 
advocated free markets, low taxation and privatisation of public services along with 
such policies as the decriminalisation of drugs, the removal of restrictions on same-
sex relationships and the complete abandonment of all state censorship. However, 
the political force which emerged in the 1970s and which was to re-shape both na-
tional and world politics from its bases in the United States and the United Kingdom 
was one which combined social conservatism—using the machinery of the state to 
try to enforce social norms and police marginal communities (such as ethnic and 
sexual minorities)—with economic liberalism: slashing taxes and public- spending, 
deregulating fi nancial markets and restricting the activities of trade unions in a gen-
eral effort to lower labour costs for business (Grossberg 2005: 111–55).
Why these different policy agendas should have been brought together is an in-
teresting question. The perspective of classical Marxism is clearly useful in helping 
us to understand the neoliberal agenda, which represents on all points the traditional 
effort of the capitalist class to restrict wages and protect profi ts and property (Harvey 
2005). From a simple Marxist perspective, however, there is really no good reason 
for capital or its political representatives to advocate any kind of social conservatism. 
Such social changes as the entry of women into the labour market or the public rec-
ognition of same-sex relationships do nothing to reduce profi ts and in many cases 
help to generate them, by expanding the pool of workers competing for jobs and 
thus driving down wage bills, and by expanding the range of specialist services and 
consumer goods which can be marketed to specifi c social groups (from child-care 
services to gay-friendly taxi companies). Something more is therefore needed to 
explain the politics of the New Right than a simple idea of class interests. The most 
straightforward explanation is to follow the Marxist assumption that the political 
right, as it always has done, represents the interests of the powerful, and therefore to 
infer that the ruling groups in society must have something to gain from the promo-
tion of social conservatism above and beyond the simple accumulation of profi t.
This sounds simple, but its implications for radical theory in the 1970s and 1980s 
were profound. As soon as we acknowledge that power relationships in modern soci-
eties are not simply a matter of the class struggle between workers who want to maxi-
mise their wages and overall standard of living and capitalists who want to minimise 
wages and maximise profi ts, but involve other types of confl ict and antagonism as 
well, then our picture of those societies threatens to become vastly more complicated, 
and a whole set of new questions arise. Which power relationships are the really im-
portant ones? What are the relationships between different types of power? Is there 
any overall set of power relationships shaping society as a whole? These are the ques-
tions which radical political theory, inside cultural studies and beyond it, has been 
trying to address since the 1970s.
To understand the signifi cance of these questions, we have to understand the re-
liance of much radical thought on a general Marxist frame of reference during the 
twentieth century. Only the crudest and most dogmatic of so-called Marxists ever 
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thought that the struggle between labour and capital was the only one that mattered. 
It was clear from the late nineteenth century that the struggles of women and of 
colonised peoples and oppressed nations around the world could not be ignored or 
reduced simply to aspects of the class struggle. Nonetheless, a great deal of Marx-
ist and neo-Marxist theory in the twentieth century argued that prevalent forms of 
sexism, racism and homophobia were inextricably tied to the capitalist mode of pro-
duction. Hence, to struggle against these phenomena effectively it was necessary to 
join the class struggle on the side of the workers (possibly through allying oneself 
to communism) and, conversely, any real progress against these different forms of 
oppression had to be seen implicitly as progress by the working class itself. The 
exclusive attention to class, at the expense of other dimensions of social experi-
ence, in Marxist political theory until well into the 1970s effectively implied that all 
signifi cant social antagonisms could be reduced to facets of the class struggle. This 
was encouraged by a very strong tendency amongst social theorists of most political 
persuasions during the middle decades of the twentieth century to assume that the 
highly organised form of capitalism which emerged during that time was the logical 
form of advanced capitalism as such, an idea greatly infl uenced by Max Weber’s 
argument that bureaucratic rationality was, in effect, the dominant organisational 
paradigm of Western modernity (Weber 1947: 328–41). Together, these intellectual 
tendencies converged upon the assumption that advanced capitalism was a total sys-
tem that could only produce a stultifying and hierarchical culture and that any attack 
on any element of that culture was therefore an attack on capitalism itself. As we 
have already discussed, this set of assumptions could not survive the radical changes 
in the nature of how capitalism was practiced in the 1970s and 1980s, and it was in 
trying to make sense of the emergent politics of the New Right that the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies writers made some of the most signifi cant headway 
in grasping the nature of these changes.
The Emergence of Thatcherism
Arguably the most signifi cant piece of cultural studies ever produced was a book 
published by Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies researchers in 1978. Polic-
ing the Crisis—a volume co-written by Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John 
Clarke and Brian Roberts—remains a remarkable work. It begins as a study of the 
moral panic over mugging in the British press in the 1970s, observing that statisti-
cally, violent street robbery perpetrated by young black men against white victims 
had not undergone any kind of increase during this period, although the press were 
going to some lengths to create the impression that it had. Their attempts to explain 
why this should be the case lead the authors to offer an overall analysis of the crisis 
of the British state in the 1970s and the emergence of a political solution to this crisis 
from the right. Put very simply, the argument runs as follows. In the post-war period 
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countries like Britain arrived at a social settlement according to which labour mili-
tancy never escalated to the point of posing a serious threat to capitalism as such, in 
return for which labour was accorded major concessions: full employment, a welfare 
state, rising standards of living, and governments broadly committed to pursuing 
social justice and prosperity for all, whatever their nominal political character. How-
ever, that settlement was dependent upon very high profi t levels and relatively stable 
and predictable markets enabling such prosperity to be pursued without incurring 
major risks for capital. For a number of reasons (and economists are still debat-
ing exactly what they were: e.g. Brenner 2005) the profi tability of both British and 
American fi rms began to decline during the 1960s, and by the 1970s unemployment 
in those countries was rising for the fi rst time since World War II, as the traditional 
imperative of capital to lower labour costs was asserted.
The cumulative effect of this shift and the general decline of consensus as to what 
kind of society people wanted to live in amounted to a full-scale crisis for the post-
war settlement, a crisis whose outcome would be decided by political struggles be-
tween different political tendencies and class fractions to create large-scale coalitions 
of interests committed to implementing some particular new settlement. From this 
perspective, the greatest danger to capital and its profi ts was posed by the possibility 
that a confi guration of forces including the newly radicalised groups (women, youth, 
students, black people, gay people) and a well-organised labour movement would 
succeed in demanding a settlement which permanently weakened the power of capi-
tal to maxmise profi ts and suppress wages, probably through the further socialisation 
of large parts of the economy. Conversely, the great opportunity for capital was that 
it might be able to shed the constraints of the post-war settlement, to pursue its goals 
more effectively. In order to achieve this aim, it was necessary for a confi guration 
of social forces to emerge which included at least some of the elements which were 
in danger of being radicalised in the new political context, and which bound them to 
the new project of capital. It was therefore necessary for capital and its allies in the 
press and politics to try to win support from those sections of the working classes 
who had not already been radicalised by the new wave of trade union militancy to 
a view of the situation which would ensure that they were not so radicalised and 
would oppose the policies of those who were. That support was won by the invention 
and popularisation of a public narrative about what the nature of the crisis was and 
how it could be solved. Essentially, this narrative maintained that the crisis should be 
understood as a ‘breakdown of law and order’ provoked by uncontrolled immigra-
tion by so-called alien elements, excessive ‘permissiveness’ towards minority and 
youth cultures on the part of parents and the state, and irresponsible militancy on 
the part of trade unionists and radical political groupings, all of whom represented 
either narrow sectional interests or more sinister conspiracies to destabilise the social 
order (either in the name of sheer anarchy or in alliance with international commu-
nism). The creation of a panic around mugging—supposedly a sure sign of this social 
breakdown—was just one element of this emergent project.
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What Hall and his colleagues saw emerging, then, was a whole new political 
confi guration, within which a large section of the left’s traditional constituency—
 so-called ordinary working class people—would be persuaded to back a political 
agenda which included, amongst other things, the heavy use of the state’s repressive 
apparatus against their traditional representatives, the trade unions. This constitu-
ency had gained relatively little from the social liberalisation of the 1960s, most of 
the gains of which were being enjoyed by that new cohort of educated liberal pro-
fessionals which the 1968 generation had grown into. Many working-class people 
were experiencing the cultural upheavals which such liberalisation had produced, 
along with the effects of waves of non-white immigration and the loss of so-called 
traditional manufacturing jobs, as impositions which they had never asked for. At the 
same time, the broad economic context was one of clearly visible economic stagna-
tion throughout the 1970s, something for which the press and the political right were 
keen to blame the ‘greedy’ and ‘uncooperative’ trade unions, whose militancy was 
presented as a key cause of British industrial decline. This was the context in which 
Thatcher and Reagan came to power, and the means by which they put together a 
new social coalition to support them. Promising to restore a sense of national purpose, 
attacking trade-unionists at home and communists abroad, promising to limit im-
migration, restore traditional social values and lower taxes and public spending, this 
was a new political programme. In the United Kingdom, at least, the Centre for Con-
temporary Cultural Studies writers were among the fi rst on the left really to see what 
was happening, and they did it with a study that began by looking at a short-lived 
moral panic in British newspapers: a phenomenal achievement for cultural studies.
Importantly, it was the analytical framework offered by Antonio Gramsci which 
really allowed them to make the analysis that they did, and in the long term it was 
the success and prescience of that analysis which was one of the major reasons for the 
prestige which Gramsci would acquire on the anglophone left in the 1980s. Unlike 
most mid-century Marxists, Gramsci did not argue that the highly organised capital-
ism which he saw emerging in the 1930s was the only form that advanced capitalism 
could take. Rather, in his famous essay ‘Americanism and Fordism’, he analysed 
the social system being built in America as one very specifi c form of capitalism. 
Gramsci’s understanding of modern politics as characterised not simply by the class 
struggle, but by the struggle for hegemony (social leadership) between different class 
fractions and political groupings, enabled the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Stud-
ies writers to grasp the complexity of the crisis of the 1970s. It also gave them a 
keener sense than many of the scale of the task which would face the left if it wanted 
to defeat the New Right in a struggle for hegemony. It would be a long time before 
most of the British left woke up to just what that task would have involved. In Britain, 
very few on the left in 1978 realised just how bad the coming decade would be for 
them, and virtually none were prepared for the wholesale victory of the right when 
it came. When the Labour government was defeated by Thatcher in 1979 following 
a disastrous wave of pay disputes with public-sector unions, many believed that it 
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was that government’s capitulation to pressure from business, the press and interna-
tional fi nance to implement major cuts in public spending which was to blame. The 
Labour party therefore proceeded to elect the most radical and the least charismatic 
leader in its history, Michael Foot, and for the only time in Labour Party history, it 
went into the 1983 general election with a manifesto promising to implement a radi-
cal socialist programme. In the process it provoked the biggest internal split in its 
history, and performed so poorly at the ballot box that it seemed unlikely that there 
could ever be a Labour government again. The left had temporarily won control of 
the party, but they had failed dismally to win over the country, and indeed they ap-
peared to have lost sight of that objective altogether.
The disastrous consequences of this strategy were brought home a year later when 
the National Union of Mineworkers went on strike in protest against government 
plans effectively to run down the British coal industry. This resulted in the longest 
industrial dispute in British history. Armies of massed pickets clashed with police 
at coal mine pits for much of the year. While the right-wing press demonised the 
miners and their leader, Arthur Scargill, media celebrities, pop stars, intellectuals and 
thousands of ordinary people rallied to the miners’ cause, donating money and time 
to the infrastructure of the strike: a considerable achievement considering that up 
and down the country, miners’ families were without any regular income for much of 
the year. In the end, however, it was not enough. Support for the strike was far from 
unanimous and unequivocal, even from unions members and the Labour leadership, 
sections of the National Union of Mineworkers broke away from the unions, and 
eventually the strike was defeated: the miners returned to work without concessions 
from government. One of the obstacles to more widespread and intense support for 
the strike was Scargill’s outright refusal to hold a ballot of members to legitimate 
the strike, despite the fact that such a ballot would certainly have been won by sup-
porters of the strike. A highly orthodox Marxist–Leninist, Scargill regarded such an 
exercise as a distraction, an unacceptable concession to liberal notions of democracy 
at a time when revolutionary discipline demanded that the authority of the workers’ 
leaders be respected. Scargill’s determination to maintain the proletarian purity of 
the miners’ struggle, untainted by bourgeois ideals of democracy, did not win much 
support outside the ranks of the so-called hard left. Thus, in the wake of Thatcher’s 
1979 and 1983 election victories, the British left did not pursue a hegemonic project 
to win over new constituencies to its cause at all: instead it took the opposite line 
of asserting a political identity characterised by working-class militancy and radical 
socialism at a time when fewer and fewer members of the public had any concrete 
reason to identify themselves in such terms. It has simply never recovered from the 
comprehensive defeat that ensued.
Perhaps things could have been different had more attention been paid at that 
point to Stuart Hall and his colleagues. By the end of the 1970s he was refi ning his 
account of the emergent politics of the New Right into an analysis of the phenom-
enon which he was the fi rst to name Thatcherism. Hall was one of a number of voices 
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at that time, in various countries, arguing that the broad social changes accompany-
ing the decline of industrial manufacturing and the consequent erosion of support for 
the unions would permanently weaken the traditional labour movement. Along with 
such fi gures as the great communist historian Eric Hobsbawm and the political scien-
tist Andrew Gamble, Hall became at this time one of a group of writers contributing 
to the magazine Marxism Today. Technically the house journal of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain, Marxism Today came under the sway of that section of the 
party most infl uenced by Eurocommunism, a tendency in western European commu-
nist parties to reject Leninist orthodoxy and embrace more democratic and pluralistic 
forms of politics, partly under the infl uence of the so-called new social movements. 
A kind of belated rapprochement with the politics of 1968, Eurocommunism was 
closely associated with the policies of the Italian Communist Party and with the 
thought of its greatest icon, Gramsci (Andrews 2003). Under the editorship of Martin 
Jacques, Marxism Today came to be the most infl uential organ of ideas on the British 
left, with a readership that went well beyond the ranks of the Communist Party. It 
was a conduit for new thinking across a range of fi elds, from economics to cultural 
theory, but one overriding question informed the debates which it hosted: how could 
the left understand the defeat it had suffered since the 1970s, and what lessons could 
be learned from that defeat? The potential answers explored were various and often 
deliberately extreme, and in some cases amounted to a simple concession that the 
socialist project was redundant, but this was never the line pursed by Hall. It was 
through Marxism Today that Hall and some of his colleagues in cultural studies came 
to the attention of a much wider audience than radical sociologists and humanities 
scholars or readers of New Left Review, and Hall used that position to argue consis-
tently for a radical left politics which would try to engage with the broader sphere 
of popular culture, making alliances and connections between a range of existing 
constituencies and at time shedding its own shibboleths in order to acquire new sup-
port, making itself relevant to the new situation of post-industrial Britain. This was 
the politics of New Left cultural studies writ large. The best record of this moment 
is Stuart Hall’s collection of essays The Hard Road to Renewal (1988)—his only 
single-authored volume, intriguingly—which was mainly a set of political writings 
drawn from his contributions to Marxism Today and New Socialist magazines. It is a 
fascinating document of British left politics in the 1980s, as well as a unique collec-
tion of exemplary political analyses.
But what was happening to cultural studies itself at this time? As the decade 
turned, Birmingham remained a centre of innovation. David Morley’s The Nation-
wide Audience (1980) was a ground-breaking study of differential responses to a key 
TV news programme which was already clearly informed by a nascent post-Marxist 
perspective, stressing the importance of the political discourse in which particular so-
cial groups participated as conditioning their responses more dramatically than their 
class location understood in any simple terms. Culture Media Language (Hall, Hob-
son, Lowe & Willis 1980) was a diverse collection which demonstrated the growing 
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theoretical, topical and methodological scope of cultural studies, covering work on 
media, literature, linguistics ethnography and audience-studies. Interestingly, while 
the book contains refl ections on the changing institutional context of cultural studies 
and on the latest theoretical debates, it contains no reference to the broader political 
context or to the current state of those political and social movements which are the 
source of many of those ideas. As we have just seen, fi gures such as Hall, the edi-
tor of the volume, were to continue to focus their attentions on issues of immediate 
political concern: but the relationship between those and the wider work of cultural 
studies was changing as the left went further into retreat.
Note
1.  This phrase is usually attributed to Rudi Dutschke, one of the leaders of the West 
German radical student movement in 1968 and one of the founders of the 
West German Green Party in the 1970s.
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A Political History of Cultural Studies, 
Part Two: The Politics of Defeat
Into the 80s . . . 
It was at this time that Stuart Hall himself left the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies to work at the Open University, which in the 1980s became the key site for 
innovation and consolidation in the fi eld. The powerful cocktail of structuralist se-
miotics and Gramscian theory which the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
had mixed in the 1970s became the key paradigm for work across a range of fi elds at 
the Open University (e.g. Middleton 1990) while Centre for Contemporary  Cultural 
Studies graduates began to staff new programmes in cultural studies at institutions 
such as Portsmouth and North-East London Polytechnics. At the same time, the po-
litical crisis of the left, the politics of the social movements, and the long-term infl u-
ence of 1968 all impacted on the methods of cultural studies and its choice of objects 
for study.
To get to grips with the nature of these changes, it is necessary to understand still 
further the broader conjuncture in which they took place. While the right seemed 
absolutely hegemonic in political and economic terms, so-called mass culture in the 
early 1980s looked in many ways like a site of progressive change. In the United 
Kingdom, Thatcher may have won elections, but the pop charts were topped by gay 
singers who publicly supported the striking miners while the fashion and advertising 
industries promoted the pro-feminist ‘New Man’ as the ideal model of masculinity 
(Nixon 1996). The fourth national television network, Channel Four, started broad-
casting in 1982 with an explicit remit to represent minority interests, and for much of 
the decade did indeed offer programs catering explicitly to feminist, gay and ethnic 
minority interests. The channel even made a minor celebrity of Marxist historian 
Gwyn Williams (a lifelong friend of Raymond Williams). Pop culture must have 
looked to many at this moment like a more promising site of struggle than the picket 
line or the polling booth. At the same time, importantly, the mainstream political left 
had never embraced the libertarianism of the 1960s with any enthusiasm, and this 
was a growing problem in terms of its ability to reach new constituencies.
Throughout the developed world, the generation who had grown up in the 1950s 
and 1960s included many people who wanted to enjoy the freedoms of the new 
liberal consumer society but had no investment in preserving the social gains of 
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the post-war period now that they felt prosperous enough not to have to rely on the 
state, the unions or their local community for support in hard times. By the end of 
the 1970s there were many such citizens working in new and expanding economic 
sectors—most notably the service industries, media and communications, and infor-
mation technology—who had no interest in radical politics and no reason to identify 
with the labour movement, with its fi rm historical base in manufacturing industries. 
In many metropolitan and suburban areas, such people were a crucial addition to 
the coalition supporting the New Right, whose rhetoric promised to encourage free 
enterprise and release the spending power of the overtaxed consumer even while it 
promised to curb immigration and union power. The dream of 1968 had always been 
that the hedonism that the new consumer society made possible, and the right to self-
expression, which was one of the demands of the new social movements, need not 
lead only to such a selfi sh individualism. Indeed, the utopian tradition of romantic 
socialism which had inspired Williams and Thompson (like the anarchist tradition 
which they tended to ignore) had itself always asserted that capitalism could not 
ultimately contain a demand for true autonomy and creative fulfi lment on the part of 
all citizens. However, the mainstream communist and socialist left had been barely 
touched by this sensibility in the twentieth century, and had tended to appeal to ide-
als of class or national solidarity rather than to any kind of hedonistic imperative 
amongst its possible constituencies. Indeed, both the communist tradition and the 
mainstream socialist tradition (which, according to Harold Wilson, ‘owed more to 
Methodism than to Marxism’) tended to adopt a rather censorious stance towards the 
new pleasures which consumer culture made available. By the 1980s it had become 
clear that this was an approach which could never win support in relatively prosper-
ous countries. Since the 1950s, one of the appeals which the New Left had made to 
the Labour mainstream was to take seriously the challenge posed by the enthusiastic 
embrace of consumer culture on the part of young people, women and conservative 
politicians, and this was clearly one of the motivations behind the initial project of 
cultural studies itself. Now both the urgency of this task and the opportunities it 
seemed to represent were greatly enhanced.
This was the context for the moment of cultural populism. This term was used to 
describe the way in which nominally leftist commentators working in or infl uenced 
by cultural studies began to embrace elements of contemporary popular culture for 
their potential radicalism and to denigrate as elitist and exclusionary cultural forms 
or theoretical positions informed by any kind of avant-gardism. The cultural popu-
lism of the 1980s was a recognisable and coherent body of attitudes and approaches, 
but it did not amount to a consistent and homogenous political perspective. Instead, 
it is better understood as a continuum of opinion which ranged from the democratic, 
libertarian Marxism of E. P. Thompson to the perspectives of those who argued 
that the defeat of socialism was so complete that nihilistic or celebratory abandon-
ment to the postmodern world of hyper-capitalism was the only reasonable response 
(Baud rillard 1988a). In the specifi c context of British left politics in the 1980s, all 
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of these positions found common ground in their resistance to that so-called old left 
conservatism, which insisted that the basic features of the classic struggle had not 
changed and that political tactics appropriate to the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury remained appropriate at the end of it. Critics of Stuart Hall and other cultural 
populists of the 1980s have consistently refused to address this aspect of the political 
context in which they were operating, asserting without any substantive argument 
that the political implications of all elements of the cultural populist continuum were 
effectively identical (e.g. Žižek 2001, Frank 2002). As we will see, subsequent his-
tory comprehensively undermined this assumption: whereas one section of the left 
was to embrace the corporate populism of Blair and Clinton in the 1990s, New Left 
cultural studies fi gures such as Hall and McRobbie did not.
Cultural populism was exemplifi ed by some of the key cultural studies works of 
the period. Ien Ang’s Watching Dallas (1985) offered a fascinating description of the 
range of responses to the popular TV show amongst members of the Dutch audi-
ence and identifi ed a tension between the dominant ideology of mass culture and a 
populist aesthetic which opposed it. While the study raised some important questions 
about the complex relationships and non-relationships between quotidian pleasures, 
private fantasies and modes of political identifi cation, its failure to offer answers 
to any of those questions and its lack of any coherent theoretical framework left 
it open to charges of simplistic populism (charges which the book itself explicitly 
denied, but without offering any coherent alternative conclusion to be drawn from 
its own critiques of anti-populist positions). John Fiske’s Television Culture (1987), 
a now notorious classic of 1980s cultural populism, envisages contemporary culture 
as a ‘semiotic democracy’ in which audiences are free to make their own mean-
ings from the various materials of media culture. Fiske’s work has been widely seen 
as absurdly optimistic, effectively denying that either the specifi c content of media 
outputs, the economics of media ownership, or the power differentials between dif-
ferent components of media networks are of any real political importance. However, 
is it easy to caricature Fiske, who was in many ways working in the same spirit as 
E. P. Thompson in his efforts to record the history of English working-class agency. 
Fiske saw himself as asserting the capacities of ordinary people against the elitism 
and fatalism of certain strands of ideology critique and the naïve moralism of much 
mainstream commentary on media culture. However, as much as one would like to 
defend Fiske against his legions of critics, it is undeniable that his work inspired 
a wave of commentary which seemed to assume that anything that was popular was 
thereby inherently radical, democratic and good. By no means all cultural studies of 
this moment was so naïve, however. Coming at the end of this phase, Mica Nava’s 
Changing Cultures: Feminism, Youth and Consumerism (1992) brought together a 
number of essays which exemplifi ed the new emphasis on consumer agency in novel 
and useful ways, emphasising the unpredictable creativity of consumers, especially 
young ones. Angela McRobbie remained at the forefront of this kind of research, 
looking for signs of democratisation in the culture wherever they might be found, but 
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without succumbing to naïve populism at any stage: Feminism and Youth Culture: 
from ‘Jackie’ to ‘Just Seventeen’ (1990) is a collection of McRobbie’s important 
writings and remains exemplary of its kind.
Marxism Today and the New Times
At this stage of the argument, it is important to grasp the extent to which the old left 
continued to dominate radical political discourse in the Britain of the 1980s. Still by 
far the most visible and well-organised groupings to the left of the Labour leadership 
at this time were neo-Trotskyists such as the Socialist Workers Party and the noto-
rious Militant Tendency: an entryist faction whose express aim was to destroy the 
‘bourgeois socialist’ Labour Party from within, but whose members and supporters 
were nonetheless indignant at being hounded out of the party by the Labour leader-
ship in the latter part of the decade. All of these groups were explicitly opposed to 
those so-called revisionists who, following Gramsci, argued that the tactics and forms 
of political organisation which had worked in Russia in 1917 might not be effective 
in the world of mass democracy, consumerism and globalised capitalism. They also 
tended to regard it as their revolutionary duty to impose their view wherever they 
had any infl uence (in local government, trade unions and Labour Party branches), by 
means of physical intimidation if necessary. At the same time, despite the govern-
ment actually being voted for by a minority of the electorate, a divided mainstream 
opposition was allowing the Thatcher government to implement the most right-wing 
political agenda of any since the advent of mass democracy. It is easy to understand 
how intelligent socialists like Stuart Hall, searching for alternatives that might have 
a wider popular appeal, could make common cause with writers from the left such 
as Charles Leadbeater and Geoff Mulgan, even if those particular fi gures were in the 
process of abandoning socialism altogether. Marxism Today was where that common 
cause was made (Hall & Jacques 1989).
What that cause amounted to was never a coherent political programme, but an 
attempt by a number of writers and analysts to paint a broad picture of what was hap-
pening to the economics, culture and politics of the advanced capitalist democracies 
at the time, and in particular to think about what that meant for the future of British 
left politics, broadly defi ned. This project to map the ‘New Times’ gained further 
impetus from the collapse of soviet communism at the end of the decade, especially 
given that Marxism Today was still ostensibly a communist magazine. However, in 
retrospect, we would have to say that even this cataclysm was, like Thatcherism, 
only one localised symptom of a global process. As we have seen, since the early 
1970s international capitalism had gone through a process of wholesale restructuring 
which had increased and intensifi ed global fl ows of money, goods, ideas and people. 
New technologies in the fi elds of communications, electronics and robotics enabled 
manufacturers to dispense with large parts of their workforce permanently and to 
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move production from one region, country or even continent to another in search 
of lower labour costs. The deregulation of international fi nance markets enabled 
investors and speculators for the fi rst time to move capital in and out of a country 
almost at will. As fashion cycles, changing tastes and intensifi ed competition made 
consumer markets ever-more unpredictable, the mid-century model of the mighty 
vertically integrated fi rm—the total corporation with its own market research, re-
search and design, manufacturing, distribution and marketing divisions—gave way 
to the ideal of the lean corporation, specialising in a narrow range of tasks and en-
tering into a range of fl exible short-term contractual relationships with other small 
specialised fi rms. Naturally, such corporations wanted that kind of fl exibility in their 
relationships with their employees, and rising unemployment meant that they could 
demand it, despite the protests of trade-unionists who had spent the past 150 years 
struggling to achieve security and stability for ordinary workers. The system of pro-
duction and general social organisation described by Gramsci as ‘Fordist’ (because 
he associated it with the Henry Ford’s innovative policy of paying his workers a 
high wage for deeply unrewarding work on assembly lines while imposing strin-
gent conditions of ‘respectability’ on their personal lives) was giving way to a new 
‘post-Fordist’ world of ‘disorganised capitalism’ (Lash & Urry 1987), unashamed 
consumer hedonism, an ever-proliferating array of lifestyles and an ever-shrinking 
degree of social cohesion.
The winners from this shift towards consumer hedonism were those capitalists 
who could adapt to it and those consumers who could afford to benefi t from the 
vast new range of choices available to them. The losers were all those groups, indi-
viduals and institutions whose habitual ways of dealing with the world assumed the 
relatively stable, predictable and ordered world of Fordist capitalism or pre-modern 
traditions. National governments quickly found that they could not maintain high 
levels of taxation without driving capital out of the country, and so could not af-
ford to maintain expansive and generous social programmes or to invest heavily 
in economic infrastructure. Those fi rms which depended heavily on state protec-
tion, regulation, or provision of infrastructure (such as transport networks) could 
not survive. The Soviet economies, entirely controlled by and dependent on national 
governments, were simply unable to compete under these conditions: they could 
not deliver consumer satisfaction or generate suffi cient productivity to support the 
Soviet Union’s ever more costly arms race with the United States. In 1989, under 
pressure from mass protests, Soviet leaderships more or less abandoned the attempt 
to maintain a non-capitalist economic model in Eastern Europe. In the meantime, the 
1980s had seen nominally socialist governments in places as far apart as France and 
Australia implement neoliberal economic policies, cutting taxes and public spend-
ing while privatising publicly owned services and enterprises. It is often forgotten 
in Britain that the neoliberal programme of governmental cost-cutting was begun 
by the Labour government in 1976, under enormous pressure from the International 
Monetary Fund, not by Thatcher in 1979.
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The essays brought together in the Hall and Jacques volume New Times (1989) 
charts the importance of new kinds of political mobilisation (such as Live Aid and 
consumer boycotts) in a heavily mediated culture and the weakness of forms such as 
traditional trade-unionism. Published at the very moment of the Soviet system’s col-
lapse, the book could not have been more prescient. But the political conclusions to 
be drawn from its analyses were by no means clear, even to the volume’s own editors. 
Could post-Fordist capitalism be the context for new, more democratic forms of la-
bour organisation to emerge? Could the new political antagonisms around questions 
of sexual identity or the politics of ecology form the basis for a new radical politics? 
Or was socialism completely fi nished? Was politics itself now just a nostalgic game 
for those unwilling to accommodate to the new world of consumer capitalism? While 
one section of the left infl uenced by the New Times analysis, represented by writers 
like Mulgan and Hall, would ultimately advocate the abandonment of anything like 
the traditional goals of socialism, this would never be the route taken by those more 
closely associated with cultural studies and the New Left. What exactly those writ-
ers would advocate would be increasingly unclear as the years went by, however. It 
is one of this book’s contentions that the politics of contemporary anti-capitalism 
represents at least a possible answer to that question. For the moment, however, 
we should focus on the fact that the New Times charted by Hall and colleagues 
were characterised by a few interesting democratic possibilities, but also marked 
the consequences of the left’s defeat, at home and abroad.
Culture Wars
In the United States, the left was similarly marginalised, although the scale and com-
plexity of American politics cannot be easily compared to the United Kingdom’s 
highly centralised political system, in which the leader of the parliamentary majority 
can effectively govern the entire country by diktat. While still infl uential in Congress 
and at a local and state level in many areas, the Democrats were out of the White 
House throughout the 1980s. More importantly, the public backlash against left-
wing ideas went much further than in the United Kingdom. Both the legacy of the 
New Deal—the historic social settlement implemented in the 1930s which remained 
the basis for the American welfare state—and the achievements of the new social 
movements came under savage attack from the newly politicised Christian right and 
a strain of anti-federalist libertarianism with deep roots in American political culture. 
Politically, the anti-communism of the 1950s had created a long-term context in 
the United States whereby it was virtually impossible for any national politician to 
admit to sympathy for even moderate kinds of socialism or social democracy. Even 
in the late 1960s, only the most radical sections of the counterculture or the new 
social movements had publicly allied their cause to any kind of serious economi-
cally egalitarian agenda. As such, the New Left in the United States came largely 
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to concern itself with cultural politics, and in particular the struggles of women, gay 
people, non-whites and other minorities to be protected from discrimination and en-
abled to participate in public and private life on equal individual terms with straight 
white men, although this in turn often involved demands for local, state of federal 
government support for programmes to combat the social and institutional effects of 
entrenched traditions of discrimination against such groups.
It was in this context that liberalism acquired a new meaning in the American po-
litical vocabulary. The very movement which had culminated in the American Revo-
lution and the constitution of the Republic had been one informed by the principles 
of classical liberalism. In practice, however, the rights to free speech and equal-
ity before the law supposedly enjoyed by all citizens of a liberal polity had never 
been extended to groups such as southern black voters, who had been customar-
ily disenfranchised for generations before the Civil Rights movement succeeded in 
criminalising such practices in the 1950s, just as in earlier times both women and all 
propertyless people had been excluded from the franchise. In both Europe and the 
United States, the left had often been divided between those who saw liberalism as 
an ideological mask for entrenched inequalities of class, race and gender and those 
who saw the language of individual rights as providing the basis from which to at-
tack those inequalities. During this period, it was largely the latter tendency which 
prevailed. Elements of the new social movements often tried to model themselves on 
the Civil Rights campaign, demanding access for all to the political privileges of lib-
eralism. In many cases, however, this implied a radicalisation of the liberal tradition 
to the point where it threatened to transform all kinds of existing power relationships. 
As such, the term liberalism came to be associated with those who made these new 
demands, rather than with the political tradition of classical liberalism which had in-
formed the whole of US constitutional law up to that point. At the same time, liberal 
had been acquiring a further slightly different meaning since the advent of the New 
Deal in the 1930s, in this case referring to an attitude towards government spending 
which was liberal in its generosity, as opposed to one advocating fi scal conservatism. 
During the 1970s, these terms and meanings crystallised what became the defi nitive 
fault line in American politics; that between liberals, who sought to use the power 
of government to break down old hierarchies, either through the promotion of equal 
rights agenda for women and minorities or through the extension of welfare pro-
grammes and wealth redistribution, and conservatives, who were committed to low 
government spending, low taxation and so-called traditional family values, and who 
were opposed to any legislation which seemed to threaten the latter (Grossberg 2005: 
160 – 4). This conservative sensibility was to prove far more robust in the United 
States than in Europe.
In Western Europe, those demands and gains of the social movements which could 
easily be accommodated by a liberal (but not socialist) politics were largely absorbed 
into everyday political common sense, such that by the 1990s no mainstream politi-
cian could publicly espouse racist views or defend the traditional limitation of women 
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to the domestic sphere. In the United States, by contrast, the so-called moral major-
ity campaigned hard for such policies as the full-scale recriminalisation of abortion 
(which even Ireland legalised in the 1990s and which there has been no signifi cant 
move to re-criminalise in any European country). At the same time, the centrality of 
the liberal tradition to American politics and American constitutional law meant that 
campaigners for minority rights and other elements of the New Left agenda had in 
many cases far more powerful resources to draw on than their European counterparts: 
the rights to free speech, freedom of conscience and equality before the law set out 
in the US constitution and the Declaration of Independence had no real equivalent 
in much of Europe (even in France, where no constitution had held for more than a 
few decades since the revolution of 1789), and they were often powerful weapons in 
the hands of campaigners. For example, many of the major gains of the civil rights 
 movement—such as the right to abortion for women and the rights of black voters 
in the south—were technically won by demonstrating legally that any infringement 
of those rights by local or state institutions was and always had been constitution-
ally  illegal. On the other hand, the tradition which sees the United States as a funda-
mentally Christian country, a republic of the Godly, has arguably even older roots, 
stretching back to the Puritanism of the fi rst English and Dutch colonists in New En-
gland. The Christian right has called on this tradition to argue that almost any prac-
tice which they regard as unbiblical falls outside the protection of the constitution (or 
even, at their most extreme, to argue for the modifi cation of the constitution itself ). 
For example, the debate over whether individuals of the same sex should have the 
right to marry has seen both the letter and spirit of the constitution invoked by both 
sides of the argument and has seen Republicans agitate for a national constitutional 
amendment outlawing gay marriage.
In this situation, the success of these competing agendas—radical liberalism and 
hardline conservatism—has largely depended upon local conditions in the United 
States. In institutions or geographical areas where conservative Christianity consti-
tutes the basic cultural frame of reference, the conservative agenda has prevailed, 
and the reverse has applied in those contexts characterised by a liberal culture. In 
situations where no one of these formations is clearly prevalent, bitter clashes have 
occurred, and in the 1980s and 1990s the so-called culture wars (Gitlin 1995) con-
stituted much of the substance of meaningful political debate. One product of this 
confl ict was the emergence of the discourse of political correctness in the 1980s. 
According to conservative commentators, liberal cultural mediators (including jour-
nalists, editors, teachers and academics) were engaged in a conspiracy to silence and 
censor the views of their political opponents, practising a kind of diffuse Stalinism 
with their insistence that racism, sexism and homophobia be excluded from public 
discourse. The term politically correct—not one that liberals or leftists would ever 
have used, unless ironically—was mobilised with remarkable skill by conservative 
mediators in order to characterise almost any attempt to problematise the ways in 
which conventional institutional and linguistic practices work to reinforce traditional 
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social hierarchies as inherently authoritarian and anti-pluralist. At the same time, 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, those fragments of the New Left which were es-
pecially infl uential in academic debates within the humanities and student campus 
politics did exhibit a tendency to concentrate on cultural issues and identity politics 
(concerned with asserting the right to public recognition of various marginal social 
identities, from women to people with disabilities) to the virtual exclusion of more 
traditional left concerns like economic inequality and expansive collectivism. At the 
same time, many felt that the waning prestige of Marxism as a general analytical 
framework for critical work in the humanities and social sciences at this time was not 
accompanied by the emergence of any coherent alternative which could engage with 
such issues. As such, identity politics and even the hypothetical political correctness 
were eventually to come under attack from critics on the left as well as the right in 
the 1990s (e.g. Klein 2000).
The main concern for the British left at this moment, in the mid to late 1980s, 
was the persistent hegemony of Thatcherism. In the United States, at the same time, 
the Reagan administration pursued a similar agenda. It was easy, at this moment, 
to see the New Right and its success as the main political problem facing the left. 
So relatively few commentators in the United States and the United Kingdom were 
paying attention to the fact that neoliberal economic policies were already being 
pursued by nominally socialist governments in France and Australia, a fact which 
suggests that the long-term strength of neoliberalism was a different issue from the 
short-term success of the New Right in the 1980s. Instead, many radical thinkers and 
activists understandably focussed on the most immediately objectionable elements 
of the New Right programme; its conservative hostility to feminism, gay liberation 
and anti-racist politics. This focus on cultural issues chimed well with cultural stud-
ies’ long-term assertion that issues of culture and identity should be considered as 
properly political questions, not as merely superfi cial issues compared with the ‘real 
stuff’ of class struggle and economics, and this created a context, especially in 
US universities, for a massive expansion of interest in cultural studies (Grossberg, 
Nelson & Treichler 1992). However, this development, combined with the visible 
populism of some strands of cultural studies at that moment, created a situation in 
which many commentators outside cultural studies, and even some inside it, came to 
see cultural studies as naturally antagonistic to more traditional leftist agendas, quite 
contrary to the intentions of the discipline’s key fi gures and those practitioners closest 
to its sources.
The Anti-Essentialist Turn
It is at this moment that the history of cultural studies as such intersects with that 
of a much broader turn towards new forms of theoretical thinking across disciplines 
in the anglophone world, to which cultural studies contributed and by which it was 
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itself affected. The rise of fi lm and literary theory to central rather than marginal 
positions in their respective fi elds, the theoretical development of feminist cultural 
theory beyond the often rather simplistic positions of the 1970s, and the emergence 
of postcolonial and queer theories as orienting positions within an expanded fi eld of 
cultural criticism, are all developments which cannot be confl ated with the rise of cul-
tural studies as such, although they are often elided in casual commentary. Indeed, 
the term ‘cultural studies’ is today often used to refer to almost any intellectual ap-
proach which makes reference to French philosophy of the past four decades. While 
this confl ation is entirely inaccurate, it is understandable, given the extent to which 
cultural studies proper was a key site at which issues in cultural theory were debated 
and discussed. What follows now then is not merely an account of the development 
of cultural studies, but of the broad fi eld of post-structuralist political philosophy, 
cultural criticism and cultural theory, with which cultural studies has intersected 
since the 1980s.
Despite the relative political paralysis of the left, the mid-late 1980s did see some 
very important developments in radical theory. Although all of these were later to be 
parodied by critics as over-intellectual, idealist tendencies which ignored the con-
tinuing reality of class inequality under capitalism, the key developments of this pe-
riod were all one way or another trying to meet the challenge posed by the new social 
movements, the legacy of 1968, the worldwide defeat of socialism and communism, 
and the rise of the new right. The emergent developments of particular signifi cance 
to us here are postcolonial theory, queer theory and post-Marxism. Signifi cantly, all 
of the most infl uential representatives of these tendencies were heavily infl uenced 
by the wave of French post-structuralist philosophers who came to prominence in 
the late 1960s and 1970s, in the wake of 1968. However oblique the relationship 
of thinkers such as Derrida, the later Foucault, the later Lacan, Deleuze, Guattari, 
Irigaray, Kristeva, Lyotard, and so forth may have been to the events of 1968, their 
thought in the ensuing period clearly shared much of the spirit of that moment. Spe-
cifi cally, they were inspired by and refi ned the perceived challenge of 1968 to the 
orthodox Marxism of the French Communist Party and the highly theorised structur-
alist Marxism of loyal French Communist Party members such as Louis Althusser. 
This is a very crude summary, but put simply, we can see a parallel between the 
refusal of the French Communist Party to seize the moment of 1968 and the inability 
of high structuralism to grasp the potential contingency of social relations and hence 
the unpredictable possibilities for transformation which new and unexpected histori-
cal conjunctures might throw up. The structuralism of Althusser, Levis-Strauss and 
the early Foucault, like the historiography of their contemporary, Fernand Braudel, 
found it notoriously diffi cult to imagine human agency as having any real role in 
history at all, instead seeing social life in terms of deep and largely immovable struc-
tures determining and limiting the entire fi eld of human action. This way of thinking 
lent itself very well to a highly orthodox form of Marxism which assumed that it 
understood the iron laws of history and that those laws decreed only the industrial 
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proletariat led by the communist vanguard to be capable of effecting revolutionary 
change. One of the most memorable slogans of 1968 had been a deliberate rejection 
of this view: ‘Structures don’t march in the street!’
In many ways the theoretical legacy of 1968 is still being worked through in 
anglophone cultural theory. Of all the theoretical works to have been directly in-
fl uenced and inspired by the spirit of that moment, the most lastingly important 
is almost certainly Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, a monumental critique 
of the authoritarianism implicit in much structuralist and psychoanalytic think-
ing and of an entire philosophical frame-of-reference which sustains it. Outside of 
the pioneering work of Lawrence Grossberg, Deleuze and Guattari’s critique had 
relatively little direct impact on either cultural studies or critical thought up until 
the end of the 1990s. Much more signifi cant for this broad area in the 1980s was 
the intervention of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their 1985 breakthrough 
volume Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. This remarkable piece of work offered 
a historical genealogy of the concept of hegemony in the Marxist literature of the 
early-twentieth century from a perspective informed by the key philosophical de-
velopments coming from France since the later 1960s. At this point, many on the 
anglophone left had already been infl uenced by the post-structuralist thought of 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan. However, Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction 
and the postmodern philosophy of Jean-François Lyotard had been widely misun-
derstood as advocating a nihilistic epistemological relativism which simply under-
mined the possibility of any effective politics (which is how ignorant commentators 
such as Terry Eagleton and Thomas Frank continue to refer to postmodernism to 
this day), although in emergent fi elds such as postcolonial studies, the political 
value of Derrida’s writings had already long been recognised.
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy was the fi rst major work of anglophone politi-
cal theory to be fully informed by these developments and it sought to bring their 
insights to bear on the problems facing the left in the increasingly complex and fl uid 
societies which advanced capitalism was producing. Perhaps the key position which 
this work popularised was anti-essentialism; a position which refuses to acknowl-
edge any essential absolute, fi nal, objective reality to social and political identities, 
instead seeing them as the always contingent outcome of political struggles and ne-
gotiations. Within this frame of reference, identities which had been fundamental 
to left politics—such as worker or woman—came to be seen as merely contingent 
positions within discourse whose meaning could be changed at any time by virtue 
of their shifting relationships with other identities in the wider social fi eld. While 
for many this was a radically destabilising position, cutting the very ground from 
underneath progressive movements, for others it provided the only framework with 
which to confront the destabilisation of political identities which had ensued in the 
years since 1968.
Laclau and Mouffe argued, in effect, that almost any social, cultural or political 
identity could be ‘articulated’ (connected) to any other if the political circumstances 
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were right. So there was nothing inevitable or even probable about workers link-
ing their struggles to those of women or black people, for example: instead, if such 
struggles were to be connected, then connecting them would require a great deal of 
political work, and the elaboration of a common frame of reference which was not 
dependent upon one or the other of those identities taking precedence over the other. 
Feminism could no longer be expected to be connected to socialism either by women 
accepting that their struggle was subordinate to the struggle of all workers or by as-
serting the overriding importance of opposition to patriarchy as the basic form and 
source of all oppression. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe argued that the progressive 
movements could be linked together by virtue of a shared commitment to deepening 
and expanding the democratic revolution of modernity, thereby extending the prog-
ress that had been made in the extension of liberal democracy to include all citizens 
of advanced countries through furthering other forms of social, economic, political 
and cultural democracy.
Laclau and Mouffe’s advocacy of radical democracy as a new positive political 
position was persuasive and inspiring, even while it was never fully elaborated as 
a coherent ethical and political programme and the defi nitions of radical democracy 
which they offered tended to change over time. What is perhaps most important to re-
alise about Laclau and Mouffe’s work for our purposes here is that, on the one hand, it 
corresponded on an abstract theoretical level to currents within the post-1968 social 
and political movements which also sought to reject the authoritarianism, centralism 
and homogeneity of earlier forms of left politics, while on the other hand it emerged 
from exactly the same intellectual and political milieu as British cultural studies. 
Strands of the feminist and Green movements had been practising and advocating 
something very like radical democracy in their non-hierarchal, leaderless networks 
for some time, while the American politics of the rainbow coalition, aiming to create 
a diverse political alliance of various socially marginalised groups (McKelvey 1994: 
258–69), looked rather like that advocated in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy—and 
the loose coalitions of radicals which would emerge in the anti-capitalist movement 
of the 1990s would look even more so. Yet Laclau and Mouffe’s work was emerging 
from a direct conversation that was taking place between them and fi gures such as 
Stuart Hall, both in person and on the pages of New Left Review and Marxism Today. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s work is therefore a key reference point for us, and it is one to 
which we will return in detail.
A similar and parallel theoretical shift was effected in a number of quarters by 
both the wider critique of Althusserian Marxism and the growing infl uence of the 
ideas of Michel Foucault. Perhaps the most signifi cant moment in the history of Brit-
ish Althusserianism was the publication of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst’s Mode of 
Production and Social Formation (1977). A dense, fascinating little work, this book 
was an explicit critique of the authors’ own previous work, Pre-Capitalist Modes of 
Production. In short, the authors conclude that they, like their mentor Althusser, have 
simply not gone far enough in abandoning essentialism and economism, and that the 
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only way this can be done is to jettison the key concept of Marxist historical analysis 
mode of production, replacing it with a commitment to the study of ‘defi nite social 
formations’. This was a conceptual gesture very close to the neo-Gramscian insis-
tence on attending to the specifi cities of ‘the conjuncture’, the complex set of power 
relations obtaining at a particular historical moment—which had such an infl uence 
on Williams and Hall, and which would lead both Hindess and Hirst away from the 
Marxist tradition altogether. Hirst in particular would go on to mine an interesting if 
idiosyncratic vein as a political theorist of ‘associational democracy’, drawing on an 
English socialist tradition with its roots not in revolutionary party communism but in 
the co-operative movement and traditions of local democracy and self-organisation.
Similarly to the post-Althusserians, the French thinker Michel Foucault— already 
a well known fi gure to anglophone readers by the mid-1970s—was continuing 
his long-term project to fi nd ways of describing the relationship between forms of 
knowledge and forms of power which did not make the kind of crude assumptions 
associated with conventional Marxism. Foucault became an increasingly infl uential 
force within cultural studies and literary history as his own approach became more 
dynamic and sophisticated during the course of the decade and the early years of the 
1980s. From his early emphasis on ‘discursive formations’ (systems of ideas about 
topics such as medicine or madness) as relatively autonomous from each other and 
from wider social forces (Foucault 1961; 1972), Foucault developed a much more 
political approach informed by the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche, which stressed the 
extent to which knowledge only ever emerges in a fi eld of confl ict and contestation 
(Foucault 1979). Although often seen as some kind of enemy of all Marxism (Fou-
cault 1981), at key points in his work Foucault deployed a vocabulary and explana-
tory approach very close to Gramscian Marxism, stressing the centrality of class 
struggle to shifting ideas and assumptions about the world (Foucault 1979: 115–31).
A friend and associate of Gilles Deleuze, Foucault was the subject of a full study 
by Deleuze, and there are clear points of convergence between their ideas. Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of ‘assemblage’ (agencement in French) was closely related 
to Foucault’s notion of ‘apparatus’ (dispositif ) (Deleuze 1995: 196), which more-or-
less replaced his notion of ‘discursive formation’, and both were clearly also close to 
Hindess and Hirst’s use of the term ‘social formation’ (Hindess & Hirst 1977: 46–62). 
In all of these cases, a very loose general term is deployed in place of some more 
defi nite alternative: social formation instead of mode of production; discursive for-
mation instead of ideology, and so forth. The reason is that theorists using these con-
cepts wanted to get away from the assumptions built into some of these earlier terms. 
Using these more open concepts freed them up to analyse the specifi c mechanisms of 
power operating in particular social, historical and cultural contexts—in which the 
relationships between economic, symbolic and political power might operate very 
differently—rather than assuming in advance that those relationships must follow 
set patterns. Broadly speaking, this was what anti-essentialism initially meant at the 
level of abstract social analysis. In addition, however, all of these strands of thought 
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tended towards a position which recognised the identity of social beings as con-
stituted entirely by the specifi c sets of relationships into which they are inserted, 
rather than seeing them as the expression of some underlying essence. As such, the 
term anti-essentialism also came to designate a resistance to any idea of identity as 
fi xed and inherent rather than malleable and relational.
While Laclau and Mouffe were largely concerned with offering a critique of class 
essentialism, other theorists in the 1980s were concerned with applying similar cri-
tiques of essentialism in thinking about gendered, ethnic and sexual identities. Under 
the infl uence of Laclau and Mouffe themselves and of similar sources in French 
post-structuralist philosophy to those inspiring Laclau and Mouffe, a generation of 
thinkers were opposing any notions of such identities as fi xed or natural. Again, 
although this point is rarely made, we can see this development in part as a response to 
the breakdown of many of the assumptions of radicals which had obtained since the 
nineteenth century, through the experience of 1968 and its aftermath, up until the 
1980s. The realisation that it was possible actively to pursue and in many cases to 
achieve goals such as the decriminalisation and normalisation of same-sex relations 
without engaging with any other political agenda was surely one of the factors prob-
lematising essentialist notions of identity, as many had previously assumed that there 
was something essentially revolutionary about, for example, asserting a public gay 
identity (D’Emilio 1992). While less militant gay campaigners had always believed 
in the possibility of a gay-tolerant liberal capitalist society, most who identifi ed with 
the radical tradition had believed that capitalism—and perhaps all ordered, hierarchi-
cal society—relied upon the heterosexual nuclear family as its basic unit of socialisa-
tion. So it was thought by commentators on both the left and the right that anything 
that undermined the sanctity of this social model—such as the assertion that gay sex 
is not sinful and should not be illegal—constituted an implicit threat to the existing 
social order, and hence to capitalism as such. The fact that assumptions such as this 
turned out to have been mistaken, with the dissolution of the normative family model 
and the decriminalisation of homosexuality having no impact at all on the prevalence 
of capitalist social relations, was surely one of the historical impetuses behind the 
rise of anti-essentialism.
Another such impetus was the inherent political problems caused by the forms of 
oppositional politics which were emerging as alternatives to traditional socialism. The 
legacy of the new social movements led many activists towards forms of political and 
intellectual engagement which sought only to assert the validity of one particular so-
cial group, understood in terms of its key shared feature. Identity politics concerned 
itself with the rights of women, gay people, non-white people, disabled people, and 
so forth, to participate fully in the life of the community (whatever that was taken 
to mean). Identity politics tended to oppose any perceived attempt to subjugate such 
demands to any wider, more universalistic project for human emancipation.
Identity politics of this nature was something which tended to emerge in prac-
tice but was often diffi cult to justify in theory, because any abstract refl ection on its 
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 implications makes quite clear what its problems are. On the one hand, how can such 
a politics cope with the fact that individuals might belong to more than one group 
from which they can derive an identity? On the other hand, how can any politics 
grounded in a single identity aspire to move beyond the rather limited ambition of 
protecting the rights of the members of a certain group to participate in the liberal 
polity on the same terms as other individuals? The critique of essentialism was in part 
motivated by both of these questions, and it sought to stake out a position which 
argued that because no identity was fi xed and homogenous, identity as such could 
not be the basis for any effective politics, and that every community was an imagi-
nary, contingent construct (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 85–134; Anderson 1983; Miami 
Theory Collective 1991). To put this another way, what emerged in the work of writ-
ers such as Laclau and Mouffe was a view according to which all politics was, and 
always had been, about the shifting and overlapping meanings attributed to certain 
identities and the various struggles to defi ne them. From this point of view, the dis-
course of the class struggle was just one particularly ambitious attempt to assert the 
validity of a particular identity (e.g. worker) and to persuade large numbers of people 
to identify themselves with it and act accordingly, at the expense of any contrary 
identifi cation (as, for example, English, or Polish, or Christian) which would lead 
them to behave differently (by voting for nationalist political parties, for example). 
As such, the idea of a specifi c identity politics was foolish, given that all politics is to 
some extent identity politics.
At the level of cultural theory, these insights had the greatest impact in the emerg-
ing fi elds of queer and postcolonial theory. Queer was a homophobic term of abuse 
deliberately adopted by militant gay activists, especially in response to the AIDS 
crisis, in the 1980s (Shepard & Hayduk 2002). Queer politics and queer theory took 
on rather different meanings in different contexts (Morton 1996). In some cases, 
especially within activist culture, queer designated a militant position which refused 
any liberal notion of assimilation, rejecting the political objective of simply winning 
the same rights for same-sex couples as heterosexual couples enjoyed and asserting 
the subversive nature of non-straight sexuality. In practice this type of militancy 
often took on a decidedly essentialist character, asserting an authentic queer radi-
calism as preferable to the half-hearted, subservient liberalism of respectable gay 
people. The body of work which came to be known as queer theory—most notably 
the work of Judith Butler—took on a quite different character, however. Inspired and 
informed by deconstruction, postmodernism, post-structuralism and post-Marxism, 
queer theory tended to assert the instability and contingency of all sexual and gen-
dered identity, just as anti-essentialist feminists were increasingly tending to do. 
From this point of view, the key to a progressive sexual politics was to move away 
from any fi xed notions of masculinity, femininity, homosexuality or heterosexuality. 
Signifi cantly, this echoed the views already expressed on this matter in the writings 
of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari (Derrida 1991; 
Foucault 1979; Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 278).
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Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990) remains the paradigmatic statement of 
queer theory and anti-essentialist feminism, deploying all of the theoretical resources 
which had come into the North American academy via the fascination with French 
post-structuralist philosophy in literature departments to promote the view that all 
gendered and sexed identity was socially constructed and as such at least poten-
tially open to challenge and transformation. The book reads now as dated, uneven 
and fl awed, but its historic importance is unquestionable. It was to prove a crucial 
resource for cultural studies as much as anything because it marked the maturation 
of anglophone post-structuralism into something more than a school of literary criti-
cism lacking the intellectual ambition of its French sources. Along with Laclau and 
Mouffe’s work, it suggested the possibility of a sophisticated political position deriv-
ing from the most radical currents of the French philosophical stream from which 
cultural studies had been drinking, albeit sporadically, for so long. Donna Harraway’s 
‘Cyborg Manifesto’ (1991), appearing only a year after Gender Trouble, further con-
solidated the emergence of a distinctively post-structuralist, anti- essentialist, but 
clearly leftist position in feminist theory. Arguing against the primitivist tenden-
cies of certain strands of goddess-worshipping ecofeminism, Harraway effectively 
launched a whole sub-genre of cultural studies concerned with assessing the impacts 
and possibilities of emergent communication technologies.
Closely allied to queer theory was the emergent fi eld of postcolonial theory; 
a body of work which emerged from the encounter between anglophone literary-
 critics with third world affi liations and the writings of Foucault and Derrida, but 
whose roots go back further, most notably to the work of the Martiniquan psycho-
analyst and partisan of the Algerian anti-colonial struggle, Frantz Fanon. Stuart Hall, 
amongst others, also became heavily involved in this body of work, which is far 
too rich and detailed to chart in detail here (Morley & Chen 1996). What is signifi -
cant for us is that this body of work, much like the queer theory of Judith Butler 
and the post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe, stressed the extent to which all social 
identities are partial, contingent and temporary outcomes of a variety of interact-
ing power-struggles, and as such no single form of power—whether, for example, 
classed power or gendered power—can be seen as the source of all others: no aspect 
of a person’s identity is necessarily more or less political, or politically important, 
than any other. The postcolonial theorists tended to stress the hybrid nature of all 
identities as a way of overcoming any essentialist understanding of race, ethnicity or 
nationality. (e.g. Bhabha 1994).
To this day, many commentators assume that writers in these fi elds believe that 
identity is just a kind of fi ction, that there is no such thing as truth, that there are 
no values which we can appeal to against cruelty and injustice of all kinds, and that 
there is no point engaging in active politics. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
In fact, all of these writers have been implicitly motivated by an understanding that 
precisely because no identity, and indeed no social situation, is fi xed forever, then 
many kinds of political activity are possible and many more kinds may be useful 
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than were envisaged by the revolutionaries of the past. Perhaps most importantly, 
these writers have been motivated by the recognition that all successful political 
projects are carried out by coalitions of diverse and often very different groups and 
individuals, and that such coalitions are always unstable, and as such, they require 
ongoing political work to maintain them. Indeed, these writers point out that every 
individual is a kind of microscopic coalition, constituted as they are by multiple and 
sometime competing sets of loyalties. This is the real meaning of the anti-essentialist 
turn. As we will see, in many ways this is a philosophical attitude which prefi gured 
the anti-capitalist movement’s stress on ‘unity-in-difference’ and its refusal ever to 
let one single organisation speak for the ‘movement of movements’.
Back to Cultural Studies
Within the mainstream of British cultural studies, it was Angela McRobbie once 
again who engaged most directly with some of these developments. Her Postmod-
ernism and Popular Culture (1994) was a signifi cant collection of essays that linked 
the pluralist politics of the New Left and the women’s movement with the philo-
sophical and cultural trends which variously went under the name of postmodern-
ism. Her 1992 essay ‘Post-Marxism and Cultural Studies’ marked a key moment of 
engagement between the two fi elds and was presented as the concluding essay to the 
massive Cultural Studies (Grossberg, Nelson, & Treichler 1992) which remains the 
most ambitious of its kind to date. The anti-essentialist moment in cultural studies 
was also represented by Kobena Mercer in his 1994 volume Welcome to the Jungle, 
which opens with Mercer’s famous celebration of Michael Jackson’s Thriller video. 
Mercer argues that the video is a deliberate experiment with androgyny and parody, 
refusing any number of clichés about the authentic nature of the black male body:
What was important and empowering about the redefi nition of black identity in British 
society in the 1980s was that it showed that identities are not found but made; that they 
are not just there, waiting to be discovered in the vocabulary of nature, but have to be 
culturally and politically constructed through political antagonism and cultural struggle.
(Mercer 1994. 292).
Mercer’s book represents arguably the most coherent and explicit deployment of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s work in the mainstream of cultural studies, offering in its later 
chapters a brilliant analysis of the shifting parameters of black cultural politics in 
the post-war era. At the same time, these chapters reveal a real frustration with the 
apparent failure of the plural, radial democratic left envisaged in their work (and, 
for that matter, by the New Left in the 1960s) to emerge in the postmodern context. 
Intriguingly, the book concludes with a rather vague critique of the historic failures 
of the left and the New Left, but without making at all clear what Mercer thinks the 
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alternative political formation could look like. It’s worth refl ecting that the book 
 appeared in the same year that the Zapatista uprising began.
However, most of the key fi gures of mainstream cultural studies were never re-
ally caught up in this wider post-structuralist moment. The previous year, Paul Gil-
roy had published his seminal study The Black Atlantic (1993), which posited black 
culture as a geo-historical continuity inseparable from the experience of slavery and 
its aftermath, but he argues that black culture should not be understood simply as 
an expression for some essential African identity. Gilroy’s There Ain’t No Black in 
the Union Jack: The Politics of Race and Nation (1987) had already proved highly 
signifi cant in putting issues of race at the heart of the cultural studies agenda, and The 
Black Atlantic did much to open up cultural studies to an approach less fi xated on 
national cultural contexts than it had previously been. Hall had been an  admirer of 
Laclau’s earlier work towards an anti-essentialist theory of politics (Chen & Morley 
1996: 146), and he had infl uenced the broader anti-essentialist turn, but he vocally 
declined to follow Laclau and Mouffe down the path they had taken in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy. Hall, like many others, thought that this book ended up with a 
problematic position which ignored the material constraints on political struggles. 
Laclau and Mouffe themselves offered perhaps their most brilliant work in respond-
ing to such charges, providing a sophisticated defence of their own materialism in the 
essay ‘Post-Marxism Without Apologies’ (Laclau 1990: 97–132), but neither their 
critics nor they themselves showed much interest in pursuing the resultant line of 
enquiry into the 1990s. Hall, in the meantime, continued to work in a number of veins. 
He was instrumental in developing a tremendously sophisticated model of the rela-
tionship between race and class which was to infl uence an entire generation, inspir-
ing a generation of young artists and fi lm-makers to explore complex questions of 
identity, belonging and exclusion, and re-shaping the ways in which British intellec-
tuals understood the postcolonial status of their own culture (Chen & Morley 1996: 
411–503). He was infl uential in shifting the focus of cultural history and cultural 
studies away from apocalyptic pronouncements about the end of history or narrowly 
economistic accounts of late capitalism, focussing attention instead on the histori-
cal specifi city of emergent and residual forms of modernity (Hall 1992). Perhaps 
most importantly, he remained a key voice on the left arguing for the possibility of 
a populist, democratic, inclusive vision of an alternative modernity to that proposed 
by Thatcher and Reagan (Hall 1988).
Raymond Williams, who died in 1988, had never been enamoured of structural-
ism or post-structuralism and had continued to try to develop his Gramscian cultural 
materialism up until his death. Lawrence Grossberg, who emerged as the key fi gure 
in North American cultural studies, was a former student of Hall’s who had also never 
pursued the post-structuralist line, having argued very early indeed for the effective 
inclusion of Deleuze and Guattari in the cultural studies canon of theorists (Grossberg 
1982). Grossberg’s 1992 volume We Gotta Get Out of This Place was an ambitious 
attempt at the kind of conjunctural analysis which cultural studies had produced little 
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of after Policing the Crisis. Offering an original synthesis of Gramsci, Foucault and 
Deleuze and Guattari, it set out to map the emergence of a conservative structure of 
feeling in American popular culture which paid particular attention to the affective 
power of popular music. Whereas Hall remained closer to post- structuralism in his re-
liance on Saussurian semiotics and post-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, Grossberg’s 
approach in some ways revived Williams’s scepticism towards both psychoanalysis 
and the consequences of ‘the linguistic turn’ (Gilbert 2004b). It seems surprising, 
looked at from one angle, that We Gotta Get Out of This Place is not cited more often 
in the wider fi eld of cultural studies, as its explicitly Deleuzian materialism is very 
much in line with current fashion, and it also represents one of the singular attempts 
to pursue cultural studies’ central vocation: rigourous conjunctural analysis of the in-
tersecting power relationships shaping, and shaped by, contemporary culture. Never-
theless, the moment of its publication was clearly one characterised by a new level of 
intellectual ambition and institutional and geographical reach for the young discipline 
of cultural studies, as well as a new prominence in international cultural studies for 
Grossberg. A large conference which had been held at University of Illinois in April 
1990 marked cultural studies’ full emergence on the North American scene, and the 
788-page volume Cultural Studies (1992), which Grossberg edited with Carry Nelson 
and Paula Treichler, remains to this day the most ambitious snapshot of the discipline 
at any one moment in its history, featuring as it did a vast range of contributors from 
the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the degree to 
which the political tradition which had given birth to cultural studies had been de-
feated was only just beginning to become clear.
Cultural Studies after Communism
At the close of the 1980s, as we have seen, the broader political context underwent 
arguably its greatest transformation since the end of the second world war. The col-
lapse of the soviet system in 1989 marked the fi nal victory of the United States and 
its allies in the Cold War, and the emergence of the unipolar world in which American 
economic and military power would meet with no serious political opposition outside 
of the Islamic enclaves. The initial response to this event on the part of those strands 
of the left associated with the New Left and Marxism Today was almost celebratory1. 
This was hardly surprising. These tendencies had long defi ned themselves in terms 
of their opposition to Stalinism and its undemocratic legacy. The sight of the massed 
citizenry of Eastern European countries taking to the streets to demand, and win, a 
complete transformation of their social system could not fail to warm the hearts of 
any revolutionary. In the medium term, however, the consequences of the collapse of 
communism were to prove far more ambivalent. For most people in Eastern Europe, 
the result was not simply their accession to the Western European world of prosper-
ity and democracy. Instead, across much of the former Soviet Union, the collapse 
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and rapid privatisation of state industries resulted in massive unemployment, almost 
total social breakdown and a drop in average life expectancy for nearly 2 decades. 
On a global level, the United States quickly set to work on two grand projects which 
we must assume it would have engaged in much earlier had the power of the Soviet 
Union not presented them with such an obstacle: the imposition of neoliberalism on 
the rest of the world and the military subjugation of the oil-rich Middle East.
It was apparent by the early 1990s that this situation posed a grave problem for 
the very existence of the political left in the Western world. On a local level, the Com-
munist Party of Great Britain, like many of its European counterparts, tried ineffec-
tually to reinvent itself before effectively ceasing to exist. Marxism Today (which, 
it was revealed—much to the chagrin of its unknowing staff—had always been se-
cretly subsidised by the Soviet Union) folded, and the British left never again had an 
equivalent space within which to debate new ideas. Perhaps more signifi cantly, the 
democratic left now no longer represented a third way between the two great com-
peting systems of centralised socialism and liberal-democratic capitalism. Instead 
it represented only an abstract and practically impotent set of critiques of the one 
dominant social model: liberal capitalism. However, the full extent of this crisis was 
not to be felt until the 1990s were well under way, because the continued electoral 
success of the Conservatives and the Republicans allowed many to continue to hope 
that Democrat or Labour administrations would resume the twin projects of social 
liberalisation and social democratic reform. Many people optimistically assumed 
that these projects had merely been interrupted by the hegemony of the New Right.
The vanity and futility of such hopes may be apparent with hindsight, but in prac-
tice there were good reasons for people in the tradition of the New Left to entertain 
them. Both Clinton and Blair belonged to the generation that came of age in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. What’s more, the ideas of the New Left were well-known 
to have been directly infl uential on key fi gures in both administrations. Blair had 
written for Marxism Today, and one of its key writers in the period immediately 
preceding its closure, Geoff Mulgan, was to become his policy chief when he took 
power in 1997. In the US, fi gures like Robert Reich, Clinton’s secretary of state for 
labor, were generally seen as typical of the New Left generation in their combined 
commitments to egalitarianism, social liberalism and feminism. During the course 
of the 1990s, however, it became apparent that both the constraints of the unipolar 
world order and their own political predilections were driving these politicians and 
their advisors in quite different directions to those aimed at by the New Left or 
even by mainstream supporters of the welfare state. Mulgan, for example, showed 
no commitment to the democratising traditions of the Labour movement, and came 
instead to exemplify a new generation of elite technocrats who were attracted to 
postmodernism’s rejection of utopian thinking but unmoved by its implicit critique 
of all notions of expertise. Loathing political activists, the key generation of young 
politicians and advisers around Blair were nonetheless confi dent of their own ability 
to solve social problems from the centre.
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Where both the Clinton and Blair administrations were to fulfi l some of the hopes 
of the New Left was in their genuine commitment to social liberalisation, making 
signifi cant moves towards the full normalisation of same-sex relationships, encour-
aging mothers to work, and actively encouraging the development of multicultural 
societies. This wasn’t particularly diffi cult. Arguably the key reason as to why both 
the Republicans and Conservatives lost power in the 1990s was that their brand of 
nationalistic social conservatism came to seem increasingly anachronistic in the in-
dividualised world of highly mobile, consumer-focussed advanced capitalism. The 
libertarian values which had once been the preserve of the 1968 generation sat per-
fectly with the new world of diverse and ever-proliferating forms of pleasure, and the 
New Right’s articulation of neoliberal economics with social conservatism no longer 
made political sense in this context. The real political achievement of Clinton and 
Blair was to re-articulate the neoliberal economic agenda to a liberal social agenda. 
By making a few concessions to their traditional supporters (raising public sector 
pay in the United Kingdom, for example), each managed hold together a coalition 
of traditional left-wing constituencies and aspiring, prosperous consumers who no 
longer felt the need to be reassured by the conservative platitudes of a Reagan or a 
Thatcher. In the United States, in contrast to most European countries, this coalition 
has been fl anked to the right by a religiously motivated constituency, whose concerns 
can be articulated to those of a much wider public at times of perceived cultural, 
economic or military crisis, securing support for a conservative regime such as that 
of George W Bush.
Of course, their precarious dependence upon affl uent centre voters who did not 
want to see tax rises of any kind led Clinton and Blair to do very little to extend the 
post-war social democratic project. Blair’s New Labour government, having fl irted 
with variants of communitarian philosophy in the late 1990s, actually took on the 
task of continuing to dismantle the remnants of the welfare state. New Labour be-
came wholly committed to the neoliberal project of extending competition, individu-
alism and market relations into every area of social life, whether the public wanted it 
or not (Leys 2001). The bitter disappointment of the survivors of the New Left was 
palpable. Marxism Today was revived for one special issue in 1998 merely so that 
a collection of its contributors from the 1980s could denounce Blair and his betrayal 
of the left tradition, its cover emblazoned with one word: ‘Wrong’. However, from 
a more detached perspective, we have to ask if such a response was ever fully justi-
fi ed. In the broad context of a unipolar world and an in increasingly interconnected 
global economy, it is not at all clear that Blair or Clinton could have behaved in any 
other way. Their electoral success was not accompanied by any large-scale upsurge in 
political activism amongst a wider public: there were no demonstrations in the streets 
of British or American cities welcoming the dawn of a new era of social democracy.
This might sound like just a humorous image, but it is not intended as such, be-
cause arguably it just such scenes which would have to have been witnessed if Clin-
ton and Blair were ever going to have had a real chance of renewing the social 
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democratic project. The pressure on both governments from institutions committed 
to neoliberalism—all major corporations, the fi nancial markets, the US Federal Re-
serve, the European central banks, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
the newly formed World Trade Organisation and the conservative media, especially 
the vast empire of Rupert Murdoch—was immense. Without countervailing pressure 
from organised labour, mass-membership political parties on the left, and a heavily 
armed block of nominally socialist countries in Eastern Europe and beyond, it is hard 
to see how such pressure could ever have been resisted. From this point of view, the 
complete marginality of the New Left to mainstream politics in the United States and 
the United Kingdom only became fully apparent in the late 1990s, but it had been a 
historical fact since the defeat of the miners strike in the United Kingdom and Jesse 
Jackson’s rainbow coalition in the United States in the early 1980s (indeed, much of 
the American left had given up on the Democratic Party when it failed effectively to 
lead opposition to the Vietnam War, at the end of the 1960s). Panitch and Leys, in 
their detailed study of the historical marginalisation of the Left in the Labour Party, 
have argued persuasively that it was naïve for anyone to believe that the  Labour 
leadership was likely to pursue a New Left agenda after 1983/4, but they point out 
that many did believe in the likelihood of such an outcome (Panitch & Leys 2001: 
211). It was this belief, however mistaken, which continued to inform the political 
imaginary of mainstream cultural studies, until it became fully clear under Blair that 
there was no way this would happen.
The political tradition informing mainstream cultural studies had therefore been 
becoming increasingly detached from any real-world political movements for nearly 
20 years, but the extent of this detachment only became clear in the fi rst years of the 
new millennium. It is ironic then, that the 1990s saw cultural studies sweep through 
the anglophone academy. By the end of the decade, what had been a fashionably 
 cutting-edge but institutionally marginal discipline in the late 1980s had been fully 
established as a recognised fi eld in institutions throughout the English- speaking 
world, taught at every level in its own right, with its own apparatus of journals 
and international conferences, but also informing the mainstream of new research 
and teaching in fi elds as various as sociology, literature, history and fi ne art. Why did 
this happen? Why, at the very moment when the New Left project effectively ended in 
the ignominy of Clinton’s and Blair’s complete capitulation to neoliberalism, did cul-
tural studies as practised by Stuart Hall emerge as arguably the leading paradigm in 
the humanities and social sciences?
Any number of answers to this question have been offered, any number could be 
invented, and none will ever be fully defi nitive. The most pessimistic accounts see 
the two developments as wholly interdependent. Some actually see the radical left 
as having been lured into complicity with neoliberal hegemony by the offer of an 
amusing life of intellectual dilettantism: why bother organising the workers when 
you can be paid a good salary teaching ideology-critique to intelligent and personable 
students? (Frank 2002) Others point to the fact that the politics of cultural studies 
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shifted subtly just as the politics of the New Left did when it was modulated into the 
ideas and practice of Clinton’s New Democrats and Blair’s New Labour: in both cases, 
traditional commitments to the goals of the labour movement were dropped in favour 
of a banal liberalism. Certainly some work in cultural studies has followed this tra-
jectory, simply criticising racism or sexism from a liberal perspective, and therefore 
fi nding itself with no reason to criticise anything of consequence in the world of 
twenty-fi rst-century liberal capitalism, where George W. Bush appeals to feminism 
as justifi cation for attacking the Taliban and neoliberal governments encourage the 
growth of cosmopolitan culture because higher rates of immigration lower the overall 
price of labour. But this is a relatively small tendency in work published as cultural 
studies, most of which is still written from a perspective which is well aware of the 
legacy of egalitarian critiques of capitalism, even if it has no great interest in them; so 
the foregoing is only a partial explanation as to how the institutionalisation of cultural 
studies managed to happen at the same time as the marginalisation of the New Left.
Another explanation is to look at these two related phenomena from a slightly 
different angle. The so-called institutionalisation of cultural studies has to be under-
stood as in part a result of its massive popularity amongst scholars working in the 
humanities and social sciences: this isn’t simply a matter of cultural studies becoming 
institutionalised but also of institutions changing under the impact of cultural studies’ 
programme. One way in which we might explain this popularity is to look at the global 
context in which such scholars now fi nd themselves. From a sociological perspective, 
university teachers and researchers belong to a particular social group: public-sector 
professionals. This group was virtually brought into existence by the post-war expan-
sion of the welfare state and has a natural inclination to support social democratic 
policies: it is, after all, only taxes and government spending on public services which 
pays the salaries of teachers, professors, lecturers, social-workers, local government 
offi cers and (in countries with a socialised health service) health professionals. The 
neoliberal era has seen savage cuts in public spending compared to the post-war 
period, even while the demands of the knowledge economy have seen a massive 
growth in higher education throughout the developed world. The result is that for de-
cades now university teachers have seen their relative salaries cut, their social status 
downgraded and their workloads increased, as have most workers in education and 
in similar service sectors such as public health. At the same time, the social composi-
tion of many of these professions has changed in recent decades, such that they are 
no longer dominated by white males educated at elite educational institutions, as they 
once were. Consequently, it should be no surprise to fi nd that a generation of workers 
in this sector should be far less inclined than their predecessors to act as agents for 
the transmission of mainstream social values and far more likely to adopt positions 
which are critical of the general norms and direction of the culture they inhabit. In 
this sense, the discontented radical attitudes of the New Left and 1968 were only the 
forerunners of a far wider sense of disaffection and marginalisation amongst univer-
sity teachers in the neoliberal world, a disaffection which has encouraged workers in 
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those sectors to look around for more radical perspectives, perspectives which some 
found in New Left–inspired cultural studies. At the same time, the fact that these pro-
fessions attracted many of the most militant members of the post-1968 generation is 
no surprise: even radicals have to make a living, and if they want to do it working in 
the public services rather than in the profi t-oriented private sector, then this is hardly 
surprising as it does not compromise the authenticity of their politics.
The reality is that the situation is complex. No doubt some liberal versions of 
cultural studies merely refl ect the ideological norms of neoliberal culture, as Marxist 
critics of cultural studies often assert (e.g. Žižek 2001). No doubt it is also true that 
the absence of any strong organised opposition to neoliberalism drove some radi-
cals into safe academic careers as opposed to full-time political militancy. Overall, 
however, the rise and institutional success of cultural studies is a consequence of 
the convergence between the ideas and attitudes of the New Left and the attitudes 
of those many university teachers and students whose social situation and political 
background have tended to drive them to the left over the past thirty years. It is in-
teresting to note, then, that university teachers and other public service professionals 
are not the only group of people whose political attitudes have come to resemble 
closely those which took shape amongst the New Left after 1956. The anti-capitalist 
movement which has emerged since the 1990s has also been informed by a very 
similar set of attitudes and approaches.
The implicit affi nities between some strands of cultural studies and the emergent 
anti-capitalist movement have at times been quite striking. Angela McRobbie’s Brit-
ish Fashion Design: Rag Trade or Image Industry (1998) marked a turn away from 
the consumption-oriented studies of fashion and other aspects of contemporary cul-
ture with which much feminist cultural studies had come to be associated, examin-
ing in detail the production practices and working conditions in the industry and the 
ideological mechanisms which legitimated them. The book appeared less than a year 
after Andrew Ross (ed.) No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade and the Rights of Garment 
Workers (1997), and two years before the publication of Naomi Klein’s No Logo, 
much of which shared the concerns of these two books. Perhaps the most signifi cant 
observation to make for our purposes here, however, is that while being in itself an 
extremely substantial piece of work of great topical relevance, McRobbie’s book 
makes no reference to the emergent political movement against sweated labour and 
the commercial exploitation of popular culture documented in Ross’s and Klein’s 
books. The organisational divergence between New Left cultural studies and those 
wider political movements which continue to share its concerns is surely well 
illustrated here.
In fact, if we were to look at a broad sample of work in cultural studies from, say, 
the mid-1990s to the present, then we would see something of a change in the way 
in which new themes and issues have emerged into cultural studies from that which 
marked the earlier phases. Broadly speaking, this shift has to do with the way in which 
cultural studies researchers chose their objects and approaches, and it involves a 
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shift from a situation in which explicitly political motives are driving those choices to 
one in which a more diffuse project of generally expanding the range of cultural stud-
ies’ possible objects, and responding to changes in the larger world and in the wider 
intellectual environment, is the driving force. So it is not the concerns of new or even 
existing political movements which is represented by such work, but a general effort 
to map the emerging contours of the present. The rise of digital culture, the globalisa-
tion of world culture, issues raised by the urbanisation of life on earth, multicultural-
ism, cosmopolitanism and their consequences, the emergence of new trends in music 
or fashion, and so on; these have been the types of new objects and issues to preoc-
cupy cultural studies over the past decade or so. At the same time the massive institu-
tional success of cultural studies has involved not just an expansion of the discipline 
itself, but a great deal of exchange between cultural studies and contiguous disciplines 
which have borrowed from it: media studies, geography and sociology, for example, 
have all taken on board many of cultural studies’ concerns and approaches such that 
there is not much discernible difference now between much work in those areas and 
specialist branches of cultural studies. Cultural studies since the 1970s has drawn on 
continental philosophy for the formulation of its basic theoretical concepts, and the 
continuing exploration of different strands of philosophy, especially recent French 
philosophy, has become an autonomous project within cultural studies that is more-or-
less devoid of explicit political motivation. In addition, since the early 1990s there has 
been a steady stream of work refl ecting on cultural studies’ history and the politics of 
its competing paradigms, both consolidating  earlier work and refl ecting upon some of 
the discipline’s implicit assumptions (e.g. Harris 1992; McGuigan 1992; Frow 1995; 
McRobbie 2005). The collection of essays by and about Hall edited by David Morley 
and Kuan-Hsing Chen under the title Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies (1996) 
is the only volume to offer anything like a representative selection of Hall’s contribu-
tions to cultural studies and cultural theory, and as such represents something of 
a coming-of-age for the discipline. More recently, works such as Byrne and McQuil-
lan’s Deconstructing Disney (1998) and Gary Hall’s Culture in Bits (2002) arguably 
marked the emergence of a new generation of cultural studies writers who had been as 
infl uenced by the impact of post-structuralism on literary studies as by the legacy of 
the New Left and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, explicitly deploying 
tropes and techniques borrowed from Derridean deconstruction in order to question 
some of the received assumptions of the discipline. Similarly, Joanna Zylinska’s The 
Ethics of Cultural Studies (2005) consolidated this trend, while Paul Bowman’s Post-
Marxism Vs. Cultural Studies (2007) marks an important intervention, arguing for 
a deep affi nity between deconstruction and the persistent self-interrogation of Hall’s 
form of cultural studies. At the same time, writers working within a more sociological 
tradition have opened up new areas of inquiry at the borders between cultural stud-
ies, political economy, anthropology and social psychology (e.g. Couldry 1999; Hes-
mondhalgh 2002; Hills 2002), and in particular, these writers have worked to chart the 
increasing integration of the capitalist economy with all forms of culture. In addition 
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to all this, the full impact of post-1968 French philosophy has arguably only begun to 
be felt recently. Since the publication of Brian Massumi’s seminal A User’s Guide to 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1992), young scholars with a particular interest in pos-
sible relationships between new science and cultural theory have ploughed a radical 
Deleuzian furrow at the very edge of the cultural studies fi eld (e.g. Parisi 2004; Fuller 
2005). What is remarkable is that there has been as yet virtually no exchange between 
this strand and work more directly committed to radical political analysis.
Now, this can create an impression, to anyone who does not bother to read the 
work in question, that cultural studies has abandoned its political project and simply 
become a part of the culture it once criticised. Cultural studies is accused of having 
been reduced to the status of a kind of journalism which simply reports on the su-
perfi cially changing world but does not show any desire to critique its fundamental 
structures of power. In some cases this is true, but in most cases of work that gets 
published under the heading of cultural studies it is not. Any study of the works just 
mentioned, or any survey of the contents of journals like Cultural Studies or New 
Formations over the past 12 years will reveal that most of the conceptual, political 
and ethical assumptions of such work are clearly inherited from the legacy of cul-
tural studies’ evolution through the 1970s and 1980s. Most of this work is clearly 
informed by a broadly egalitarian and libertarian politics and seeks to understand 
new cultural phenomena, or to use new philosophical ideas, from the point of view of 
such a politics. What happens much more rarely than in the past, however, is any at-
tempt to specify the theoretical and political coordinates of the work being done and 
their relationship to any wider political confi gurations or projects. Theoretical tools 
and approaches are simply deployed much as they have been for some time. The 
consequence of this is that cultural studies today tends to work with a set of political 
and intellectual refl exes inherited from key moments in the past, be it the Marxism of 
the 1970s, the voluntarism of the cultural populist 1980s or the under-theorised lib-
ertarianism of the anti-essentialist moment. None of these perspectives are currently 
useless or irrelevant, and it is surely laudable that most of the actual work that gets 
done in cultural studies is still informed by a resolutely political critique of capital-
ism, individualism, patriarchy, colonialism and hierarchy in general. More than this, 
a good deal of work in the fi eld continues to undertake the discipline’s core task of 
mapping the emergent conjuncture from the perspective of an egalitarian politics. 
Figures such as Lawrence Grossberg, Andrew Ross and Henry Giroux, or the British 
social policy expert John Clarke (one of the co-authors of Policing the Crisis), still 
strive to map the coordinates of power which shape neoliberal culture using the ana-
lytical methods of cultural studies. It is therefore diffi cult to see how commentators 
such as Frank, Klein and Žižek could continue to parody cultural studies as a wholly 
institutionalised form of cultural liberalism, if they actually bothered to survey the 
fi eld in any detail. However, there is one possible reason why commentators such as 
this do not feel inclined to undertake such surveys. For although such work clearly 
shares the concerns of the new movements against neoliberalism, very little of it 
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tries to engage with them directly. It is this situation which following chapters of this 
volume will seek to address.
We can, however, point to one rather different example of the institutionalisation 
of cultural studies, wherein its political character did seem to change in response to 
the needs of state institutions. In Australia in the 1990s, cultural studies was actively 
supported by a Labor government which was committed to the implementation of 
multiculturalism as a broad programme, encouraging positive attitudes to cultural 
diversity across a range of spheres, from education to arts policy to broadcasting to 
local government. Cultural studies, partly insofar as it was understood to be a dis-
cipline in which the challenges faced by a multicultural society could be addressed 
head-on—but also insofar as it was seen to be informed largely by a set of attitudes 
which were amenable to the priorities of offi cial multiculturalism—was viewed by 
the government as something to be encouraged. In this context, a number of cultural 
studies writers became interested in making a direct engagement with debates in 
cultural policy (a rather amorphous category including arts policy, some aspects of 
heritage and education policy, etc.), and a school of writers quickly emerged, central 
to which was the British veteran of the Open University, Tony Bennett. Theoreti-
cally, these writers were heavily infl uenced by a particular reading of the work of 
Michel Foucault which tended to stress its anti-utopian dimension as opposed to its 
anarchistic appeals to the politics of ‘bodies and pleasures’. Broadly speaking, these 
writers accused the mainstream of cultural studies of a naïve romanticism, which 
manifested itself in the humanistic attitudes of the early Raymond Williams as well 
as the utopian politics of the later New Left and writers such as Stuart Hall. Instead of 
allying itself to progressive social movements, fi gures such as Bennett have argued 
that cultural studies would do better to accept that all pedagogic practices are forms 
of disciplinary practice (and as such are not necessarily malevolent) and that cultural 
studies can be of most use when it allies itself to specifi c fi elds of cultural policy 
practice rather than vainly dreaming of social revolution and counter-hegemonic 
wars of position.
The trouble with this work—of which the exemplary case is Bennett’s book 
Culture: A Reformer’s Science—is that it invariably fails to specify the ethical or 
political position from which it proposes to engage in specifi c, discrete, non-utopian 
forms of government. This work deploys a rhetoric which seeks to distance itself 
from any naïve revolutionary pretensions, for example, in Bennett’s titular appeal to 
reform (the traditionally conceived opposite of revolution, and a word with a long and 
honourable legacy in British political history, evoking memories of the pragmatic, 
piecemeal, but ultimately effective programmes for social change enacted by vari-
ous local and national governments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). The 
question is: reform of what, for what, by whom? Bennett never even addresses these 
questions, and in the process takes a position which is in fact precisely analogous 
to that of Geoff Mulgan and other proponents of the Third Way (the name given to 
the mixture of mild technocratic reformism and social liberalism typical of the Blair 
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and Clinton administrations: see Giddens 1998). Claiming to have outgrown the 
childish vestments of political ideology, such fi gures present themselves as carefully, 
pragmatically solving social problems one at a time as they arise, unencumbered by 
any overarching vision or grand analysis. Such writing remains apparently oblivious 
to its own ideological status. Put very crudely, the most basic concept of ideology to 
be derived from the Marxist tradition understands ideology as a world-view which 
expresses the particular interests of a specifi c social group as if it was universal truth. 
In this case, it could hardly be clearer that the privileged technocrats of the Third 
Way or Australian Cultural Policy Studies had a great deal to gain by popularising 
the idea that social problems could be solved by experts in specifi c fi elds of knowl-
edge without any need for recourse to old-fashioned utopian ideas like justice or de-
mocracy. Whether the people who put forward such ideas are truly unaware of their 
obviously self-promoting, ideological status is unclear: ideology which really wants 
to persuade people to believe in it never advertises itself as ideology and always tries 
to pass itself of as common sense (Gramsci 1971; Barthes 1972).
Even on their own terms, the Cultural Policy writers never address the question 
which becomes immediately apparent as soon as one moves out of the local (and now 
historically superseded) context of Australia in the 1990s: what do you do, as a Cul-
tural Policy Studies scholar, if you don’t have a sympathetic government keen to 
implement your policies? Under these conditions—which have obtained throughout 
the English-speaking world, including Australia, for most of the past 40 years–the 
pragmatism of the reformers comes to seem even more naïve than that utopianism of 
the revolutionaries. For what use is a mild-mannered technocrat whose policy sug-
gestions are entirely ignored by government? These writers are not stupid, however. 
In practice, it seems clear that they do not trouble themselves greatly over this issue 
because in fact the politics which informs their perspectives is largely hegemonic in 
the developed world. Although it is never specifi ed, what is clearly implicit in the 
priorities and attitudes of the Cultural Policy scholars is that their politics is more-
or-less that of the Third Way. That is to say; promoting a liberal cultural and social 
politics, and a range of state interventions which seek to mitigate the worst social 
effects of neoliberalism, without challenging its fundamental premises, is in fact the 
implicit goal of their proposals. As such, it is these so-called Cultural Policy Reform-
ers far more than the reviled cultural populists of the 1980s who actively promote 
a version of cultural studies which would put it fully at the service of current ruling 
elites and their political projects.
However, the defenders of this position have a very powerful response to make 
to such criticisms, and it is simply this: what is the alternative? In the early 1980s, 
when the Soviet Union still existed, and many hoped that it would undergo demo-
cratic reform without capitulating to capitalism, when the fi rst wave of neoliberalism 
in the developed world was provoking fi erce resistance and the election of radical 
socialist governments in countries such as France and Nicaragua, it might have made 
sense to ally oneself to the labour movement and the socialist tradition. Theoretically, 
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it made good sense to ally one’s work to Marxism when Marxism was still the phi-
losophy nominally informing some of the most powerful political institutions in the 
world, institutions with whom one broadly wished to take side against American 
imperialism and capitalist exploitation. Today however, the real political struggle 
in the developed world is not between capitalism and socialism (which has been 
comprehensively defeated, however much we may regret the fact) but between the 
socially liberal, forward-looking, mildly egalitarian administration of capitalism by 
fi gures such as Clinton, Blair (and Mulgan, and Bennett) and the violent, national-
istic, fundamentalist politics of the American religious right, the European far right, 
Zionism, Islamism and Hindutva. In this context, what does it mean to ally oneself 
with a political perspective more radical than the socially liberal egalitarian mode of 
capitalism, except to indulge in meaningless and impotent abstractions?
This is not an argument made explicitly by such writers, or by those celebrants of 
popular culture and consumer agency (e.g. Mort 1996; Hermes 1996) whose work 
implicitly endorses the hegemonic norms of neoliberal culture, but it is one implicit 
in the positions that they take, and it must in turn be taken seriously. For the situation 
which these writers have really responded to is simply the end of that political proj-
ect which gave a coherent political identity to the mainstream of cultural studies for 
forty years: the New Left. The inaugural moments of the Clinton and Blair adminis-
trations represented the last times when anybody entertained serious hopes that the 
ideas of the New Left would have any real impact, however indirect and diluted, on 
mainstream politics, and those hopes have been comprehensively crushed. While the 
egalitarian, collectivist aspects of New Left thinking have been wholly marginalised, 
its libertarianism and social liberalism have been largely incorporated into the hege-
monic common sense of our times. Today, no serious candidate for political offi ce 
in Britain could publicly espouse the view that people of different ethnicities cannot 
live together peacefully, that homosexuality is a perversion and a natural crime, or 
that women with children should not work; and amongst the advanced capitalist 
societies it is only in the United States that such views still have any currency in the 
political mainstream. It is true that the global social dislocation produced by neolib-
eralism is now provoking a range of authoritarian state measures on the part of gov-
ernment in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia—measures which, 
in targeting terrorists, immigrants and asylum seekers, are all aimed at regulating the 
mobility of the poor—but opposition to these measures comes from the libertarian 
right and the liberal tradition more than from the tradition of the political left.
The New Left can be seen as having achieved some partial victories. For example, 
it helped popularise a critique of racism in institutions such as the police force, which 
has become part of offi cial discourse in the United Kingdom (Marlow & Loveday 
2000), and it transformed university curricula through the success of cultural stud-
ies. But in broader political terms, its project appears to be fi nished. In the United 
Kingdom, the great task it had set itself had been the modernisation and democ-
ratisation of the labour movement and its political institutions. In the late 1980s it 
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had seemed conceivable that this goal might actually be achieved. Instead, Blair’s 
so-called reforms of the 1990s saw the Labour party modernised so as to make it 
a compliant agent of neoliberal governance, with almost all power to participate in 
the administration and decision-making of the party removed from ordinary mem-
bers, and a commitment to the full neoliberal programme at the heart of the Labour 
government’s agenda. The direct conclusion drawn by Angela McRobbie is that 
‘left-academic endeavours, like cultural studies, must rely more on the academic en-
vironment and the university for their continued existence . . . Voices like that of Hall 
now have to function as “productive singularities”, and there is a certain loneliness 
in such distinctiveness’ (McRobbie 2005: 38). Does this mean that those writers and 
scholars who have worked in the mainstream of cultural studies from a perspective 
directly informed by the agendas of the New Left are now entirely isolated, forced to 
chose between a pragmatic accommodation to liberal capitalism or complete political 
irrelevance?
Not necessarily. For while they may yet have had little impact on electoral politics 
in the developed world, the years since the end of the cold war have seen the emer-
gence of a range of political tendencies informed by just the same values and ideas as 
the New Left. Perhaps most striking has been the emergence of the Green movement, 
and in particular the Green parties of Western Europe. It’s striking that in the United 
Kingdom, for example, the Green Party’s programme and organisational procedures 
are directly informed by New Left thinking, unlike any other large membership or-
ganisation in the country. Although there are strong conservative strands within the 
environmentalist movement, including both authoritarian traditions and attitudes 
rooted in the largely anti-political tradition of conservative scepticism, Green poli-
tics is dominated by attitudes and priorities which in, many cases, derive directly 
from the experiences of the New Lefts and 1968 (for example, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, 
the most famous spokesman for the Paris Students in May 1968, eventually became 
a Green MP). The Greens’ deep questioning of the fundamental values and orienta-
tions of contemporary culture and their typical commitment to a politics which con-
nects libertarianism with egalitarianism and communitarianism all point to a strong 
affi nity with the politics of the New Left, as does the historic Green commitment to 
feminism. At the same time, key fi gures in the evolution of Cultural Theory have 
written on ecological themes, most notably Raymond Williams and Félix Guattari 
(Williams 1973; Guattari 1989). Despite all this, there has been little signifi cant en-
gagement between the remnants of the New Left, key fi gures in cultural studies, and 
green politics, despite some notable exceptions (e.g. Wheeler 2006). In the United 
Kingdom, there has been a gradual infl ux of left-wing activists from the Labour party 
into the Green party, but joining the Greens has only been a minority response even 
from disaffected leftists, amongst whom a general sense of despondent disengage-
ment is a much more typical response—a response that has effectively typifi ed the 
political current most associated with cultural studies. At the same time, the lack of 
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any apparent resonance between Green politics and its countercultural attitudes and 
the attitudes of the vast majority of the public cannot leave anyone trained in the 
Gramscian tradition with much hope as to its capacity to build the kinds of coalition 
needed for radical social change.
The Green parties, however, are only one manifestation of a far wider envi-
ronmental movement which to some extent includes everybody who has ever re-
cycled some paper or cycled to work. At the same time, the more militant sections 
this wider environmental movement intersects with a range of political movements 
which have emerged since the early 1990s to challenge or protest the unmitigated 
hegemony of corporate power in the era of neoliberalism. From the new forms of 
democratic socialism which have emerged in Latin America to the radical environ-
mentalism of the British anti-roads movement of the 1990s, from the actions which 
shut down the World Trade Organization meeting at Seattle in 1999 to the World 
Social Forum, a range of movements and activities has emerged which is not bound 
together by a single ideology or vision of the future but by a rejection of neoliberal 
hegemony. Although much is often made of the diversity and incoherence of these 
movements, of the absence of any single ideology unifi ying them, this is clearly 
a somewhat disingenuous claim on the part of both supporters and critics of the 
‘movement of movements’. The fact is that all of the many diverse and discontinu-
ous movements and projects participating in the World Social Forum, for example, 
are informed by a broad set of shared values, without which it would be impos-
sible for them to join in rejecting not just neoliberalism but all of the authoritarian 
and conservative alternatives to it. These values may be loose and general, but, 
crucially, they involve the combined commitment to egalitarianism, libertarianism, 
feminism, democracy and communitarianism which has been absolutely typical of 
the New Lefts.
We can recognise this convergence even more clearly if we consider the program-
matic commitments of cultural studies set out in one of the most thoughtful consid-
erations of the discipline to have appeared in recent years. In Inside Culture, Nick 
Couldry (2000) proposes the following fi ve principles as informing all work in the 
cultural studies tradition (which, I would stress, we should specify as the New Left 
cultural studies tradition):
The fi rst principle involves valuing what all members of a ‘culture’—any culture—have 
to say, in their own voice and not as spoken for by others ( p. 37).
Cultural studies has to be a space for both speaking and listening ( p. 38).
Cultural studies, however, should involve not only dialogue, but refl exivity . . . includ-
ing refl ection about the means through which all the voices in the dialogue have been 
formed, and the conditions which underlie the production of the space of cultural studies 
itself (p. 38).
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In looking at how voices and cultures are formed, it must adopt a materialist perspective 
(p. 39).
Cultural studies must be an empowering practice, a practice which acts directly upon 
the conditions of culture to change them (p. 39).
The overlap between these principles and those embodied in the founding charter of 
the World Social Forum (set out in the following chapter) is striking.
The survivors, legatees and descendants of the New Lefts do then fi nd themselves 
today with a choice. They can accept a position of lonely isolation, or they can ally 
themselves to the neoliberal project of cultural liberalisation. But a third option is 
available: to explore the extensive common ground between the intellectual legacy 
of the New Left and the aims and values of the emergent anti-capitalist movement. 
It is this third option which the rest of this book is going to explore in detail. How-
ever, undertaking such a task is not so simple as it might initially sound. On the one 
hand, it is not at all clear what the anti-capitalist movement is, or even if it really 
exists outside of the imagination of journalists and a tiny number of activists. If it 
does exist, then the fact that it has largely only been participated in consciously by 
activists raises all kinds of questions about how people engaged in other lines of 
activity—cultural theorists and cultural studies scholars, for example—might ally 
themselves to it. Certainly not just by dogmatically declaring themselves its parti-
sans: as we have seen already, cultural studies has always been in relations of critical 
dialogue with the political movements it has been related to. As I will discuss later 
on, any political movement which is made up only of its activists has a problem—as 
without a large number of passive but committed supporters, no movement has ever 
changed anything—and one of the great problems for anti-capitalism today is fi nding 
meaningful points of connection with supporters who are not full-time activists. This 
also brings us to around to another question: are there any reasons for supporters and 
activists within the anti-capitalist movement to be interested in the legacy of cultural 
studies? I think so. On the one hand the sheer richness of the intellectual legacy of 
the New Left and the several decades of political experience which have informed it 
means that this is a resource which anti-capitalists would do well to draw on, given 
that the values and aims informing it have always been absolutely compatible with 
those of contemporary anti-capitalism. On the other hand, cultural studies has had a 
historically unique relationship to radical social movements, insofar as it has always 
been concerned with the question of what it might mean to think about everyday life 
and the whole complex tapestry of contemporary culture from the point of view of 
the values and aims of such movements, and anti-capitalism today is badly in need 
of some serious refl ection on this set of issues. The rest of this book will ultimately 
be concerned with exploring this set of possibilities: asking what it might involve to 
deploy a position in contemporary cultural theory which activates some of the values 
and priorities of the anti-capitalist movement in the way that cultural studies has 
historically activated the concerns of the New Left and the movements associated 
A Political History of Cultural Studies: The Politics of Defeat • 73
with it; asking also what the potential strengths and weaknesses of the anti-capitalist 
movement might be from the point of view of the New Left tradition; and above all 
seeing how far cultural studies can be used to usefully map the terrain on which the 
anti-capitalist movement must fi ght. To begin that task, we have to ask in some detail 
what the anti-capitalist movement actually is.
Note
1.  See, for example (Laclau 1990: xi–xvi) or (Bobbio 1989). It is important to note 
that many such writers, such as Laclau, have themselves subsequently criticised 
the celebratory tone of this moment.
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Another World is Possible: 
The Anti-Capitalist Movement
Anti-Capitalism?
Since the mid-1990s opposition to the global hegemony of neoliberal institutions and 
the corporate interests which they serve has grown immensely. This movement is 
often called anticapitalism, anti-capitalism or the anti-capitalist movement. The name 
anti-capitalism is a problematic name for several reasons; however, it is the name that 
I am going to use, and whose implications we are going to explore, for the simple rea-
son that it is the name used by the most comprehensive and articulate works to docu-
ment this movement in any coherent way (i.e. Tormey 2005; Notes from Nowhere 
2003; etc.). This chapter will not try to offer an exhaustive documentary account of 
the movement—partly because these works have done that job better than I could—
although it will delineate what I think to be its most novel and notable features.
Not much can be said with any certainty about this movement. Indeed, the very 
existence of a coherent anti-capitalist movement is not something that all commenta-
tors would assent to. For example it is doubtful that any rigourous investigation of 
the term movement, such as one would fi nd in the academic fi eld of social move-
ment studies, would be able to discern a coherent anti-capitalist movement in the 
United Kingdom1. Since the mid-1990s, a number of political formations have arisen 
around the world which seek to oppose the imposition of neoliberal policies such 
as the World Trade Organisation and the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
The World Social Forum has come to be widely recognised as a point where these 
oppositional formations converge. How far these formations have anything in com-
mon, how far they represent a set of new developments rather than continuations 
and survivals from the past, and how far they can be said to cohere suffi ciently in 
their objectives and priorities to be described accurately as a movement, is not at all 
certain (Tormey 2005: 38–70; Starr 2000).
A variety of terms have been used to describe this possibly hypothetical move-
ment. The fi rst name to be widely circulated in the press was the anti-globalisation 
movement, because it was seen as specifi cally opposing the globalisation agenda of 
the World Trade Organisation, which has been characterised by the drive to liberalise 
world trade at every level, irrespective of the local social consequences. The term 
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 anti-globalisation movement led many observers and commentators to assume that 
protestors against the World Trade Organisation and enforced neoliberalism were 
opposed to the intermixing and hybridisation of local cultures, the erosion of state 
control over borders and the mobility of people, and the generally cosmopolitan 
and internationalist outlook which are all associated with globalisation. While this 
may be true of some elements of the movement, it is clearly not typical of the vast 
majority of participants, who see themselves as opposed not to the general prin-
ciple of international exchange and a weakening of national borders, but to the situ-
ation in which these processes are driven solely by and for corporate interests. In 
its place, some activists have sought to assert their own internationalism by arguing 
that theirs is a movement for ‘globalisation from below’ or an ‘alternative globalisa-
tion’. In France, in particular, the terms altermondialisme (literally ‘alter- globalism’) 
and mouvement altermondialiste (‘alter-globalist movement’) have come into wide-
spread use. Others have argued, less infl uentially, that the movement cannot be simply 
a movement against something; alternative names such as global justice movement 
or the pro-democracy movement have been suggested. Such titles recognise two key 
facts: that the movement shares a common goal of defending the capacity of people 
collectivity to determine their own destinies in the face of threats to that capacity 
from concentrations of corporate power; and that there are many groups broadly op-
posed to capitalism (e.g. Moslem Jihadists) who are not part of the movement and 
share none of its goals.
In subsequent chapters we will explore in more depth some of the issues raised 
here, but we cannot entirely overlook them for now. Firstly, we have the problem of 
defi ning exactly what it means to be anti-capitalist. This is a particularly tricky issue, 
as some may regard anti-capitalism as involving the wholesale rejection of the exist-
ing social order and a determination to replace it with a wholly different one, while 
others may see anti-capitalism simply as a matter of limiting corporate power or op-
posing the implementation of the neoliberal programme for capitalist governance, 
which imposes market relations even where they are not wanted. The potential con-
stituency for the anti-capitalist movement can be seen as much bigger or much smaller 
depending on which of these defi nitions of anti-capitalism we accept. At the same 
time, the general reluctance to make any attempt to unite the movement behind a com-
mon programme belies the extent to which it is clearly united by some consistently 
shared values. Probably the most authoritative statement of these values is the Charter 
of Principles of the World Social Forum, which makes clear that, at the very least, a 
commitment to democracy and a certain egalitarianism is central to the philosophy 
which informs it (World Social Forum 2002). In its commitment to these values, the 
anti-capitalist movement is clearly distinguishable from the other major forms of op-
position to global neoliberal hegemony: nationalism and religious fundamentalism.
At this stage it’s worth refl ecting that the term capitalism does not necessarily mean 
the same thing to all people, and as such, neither does the term anti-capitalism. Broadly 
speaking, we can distinguish between an understanding of capitalism as a particular set 
Another World is Possible: The Anti-Capitalist Movement • 77
of socio-economic practices and the social relations which they engender, reproduce, 
and come to depend on, and an understanding of capitalism as a total social, cultural, 
economic and political system to which those practices are central but which cannot 
be reduced to them. The political implications of this distinction are profound. From 
the second point of view, to oppose capitalism must mean to oppose an entire social 
system and to seek to replace it with an alternative: this is the view associated with the 
tradition of revolutionary communism derived from the ideas of Marx, to which Le-
ninism was so central in the twentieth century, and there certainly are remnants of the 
Leninist left who now seek to attach themselves to the anti-capitalist movement (e.g. 
Callinicos 2003). From the fi rst point of view, on the other hand, to be anti- capitalist 
might simply be to be opposed to the hegemony of capitalist practises—buying, selling, 
commodifi cation, investment for profi t—within all areas of social life. Now, within the 
revolutionary tradition, this attitude is associated with reformism: political beliefs and 
projects which seek to ameliorate the worst effects of capitalism on the society and the 
environment but without transforming the fundamental social relations of capitalism. 
From the alternative perspective, however, it is not necessary to accept the distinction 
between revolutionary and reformist politics. Instead it is at least theoretically possible 
to take up a position which might or might not advocate the abolition of capitalist insti-
tutions and their substitution with alternatives, depending on what is feasible at a given 
juncture. If contemporary anti-capitalism has a novel feature, then it is the tendency 
and the potential within the movement to take up positions which are militant in their 
opposition to specifi c institutions (e.g. the World Trade Organisation), policies (e.g. the 
privatisation of public services) and projects (the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices, for example). Although contemporary anti-capitalist groups are often prepared 
to fi ght institutions by any means necessary, but they are not committed to the arguably 
impossible goal of overturning all existing social relations and are not committed to 
a singular vision of an alternative. This positions is well summed up by the Brazilian 
social theorist Robert Unger, when he writes that
To be progressive today is to insist upon crossing the boundaries of the established in-
stitutional settlement in a democratising direction. Anyone who accepts the established 
institutional framework as the horizon within which interests and ideals—including 
egalitarian ideals—must be pursued is not a progressive. The European social demo-
cratic parties are not progressive. A pessimistic, socially concerned, but institutionally 
conservative reformism is not progressive. The error lies in believing that the alternative 
to resignation is the total substitution of one “system” by another. (Unger 1998: 295)
This is certainly the politics which seems to typify the participants in and the found-
ing principles of the World Social Forum. Another writer who in recent times has tried 
to map out ways in which it might be possible to move beyond the institutional limita-
tions of neoliberal capitalism and liberal democracy is Michael Albert. He proposes 
replacing the institutions of liberal capitalism with institutions which would enable 
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the emergence of a participatory economy in which key economic decisions were the 
outcome of egalitarian processes of collective decision-making, involving
 • social rather than private ownership
 •  nested worker and consumer councils and balanced job complexes rather than cor-
porate workplace organisation
 • remuneration for effort and sacrifi ce rather than for property, power, or output.
 • participatory planning rather than markets or central planning
 • and participatory self-management rather than class rule. (Albert 2003: 84)
Again, what is distinctive about Albert’s position is that it effectively abjures the 
distinction between revolutionary and reformist approaches which was typical of 
twentieth-century radicalism, in its pursuit of a radically democratic socialism. It’s 
this willingness to push back the boundaries of democracy without insisting on a sin-
gular imagined future which most strikingly characterises the politics of the World 
Social Forum.
From Chiapas to Seattle
The World Social Forum is probably the phenomenon which best justifi es any refer-
ence to anti-capitalism as a coherent movement; it is the place where the ‘movement 
of movements’ comes together (Sen, Anand, Escober & Waterman 2003). To under-
stand how this has come about, however, we have to understand something of the 
history of its constituent elements. The most commonly cited starting point for this 
process of resistance and convergence was the fi rst day of the Zapatista insurgency 
in Chiapas, Mexico, 1 January 1994. The Zapatistas, who take their name from the 
Mexican revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919) remain in many ways 
the ideal symbol of everything that is distinctive about the anti-capitalist movement. 
They are a radical movement based amongst the indigenous Mayan community of 
rural Chiapas, principally concerned with defending a traditional way of life. They 
are clear and explicit that what threatens the traditional way of life is the neoliberal 
programme embodied in the North American Free Trade Agreement. They argue 
for the right of communities to self-determination, the right to practice rigourously 
participative forms of democracy, the right to defend a largely communalist way of 
life and the right explicitly to reject the vanguardism of the revolutionary communist 
tradition. So the Zapatistas are clearly and indefatigably anti-capitalist and pro-
democracy, yet they actively reject much of the revolutionary tradition, with its in-
sistence on class as the only basis for a meaningful political identity and its tendency 
towards centralising and authoritarian political methods.
For all these reasons, the Zapatistas almost seem to have sprung from the pages of 
post-structuralist and postmodernist political theory: as we will see, the resonances 
between Zapatista practice and radical democratic theory are at times uncanny. But 
there is still more. The Zapatistas main spokesperson is the mysterious and  beguiling 
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Subcomandante Marcos, a former Marxist revolutionary whose true identity is not 
known with absolute certainty (although it is no longer regarded as much of a se-
cret), partly thanks to the balaclava which he never removes in public. Marcos’s 
deliberate anonymity and his adoption of a different moniker (delegado Zero) in the 
Zapatista tour of Mexico which paralleled the 2006 general election are all seen as 
gestures designed deliberately to defl ect the possibility of any kind of personality 
cult developing around Marcos, and as a consequent rejection of any hierarchical 
or individualist value system. The content of Marcos’s public pronouncements and 
writings, while rarely ambiguous in their meanings (‘I shit on all the revolutionary 
vanguards of this planet’ being a typical opening line) are deliberately evocative and 
poetic in character. Marcos himself has spoken ironically of his thinking as having 
been ‘thoroughly spoilt by literature; its irony and humour’ (Mertes 2003 14) before 
he ever got around to reading Marx and Engels, in a manner decidedly reminiscent 
of Jacques Derrida’s persistent problematisation of the boundaries between philoso-
phy and literature, or the revolutionary poetics of the Russian Formalists and Julia 
Kristeva (Derrida 1982; Kristeva 1984; Bennett 1979). Most importantly, his writ-
ings are obviously the product of an encounter between modern leftist thought and 
the traditional beliefs and practices of the Mayans which refuses the modern impera-
tive to assume the superiority of the former or any primitivist reverence for the latter. 
The impact of the new social movements is very clear on Marcos, who has spoken 
more than once, for example, of the need to reject the traditional homophobia of the 
Latin American left. In his most famous statement, Marcos declared that
Marcos is gay in San Francisco, black in South Africa, an Asian in Europe, a Chicano in 
San Ysidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, a Mayan Indian in the streets 
of San Cristobal, a gang member in Neza, a rocker in the National University, a Jew in 
Nazi Germany, an ombudsman in the Defense Ministry, a communist in the post-Cold 
War era, an artist without gallery or portfolio. . . . A pacifi st in Bosnia, a housewife alone 
on Saturday night in any neighborhood in any city in Mexico, a striker in the CTM, a re-
porter writing fi ller stories for the back pages, a single woman on the subway at 10 pm, 
a peasant without land, an unemployed worker . . . an unhappy student, a dissident amid 
free market economics, a writer without books or readers, and, of course, a Zapatista in 
the mountains of southeast Mexico. So Marcos is a human being, any human being, in 
this world. Marcos is all the exploited, marginalised and oppressed minorities, resisting 
and saying, ‘Enough’!
(qtd. in Mertes 2003: 3–16)
At the same time, the Zapatistas explicitly reject any claim to be able to speak on be-
half of any other group of individual. According to their own view, the Zapatistas do 
not represent the oppressed and marginalised of the globe, but they are in some sense 
in solidarity and in common cause with them, insofar as they are victims of neoliber-
alism or any other anti-democratic project for the perpetuation or implementation of 
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hierarchical power relationships. The relative success of the Zapatistas in maintaining 
the autonomy of the region under their control has been an inspiration to the many 
sympathisers around the world who have been following the course of their campaign 
via the internet since they began to use it to publicize their cause in the 1990s (Bur-
bach, Robinson & Jeffries 2001).
It is easy enough to see the Zapatistas as the fi rst manifestation of a new, post– 
Cold War, postmodern type of anti-capitalist politics. However, there are clearly 
many antecedents to Zapatista thought and practice, not least in the tradition of the 
New Lefts and the various strands of the 1968 generation. The complex relation-
ships (actual and imaginary, practical and theoretical) between the Anglo-American 
New Lefts and Latin American socialist movements would warrant a whole book of 
their own, and we won’t have space to investigate them here (see, for example, Raby 
2006). More important for us to note here is the fact that several strands of contem-
porary anti-capitalism have a clear line of continuity stretching back from the 1990s 
to the 1960s and even earlier.
To some extent, the Zapatistas belong to a current of resistant movements which 
have emerged in the post-colonial context of recent decades: the movements of so-
called indigenous peoples. This is a loose and problematic term, but broadly it refers 
to the movements of those peoples living in pre-modern village or tribal communities 
who have been displaced, marginalised or threatened by colonialism and its conse-
quences. For example, the struggle of the Native American peoples to defend their 
culture and their land began almost with the fi rst European colonisations. What has 
changed since the global wave of decolonisation of the mid-twentieth century is that 
there has been a much wider recognition within hegemonic cultures of the justice 
of such people’s claims. Consider that even until the early 1960s, it was routine for 
Hollywood to depict Native Americans as the savage enemies of heroic white set-
tlers on the Western frontier: a depiction which at best would not be taken seriously 
today, and at worst would provoke outraged condemnation. The worldwide process 
of decolonisation and anti-colonial struggle, the civil rights and anti-racist move-
ments which have re-shaped attitudes in many countries since the 1960s (but which 
interestingly have very few links with the anti-capitalist movement at the present 
time), and even the infl uence of cultural studies and other strands of radical thought 
have all played their part in changing this situation. At the same time the awful legacy 
of the Holocaust and the experience of fascism still stand as memorials to what can 
happen when one culture determines another to be inherently inferior to it. More 
broadly, we can say that this change is one of the key indexes of the postmodern 
sensibility: privileged Westerners no longer feel confi dent that the way of life typical 
of capitalist modernity is inherently superior to all others and so are no longer likely 
to regard cultural genocide as a progressive project. Now, this is not to say that things 
have greatly improved for many indigenous peoples or that they do not continue to 
suffer terribly from both the legacy of colonialism and from capital’s continued drive 
for new sources of profi t (natural resources, cheap labour, captive markets). In some 
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countries (Canada, New Zealand) there have been some very real gains made, but 
in many there have not. The great importance of the Zapatistas is that they have 
taken a militant stand against the forces which oppress them, without appealing to an 
imagined neutral standard of justice and human rights within a specifi c national-legal 
framework. They fi ght in explicit solidarity with all those whose opportunities to live 
as they wish are threatened by neoliberalism, but without any attempt to subsume all 
of those resistant groups into a single common identity. It is this defense of a radical 
cultural pluralism which characterizes the contemporary indigenous movement, and 
it is one of the most characteristic features of twenty-fi rst-century anti- capitalism. 
Whereas the communist and socialist traditions generally saw the preservation of tra-
ditional communities as an obstacle to their modernising goals, these movements—
more in the tradition of Gandhi than Lenin—do not necessarily argue for the mere 
conservation of traditional ways of life, but for the right to follow their own distinc-
tive paths, in solidarity with other groups wishing to do the same.
One such is the peasants’ movement which unites small farmers and the so-called 
landless, who include those from subsistence-farming cultures who have been de-
prived of land, from southern France to Brazil (Bové & Dufour 2001). What all of 
these movements have in common is that despite their pluralism, and to some extent 
their particularism, they must oppose themselves to fundamental features of the way 
in which capitalism is currently organised. For not only does the capitalist accumula-
tion process threaten their immediate way of life, its incessant destruction of natural 
resources puts the very land on which they depend in danger (Shiva 1997). It is for 
this reason that they cannot be considered as merely particularistic movements, latter-
day nationalisms, and it is for this same reason that they must be understood to share 
a fundamental affi nity with another key strand of contemporary anti-capitalism: the 
environmental movement. This is a strand which is often relatively overlooked in 
accounts such as this one, in part because it does not have clear roots in the socialist 
and anarchist traditions of the nineteenth century, despite sharing certain affi nities 
with elements of them. Concern with the preservation of the natural environment 
has a long history, notably in the conservation movement of the nineteenth century, 
which amongst other achievements gave rise to the institution of the great National 
Parks in the United States. However, organised green politics really emerged for the 
fi rst time in the early 1970s, fi rst in Australia, Canada and New Zealand and then 
in Western Europe. While organisations such as the British Ecology Party—later 
to become the Green Party—seem to have been motivated by an agenda which was 
purely environmentalist, other green parties were more clearly infl uenced by New 
Left thinking, as the UK Green Party was itself to become. It’s surely no coincidence 
that all of these organisations came into existence in the wake of the wholesale ques-
tioning of established Western values which was embodied in 1968 and the spread 
of the counterculture of the 1960s. At the same time, non-party environmentalist 
activist organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, both formed be-
tween 1969 and 1971, emerged at precisely the same moment,  sharing a commitment 
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to campaign for an agenda which was more radical in its opposition to growth-led 
economic policies in general than conservationist organisations had been up to that 
point. Greenpeace in particular pioneered a new style of political activism which 
grew out of some of the methods of the 1960s while eschewing any pretense to mass 
participation: funding missions by skilled cadres of professional activists to disrupt 
military tests and the operations of polluting corporations, drawing the attention of 
the world’s media to issues of concern, with resources provided by an otherwise 
largely passive membership. This emphasis on direct action is something which the 
early green movement shared with certain strands of anarchist thinking, and which 
both would bequeath to the contemporary anti-capitalist movement, with all of its 
ambiguities as to what direct action actually constitutes and how it connects with any 
kind of democratic practice (Doyle & McEachern 1998).
In the early 1990s, in the United Kingdom and North America, probably the most 
prominent elements of what would come to be called anti-capitalism were groups 
of militant environmentalists situating themselves to the left of organisations like 
Friends of the Earth, and skeptical about the value of party politics even as practiced 
by the radical ‘deep’ greens of the various green parties. Those parties were by this 
time clearly divided between deep radicals and more moderate elements who sought 
less radical transformations of the social order, looking for an ecologically regulated 
form of capitalism rather than a complete end to the consumption-oriented society. In 
the United States, members of the Earth First network had throughout the 1980s de-
ployed a range of confrontational tactics to challenge any ecological threat, in partic-
ular damming and logging projects. Earth First’s eschewal of any form of structure 
or formal organisation in favour of a decentralised pattern of wholly autonomous and 
self-directed cells was to prove highly infl uential on sections of the anti-capitalist 
movement, although its biocentric philosophy (rejecting humanism and instead re-
garding all life as of equal value) was to prove less so. In the United Kingdom the 
early 1990s saw a wave of organised protests against road projects through ancient 
woodlands which captured the imaginations of large sections of the public, tapping 
into a deep vein of English pastoral sentimentalism as well offering a political outlet 
for many disaffected citizens of John Major’s Britain. These protests drew in part 
on the communities of cultural dissidents which had grown up in the 1970s and 
1980s: the squatters of London and other big cities and the nomadic travelers who 
spent their summers traveling between campsites and free festivals (McKay 1996). 
While in rural areas these protests were more-or-less directly derived from Earth 
First! practice and were concerned exclusively with defending woodlands, in East 
London the campaign against a major road project (the so-called M11 Link Road) 
was also a campaign to save the hundreds of homes that would be destroyed in this 
traditional working-class community inhabited by large numbers of young squatters 
as well as many elderly folk who had lived in the area for decades. The result was a 
sustained mass campaign which was concerned with far more than rural conserva-
tion, devel oping a critique of the extent to which a policy agenda dictated by the 
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motoring lobby was at odds with social justice in areas such as housing and local 
democracy (local government bodies having long opposed the building plans). Ener-
gised by those sections of the free rave movement who were fi ghting their own bat-
tles against criminalisation, the Reclaim the Streets project which emerged from the 
M11 campaign staged a series of innovative street protests against car culture around 
London which involved occupying large sections of urban road for an afternoon and 
using them to hold a rave. Reclaim the Streets, for all of the limitations of its tactics 
and agenda, was to prove a lasting inspiration to campaigners around the world and 
was to become the point at which British radicals made the most direct contact with 
a wider international anti-capitalist movement (Mckay 1998: 100–51).
The broad-based British anti-roads movement of the 1990s was actually a remark-
ably successful coalition of interests, bringing together anarchists, travelers, squatters, 
conservationists, moderate greens and sympathizers from across the political spec-
trum. Although it did not succeed in preventing the completion of any of the road 
projects to which it turned its attention, few had expected it to do so: rather, the aim 
had always been to raise the profi le of the government’s extensive road-building 
program while adding to its costs, by requiring massive expenditures on security to 
remove and keep out protesters from road-building sites. The effect was, temporarily, 
remarkable, as by 1996 the Conservative government had been forced temporarily 
to shelve all of its programs for major road-building (Wall 1999: 187–90; see also 
the archive of the British Earth First!–sympathising publication Do or Die at http://
www.eco-action.org/dod/ ). This effect was not to last, however.
The direction taken by London Reclaim the Streets in the late 1990s remains one 
of the most instructive instances from recent British history of the paradoxes of radi-
cal politics. Buoyed up by the success of the anti-roads campaign, many in the group, 
whose principle organizers had always been anarchist-inspired militants, wanted to 
make more direct connections with the international tendencies such as the Zapatis-
tas and the movement against the World Trade Organisation which was to come to 
global attention in Seattle in November 1999. Five months prior to the Seattle events, 
on 18 June 1999, the London Reclaim the Streets group organised a so-called Carni-
val against Capitalism in the London fi nancial district which was timed to coincide 
with similar protests in cities around the world and attracted thousands of protesters 
and some terrifi ed press (footage of a branch of McDonalds, that notorious symbol of 
US imperialism, being vandalised, was widely circulated). While this may have cre-
ated international connections with anti-capitalists elsewhere and helped to provide 
inspiration for the Seattle events later that year, it did not succeed in carrying many 
of the elements of the anti-roads coalition towards a full-scale critique of capitalism. 
By this time, Tony Blair’s New Labour government was already in the process of 
fully reinstating the postponed road-building plan, and the anti-capitalist movement 
in Britain did not expand after the so-called J18 protests: instead its events dwindled 
in size over the course of a couple of years until completely disappearing from the 
political scene. Some spectacular connections with an international movement had 
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been made, but at home, the few political gains made in the 1990s had been lost in 
the process.
This story illustrates many of the ongoing problems inherent in the relationship 
between anti-capitalism and campaigns for limited but achievable social objectives. 
If we believe that the entire social system generated by capitalist social relations is 
inherently destructive of the environment, or inevitably produces unacceptable levels 
of poverty, or invariably undermines democratic institutions, then at some point we 
have to tackle the very existence of capitalism. Or do we? By the same token, we 
might argue that if this is the case, then attacking any of the symptoms of capitalism 
will inevitably lead us to attack the whole basis of the social system eventually, and as 
such there is no need to make any direct assault on abstractions such as capitalism. On 
the other hand, if we assume that capitalism is not inevitably destructive of the envi-
ronment, but we nonetheless have particular problems with the ways in which capital-
ist institutions work, or with the imposition of market relations on particular areas of 
social life (such as education), then anti-capitalism becomes necessary as a specifi c 
political critique of specifi c institutions and their policies, rather than as a general 
systemic critique of contemporary society as a whole. However, in that case we might 
still want to forge connections between anti-capitalist activity and activity in defence 
of the environment or social justice. In any of these cases, effective political action 
is going to depend upon making a calculation as to what course of action is going to 
have the desired effect, whether that be to mobilise a mass struggle against capital-
ism as such, or to create connections between different political campaigns including 
campaigns against the hegemony of capitalist interests. On any of these counts, the 
course followed by Reclaim the Streets at the end of the 1990s was not successful: 
no effective challenge to neoliberal hegemony emerged, no alternative to capitalism 
was brought onto the political agenda, no lasting connections were made between 
the anti-roads movement and international anti-capitalism, and no lasting affect was 
felt on UK transport policy. It is not obvious from this account just what course of 
action would have had some lasting success, but it is clear that simply failing to think 
through the paradoxes and complexities of a shift from the environmental reformism 
of the anti-roads movement to revolutionary anti- capitalism was a disastrous mistake 
from which a once-potent strand of British radicalism has never recovered.
From a global perspective, however, this was a shift which always made some 
sense. A movement to draw attention to and challenge the agenda of the World Trade 
Organisation had been growing since that institution’s inception in 1995, and the in-
tervening period has seen a number of signifi cant gatherings of activists at meet-
ings of the World Trade Organisation and the G8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia), some of which have led 
to major confrontations with police: it’s understandable that militants of a group like 
Reclaim the Streets should want to direct their energies to contributing to this move-
ment. The summit protest is one of the most distinctive features of contemporary 
anti- capitalism. These often quite large gatherings are generally not coordinated by 
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any single organisation or institution, but come into existence by way of activists dis-
cussing plans and communicating intentions through email lists, online forums and 
word of mouth. Various organisations may assist their members and sympathisers in 
attending, but there is rarely if ever any centralised system. The classic (although not 
the fi rst) summit protest which did so much to fi x the idea of an anti- globalisation 
movement in the mediated public imagination was the November 1999 protest against 
the World Trade Organisation meeting in Seattle, at which a coalition of radical trade 
unionists, anarchists, economic justice campaigners and environmentalists caused 
such disruption to the city with their imaginative tactics and highly devolved forms 
of self-organisation that they succeeded in preventing the World Trade Organisa-
tion delegates from concluding their business (Yuen, Katsiafi cas & Rose, 2002). The 
symbolic impact of this success was huge, inspiring waves of local activism across 
the globe. At my own institution, the University of East London, it inspired a wave 
of student militancy which managed to put a halt to compulsory staff redundancies 
and unseat an incompetent and unpopular management in a way which decades of 
conventional trade union lobbying had not managed to do. This was only one of the 
many ripples sent out by this extraordinary event, and it should remind us of just how 
incalculable and unforeseeable the results of such action can be.
Are We All Anti-Capitalists Nowadays?
The heyday of the summit protests is now sometimes thought to have passed, with 
the largest gatherings and most spectacular confrontation with authority having taken 
place at Seattle in 1999, Prague in 2000 and, perhaps most notoriously (because of 
the murder by Italian riot police of activist Carlo Giuliani), Genoa in 2001. However, 
2005 saw a novel confi guration of forces around the G8 summit at Gleneagles, Scot-
land. Although the presence of militant activists at the summit was relatively small, 
the real political focus was on a massive demonstration held in Edinburgh the previ-
ous weekend. The culmination of the Make Poverty History campaign to pressure 
G8 leaders into cancelling third-world debts and reforming trade practices which 
discriminate against poor countries (the perpetuation of which is arguably the main 
geopolitical function of the European Union, for all of its free-market rhetoric), the 
demonstration was supported by a range of political groupings led by major NGOs 
(non-governmental organisations) such as Oxfam. Make Poverty History had been 
a very broad-based campaign which even the UK fi nance minister Gordon Brown 
had been obliged to put his name to, and which had involved tens of thousands of 
citizens and celebrities wearing the campaign’s trademark white wrist-bands. How 
far the campaign’s political goals were understood, beyond general approbation for 
the notion of abolishing poverty, is a moot point. Still more so is the question of how 
far any of the reforms it proposed were feasible without mass political mobilisation 
against key capitalist and neoliberal institutions, given that most of them involved 
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major costs for such institutions in terms of profi ts and power. Still more populist 
and less focused was the Live 8 concert organised by British impresario, social en-
trepreneur and sometime rock musician Bob Geldof, in a reprise of the epochal Live 
Aid concert of 1985. The political aims of Live 8 never even claimed to be more 
specifi c than to draw the attention of the G8 leaders to the fact that a large public was 
aware of their activities. Unsurprisingly to partisans of militant anti-capitalism, the 
campaign achieved very little indeed, with fi gures such as Brown and Geldof pre-
senting minor progress on debt-relief as major political victories and all but the most 
institutionalised and politically conservative NGOs expressing great disappointment 
at the failure of the summit to push through major reforms to the international trade 
and fi nance regime.
This event tells us a great deal—almost everything—about contemporary anti-
capitalism in the global north. On the one hand, a broad range of policy objectives 
which, if implemented, would involve more-or-less reversing the entire neoliberal 
programme and greatly weakening the power and profi tability of fi nance capital and 
institutions like the World Trade Organisation, has support from huge sections of the 
public: probably a clear majority throughout Europe, for example. On the other hand, 
the organisations which lobby for these policies in the political mainstream—from 
NGOs to trade unions to social democratic political parties—continue to address 
their arguments to political and institutional leaders or to a public to whom they are 
assumed to be accountable, on the implicit assumption that the fundamental role of 
these institutions is to implement the policy preferences of those publics and to pro-
tect the general welfare of the world’s people.
But this latter point, as any Marxist or any stockbroker could tell you, contains 
an absurd assumption: because the function of all of these institutions (including 
democratic governments) is, and has been for several hundred years, to maintain the 
profi tability of the corporations, fi nancial institutions and wealthy individuals whose 
interests they represent. Certainly there are many occasions on which such aims hap-
pen to coincide with the promotion of the well-being of large publics, especially when 
the profi tability of corporations happens to depend on the spending-power of those 
publics. But broadly speaking, Western governments and powerful institutions have 
never enacted major policy initiatives simply because their citizenry wanted them to 
or because it was the moral thing to do. Why they should start doing so now—when 
the lack of engagement of most people with electoral politics and the lack of radical 
alternatives in the political mainstream means that there is no real danger even to 
elected representatives in simply ignoring public pleas for reform—is quite unclear. 
The radical anti-capitalist critique of this perspective is therefore not dogmatic but 
pragmatic: what, it asks, are we going to do when we realise that banks, govern-
ments and supra-national bodies such as the European Union are simply not going to 
implement the reforms we desire just because we, the people, keep asking them to? 
The problem is similar at the level of national politics. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, governments since 1977 have implemented a programme of privatisations 
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of national utilities and public services which has effectively dismantled most of the 
public sector as it existed in the 1970s. This programme has never been supported 
by a majority of the electorate, and opinion polls have shown consistent opposition 
to it throughout that time. Nonetheless, mainstream opposition to this programme, 
to this day, tends to be framed in terms which imply that it could be easily reversed 
if only a change of attitudes or personnel amongst key government ministers were 
forthcoming. The fact that this programme has been consistently implemented by 
range of ministers from both of the main parties since the late 1970s seems to have 
little impact on this discourse and those who perpetuate it. The anti-capitalist critique 
of this type of reformism is initially just an observation that it clearly is not getting 
anywhere, and that as such some other type of politics might be necessary in order to 
implement even its more modest goals.
Now, it would be far too simplistic to proceed from this observation to the con-
clusion that electoral politics is a waste of time. History suggests that in a country 
like the United Kingdom, only government institutions can enable or implement the 
kinds of reforms that are being sought here, and this will remain the case unless the 
country enters some unprecedented political crisis. However, history also suggests 
that the Labour leadership will only challenge capital when it is forced to do so by an 
organised body of public opinion pushing it to the left. It is not a question of making 
a distinction between electoral and other kinds of politics, but rather of recognis-
ing the sheer unpredictable complexity of relationships between state institutions, 
capital, and various publics. In these terms, the challenge is to engage directly with 
the state while fully recognising its limitations; not ignoring it, but pushing its demo-
cratic capacities past breaking point. The important point for the moment, however, 
is that political leaderships in the capitalist democracies will never offer any chal-
lenge to the neoliberal agenda until some groundswell of popular energy demands 
that it do so.
From this point of view, we might say that the major NGOs and the social 
democratic political parties occupy a fundamentally similar political position. While 
divided between wings which are reconciled to the neoliberal paradigm (much of 
Oxfam, the right-wing of the British Labour party, the Democrats) and those which 
are not (the World Development Movement, which campaigns strongly against pol-
icy initiative such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services in the United 
Kingdom, the left wing of the German SPD and of the French Socialists, the Green 
party and the radical left of the Democrats in the United States), they generally fi nd 
their powers limited to those of a weak lobby to be set against the enormous power 
wielded by those lobbies which can call on the full reserves of wealth and infl uence 
possessed by great corporate institutions. In the absence of effective democratic in-
stitutions and movements, all that they can do is to carry on asking state and corpo-
rate bodies to implement reforms but with no means of forcing them to do so. The 
response of the anti-capitalist movement to this situation has been broadly to propose 
that new forms of democratic power be constituted which might be able to do this, 
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and we will discuss this in more detail shortly. However, it is worth considering at 
this stage just how far bodies such as the NGOs and the social democratic parties are 
themselves part of this movement. Clearly, some sections of both see themselves as 
such, and other sections do not. Perhaps more interestingly, even the more moderate 
of these bodies represent large sections of public opinion which broadly oppose the 
entire thrust of neoliberalism. This raises the question of how far we can think of 
the anti-capitalist movement as extending: in some senses, a majority of opinion in 
Europe, for example, supports policies which are effectively anti-capitalist in nature. 
What then is specifi c about the agenda of the anti-capitalist movement which distin-
guishes it from mainstream political opinion?
An answer which could be given to this question would be that anti-capitalism be-
longs to the revolutionary tradition while these other tendencies are reformist, commit-
ted to the gradual improvement of social conditions without any fundamental attack 
on the overall social system. This, however, would be an old-fashioned and unhelpful 
way of formulating the distinction. In fact it would be more accurate to say that the 
contemporary anti-capitalist argument is that even the type of minimal reforms being 
proposed by the moderates cannot be implemented under the current political condi-
tions obtaining in those countries, in which government is largely the preserve of a 
technocratic elite and the public to whom they are nominally answerable plays a very 
small role in infl uencing the formation of fundamental policy agendas, and exercises 
an often ineffective veto. Only a shift in power towards new or renewed institutions 
of popular power could now make such reforms possible, and only a mass movement 
could bring such institutions into existence or radicalise existing ones suffi ciently. Of 
course, even this is a position which the more radical sections of the NGOs and social 
democracy have always supported, and as such it is unsurprising that, for example, 
the World Development Movement in the United Kingdom and sections of the French 
socialist party have been associated with anti-capitalist campaigns.
A number of European organisations occupy novel places in this landscape. For 
example, in France the campaigning organisation ATTAC (Association for the Taxa-
tion of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens: see http://www.attac.org/ ), 
which campaigns for a so-called Tobin tax (a tax on speculative currency trading, fi rst 
proposed by the economist James Tobin), which would limit the power of  fi nancial 
institutions and the proceeds of which would be used to alleviate third-world pov-
erty; ATTAC is both a lobby group and a 30,000 strong membership organisation 
with affi liated organisations in 40 countries, which campaigns across a range of is-
sues concerned with the neoliberal assault on the public sphere and the public sec-
tor (Cassen 2004). One of the key leaders of French ATTAC is the American-born 
activist and writer Susan George, whose book Another World is Possible If  . . . (2004) 
is one of the most thoughtful documents so far to refl ect upon the experience of the 
movement to date and draw lessons for a possible future. We should also mention 
here another organisation with which George is associated: the Amsterdam-based 
Transnational Institute (http://www.tni.org/ ), which is the nearest thing to an interna-
tional anti-capitalist think tank.
Another World is Possible: The Anti-Capitalist Movement • 89
While several small far-left parties across Europe see themselves as sympathetic to 
the anti-capitalist movement (even constituting a relatively informal bloc—The Eu-
ropean Anti-Capitalist Left), Italy’s Communista Rifondazione (Refoundation Com-
munist) party is perhaps unique as a party which actually has played a signifi cant role 
in government, being part of the national governing coalition elected in 2006, and 
which is explicitly affi liated to the anti-capitalist movement (Andrews 2005: 91–106). 
Originally a splinter from the dissolution of the Italian Communist Party in the early 
1990s which was opposed to the reformist social democratic turn taken by the largest 
section, Rifondazione has taken on many of the critiques of traditional party structures 
typical of the anti-capitalist movement; they encourage the spread of social forums 
which are not dominated by the party or any other political party, and they practise 
open and participatory democracy within its own structures. In this it has been it-
self infl uenced by the example of the Brazilian Workers’ Party, which has worked to 
bring together radical trade-unionists, socialists, social movements and landless peas-
ants with great success in recent decades (Branford & Kucinski 2003). Apart from 
Rifondazione and a handful of far-left parties of no electoral signifi cance, it is actually 
the Greens, of all the various European parties, which today tend to have a political 
analysis and approach closest to that of the anti-capitalist movement. The story of the 
rise of eco-socialism as the dominant strand of European Green politics would require 
a book in its own right, but it would be fair to say that, for example, the British Green 
Party today stands on a platform which is clearly derived from the political tradi-
tion of the New Left and is sympathetic to the goals of the anti-capitalist movement. 
However, these parties are small and possess little infl uence, especially at a national 
level. In effect, then, anti-capitalism has had a negligible impact on national electoral 
politics, apart from the instance of Ralph Nader’s strategically disastrous bid for the 
US presidency in 2000 (which clearly helped Bush to secure the White House). In 
France in 2005 the opposition of ATTAC and the anti-capitalist left to the proposed 
European Constitution contributed to the success of the “No” campaign leading up 
the referendum on its ratifi cation, but this did not prevent the election of the aggres-
sively neoliberal Nicolas Sarkozy as president in the election of 2007. In that election, 
anti-capitalist hero José Bové, a leader of the international peasants’ movement and 
friend of Subcomandante Marcos (Bové & Dufour 2001), received a pitiful 1.5 per 
cent of the vote. European electorates seem to dislike neoliberalism, but they are not 
yet convinced of the need for, or the feasibility of, radical democratic alternatives.
Hope Rising in the South: Latin American Socialism 
and the World Social Forum
In Latin America, things have been quite different. Recent years have seen a now 
very widely documented shift to the left in South American electoral politics. In 
Brazil, 2003 saw the election of anti-capitalist icon Lula (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva) 
to the presidency. In Argentina, the complete melt-down of the national economy 
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in 2002 saw the emergence of a whole mass movement for local participatory de-
mocracy and the large-scale occupation of factories, land and buildings, in direct 
opposition to the international neoliberal programme which was blamed (rightly) for 
the bankruptcy of the country. The consequence was the eventual election of a left-
wing, Peronist Néstor Kirchner, as president. In Venezuela, signifi cantly one of the 
world’s great oil-producers, the election of outspoken militant socialist Hugo Chavez 
provoked an attempted coup, supported if not backed by the US administration and 
signifi cant corporate interests. The coup failed owing to the massive popularity of 
Chavez and his explicitly anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal administration. The failure 
of Chavez’s recent attempt to concentrate executive power with a national referen-
dum is an ambivalent moment in this process, possibly marking the limit point of 
Chavez’s so-called Bolivarian Revolution, possibly marking the welcome defl ection 
of that revolution away from a path towards tyranny. In Bolivia the election of Evo 
Morales as President in 2005, following several years of campaigns against foreign 
corporate control of local water supplies, led to the rapid nationalisation of industries 
such as gas extraction and water supply. At the time of writing the long-term global 
consequences of this constellation of developments are not clear. What is clear is 
that the US administration is not currently equipped to put down this uprising to its 
South as it has done in the past (with its ruthless backing for the military opposition 
to the elected government of Nicaragua in the 1980s, for example). Bogged down 
in costly and unpopular wars in the Middle East, facing a serious challenge to its 
economic supremacy in the shape of emergent China, and unable to prevent the 
new socialist governments profi ting from the very high prices which their mineral 
reserves currently command on the world markets, America’s outraged opposition 
to these governments has so far proved quite ineffectual. Whether their example is 
taken up in other parts of the world probably depends on how far the anti-capitalist 
movement is able to create connections between mainstream socialists and social 
democrats and other strands of radicalism at home, and how far it is able to cement 
international solidarities within and across these movements. If it is able to do this 
at all, then the spread of the social forums will certainly be one of the key means by 
which it does it.
The election of Lula as President of Brazil was the culmination of a quarter cen-
tury of campaigning at local, regional and national level by the Partido dos Trabal-
hadores (Workers’ Party, PT; Genosko 2003). Although Lula disappointed many in 
offi ce with his apparent willingness to accommodate to neoliberalism, it is not at all 
clear that political or economic circumstances at that moment left him with much 
choice, and it is certainly the case that the PT has over the years innovated many new 
and important forms of political organisation. Perhaps the most famous of these was 
the implementation of the participatory budget process by the municipal government 
of Porto Alegre. This radical departure in local governance involved much of the 
local community in setting the city’s annual budget, by way of a year-long round 
of open public meetings and forums that attracted attention from around the world 
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(Wainwright 2003: 42–69). It was for this reason that when ATTAC and the editors 
of the radical journal which founded it, Le Monde Diplomatiqe, were looking for 
partners in a new political initiative, it was to the PT government of Porto Alegre that 
they turned. This initiative was for a parallel summit to the annual World Economic 
Forum at Davos, a meeting of banks and other powerful institutions and fi nance 
ministers from the wealthiest countries. The World Social Forum was to be a meeting 
place for all of the organisations and individuals involved in the struggle against neo-
liberalism, without the control of any one governmental institution and without the 
participation of sectarian organisations (so political parties as such were not allowed 
to participate, although their members were free to do so). The forum held in 2001 
attracted 12,000 delegates and was regarded as a landmark event simply in taking 
place at all. The forum became an annual event, growing rapidly in size and moving 
from Porto Alegre to Mumbai in 2004, where it attracted over 100,000 participants. 
Returning to Porto Alegre in 2005, over 155,000 registered for the forum, and in 
2006 it was decided to make the forum polycentric, taking place simultaneously at a 
number of locations around the world. During this period, local social forums sprang 
up in cities around the world, most notably in Italian cities with the encouragement 
of Rifondazione, and regional social forums such as the European Social Forum also 
started to appear. All of these forums see themselves as autonomous nodes in an 
international network, and all adhere to the principles of the World Social Forum, 
adopted by the organisers of the fi rst forum in 2001:
1.  The World Social Forum is an open meeting place for refl ective thinking, demo-
cratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and 
interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are 
opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form 
of imperialism, and are committed to building a planetary society directed towards 
fruitful relationships among Humankind and between it and the Earth.
2.  The World Social Forum at Porto Alegre was an event localised in time and place. 
From now on, in the certainty proclaimed at Porto Alegre that “another world is 
possible”, it becomes a permanent process of seeking and building alternatives, 
which cannot be reduced to the events supporting it.
3.  The World Social Forum is a world process. All the meetings that are held as part 
of this process have an international dimension.
4.  The alternatives proposed at the World Social Forum stand in opposition to a 
process of globalisation commanded by the large multinational corporations and by 
the governments and international institutions at the service of those corporations 
interests, with the complicity of national governments. They are designed to ensure 
that globalisation in solidarity will prevail as a new stage in world  history. This will 
respect universal human rights, and those of all citizens—men and women—of 
all nations and the environment and will rest on democratic international systems 
and institutions at the service of social justice, equality and the sovereignty of 
peoples.
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 5.  The World Social Forum brings together and interlinks only organisations and 
movements of civil society from all the countries in the world, but intends neither 
to be a body representing world civil society.
 6.  The meetings of the World Social Forum do not deliberate on behalf of the World 
Social Forum as a body. No-one, therefore, will be authorised, on behalf of any 
of the editions of the Forum, to express positions claiming to be those of all its 
participants. The participants in the Forum shall not be called on to take decisions 
as a body, whether by vote or acclamation, on declarations or proposals for action 
that would commit all, or the majority, of them and that propose to be taken as 
establishing positions of the Forum as a body. It thus does not constitute a locus 
of power to be disputed by the participants in its meetings, nor does it intend to 
constitute the only option for interrelation and action by the organisations and 
movements that participate in it.
 7.  Nonetheless, organisations or groups of organisations that participate in the Fo-
rums meetings must be assured the right, during such meetings, to deliberate on 
declarations or actions they may decide on, whether singly or in coordination with 
other participants. The World Social Forum undertakes to circulate such decisions 
widely by the means at its disposal, without directing, hierarchising, censuring or 
restricting them, but as deliberations of the organisations or groups of organisa-
tions that made the decisions.
 8.  The World Social Forum is a plural, diversifi ed, non-confessional, non-governmental 
and non-party context that, in a decentralised fashion, interrelates organisations and 
movements engaged in concrete action at levels from the local to the international to 
built another world.
 9.  The World Social Forum will always be a forum open to pluralism and to the di-
versity of activities and ways of engaging of the organisations and movements that 
decide to participate in it, as well as the diversity of genders, ethnicities, cultures, 
generations and physical capacities, providing they abide by this Charter of Prin-
ciples. Neither party representations nor military organisations shall participate 
in the Forum. Government leaders and members of legislatures who accept the 
commitments of this Charter may be invited to participate in a personal capacity.
 10.  The World Social Forum is opposed to all totalitarian and reductionist views of 
economy, development and history and to the use of violence as a means of social 
control by the State. It upholds respect for Human Rights, the practices of real 
democracy, participatory democracy, peaceful relations, in equality and solidar-
ity, among people, ethnicities, genders and peoples, and condemns all forms of 
domination and all subjection of one person by another.
 11.  As a forum for debate, the World Social Forum is a movement of ideas that 
prompts refl ection, and the transparent circulation of the results of that refl ection, 
on the mechanisms and instruments of domination by capital, on means and ac-
tions to resist and overcome that domination, and on the alternatives proposed to 
solve the problems of exclusion and social inequality that the process of capitalist 
globalisation with its racist, sexist and environmentally destructive dimensions is 
creating internationally and within countries.
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 12.  As a framework for the exchange of experiences, the World Social Forum encour-
ages understanding and mutual recognition among its participant organisations 
and movements, and places special value on the exchange among them, particu-
larly on all that society is building to centre economic activity and political action 
on meeting the needs of people and respecting nature, in the present and for future 
generations.
 13.  As a context for interrelations, the World Social Forum seeks to strengthen and 
create new national and international links among organisations and movements 
of society, that—in both public and private life—will increase the capacity for 
non-violent social resistance to the process of dehumanisation the world is under-
going and to the violence used by the State, and reinforce the humanising mea-
sures being taken by the action of these movements and organisations.
 14.  The World Social Forum is a process that encourages its participant organisations 
and movements to situate their actions, from the local level to the national level 
and seeking active participation in international contexts, as issues of planetary 
citizenship, and to introduce onto the global agenda the change-inducing practices 
that they are experimenting in building a new world in solidarity.
Approved and adopted in São Paulo, on April 9, 2001, by the organisations that 
make up the World Social Forum Organising Committee, approved with 
modifi cations by the World Social Forum International Council 
on June 10, 2001. (World Social Forum 2002)
In practice, most Social Forum events are huge conferences, with large-scale ple-
naries featuring speakers from social and political movements, trade unions, political 
parties and even governments and smaller-scale seminars and workshops organised 
by myriad groups on every imaginable theme, from abstract philosophical issues to 
entirely concrete and localised political campaigns. Their signifi cance lies in the fact 
that there simply is no precedent for this global exercise in mass deliberation. While 
many criticise the social forums for their failure to constitute real decision-making 
bodies for the anti-capitalist movement, their supporters point out that the mere main-
tenance of open, deliberative public spaces is a crucial element of the struggle against 
neoliberalism, and that any attempt to force the forum to take public positions on 
issues would compromise its status as such a space. Whether the forums will prove 
to have been the forerunners of new, dynamic and participative forms of popular 
democratic institution able to challenge the neoliberal assault on democracy, as many 
hope, is impossible to predict. What can be said with some confi dence is that even if 
they do, one could not have expected them to have had more impact in the fi rst fi ve 
years of their existence than they have had to date. And if they do not, even if they 
decline and disappear in the near future (as is perfectly possible), they will continue 
to represent an important point of reference for twenty-fi rst-century radicalism, just 
as the uprisings of 1848 and the experience of the Paris Commune were key points of 
reference for the generations of communists and socialists who followed them.
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The location of the fourth World Social Forum and the sixth (spread between Ven-
ezuela, Mali and Pakistan) indicates another important aspect of the anti-capitalist 
movement: its vital presence across the global South, not limited to Latin America. 
Indeed, many governments of so-called developing countries, as victims of the in-
ternational fi nancial system which keeps them crippled by debt and forces them to 
implement neoliberal policies against the wishes and interests of their own publics, 
may be considered natural supporters of the movement, along with the entire popu-
lations that they represent. In India, notably, the left of centre United Progressive 
Alliance, a coalition of parties including the Indian National Congress, is supported 
by the Left Front, which is powerful in some regions and sympathetic to the move-
ment. Across India and Asia mass movements organise workers, landless peasants, 
women, environmentalists and poor farmers (some of whom are connected to small 
farmers in the North via the Via Campesina organisation, which includes the French 
anti-capitalist farmer José Bové) in struggles that are in many ways far more urgent 
and intense than those experienced by anti-capitalists in the North. Unfortunately, it 
will be outside the scope of this book to dwell on these, as the book is of necessity 
limited to a northern, and indeed an Anglo-Saxon perspective, except where (as in 
the case of the Zapatistas), developments in the south have had a real impact on anti-
capitalist thinking in the north. But their presence cannot be forgotten.
Radical Democracy and Minor Politics
At this point, it seems reasonable to think about how the distinctive politics of the 
anti-capitalist movement might be conceptualised. We have surveyed several differ-
ent manifestations of that movement, and so we should now ask what it is, at a more 
abstract level, that the various movements have in common with each other, and 
what makes them different from other forms of resistance to hegemonic formations, 
neoliberalism, or capitalist social relations. Here, two features are most striking. 
Firstly, we can note the refusal to subsume multifarious struggles into one overarch-
ing identity. Secondly, we can identify the demand for concentrations of power (both 
State power and corporate power) to be broken down by the proliferation of sites for 
participative decision-making. On the one hand, we have a radical pluralism, and 
on the other hand, a pursuit of democratisation as a radical process of participation. 
Following these two lines of thought, we can conceptualise this politics in terms of 
some key bodies of philosophical work which we will examine in much more detail 
in subsequent chapters, but which it will be useful to consider here briefl y.
Firstly, radical pluralism and refusal of identity bring to mind Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s famous celebration of the minor (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 291–3). 
Deleuze and Guattari make a fascinating distinction between majorities and minori-
ties which has nothing to do with numerical discrepancies. Majorities are those iden-
tities, those modes of being, which occupy the powerful position of the norm within 
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any given culture. They are always resistant to possibilities of change, always de-
fi ned by their position of dominance over the not-norm. So woman is always a minor 
position in a patriarchal culture, even if there are more women than men (hence it is 
still common for histories of democracy to treat women’s suffrage as a relatively un-
important issue, or to ignore the fact that Athens, the supposed cradle of democracy, 
was a slave society in which a tiny proportion of the actual population were allowed 
to vote). Following this logic, a minoritarian politics could not be one which aspired 
merely to occupy the position of majority, but which sought to free all minorities 
and all fi xed majorities from their static conditions. Now, crucially, this is not a mat-
ter of identity politics promoting a rainbow coalition of oppressed groups, each de-
fending its pure status as woman, or black, or gay. Rather it is a matter of seeking 
the destabilisation of all such fi xed positions: ‘only a minority is capable of serving 
as the active medium of a becoming, but under such conditions that it ceases to be 
a defi nable aggregate in relation to the majority’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 291)’
From this point of view, the so-called movement of movements might be con-
ceived as a loose assemblage of minorities, waging war against all majority. So does 
this mean that it would have to be conceived as opposed to all democracy as such?
Well, that depends how we conceptualise democracy. If we imagine that democ-
racy means simply majority rule, then of course Deleuze and Guattari could have no 
truck with it. But what if we conceptualise it differently?
the notion of radical and plural democracy . . . will be central to our argument from this 
point on . . . Pluralism is radical only to the extent that each term of the plurality of identi-
ties fi nds within itself the principle of its own validity, without this having to be sought 
in a transcendent or underlying positive ground for the hierarchy of meaning of them all 
and the source and guarantee of their legitimacy. And this radical pluralism is democratic 
to the extent that the autoconstitutivity of each one of its terms is the result of displace-
ments of the egalitarian imaginary. Hence, the project for plural and radical democracy 
is nothing other than the struggle for the maximum autonomisation of spheres (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985: 167).
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe here offer an account of radical democracy 
which is entirely compatible with the minoritarian perspective. From this point of 
view, radical democracy does not imply the tyranny of the majority, but an ongoing 
effort to maximise autonomy for groups and individuals, against the rule of either 
capital or state institutions. It therefore seems hard not to argue that the anti-capitalist 
movement is, as much as anything, a movement for radical democracy.
Here is one point to keep in mind. Whichever vocabulary we choose, this minori-
tarian radical democratic perspective depends on one thing. It depends on a rejection 
of all old-fashioned ways of thinking about politics which see society as a single 
coherent thing with a centre, or a top, a singular locus of power, which a radical 
movement must seek to occupy and control. Neither government, nor control of the 
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means of production, nor anything else, can be seen as the one source of power and 
the one objective of struggle. In other words, although we may continue to regard all 
the elements of world culture as connected and related in complex ways, we can no 
longer think of society, or capitalism, or anything else, as simple totalities. This will 
prove to be a very important point later in the book. For now though, let’s move on 
from this assessment of the abstract politics of radical democratic anti-capitalism, to 
look briefl y at the ways in which the movement thinks and acts in regard to one of 
this book’s key issues: culture itself.
Anti-Capitalist Culture?
Along with the social forums, one of the great achievements of the anti-capitalist 
movement has been the creation of an alternative media infrastructure, particularly 
through the internet. Even before the globalisation of the Web, media activists such 
as Undercurrents (http://www.undercurrents.org/ ), who specialise in cheap activist-
produced investigative documentaries, had done much to offer a model in miniature 
of what a democratic public sphere could look like. In recent years the Indymedia 
network of Web sites has emerged to provide open access news reporting on a range 
of issues, from local campaigns to global politics (www.indymedia.org; Kidd 2003). 
Anyone can post to these sites, which are maintained to a high standard by commit-
ted teams of programmers and which often feature blow-by-blow real-time reports 
from major events such as summit protests. However one of the notable features of 
this new media form is its tendency to concentrate very much on events and concrete 
political actions. One rarely fi nds discussions of wider issues of political strategy 
on Indymedia sites, never mind any engagement with issues around contemporary 
culture, lifestyle, philosophy or ethics. In this, Indymedia tends to reproduce a no-
tion of politics which is in fact incredibly narrow, focussed on events and campaigns 
rather than the complex interactions of work, leisure, politics and economics. To be 
fair, many of these issues are themselves addressed by the types of campaign sup-
ported by Indymedia and other sections of the anti-capitalist movement, particularly 
in North America, where anti-capitalism operates as much as anything as a consumer 
movement concerned with the ethical and political implications of particular lifestyle 
choices. At the same time, a network of more conventional media institutions across 
the world remains committed to the movement and its goals and analyses: these 
include Le Monde Diplomatique; Z Magazine in the United States (whose Web site 
http://www.zmag.org/ is a fantastic resource); Red Pepper and New Internationalist 
in the United Kingdom; and the radical French philosophical journal Multitudes.
Another key element of the anti-capitalist media is the strand of so-called  culture 
jamming associated most closely with Adbusters magazine (Lasn 1999). Culture 
jamming is a generic name given to a range of activities which seek to re-work 
and re-contextualise elements from mainstream culture in order to make some kind 
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satirical comment on their contents. While the term is usually credited to the band 
Negativland, pioneers of a kind of satirical sonic collage which does for sound what 
the radical artist John Heartfi eld did for visual media, the most characteristic form 
of culture jamming is probably the work of the Billboard Liberation Front (http://
www.billboardliberation.com/ ) who have been disseminating the practice of deliber-
ate alteration of commercial billboards—transforming advertising and political mes-
sages into radical anti-capitalist ones—for 30 years. Adbusters, under its founder and 
editor Kalle Lasn, has more-or-less elevated culture jamming into an entire political 
philosophy, albeit a decidedly incoherent one. Highly critical of all mainstream poli-
tics and commercial culture, and of most of the organised left, Adbusters and its con-
tributors tend to seem very convinced of the radicalism of their own practices and are 
decidedly dismissive of anyone they consider less authentic in their anti-capitalism, 
although it is never at all clear from what political or ethical perspective they actually 
make these judgements or what positive politics they would like to pursue (see, for 
example, Littler 2005). As such, the Adbusters activists are often typical subjects of 
what I will call in following chapters the activist imaginary. This is hardly surprising 
given that their main theoretical and practical point of reference is the work of Guy 
Debord and the Situationist International (which we will also discuss shortly).
One of the key objects of Adbusters critique has been, for many years, the cul-
ture and practice of branding. This critique was brought to a much wider public 
with the publication and enormous success of Naomi Klein’s No Logo in 2000. 
This work’s critique of the emergence and costs of brand culture was intellectually 
problematic to say the least—theoretically weak, frequently unoriginal, and politi-
cally  inconsistent—but it was a passionate work by a committed journalist explor-
ing a complex set of interrelated phenomena: corporate strategy, cultural change, 
fundamental shifts in capitalist organisation, contemporary politics. Perhaps more 
importantly, the book tried to document not just the emergence of the brand as the 
key meta-commodity of late capitalism, but the emergence of a movement against 
those key brand-based companies—most notably Nike—who relied on extremely 
cheap labour in China and the South. The anti-sweatshop movement, which began on 
US campuses in the 1990s, with students campaigning against companies relying on 
workers with few rights and poor pay and living conditions and against universities 
involvement with them, has had a major impact on the behaviour of key corporations, 
and it is itself a key component of the anti-capitalist movement in the north. But it 
is questionable whether it would have become so important without the intervention 
of No Logo in documenting it, celebrating it, theorising it (however  clumsily) and 
disseminating it. Here we have an excellent example of the signifi cance of culture 
for political intervention. Klein’s singular cultural intervention amplifi ed the anti-
sweatshop movement in a way which nothing else could have done.
No Logo was only the fi rst of a new wave of popular books and fi lms to make a di-
rect critique of contemporary capitalism, or some manifestation thereof. The writings 
and fi lms of socialist Michael Moore—whose fi rst fi lm, about the social consequences 
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of de-industrialisation in Michigan, appeared in 1989—have had a major impact, con-
stituting in themselves a whole sub-genre of popular anti- capitalist critique, tackling 
subjects from gun control to racism. Morgan Spurlock’s anti- McDonalds propaganda 
piece Supersize Me (2004) was a major hit, despite the vacuity of its political mes-
sage (elite metropolitan health food good, junk food bad) and Robert Greenwald’s 
Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price (2005) achieved success through a network 
of home-viewing parties organised over the internet. Taking all of this into account, it 
would perhaps be fair to say that in the United States, anti-capitalism is essentially a 
media phenomenon. This, however, is not to devalue it in any way: the creation of 
a non-corporate media infrastructure is without question a major political achievement, 
and the value of the interventions made by fi gures such as Klein can be registered in 
the enormous attention paid subsequently to many of the issues that she raised.
What is interesting about this situation, however, is that almost all of this cul-
tural anti-capitalism operates in a documentary mode. It’s about uncovering, discov-
ering and detailing the iniquitous and unsavoury activities of major corporations. 
Only Moore’s work ever goes much further, actually refl ecting on some of the wider 
problems faced by any movement to organise against corporate power: for example 
suggesting, in a classically Gramscian vein, ways in which a radical might ‘Talk 
to Your Conservative Brother-in-Law’ (Moore 2003: 183–201). What anti-capitalist 
culture does not engage with to any signifi cant degree is the world of sport, enter-
tainment, popular fi ction (cinematic, televisual and literary), music and the other 
arts which so preoccupies much of the world’s population: in other words, popular 
culture. One rarely fi nds a record review on Indymedia. There is little sense of what 
an anti-capitalist movie that was not a documentary might look like. Explicitly anti-
capitalist musicians usually restrict their politics to the content of their productions 
(such as lyrics or album packaging), or else assume that an austere avant-gardism is 
the appropriate correlate to an anti-capitalist politics. For example, America’s Rage 
Against the Machine spent much of the 1990s combining earnest and articulate anti-
capitalist rap with a heavy rock soundtrack, the overall effect of which was to gener-
ate an extremely macho sound which had little appeal beyond heavy rock’s usual 
constituency of straight white young men. While there have been works of fi ctions 
(such as Rob Newman’s 2003 The Fountain at the Centre of the World ) set around 
the movement, there’s little discussion as to what a critical perspective on literary 
production an anti-capitalist perspective might entail: Marcos’s generic adoration of 
literature as such hardly amounts to a critical perspective, and his favourite author is 
Cervantes, the most predictably canonical author in the Spanish language.
This is all woeful. One of the strengths of the movement of movements is that 
it focuses on specifi c sets of issues upon which many of its constituent elements 
can agree at a given moment, without dogmatically expecting them to sign up to 
a single coherent world view. However, if this is the case then it ought to be able 
to constitute spaces for critical debate on a wide range of issues. More than this, 
perhaps, any social or political movement which hopes to achieve real change must 
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seek to extend itself beyond the cadres of its committed activists, developing both 
a language and a set of shared experiences for relatively inactive supporters of the 
movement and some rigourous philosophical concepts of its own. One of the great 
paradoxes of current northern anti-capitalism is that it is a movement whose self-
identifi ed partisans are almost all committed activists, and yet it espouses aims and 
values which are not in confl ict with the aspirations of vast sections of the public. In 
other words, it does not have many passive supporters amongst the public at large, 
even though it shares the views of many. What’s more, the emphatic belief of those 
activists in the im portance of direct participation in politics, action, democracy and 
life in general would tend to imply that this divide between committed activists and 
the general public is actually a good thing. I want to suggest that in fact this is a 
mistaken view. While any democratic movement must to seek to enthuse its mem-
bers to participate in politics as actively as possible, at the same time any movement 
which cannot inspire sympathy and support amongst those large numbers of people 
who will never have the time or skills or energy or inclination to do so is not going 
to achieve much. The absence of any sense of what it would mean to be an anti-
 capitalist when engaged in any other activity than attending a summit demonstration 
or planning to do so is a great handicap for the movement in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, in particular. This is not simply a question of developing an anti-
 capitalist identity, however (in fact I will suggest later that this would not necessarily 
be a helpful thing to develop). Rather, it is a question of how it might be possible to 
create common ground between the self-conscious anti-capitalism and that popular 
anti-capitalism which is expressed in, for example, the popularity of Michael Moore 
and the unpopularity of privatisation programmes in the United Kingdom. It is worth 
considering, then, that one of the aims of New Left cultural studies was always to 
fi nd ways to explore the territory between the implicitly progressive elements of 
popular culture and the explicit political projects of the socialist, feminist and other 
movements. However, that tradition has been sadly neglected by partisans of the 
anti-capitalist movement to date.
So what ideas about culture and its politics have actually been infl uential within 
that context? In many cases, the only thing that amounts to a theory of culture in 
contemporary anti-capitalist thought is some very crude applications of Marxist or 
anarchist jargon to random social or cultural issues. However, we can pick out two 
strands of thought which have been used to elaborate more sophisticated approaches 
within certain strands of the global justice movement and have infl uenced practices 
such as culture jamming: Situationism and social ecology.
Situationism
Situationism is a body of ideas and practices with roots in the inter-war avant-gardes 
of the early-twentieth century. The Situationist International was a group of artists 
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and intellectuals which emerged in the 1950s from some fragments of the Surrealist 
movement and which to some extent followed the Surrealist model of combining 
avant-garde art practice with leftist political theory. They were active until the early 
1970s and were to prove both prescient and infl uential in much of their thinking 
and aesthetic practice, infl uencing radical students in 1968, punks in the 1970s and 
anti-capitalist culture jammers in the 1990s. It has been argued that their thinking 
in many ways prefi gured the post-Marxist radicalism of fi gures such as Deleuze 
and Lyotard, although perhaps more persuasively links have been made between 
their thought and the postmodern political pessimism of Jean Baudrillard (Baudril-
lard 1988b; Plant 1992). Their name, rather obscurely, derived from their professed 
determination to create ‘situations’—moments of shared authentic experience for 
small groups—which they saw as a tactic for challenging the forced inauthenticity of 
life in modern culture. Not that they saw this as a suffi cient measure for challenging 
the social basis of that culture: the Situationists were committed political revolu-
tionaries after all, not just artistic pranksters. Perhaps their most famous and typical 
aesthetic practice was their ‘détournement’ (Debord 1959)—deliberate alteration or 
re- contextualisation—of existing art objects or cultural commodities, such as in the 
case of André Bertrand’s polemical collage comic-poster, The Return of the Durutti 
Column (Ford 2005: 114–5). But their lasting legacy was not artwork of any kind, 
but a set of theoretical concepts and analyses and a generic attitude of guerilla uto-
pianism which was to have enduring appeal for political and cultural activists.
To some extent however, there was always a contradiction between these two as-
pects of the Situationist project, and it is a contradiction which a great deal of 
anti- capitalist thought and practice has inherited. On the one hand, their activities 
amounted to a piecemeal tactical warfare against the tedium and passivity of life in 
the consumer society. On the other hand, their theoretical framework amounted to a 
wholesale denunciation of that society which leaves little scope for imagining any 
kind of political progress without some impossible moment of absolute transforma-
tion, a revolution more complete than any previously seen in human history. This 
framework emerges in the two principle texts of the Situationist International: their 
leader Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle (1994) and Raoul Vaneigem’s 
The Revolution of Everyday Life (1983). Although subtly different in emphasis and 
political implications, these two books propose and assume a common central concept: 
the spectacle. The continued importance of this concept is attested by its recent use 
by the radical collective Retort in their widely read account of contemporary geo-
politics, Affl icted Powers (Retort 2005), and it has proved to be a persistently sug-
gestive, but also persistently problematic, term since the 1960s. The term is used 
most famously by Debord to designate the accumulation of images which charac-
terises the sensory environment of advanced capitalist societies and which in some 
senses constitutes the alienated reality of those societies, rendering all life within 
them a process of passive contemplation (Debord 1994: 12–15). The Spectacle is un-
derstood as at once the site and the most developed and integrated form of ideology, 
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the concrete manifestation of ‘false consciousness’ and the most powerful agency of 
exploitation. Debord writes that ‘The Spectacle is not a collection of images; rather it 
is social a relationship between people that is mediated by images’ (1994: 12).
Essentially, the concept of Spectacle is the culmination of two related traditions of 
philosophical thought: the Marxist humanist tradition which regards alienation and 
reifi cation as the key features of modern (or post-modern) life and that long tradition 
which, going back to Plato, mistrusts the visual in general (Debord 1994: 17) and 
suspects the world of appearances of superfi ciality and falsehood. From this point of 
view, capitalism is characterised by its tendency to separate people from each other 
and from the products of their labour, and to mask social relationships by giving 
objects and institutions (from commodities to the institutions of the state) the appear-
ance of real things with a life and agency of their own. This is certainly a valid obser-
vation about the social dynamic of capitalism: what is much more problematic is the 
implicit assertion made by commentators such as Debord that it defi nes the totality 
of social relations in advanced capitalist societies. Under this rubric it comes to be 
very unclear how we can imagine any real resistance to capitalism manifesting itself. 
In fact, the range of responses to this problem imagined by such thinkers is instruc-
tive. They tend implicitly or explicitly, to identify only fl eeting and momentary or 
entirely isolated forms of resistance—school students truanting, lovers momentarily 
freed from alienation by their passion, city-dwellers rioting, radical philosophers de-
nouncing the inauthenticity of modern life—as having any real validity, while look-
ing to some future moment of full-scale proletarian revolution as the only possible 
source of permanent change. Every other form of apparent resistance is regarded as 
always-already recuperated by the institutions of capitalism. From this point of view, 
for example, the apparent achievements of Social Democracy—from the New Deal 
in the United States to the establishment of more-or-less extensive welfare states in 
the Northern European democracies—were not real victories for the working classes 
at all. Instead their purpose was merely to enable the citizens of those countries to 
function more effectively as (healthier, better educated, so more effi cient) workers 
and, crucially, as consumers.
The problems with this perspective are well-documented. To put it simply, it is 
a view which tends implicitly to assume that the prejudices and priorities of artists 
and intellectuals are of universal value: anyone who doesn’t want to be a fully active, 
creatively vibrant, original, but ultimately rather ascetic participant in the endless 
construction and re-construction of their world is clearly a hopeless slave to capital-
ism and its ideologies. The idea that, given the choice, most people might choose 
freely to be well-fed, well-housed, secure and rather lazy is not on the agenda here, 
despite the anti-work rhetoric of some Situationist writings. However, there is a more 
fundamental problem with this whole way of conceptualising social relations, which 
brings us to one of the key points of difference between the thinkers who are closer to 
the tradition of New Left cultural studies. While there are many differences between 
them, writers such Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Lyotard and Laclau and Mouffe 
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share one important tendency. They all move decisively away from any notion of 
society as a totality. They reject any view which would conceptualise social relations 
within a given context as constituting a singular whole governed by an overarching 
force, principle or historical destiny. Instead they see social formations as constituted 
by complex and contingent confi gurations of elements. By contrast, we can compare 
the Situationist position to that of two theorists who have been very popular with anti-
capitalist activists in recent years: Michael Hardt and Tony Negri. Hardt and Negri 
locate a singular formation—‘Empire’—as the dominant force in the world today. 
Now, although they understand that formation as a complex network—a ‘rhizome’, 
almost—and insist that it has no centre, they nonetheless insist on both its singularity 
and its ubiquity to an extent which has serious political consequences. Most obvi-
ously, their claim that an attack on any part of Empire is equal to an attack on any 
other leads directly to a refusal of any attempt to build lateral connections between 
different elements of the struggle against neoliberal hegemony: in other words, to a re-
fusal of politics as such. In fact, given their rejection of such strategic politics, we can 
read Hardt and Negri as endorsing the kinds of low-level tactical innovation typical 
of the anarchist and Situationist strands of the anti-capitalist movements which have 
so singularly failed to have any signifi cant political effects. What we are left with, 
in this case and in the case of Situationism, is a position which implicitly endorses 
isolated acts of creative, symbolic or theoretical resistance and some future revolu-
tion which would completely transform all social relations, but which maintains an 
austere distance from any other kinds of political activity. We can see this in the rheto-
ric of those culture jammers who seek to elevate their activities well beyond their 
warranted status as interesting but minor interventions against corporate hegemony 
(www.adbusters.org) and in the carnivalesque activities of those activists—such as 
radical clowns (http://www.clownarmy.org/ ), who dress up as clowns and taunt the 
police on anti-capitalist demonstrations, and so-called space hijackers (http://www.
spacehijackers.co.uk/clp3/ ) who organise spontaneous urban gatherings—and whose 
antics and messages are often simply indistinguishable to the wider public from the 
activities of viral marketers and cutting-edge corporate publicists.
Perhaps surprisingly for a work written in explicit sympathy with anti- capitalism, 
this book takes the view that this is an approach whose political futility is both logi-
cally apparent and historically incontestable. Real alternatives to the hegemony of 
capitalism and its institutions have only ever been built by complex social coalitions 
willing to experiment with a range of institutional and democratic innovations: from 
squatters building alternative communities with the tacit support of local govern-
ment to the coalitions of workers, bureaucrats and professionals who built the in-
stitutions of the welfare state in the twentieth century. Sitting around and waiting 
for the revolution or making radical statements which only our friends understand 
has never achieved anything. However, accepting such a view need not imply that 
the innovative tactics of jammers and clown are simply without value: nor need it 
entail abandoning the utopian impulse to remake the world and to remain constantly 
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 dissatisfi ed with imbalances of power. The challenge for anti-capitalism today is to 
bring together such exciting and innovative tactics into new formations of political 
possibility: that is, to assemble them into potentially effective strategies. Realising 
such potential means having to accept the irreducible and ever-intensifying com-
plexity of social life and the messy, always compromised nature of politics, without 
simply abandoning ourselves to the rule of neoliberalism. Believing in simplistic 
fairy-tales like the Spectacle just leaves us spitting in the wind.
Social Ecology
The formation of complex strategies may be the great political challenge facing anti-
capitalism, but it is not the primary one facing humanity as a whole today. Without 
doubt, the major obstacle facing us in the early years of the twenty-fi rst century is 
the ecological crisis which threatens to render life on Earth impossible for many 
species, including our own. For this reason alone, the next thinker for us to consider 
must be regarded as a signifi cant contributor to contemporary thought. The so-called 
ecological anarchist Murray Bookchin ploughed a consistent but often lonely intel-
lectual furrow through much of the latter half of the twentieth century, being one of 
the fi rst writers and activists to emerge from the Marxist tradition with a clear theo-
retical commitment to what would eventually come to be known as green politics. Of 
course, Bookchin was not alone in treating ecological themes—of the writers men-
tioned so far in this book, Williams (1973), Guattari (2000) and Vaneigem (2003) 
have all written on these issues at different times—but he was unique in placing them 
at the centre of his thought from the early 1950s onwards, and as such he is one of 
the venerable fi gures of the green movement, and one who has been widely read and 
discussed within this important strand of anti-capitalism. Given that this great fi gure 
of the American left died such a short time before writing—in 2006—it is rather 
sad that my main purpose in this short commentary will be to draw attention to the 
limitations of Bookchin’s thought, limitations typical of much thinking within the 
anti-capitalist movement.
Bookchin was no doubt, in his own way, an erudite scholar and a highly original 
thinker. As with the work of many autodidacts, however, his idiosyncratic schol-
arship generated as many misconceptions and glaring absences in his work as it 
did original insights. His most famous work, and in his own view his greatest, The 
Ecology of Freedom (Bookchin 1991), offers a complete theory of humanity’s rela-
tionship to nature which is grounded in a specifi c history of the socio- technological 
evolution of human civilisation. In this it bears an interesting resemblance to De-
leuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, and it is also close in spirit to the work of ma-
terialist historians such as Braudel, Mumford and Wallerstein. Bookchin takes 
a position which is largely informed by the same Hegelian humanism as inspired 
the early Marx, and which draws on the mainstream Western philosophical tradition 
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as mediated by the classics of Western Anarchism and early Marxism. In setting out 
the terms for his philosophy of social ecology, Bookchin makes some remarkably 
advanced arguments concerning the inseparability of humanity from nature (1991: 
1–42), which in spirit brings him close to the Spinozan materialism of Deleuze or 
Negri, and this resonance can be seen all the more strongly in Bookchin’s sympathy 
for certain radical mystical and Gnostic traditions (despite his rejection of contem-
porary mystical or quasi-religious approaches to ecology). Bookchin’s interest in the 
radical implications of early Christianity—despite his own background in Jewish 
 socialism—prefi gures the later argument of Alain Badiou that Pauline Christianity 
is the foundation of all later philosophies of universal human emancipation (Badiou 
2003). His insistence on the continuity of human and natural processes, of the so-
cial and the ecological, brings him close to those contemporary thinkers drawing 
on complexity theory to understand the similarities between natural and social pro-
cesses. His emphasis on the inherent productivity of matter has strong resonances 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic materialism and with the thought of Luce 
Irigaray, who identifi es a tendency to regard matter as inert substance within the 
‘phallogocentric’ economy of patriarchal thought. His rejection of primitivism and 
biocentrism combine with a belief in the democratic, communal and human-centred 
nature of ‘organic’ societies (pre-industrial, only primitively agricultural) to create 
an account of human history which is idiosyncratic in places, but largely mirrors 
Marx and Engels’s account, whereby the aim of political struggle is to recover a 
lost communality, while preserving the vast expansion of human capacities which 
modernisation has entailed (a conception which is actually supported by much con-
temporary anthropology; Bookchin 1991).
However, Bookchin’s thought reveals its limitations whenever it encounters 
a view which does not sit with his precise formulation of social ecology. His em-
phasis on the irreducible value of wholeness—both in human societies and in their 
relationship to nature—is decidedly problematic in the light of a perspective which 
rejects the idea of society as a coherent totality. For example, the psychoanalytically 
infl ected ideas of Ernesto Laclau stress the extent to which wholeness is always a 
fantasy, a thing that we (as groups or individuals) always wrongly imagine ourselves 
to have lost and to have a chance of recovering (1990), while Deleuze and Guattari 
would see this fantasy as the direct production of Oedipal culture (1983). According 
to this view, no human society has been or could be without confl ict, and no person 
is ever fully at one with their social and physical environment: nor could they be 
while retaining the status of a functioning human subject rather than a mere passive 
block of matter. This is a perspective which Bookchin simply ignores, while dismiss-
ing psychoanalysis out of hand (1991: 112–18). In much the same way, Bookchin’s 
Hegelian neo-Marxist account of human history as a process of progressive alien-
ation from nature through the division of labour now seems quite archaic compared 
with those theoretical approaches to human history which stress the contingency and 
complex interdependence of material and social processes, and which emphasise 
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even the historicity of matter itself (Prigogene & Stengers 1984: 208; Delanda 1997; 
Delanda 2002). Where these various approaches coincide with the post-Marxism of 
Laclau and Mouffe is precisely in their implicit or explicit rejection of the Hegelian 
idea of totality to which Bookchin remains attached and which constitutes the great-
est limitation of his thought.
Bookchin’s attitude to much of the important intellectual work of recent times 
was frankly reactionary. The introduction to the 1991 edition of the book simply 
dismisses postmodernism, deconstruction and cultural studies entirely out of hand, 
while demonstrating no apparent awareness of their relationship to political tradi-
tions very close to Bookchin’s. Given the apolitical and nihilistic image of these cur-
rents of thought in the United States at the time, this is not entirely surprising, but it 
is telling that Bookchin seemed to be entirely unaware of the ecological socialism of 
writers such as Raymond Williams and Félix Guattari. Ultimately, his thought raised 
some of the most important questions of recent times, in terms which were way 
ahead of their time, but in cutting himself off from the most relevant developments in 
radical thought, Bookchin severely limited the long-term usefulness of his thought.
Perhaps one illustration of this is his attitude to other strands of the Green move-
ment which he (almost always rightly) condemned for a lack of rigourous theoreti-
cal thinking. Bookchin alienated many with his efforts to distance himself from the 
mystifi cations of quasi-spiritual or biocentric green thought, an effort which was 
motivated by a wholly appropriate suspicion of any religious or supernatural beliefs 
or any beliefs which implied a lack of concern for other human beings. He was under-
standably appalled, for example, by the attitudes of prominent Earth First! activists 
who viewed third-world famine as a positive way of reducing the human burden on 
the Earth’s ecosystem (Bookchin 1991: xxxi; Bookchin 1988). However, his attitude 
to a wide range of such views was so thoroughly dismissive that he seemed inca-
pable of grasping the nature of their persuasive power for many people. For example, 
Spinoza’s work and the subsequent history of its reception makes clear how diffi cult 
it can be to draw a line between rationalist materialism and pantheist mysticism, 
a line which Bookchin tends to assume that he can stay on the rationalist side of 
even while asserting the inherently non-parsimonious character of nature. This is a 
problematic assertion and, some might argue, an unnecessary one. Biocentrism may 
be an extreme view to many, but it raises profound questions as to the bases of our 
ethical judgements ( just why should we place highest value on human life?), which 
cannot be waved away as easily as Bookchin would like (see http://raforum.info/
article.php3?id_article=1761).
There is no question that both Bookchin and the Situationists offer profound in-
sights into the workings of capitalist culture and the nature of possible opposition 
to it. Ultimately, however, neither of these bodies of work makes much attempt to 
engage with the full range of ideas which can inform radical theory at the beginning 
of the twenty-fi rst century. In particular, we have seen that there is an interesting 
fault line between these thinkers (and we could add to their list the kinds of dogmatic 
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Marxist still typical of small Western European revolutionary organisations such as 
the British Socialist Workers Party) and the anti-essentialists, Deleuze and Guattari 
and Laclau and Mouffe. While the former tend to see capitalist society as a totality 
of which contemporary culture is one integral element, the latter see social and cul-
tural formations as the outcome of relatively contingent processes of ‘articulation’ 
(Slack 1996) and ‘assemblage’ (DeLanda 2006). The implicit differences between 
these two sets of positions are profound, because it is really only in the latter group 
that there is any scope for understanding politics as playing a signifi cant role in the 
world. Indeed, at the present time, when neoliberal capitalism has established itself 
as, in the words of Perry Anderson, ‘the most successful ideology in world history’ 
(2000), it is not clear why believers in totality who are opposed to capitalism should 
do anything today but despair. If there is to be any scope for politics at all, then we 
surely need more complex and fl uid accounts of the relationship between culture and 
capitalism than these.
Note
1.  For a relevant study of green political activists in London, see Saunders (2007). 
On the persuasive criteria used by Saunders, there would be no question of 
designating the disparate fragments of contemporary British anti-capitalism a 
‘movement’.
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(Anti)Capitalism and Culture
In some ways, the very modern idea of culture emerged as a critique of capital-
ism. If culture is always a collective endeavour, then both conservative and radical 
traditions of critique have tended to see capitalism as inimical to it (Williams 1982, 
1961; Mulhern 2000). If we think of culture as the expressive arts, then there is a 
long tradition which assumes that commercial motives must always corrupt aesthetic 
activity. If we think of culture in anthropological terms as a way of life, then there is 
still a long history of commentary which believes that capitalism necessarily distorts, 
preys on or corrupts traditional ways of life or the self-organised activity of innovat-
ing groups. On the other hand, there are good reasons for arguing that any attempt 
to conceptually separate culture and capitalism is simply ridiculous. From this point 
of view, capitalism is not something that happens to culture. Rather, capitalism is a 
culture, a way of life, a set of practices and institutions which cannot be separated 
from the wider formations in which they emerge (Foucault 2004: 169–71). Both 
of these perspectives have some validity, insofar as capitalism is never lived as an 
abstraction, and yet it must be possible to identify its ‘singularity’ (Foucault 2004: 
170) to be able to say anything about it at all. In this chapter we will consider dif-
ferent ways of conceptualising the relationship between capitalism and culture, and 
their consequences for thinking about the politics of the anti-capitalist movement in 
various manifestations.
Capitalism, Creativity and Conservatism
Ideas about the cultural effects of capitalism are themselves dependent upon more 
fundamental sets of ideas about what capitalism is and what it does, ideas such as 
those discussed at the beginning of the last chapter. Nonetheless, we can identify a 
fairly consistent set of themes as being shared by commentators from a number of 
often mutually hostile political traditions. As Marx showed (Marx & Engels 1998; 
Marx 1992), what drives capitalism as a social process is the constant invention of 
new commodities and the search for new markets to sell them in. Those commodi-
ties might be actual new things, or minor modifi cations of existing things, or various 
types of service or intangible goods; and those new markets might actually be new 
groups of people or they might be existing groups who have been persuaded to buy 
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new things in new ways; but overall the logic is the same. For centuries, commenta-
tors have variously praised or condemned the social and cultural consequences of this 
process, although there has often been a good deal of agreement about what those 
consequences actually are. Conservative commentators have bemoaned the fact that 
the restless innovations of a society bent on inventing new things and new ways of 
doing things must inevitably undermine traditional beliefs, communities and social 
relations. Others have seen exactly the same process as benign and welcome. In the 
late-eighteenth century, Adam Smith was already extolling the civilising virtues of 
commerce and trade, and indeed Marx was to echo this view, describing the emer-
gence of a globally integrated economy as a force for bringing the world together 
and for modernising the less developed parts of the world (Marx & Engels 1998). 
Throughout this period there were voices questioning the destruction of traditional 
ways of life in the colonised world that this process involved, but they were seldom 
heard (James 1989: 4). There were many negative responses in their times to the 
social consequences of industrialisation and the capitalisation of agriculture, from 
street riots to poetry, and today the destructive social consequences of globalisation 
are one of the main reasons for the existence of the anti-capitalist movement but also 
one of the main causes provoking the rise of new forms of national, religious and 
ethnic fundamentalism. Every time a conservative commentator complains about the 
social consequences of drug abuse, hip-hop, pornography or TV, they are in effect 
decrying the cultural effects of certain relatively new types of commodity (drugs, 
music recordings, TV-shows, various forms of porn) being in circulation.
This is only one half of the capitalist story, however. Capitalism is not merely 
to be defi ned by processes of commodifi cation, because it is perfectly possible to 
have a market economy without having capitalism. Rather, what defi nes capitalism 
is the rule of capital: of that special kind of wealth that can be used to generate more 
wealth, and of those who control it. The characteristic features of a capitalist society 
include the concentration of productive wealth in the hands of an oligarchical elite 
and the tendency for their drive for capital accumulation—profi t—to organise all 
of the activities of that society, as well as the prevalence of wage labour throughout 
the economy. In fact, this will often involve processes which are quite opposite to 
the profl igate inventiveness of an ideal free market. In order to secure profi ts, and to 
maintain their position of privilege against potential rivals, capitalists (both individu-
als and institutions) will frequently work to secure monopoly control of particular 
economic sectors, limiting invention and production within those sectors. In addi-
tion, capitalists engaged in commodity-production will tend, where possible, to try 
to take advantage of possible economies of scale by producing and selling identical 
commodities to large markets. This will tend to encourage the standardisation of 
commodities, and as such will give capitalists a direct interest in encouraging a stan-
dardisation of tastes amongst consumers. Both monopolisation and standardisation 
can be understood as different aspects of what Manuel Delanda (following Fernand 
Braudel) calls ‘antimarkets’ (Delanda 1996).
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Antimarkets are organisational strategies which seek to stabilise, limit and contain 
the free production and exchange of commodities. So we can see that capitalism is 
not merely about the invention and distribution of commodities through market rela-
tions; it is also sustained by the strategic deployment of antimarkets1. Which of these 
components is the more powerful in any given context will depend upon a range of 
circumstances: technological limitations, the balance of forces within and between 
different social groups, and so forth. For example, so-called monopoly capitalism, 
characterised by a high level of cooperation between capitalists, will tend to limit 
innovation and creativity. Conversely, high levels of competition between capitalists 
will tend to lessen their ability to resort to the construction of antimarkets, as they are 
forced to innovate and to encourage wider innovation in the search for new products 
and production methods which can help them compete with their rivals.
In fact, following a line of argument that runs from Marx through to Negri, it is 
possible to claim that the creativity which gives rise to such new inventions— artistic, 
scientifi c, or utilitarian—is never really engendered directly by capital at all but is 
always the result of human interaction outside of the circuits of capital accumula-
tion. Capital, from this perspective, must always feed on this creativity and work to 
transform its products into profi table commodities, but it is never the source of new 
value in itself. This is why capital must locate itself near great centres of collective 
exchange and creativity (Paris and London in the nineteenth century, New York and 
California in the twentieth) and must to some extent allow those zones to exist. The 
great bohemian centres are always in close proximity to fi nancial centres, because 
capital needs their innovative energy, although it can never fully control it, how-
ever hard it tries. This is why the ideas, practices and social innovations of radical 
forces are often so superfi cially similar to those of leading-edge capitalism (the Bay-
area counterculture and Silicon Valley; The Loft and Studio 54). Capitalism needs 
to allow these great laboratories of change to thrive, and it cannot always direct and 
capture what comes out of them, although it will try. When it cannot, when they 
become connected to other forces, progressive social changes can ensue.
Consider, for example, what happened when the technology of oral contracep-
tion emerged in 1960s Britain: its wide availability was a product of the interac-
tion between elements of the welfare state and decades of feminist campaigning 
for women’s contraception, led by the legendary Marie Stopes. The potential for 
liberation of women from the housewife role was initially captured by the promotion 
of the Dolly Bird as the new feminine ideal: sexualised, but ultimately even more 
powerless and passive than the housewife, her role limited to that of a consumer of 
cosmetics and an object in turn of male consumption. It took the strategic coordina-
tion of the women’s liberation movement to recapture this potential and amplify 
it in democratic directions. There was a very fi ne line, but all the difference in the 
world, between the liberated woman of 1964 and the liberated woman of 1972, and 
the difference was entirely a function of capital’s relative ability to capture and direct 
the creativity of this new technology against the strategic capacity of women to do 
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the same. This kind of democratic change is always a risk inherent in the kinds of 
new technology which capitalism must permit and encourage if it is to keep moving 
forward profi tably.
This is why a wholly negative response to the social consequences of capitalism 
as such has generally been the preserve of traditionalist conservatives. Logically, to 
oppose capitalism as such, except in the name of some imagined future alternative 
would be to defend the society and culture which it has displaced; and by defi nition 
those who have sought to defend, say, the feudal order of medieval Europe or Japan, 
or the society and values of the Ottoman empire, or even the patriarchal customs of 
earlier capitalist moments, have not been on the left. Even where traditional, non-
Western values have been articulated to anti-imperialist projects, as with the evolu-
tion of Indian nationalism in the early twentieth-century, only the most reactionary 
variants have actually wanted to revert to some simply pre-modern, pre-capitalist 
state. Historically, certain currents within the left have idealised a romantic vision of 
some aspects of medieval or pre-medieval life or culture, and most historians agree 
that standards of living deteriorated for most people in the early stages of the indus-
trial revolution, but the Enlightenment ideal of a future that would be better than the 
past was fundamental to the emergence of most of the political traditions—socialist, 
anarchist, social democratic, communist, liberal—that emerged in the wake of the 
industrial revolution and which contribute to contemporary anti-capitalism.
As such, radicals have generally tended to see the process whereby traditional 
social structures—and the cultures which sustained them—are displaced as either 
benign in itself or as the necessary precondition for any truly democratic social 
change. In the most general terms, this is the process which sociologists refer to as 
detraditionalisation: a process whereby traditional patterns of belief and behaviour 
are dismantled and displaced. Interestingly, two of the key theoretical perspectives 
that we are concerned with in this book have produced their own terminologies for 
describing such a process. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘deterritorialisation’ is just such a 
term and evocatively alludes to the ways in which the destabilisation of routinised 
patterns is almost always bound up with a re-ordering of spatial relationships (so the 
break-up of so-called traditional rural ways of life in many parts of the world today is 
bound up with the depopulation and re-ordering of the countryside and the migration 
of populations to new urban centres). Much the same emphasis is given by Laclau’s 
concept of ‘dislocation’, which designates both the process by which established 
forms of social life are disrupted, and also the inherently unstable dimension of any 
social identity or structure, however apparently fi xed it may be. Laclau sums up a 
great deal of democratic thought on the social effects of capitalist modernisation 
when he writes:
Let us consider the dislocatory effects of emerging capitalism on the lives of workers. 
They are well known: the destruction of traditional communities, the brutal and exhaust-
ing discipline of the factory, low wages and insecurity of work. But this is only one side 
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of the effects, for the workers’ response to the dislocation of their lives by capitalism was 
not to submit passively, but to break machines, organize trade unions, and go on strike. 
In this process new skills and abilities were inevitably born, which might not have been 
the case otherwise. (Laclau 1990: 39)
Dislocation, deterritorialisation and detraditionalisation are by no means exclu-
sively effects of capitalism and its spread. They can be the consequences of quite dif-
ferent changes to the social order (consider, for example, the destruction of peasant 
communities by Stalin in the 1930s or the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960s). 
They can be the consequence of ecological shifts which undermine the material in-
frastructure of an earlier way of life—drought, famine and plague can force a change 
in traditional patterns of behaviour just as effectively as socio-political changes—or 
of technological innovations such as those which made the English master weav-
ers redundant within a generation in the early nineteenth-century. In the latter two 
instances, however, it is worth refl ecting that capitalism’s tendency to technologi-
cal innovation and to the intensive exploitation of natural resources has generated 
the most intense and the most rapid ecological and technological transformations in 
human history since the beginning of the modern period.
Having said this, we should note that progressive anti-capitalism has rarely been 
informed by a purely modernistic or futurist sensibility which is simply dismissive 
of the past in its entirety. Even where it has rejected the hierarchy and squalor which 
characterised previous social orders, progressive anti-capitalist thought has identi-
fi ed a tendency in capitalism to undermine certain practices and values which are 
typical of most human cultures and whose loss they regret: even while they may 
have no nostalgia for feudal hierarchy, for example, socialists have tended to regret 
the passing of a sense of mutual responsibility which seems to have informed much 
of pre-industrial European society (Polanyi 1944: 165–77) and indeed most other 
human societies. This conservative element has historically been a minor strand of 
radical thought. Today, however, when neoliberalism seeks to impose capitalist rela-
tions on those modern collectivist institutions—in particular the institutions of the 
welfare state—which were partially built by the working classes and their represen-
tatives for their own protection, then it is much easier for those in the radical tradition 
to take a wholly conservative position, concerned only with defending the achieve-
ments of twentieth-century social democracy. This is a notoriously problematic posi-
tion for anyone on the radical left to take: those institutions were never perfect, and 
in the United Kingdom, for example, were never very democratic. However, it is 
hard to deny that central to the neoliberal project is the attempt to turn those vast col-
lective resources into objects of primitive accumulation, in a process widely seen as 
analogous to the enclosure of common land in eighteenth-century England (Hardt & 
Negri 2004: 186; Retort 2005; de Angelis 2001). In this context, even those who 
regard the institutions of the welfare state as unwieldy, undemocratic and outdated 
are forced into a defensive position to the extent that they have any desire to retain 
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their status as common resources under some kind of democratic control. This is 
what makes possible a certain continuity between the aims of even the most moder-
ate social democrats and more radical sections of the anti-capitalist movement, even 
those who share little of the radical tradition’s faith in the progressive potential of 
capitalist modernisation.
One such is the strand of Green primitivism represented by some members of 
groups such as Earth First! Even here, however, it is worth nothing that the primitive 
state to which Green primitivism would like to return is not one which is simply pre-
capitalist, but one which long pre-dates feudalism and even any highly developed 
form of agriculture. This connects it with another important strand of contemporary 
anti-capitalism, the campaigns by indigenous peoples against the dislocatory effects 
of capitalist primitive accumulation. Most famous of these is, as we have seen, the 
Zapatista movement, which has absolutely no desire to see any form of industrial 
modernisation imposed on Chiapas and fi nds in native Mayan traditions a way of 
life which is simply more democratic and more ethically, politically and ecologically 
desirable than any which capitalism could make possible. The Zapatistas are not 
simply defenders of tradition: their commitment to principles such as gender equal-
ity and sexual freedom has no particular basis in traditional Mayan attitudes to these 
issues, which are much more conservative. However, like many twentieth-century 
radicals who rejected the classical Marxist idea that only the industrial working class 
can lead a socialist revolution, they seek to implement democratic values in a social, 
economic and material context not wholly disfi gured by capitalist social relations.
We can see then that a defensive resistance to neoliberalism and a commitment 
to democratising existing social relations and institutions without subjecting them 
to the logic of the market is what ties together the apparently disparate strands of 
 contemporary anti-capitalism. The question which remains for us to examine in detail 
is what the cultural effects of capitalism are which critics in this tradition have ob-
jected to, and what might be the correlate of contemporary anti-capitalism in thinking 
about culture in general.
Creative Destruction
Capitalism has tended to produce a general set of social and cultural effects which 
has caused anxiety even amongst those commentators who, like Marx, have been 
relatively gung-ho about the modernising benefi ts of capitalism. As Marx himself 
observed, capitalism’s basic function is to generate commodities. For commentators 
such as Marx and Schumpeter, capitalism is at once and in equal parts fantastically 
creative and fantastically destructive. We can see these dual aspects of capitalism just 
by examining the basic process of producing a commodity. Any commodity is ulti-
mately produced by a process of appropriation and creative destruction. For exam-
ple, chopping down a tree and turning it into a table involves someone  appropriating 
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the tree, destroying it and creating something new. Arguably this is what capitalist 
social relations do to everything, in trying to make everything (from food to clothes 
to education) into commodities. The process by which resources which were once 
owned in common by a community, or by no one, are appropriated by groups or 
individuals, is called by Marx ‘primitive accumulation’, and the process by which 
those resources are transformed into commodities—units of exchange with a cur-
rency value—is called commodifi cation. At the heart of the Marxian tradition of so-
cial criticism is the observation that capitalism as a social system tends to apply these 
processes not only to previously unexploited natural resources but also to resources 
which communities rely on for survival as well as to many other things.
For example, the changing relationship between artists and their publics in the 
centuries following the Renaissance can be understood in terms of the transforma-
tion of music, visual art objects and literary works into things which could be bought 
and sold on the open market. It is interesting to refl ect that this was in many ways 
not a bad thing: the fi ne arts had up to this point been largely the preserve of the 
aristocratic elite who could afford to retain the services of artists who were essen-
tially specialist servants. But the consequences of marketisation are not always so 
benign. At the present time, the efforts of institutions like the British government 
to transform public services such as education and health provision into units of 
service which can be bought and sold competitively is a perfect example of this 
process being actively enforced against the wishes of most concerned groups. While 
most professionals working in those fi elds and most users of those services do not 
want to reduce their relationships to buyer–seller transactions, such a transforma-
tion of those relationships is necessary if private corporations are to be enabled to 
provide such services for a profi t and to compete with each other to do so. In this 
context, the social resources built up by the welfare state in the post-war period 
are treated as objects of primitive accumulation and subject to processes of com-
modifi cation, even against the wishes of a majority of people concerned. So whereas 
most people would regard healthcare and education as collaborative enterprises—
requiring a high level of cooperation between carers and patients, educators and 
students— neoliberal policy insists that the interests of both service users and service 
providers, and of different groups of providers, be seen as antagonistic in just the 
same way as the interests of buyers and sellers of commodities are (buyers wanting 
lower prices, sellers wanting higher prices). This set of relationships is enforced, en-
trenched and institutionalised by policies designed to re-organise service provision 
into competing units, setting schools and hospitals in competition with each other 
and  forcing parents, students and patients to treat them as competing commodity 
producers: for example, by removing local democratic control over such institutions, 
leaving service users with no way of exercising power over them except by choosing 
to use some services and institutions rather than others. This exemplifi es the process 
whereby commodifi cation leads to a reduction of almost all human relationships to 
buyer–seller transactions.
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What are the cultural effects of this process? This is not a matter on which there 
is absolute agreement, so let us consider a number of views here. The most famous 
commentator on this issue in the Marxist tradition is Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), 
who argued that the conditions of production of artistic commodities for a mass mar-
ket led to a generalised homogenisation or standardisation of the output of the culture 
industry: such as similar-sounding records, clichéd movies and identikit detective 
stories or romance novels. This is a common complaint about commercial culture to 
this day, and it clearly has a good deal of validity. However, we should consider in 
more detail just what this account assumes and implies. For one thing, it is not at all 
clear that such cultural standardisation can be blamed entirely on capitalism, because, 
to put it bluntly, most human communities have displayed fairly conservative cultural 
tastes, capitalist or not. Most communities, even relatively non-hierarchical ones have 
maintained traditional forms and themes in story-telling, poetry, music and art, and 
it’s by no means clear why an anti-capitalist critic should be as wedded to the clas-
sically bourgeois values of individuality and originality as Adorno is (values which 
he never defends as such, but simply assumes to be self-evident). Having said this 
however, there is a strong socialist tradition, not least that informing the fi rst phase of 
British cultural studies (e.g. Hoggart 1957), which makes a clear distinction between 
such organic traditions and the output of the culture industry, which is characterised 
by a far more passive relationship between the consumers of culture and the culture 
they consume.
This is an important point, because Adorno’s view is part of his much wider 
account of capitalist society in the middle decades of the twentieth century which 
would similarly support the distinction between an industrialised, passive culture 
and a more participatory and active one. Adorno’s account of capitalist culture, 
which arguably owes more to Weber than to Marx (Weber 1968: 1156), stresses the 
growth of administration: the centralised, bureaucratic regulation of social, cultural 
and personal life by powerful institutions (Adorno & Horkheimer 1997: 131). It 
was an extremely widespread assumption at that time that this was the inevitable 
destiny of capitalist modernity, and probably of ‘actually existing socialism’ too. 
This is understandable, given that this is the era when centralised economic planning 
became popular with governments of all political persuasions throughout the indus-
trial world, and when the new advances in mechanisation—the culmination of the 
so-called second industrial revolution—made it possible to manufacture all kinds of 
goods (from cars and radios to foodstuffs and textiles, not to mention books, maga-
zines and records) cheaply according to vast economies of scale. It was Henry Ford 
who summed up the aesthetic of the new consumerism when he said of his famous 
Model T (the fi rst mass market motor car) that it would be available in ‘any colour 
so long as it’s black’ (Jardim 1970: 83), and it was Antonio Gramsci who named 
this new type of regulated and administered capitalism ‘Fordism’ (Gramsci 1971: 
279–318). The great era of mass culture, when economies of scale found millions of 
people consuming similar products, watching the same movies and reading the same 
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newspapers must have looked like one in which standardisation had indeed become 
the normal mode in which capitalist commodity-production would work.
Of course, even Adorno had to recognise a potential problem with such an account. 
As is quite obvious, and Marx was certainly aware, capitalist ideology claims that 
capitalism offers consumers an ever-widening choice of commodities of all types. 
Adorno argues that in fact this is a lie: the products of the culture industry are only 
superfi cially different from one another, characterised by the pseudo-individualism 
of purely cosmetic differences. This is an argument which is many ways very close to 
the later ideas of the Situationists, who also claim that, in effect, capitalist commod-
ity culture creates a feeling of freedom and widening-choice for its inhabitants which 
is simply illusory, a screen for their complete lack of real agency or authenticity.
Now, there are several major problems with this line of argument. One is that the 
critic who pursues this line of argument must claim the authority to determine what 
constitutes real differences between objects and what differences are merely super-
fi cial. Adorno’s most famous writings on these topics relate to music, and Adorno 
was notoriously narrow and elitist in his views as to what characterised good music, 
having no time for anything outside the tradition of Austro-German orchestral music 
and maintaining a rather narrow view even of composers that properly belonged 
to that tradition. As many commentators have since pointed out (Middleton 1990), 
Adorno’s criteria are not only explicitly elitist, they are also wholly ethnocentric. In 
musical traditions in which formal innovation of certain given musical structures 
is less highly valued than re-interpretation of other musical parameters his criteria 
would simply have no purchase: in house music, for example, where a minor tim-
bral contribution—an unusual sound, an unexpected fi lter effect—to a standard track 
might be heard by connoisseurs as a signifi cant innovation. In broader terms, the 
dismissal of consumer culture by commentators such as Adorno and Debord often 
seems to proceed from the austere hauteur of intellectuals for whom the material fab-
ric of everyday life has just never been much of an issue: for most of the human race 
through most of its history, by contrast, the difference between one cloth and another, 
one cheese and another, and so forth, has been the stuff that cultures, identities and 
lives have been built from (Miller 1987: 189–96; Slater 1997).
However, it would be too simplistic to conclude that Adorno and company are 
simply wrong. Capitalism may encourage the development of real and powerful new 
objects, both in producing new types of commodities and in continually innovating 
existing ones, but, importantly, it is never capital that does the inventing. Even new 
kinds of soap-powder are produced in the collective space of the laboratory, rather 
than in the boardroom or on the trading-fl oor. In these terms, the chemical research 
lab is a precise analogy to the artistic bohemias mentioned earlier—both are pro-
tected zones of experimentation which capital must keep close to itself if it is to fi nd 
new resources for accumulation.
This view has a particular relevance today, in the era of so-called post-Fordist 
capitalism (Amin 1994). One of the characteristic features of post-Fordism is that 
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manufacturing systems have become so sophisticated and so powerfully integrated 
with both retail and with research and design that it is in effect possible for manu-
facturers and retailers to dispense with economies of scale while still servicing a 
mass consumer market. One of the classic features of post-Fordism is the prevalence 
of just-in-time ordering systems in industries such as food or fashion. Supermar-
kets or fashion stores today will typically only carry a small quantity of any one 
item. Sophisticated computing and communication technologies make it possible 
for suppliers to be notifi ed every time a single item is sold and to supply a replace-
ment immediately. In some sectors, products can even be slightly modifi ed in ac-
cordance with emergent trends in demand on a weekly basis (so one week more red 
scarves can be produced, but if blue scarves start to sell faster then more of them can 
be produced). Overall, this allows manufacturers, suppliers and retailers to compete 
more effectively to meet precise consumer demands, so enhancing profi tability. The 
consequences of this shift are enormous. Capitalist culture in this context has a much 
weaker interest in promoting conformity than it did when it was trying to sell vast 
numbers of identical objects to consumers. The era of mass culture is over, and it is 
now clear that it was only ever typical of one specifi c form of industrial capitalism, 
adapted to the technological capacities and limitations of the early-twentieth century. 
We can see this just by turning on our TV sets or scanning the internet for online 
radio stations: there really is a vast range of cultural output now available to us, and 
even if we don’t think any of it has much value, it is hard to argue that the differences 
which characterise it are merely superfi cial.
This is not to say that we should celebrate the commodifi cation of everything that 
advanced post-Fordist capitalism entails, but it does draw attention to the fact that 
it is diffi cult to explain what is actually wrong with it in terms drawn exclusively 
from Adorno, or similar commentators like Debord. Even from a Marxist perspec-
tive, it’s possible to argue that Adorno’s implicit celebration of real individualism 
is itself inherently bourgeois: often the terms in which Adorno criticises the culture 
industry seem drawn more from Romanticism than from the socialist tradition. But 
does this mean that we should simply dismiss commentators such as Debord and 
Adorno altogether? It does not. There remains a certain powerful truth to their views 
if we come back to the basic question of the socio-cultural effects of widespread 
commodifi cation. For while commodifi cation may generate a situation in which very 
real differences between commodities are actually produced, it nonetheless serves to 
homogenise social relations by reducing them all to buyer–seller transactions. Marx 
described the process whereby commodifi cation comes to mask the real social rela-
tions which make the production of commodities possible as commodity fetishism, 
and in such instances we can see the logic of commodity fetishism extending into 
new domains of culture. The result is a kind of fl attening out of social and cultural 
experience whereby we are able to chose from a vast range of possible lifestyle-
 elements and experiences, but the nature of our relationships to all of those things 
will be identical. From university courses to shoes to restaurant meals to holidays to 
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dates with potential partners: everything will become, in effect, something we buy. 
This is the anxiety which Adorno and Debord so eloquently express, and the contem-
porary cultural scene—in which the broadcast and print media obsess about celebrity 
lifestyles while entirely failing to report the fact that the welfare state is effectively 
being dismantled, against the express wishes of the public—seems to bear out their 
fears more than a little.
No Logo: In the Empire of the Commodity
The most celebrated strands of contemporary anti-capitalist thought to have some-
thing like a theory of culture are heavily preoccupied with the issue of commodifi ca-
tion. Most notably Naomi Klein’s No Logo, the publication and success of which was 
itself, as we have seen, a major factor in popularising the notion of an anti- capitalist 
movement, takes contemporary processes of commodifi cation as its central theme 
through its concern with the apparent triumph of branding in contemporary culture 
and its relationship with global patterns of exploitation. For all its strengths, the book 
is intellectually weakened by Klein’s apparent unfamiliarity with the tradition of 
Marxist and post-Marxist thought: nothing in the book is inaccurate from the point 
of view of this tradition, but its claims to originality are highly problematic. In ef-
fect, Klein simply repeats a point already made many times by commentators going 
back to Marx, which is that the extreme effect of commodity fetishism is to mask 
the reality of social relations, alienating workers from each other and from the prod-
ucts of their labour, and so alienating consumers from workers and from the mate-
rial world in general. Even her casual claim that the triumph of brands as the key 
commodities of our time marks some decisive new era of capitalism is wholly un-
original, echoing both the Situationists and the work of thinkers such as Lyotard and 
Baudrillard who have analysed far more carefully the processes whereby images and 
units of information become commodities in highly advanced capitalist economies. 
 However, Klein, who is by profession a journalist, and one of the most important 
of our time, can hardly be blamed for not being an expert on political and cultural 
theory. It would be absurd for us to attack her for these shortcomings: instead it is 
the job of a book like this one to try to fi ll in some of these gaps.
So let’s look at a range of more theoretical writers who have in relatively recent 
times considered the cultural consequences of what we might call deep commodi-
fi cation. At their most extreme, the views of such thinkers would tend to imply that 
there is simply no point in trying to maintain a perspective which is in any way anti-
capitalist. Jean Baudrillard is one example. In his early work, Baudrillard argues 
that in an advanced capitalist society, commodity exchange is always an exchange 
of meaningful signs. He argues that the notion important to Marx, of a commodity 
having ‘use value’ (it’s real value) as distinct from its ‘exchange value’ (it’s market 
price), is a false one: uses are always socially imagined and as such it is only its 
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location in a system of meanings which constitutes any object as in any way useful; 
therefore, all value is exchange value (Baudrillard 1988b: 57–97). Baudrillard, quite 
logically, moved from this perspective to argue that in contemporary culture, all of 
our experience is mediated by the exchange of signs which have no direct correspon-
dence to any material reality. In fact, he argues, we can no longer speak of ‘signs’ 
but only of ‘simulacra’ (images and representations which have no referents in a real 
world) as constituting the totality of contemporary experience. Baudrillard therefore 
argues that reality as such has been overwhelmed by the ‘hyperreality’ of absolute 
commodifi cation. In a nutshell, Baudrillard carries the pessimism of Adorno and 
Debord to its logical conclusion, arguing that once commodifi cation has reached a 
certain level of intensity, any struggle for authenticity is futile: the game is now up 
(Baudrillard 1988b: 166–84).
A rather different view would be implied by the ideas of Jean-François Lyotard. 
Lyotard also considers that commodifi cation has had a dramatic effect on the status 
of truth, but he reasons along different lines. In his most famous work The Post-
modern Condition (1984), Lyotard argues that knowledge has become a commodity 
today. Just consider the fact that Bill Gates has become the world’s richest man by 
selling, not physical goods, but pieces of knowledge—most notably the Windows 
operating system—and you can see the truth of this. In fact since Lyotard wrote this 
amazingly prophetic account in 1979, the idea that we now live in a ‘knowledge 
economy’ (Rutherford 2003) has become a truism of government policy and main-
stream economics. Lyotard points out that this implies not only a change in the nature 
of the global economy but a change in the social status of knowledge, also. Whereas 
in the past, knowledge has been judged in terms of how it fi ts into traditional pic-
tures of the world or into ‘Big Stories’ about the purpose of human history, it now 
comes to be judged solely in terms of its functionality. Lyotard points out, very in-
terestingly, that this is already, in effect, how science values knowledge: the devel-
opment of theoretical physics since the late-nineteenth century, for example, has 
shown that science can tolerate quite incompatible theoretical paradigms as long as 
they continue to generate respective experimental and practical results. Incidentally, 
Lyotard’s approach is in a certain sense the opposite of Baudrillard’s. Where Bau-
drillard collapses the distinction between use value and exchange value by arguing 
that all values are exchange values, Lyotard implicitly collapses the distinction by 
arguing that all values are use values: so even the symbolic value of commodities ex-
ists only because of the social uses to which those symbols can be put. (This reading 
would tie in interestingly with the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu (1986), who argues that 
symbolic commodities are largely used as deliberate markers of social differentia-
tion). In subsequent work, Lyotard develops a rather obscure philosophical response 
to this situation which we have no space to try to summarise here. To put it very 
crudely, however, he argues that the proper ethical response to this situation must be 
to refuse any ‘totalitarian’ attempt to impose a single system of meanings and values 
on the world (Lyotard 1984, 1988). We now inhabit a world in which no Big Story 
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(or ‘grand narrative’, as the term is usually translated) can contain and legitimate all 
knowledge, and so we must learn to live with the co-existence of incommensurable 
systems and types of knowledge. In fact, what Lyotard proposes is very close to 
the terms in which sections of the anti-capitalist movement, such as the Zapatistas, 
frame their opposition to neoliberalism today.
A different perspective again is offered by those Marxist commentators who take 
a less apocalyptic view of matters than Adorno or Debord. In the English-speaking 
world, critics such as Frederic Jameson (1991), David Harvey (1989; 2005) and 
Paul Smith (1997) have offered compelling accounts of the relationship between 
advanced capitalism and various types of social and cultural change. These writers 
tend to stress the importance of understanding shifts in the technical, material and 
geographical organisation of capitalism for understanding that range of recent cul-
tural changes which are sometimes collectively understood in terms of a transition to 
a new postmodern era. Unlike the key fi gures of cultural studies, these writers tend 
to see nothing at all to be happy about in recent times and very little to be optimistic 
about without some return to fairly traditional forms of labour movement politics. As 
such, they tend to offer a simpler critique of contemporary capitalist culture than the 
mainstream of cultural studies or the anti-capitalist movement, and they tend to have 
little interest in the latter as a potential vehicle for opposition to neoliberalism. We 
should also include in this category Slavoj Žižek, who is perhaps the most vocifer-
ously anti-capitalist of contemporary cultural theorists, but who is contemptuously 
dismissive of both the anti-capitalist movement and cultural studies (Žižek 2002: 
170–1, 273).
What are the actual features of contemporary culture of which these critics are 
critical? Well, it is interesting to note that in some senses the key features which 
they identify as typical of the current era are not so different from those identifi ed 
by commentators with slightly different political emphases. Sociologists such as 
Zygmunt Bauman (who might be described as a maverick Marxist), Ulrich Beck 
and Anthony Giddens (who are certainly not Marxists) and the team of Scott Lash 
and John Urry (whose complex post-Marxism is more-or-less analogous to Stuart 
Hall’s), all see the general process of detraditionalisation as generating a culture 
which is pluralistic and individualistic, in which the logic of commodifi cation is ex-
tended across a wide range of social fi elds and in which the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century institutions of social solidarity dissolve (e.g. Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994; 
Bauman 2001). However, these sociologists tend to a more complex view of the 
losses and gains arising from such a situation than do the followers of classical 
Marxism. What distinguishes the more nuanced views of this group of sociologists 
from those of these Marxist commentators is really a matter of how they value these 
changes, and how far they regard them as reversible or inevitable. For Žižek, for 
example, the commodifi cation of all culture is neither inevitable nor desirable but 
can probably only be confronted by a full-scale revolutionary assault on capital-
ism as such. For Harvey, the answer would seem to be a resumption of the social 
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democratic or  revolutionary communist projects of the mid-twentieth century: Har-
vey does not make this explicit, but his generalised condemnation of most cultural 
change since the end of that moment seems to imply this (Harvey 1989: 284–307; 
Harvey 2005). Jameson is always unclear as to what the solution should be, but 
given his terms of reference, it must presumably be proletarian revolution. My own 
view of these Marxist commentators is that they offer brilliant and entirely accurate 
descriptions of contemporary capitalist culture, but that they do so from a perspec-
tive which has become incapable of generating effective political responses to the 
situation they describe. For now, let’s consider some aspects of these descriptions 
in a little more detail.
For the Situationist Raoul Vaneigem the basic logic of capitalism is ‘separation’ 
(1983: 87)). This is a suggestive phrase. Recall my account of the logic of commodi-
fi cation above: the process by which the tree is turned into the table is clearly a 
process whereby some wood is separated from the tree, the tree is separated from the 
ground, the ground in question is probably, in some way, separated from the common 
ground of which it was once part. What’s more, separation is also something that ap-
pears to happen to people in capitalist societies, as traditional forms of community 
are dissolved and people come increasingly to see themselves as isolated individ-
uals, separate from and largely in competition with all other individuals, rather than 
as members of any kind of group (be it tribe, nation, family, neighbourhood, party, 
union, or class). This is the process which other commentators have named ‘individ-
ualisation’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2001), and it is arguably the key socio-cultural 
tendency of the precise form of neoliberal capitalism which has been hegemonic in 
the West since the 1970s (although there are powerful countervailing tendencies, as 
we will see in later chapters). Even more than this, the traditional Marxian critique of 
alienation sees separation as part of the process whereby people lost sight of the fact 
that the material world they inhabit—a world of commodities—is in fact entirely the 
product of collective human labour.
Separation, individualisation, alienation: in different terms these all describe as-
pects of a process which is endemic to unregulated, unopposed capitalism, and which 
has manifested itself in many different ways throughout the history of capitalist 
modernity. At the present moment, however, it appears to be particularly effective. 
Rising crime, an obsession with celebrities, a decline in political participation: these 
are all, arguably, symptoms of this dissolution of the social and of any generalised 
sense of human solidarity. Carried to its logical conclusion, this process would 
undermine the very idea of the human being as a social animal at all. If anything 
more substantial than the struggle for autonomy binds together the disparate ele-
ments of the contemporary anti-capitalism, it is an antipathy for this process. In the 
United Kingdom, as discussed in the previous chapter, one of the key moments in 
the emergence of the movement was the Reclaim the Streets project of the 1990s, 
which took as its main object of attack the car culture which was prepared to see 
both ancient woodlands and affordable urban housing stock decimated by massive 
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road-building plans. Inspired in part by Situationist theory, this antipathy to cars 
was informed not just by environmentalist concerns but by a political critique of the 
socio-aesthetic function of the motor car. Cars in many ways embody the cultural 
logic of separation, alienation and individualisation. They enable private individu-
als, with or without select groups of acquaintances, to travel wherever and when-
ever they like. As such, at a purely individual level, they are hugely liberating. But 
they form part of a general system of transport (Urry 2004) which is extraordinarily 
dangerous—millions of people running around in metal boxes that travel at lethal 
speeds with no effective system of coordination—and hugely damaging to the envi-
ronment, both through carbon emissions and the heavy demands which tarmac roads 
put on fi nite stocks of land. They protect their users from any form of direct human 
contact, and from any participation in public space at all: going from home to work 
by car can save the suburban commuter from even having to walk down the street. 
To oppose the ubiquity of the motor car in our society is one way to attack the whole 
culture of alienation and individualisation which dominates it.
We can see, then, a clear continuity between the approach of the anti-capitalist 
movement, and that of various critics in the Marxist tradition who identify and criti-
cise the dominant cultural tendencies of advanced capitalism. We might ask, then, 
just why we would need anything more than this in order to generate a position in 
cultural theory which is generally usable by that movement or its sympathisers. I will 
try to deal with that question now.
For one thing, it is important to remember that these Marxist writers are gener-
ally either indifferent or mildly hostile to the anti-capitalist movement, which they 
see as no good substitute for the great projects of communism and social democ-
racy. Now, in one sense this is quite justifi ed. After all, what has this movement 
actually achieved, especially when compared with the colossal achievements of the 
labour movement in the twentieth century? Absolutely nothing worth mentioning, in 
truth. However, there seems very little reason to believe that a return to the tactics 
of the twentieth-century labour movement is going to achieve anything in the future, 
given that that movement was so comprehensively defeated in the last decades of 
that  century. More than this, however, I am going to argue that there is something 
problematic about both the attitudes of these scholars and certain prevalent attitudes 
within the anti-capitalist movement itself which point to a problem with the very idea 
of anti-capitalism. However, before we can get into this issue, we are going to have 
to pull back a moment and think a bit further in abstract terms.
Most Marxist cultural criticism takes as its object of attack the basic cultural ef-
fects of capitalism, which are usually understood in terms of the logic and conse-
quences of commodifi cation. Put very simply, however, my argument is that it is 
very diffi cult to sustain a position which is opposed to all commodifi cation as such. 
There are some contexts in which commodifi cation is not a bad thing. Let us take 
as an example the general fi eld of the production and distribution of music. This is a 
good example because Adorno, the great critic of commodifi cation, was particularly 
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interested in music and particularly clear about the implications of his position for 
thinking about it. Now there are a number of perspectives, including Adorno’s, ac-
cording to which it is possible to argue that commodifi cation as such is bad for 
music. If one believes that commodity-production necessarily implies standardisa-
tion, or if one believes a particular tradition (or several co-existing traditions) to be 
the sole repository of great music, then commodifi cation will be a bad thing. In the 
fi rst case this will be because standardisation as such can be argued to be clearly a 
bad thing: even where musical traditions are relatively conservative, conservatism is 
not exactly the same thing as the enforced and mechanical conformism of industrial 
standardisation, which, in itself, no one is going to defend. In the second case it will 
be because commodifi cation necessarily implies a process whereby the integrity of a 
tradition is compromised: music is taken out of its intended context to be sold else-
where (as sheet music or recordings) and as such much of its impact is lost and it is 
not properly understood by its performers or its listeners.
However, none of these propositions stand up if one accepts that the fi eld of 
 popular music since the early days of recording has been characterised by a great 
deal of welcome innovation, experiment and progressive practice. For the very exis-
tence of popular music as we know it depends entirely on a material, economic and 
technical framework of commodifi cation. There was no jazz, no rock, no hip-hop, no 
soul, no funk, no disco, no house that ever really existed outside of a framework of 
commodity-circulation. The very cultures into which these musics emerged existed 
primarily through the material medium of the exchange of commodities: records, 
radio broadcasts and sheet music. Indeed, for that matter, Adorno’s hero Beethoven 
also relied on a certain types of commodifi cation (selling sheet music and tickets to 
public concerts rather than being employed by wealthy patrons as previous genera-
tions of composers had been) to give him the independence to be able to revolutionise 
European orchestral music. In the case of popular musics, this is clearly something 
more than a case of creativity surviving despite the culture industry. Many of these 
musics could never have achieved the impact or the levels of creative innovation that 
they have done without the capacity to cross borders (between places, times, com-
munities and generations) that is the unique capacity of the deterritorialised com-
modity (Gilbert 1999). Of course, these are remarks that Marx himself, praising the 
civilising virtues of trade, would certainly have gone along with.
This discussion brings us back to the overall anti-capitalist position outlined at 
the beginning of this chapter. There are two key points to emphasise here. One is 
that, as we saw earlier, commodifi cation is very far from being the whole story of 
what capitalism does and how it works. On this point there are several more things to 
say. One is that while Marx begins his great analysis of capitalism by examining the 
nature of the commodity, he ultimately argues that the real truth of capitalism lies in 
its status as a system of production. What is fundamentally wrong with capitalism, 
from the point of view of Marx’s model, is not the proliferation of commodities, but 
the exploitation of workers by capitalists. More recently, various commentators with 
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an ambivalent or hostile attitude to capitalism have argued that what is wrong with 
capitalism is not trading in free markets or private ownership, but the concentration 
of power in the hands of small numbers of unaccountable institutions and individuals 
which capitalism as a social system involves (Kingsnorth 2003: 278–311). Fernand 
Braudel, the greatest historian of capitalism, includes in the conclusion to his monu-
mental survey of capitalism’s global history the observation that ‘neither the little 
workshops of Prato nor the small printers of New York can be regarded as examples 
of true capitalism. . . . This is enough to make one think again before assuming that 
our societies are organised from top to bottom in a “capitalist system”. On the 
contrary, putting it briefl y, there is a dialectic very much alive between capitalism 
on the one hand and its antithesis, the non-capitalism of the ‘lower level’ [of small-
scale trade, manufacture and the informal economy] on the other.’ (1984: 630). In the 
case of the music industry, this line of argument would tend to the view that as long 
commodity production and distribution is in the hands of musicians or a diversity 
of small companies, then the situation can be regarded as healthy. Now, of course, 
working for such a situation may involve all kinds of political and legal battles—to 
change copyright laws or to provide access to recording facilities for poor musicians, 
for example—but they do not necessarily have to involve an opposition to all market 
relations. Anti-capitalism in this context may mean a determined but ultimately lo-
calised resistance to corporate monopoly rather than opposition to commodifi cation 
as such.
However, from the anti-capitalist perspective that we are developing here, there 
may still be something unwelcome about contemporary processes of commodifi ca-
tion in music. It is one thing to commodify, say, tea: it is another to force every pos-
sible element of human existence into the mould of the bought and sold commodity. 
Music-making is by nature an inherently social, collaborative process (Toynbee 
2000). However, a wholly commodifi ed music culture tends to mask this fact. Art-
ists must, as far as possible, present their work as entirely their own (without, fre-
quently, acknowledging the input of session musicians, music-software designers, 
engineers, other musicians who may have infl uenced them, etc.) in order to maxi-
mise returns from it in the market place, and consequently the media tend to focus 
on musicians as personalities rather than as participants in a collaborative process 
when reporting on music and contributing to music culture. Music culture therefore 
increasingly comes to be presented as a kind of narrative drama about competing 
personalities rather than as a scene of collective creativity ( just consider the roles 
of Amy Winehouse and Peter Doherty in the UK press; these aren’t artists, but char-
acters in a soap opera). Music culture is thus subjected to individualisation and 
becomes a site for the propagation of individualism, that ideology which maintains 
that individualisation is merely a process by which we come to realise the essen-
tial truth of the human condition, rather than a process by which the real nature of 
human interrelationship is masked. This masking is in part what is described by the 
key twentieth-century Marxist concept of reifi cation (a term which might literally 
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be translated as ‘thingifi cation’): the transformation of relationships and processes 
into fi xed and static objects, at least in appearance (Bewes 2002). If anti-capital-
ist cultural criticism has a job in this context, it is fi rst and foremost to expose 
the extent to which individualism is a falsifying reifi cation and music-making is a 
collaborative process. If anti-capitalist cultural activism has a job, then it will be 
to defend and extend sites at which the collaborative production, distribution and 
consumption of music can take place without the maximisation of corporate profi ts 
being the overriding objective, or even any objective at all.
No Logo, No Choice? Democracy vs. the Market
So far we have discussed the politics of commodifi cation in a specifi c context—
 contemporary popular music culture—which has to some extent only ever existed 
in the medium of the commodity. This is quite different from considering the con-
sequences of commodifi cation in those contexts which have been shaped in other 
ways, particularly contexts which have previously been thought of, or been actively 
constructed as, sites protected from the market logic of commodity exchange. In the 
attempt to privatise large sections of the public sector which characterises the current 
global project of neoliberalism, we see not an organic process of ground-up produc-
tion and circulation, but the violent imposition of a particular set of social relations 
from outside and above with the ultimate aim of enabling capitalists to profi t from 
provision of services that were once provided collectively on a non-profi t basis. One 
consequence of this is to deprive communities of access to common goods (from 
education to water supplies) or ‘commons’ (de Angelis 2007) and to force them to 
access those resources only as individual consumers. In cases such as the so-called 
reform of healthcare in the United Kingdom, this project is justifi ed by government 
in terms of a rhetoric of consumer choice, explicitly promoting the ideology of indi-
vidualism which denies the existence of any real commonality of interests between 
either service users and providers, or between different consumers except insofar 
as they share the limited and short-term interests of buyers in a market place. In 
this context, individualism is clearly promoted as an ideological justifi cation for 
the transformation of common resources into sites of accumulation, and individuali-
sation is actively enforced. This is a very important point to note: in instances such as 
this one, which have been replicated the world over since the 1970s (Harvey 2005), 
the commodifi cation of once-common goods involves the violent imposition of mar-
ket relations, the enforcement of individualisation and the promotion of individualist 
ideology. None of these are organic or spontaneous developments.
Following these observations, we can argue that what is wrong with commodifi ca-
tion is not commodifi cation per se. Rather, there emerge two distinct problems with it, 
especially as it tends to occur today. Firstly, there is the exercise of power by capital-
ists and institutions which support their agendas to ensure that commodifi cation takes 
place even where it is unwanted and to limit its benefi ts to themselves. Secondly, 
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there is the tendency of market relations in general to promote an individualist mis-
conception of social reality and the deliberate promotion of this ideology by institu-
tions trying to enforce and normalise processes of commodifi cation. So far, there 
seems to be no reason not conclude from this that the entire Marxist legacy is still 
valid: aren’t we just saying that it is the ‘class power’ (Harvey 2005) of capital which 
has to be challenged by some radical alternative? This is fair enough. But the Marxist 
tradition goes much further than simply recommending that the excessive power of 
capital be challenged and curbed. Historically, this tradition tends to assert that such 
a challenge can only be made by virtue of a direct challenge to the existing relations 
of production, conceived of as the basis for a social totality, and, crucially, that it can 
only be made by the proletariat, politically mobilised as a ‘Class for Itself ’ (Lukacs 
1971). In concrete terms, this means that only the labour movement, being organised 
and mobilised on the basis of its class identity and demanding the socialisation of the 
means of production, can mount such a challenge.
Post-Marxism
This is where I, and the anti-capitalist movement, part company with classical Marx-
ism, for a very simple reasons: there are simply any number of possible reasons for 
people working together to oppose the concentrated power of capital, and any number 
of political identities which might be mobilised or might be brought into existence, 
or deliberately deterritorialised, in the process of doing so. People might mobilise on 
the basis of their shared identity as workers, they might understand the excessive power 
of capital primarily in terms of its tendency to extract surplus value from their collec-
tive labour, and they might therefore demand the socialisation of the means of produc-
tion so as to ensure this outcome. But they might equally well mobilise as, say, public 
service-users and simply demand the protection of public services from privatisation. 
They might mobilise as democrats and demand the extension of democratic control 
over commercial institutions by means of legal supervision and regulation. They might 
mobilise as members of a national community and demand an end to foreign control 
of key assets, but without such control necessarily being handed over to anyone but 
more localised elites. They might mobilise as the poor and demand better access to 
key resources, again without necessarily following the classic socialist programme. 
Broadly speaking, the anti-capitalist movement is united by a common desire to assert 
some kind of democratic control over the deployment of material resources and to 
resist the imposition of market relations where they are not wanted, without appealing 
to nationalist or fundamentalist religious identities, but only one narrow section of the 
movement argues for this on the basis of a hypothetical class identity.
If there exists a coherent theoretical framework for such a break with Marxism, 
then it is to be found in the post-Marxism of Ernesto Laclau. Laclau argues persua-
sively that the Marxist tradition has been mistaken in assuming that there is an inher-
ent tendency in the social relations of capitalism for political identities to constitute 
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themselves along class lines. Simplifying his argument considerably, we can say that 
while it is true that, insofar as they are economic actors in a marketplace, workers 
and capitalists will have certain tendential interests which are necessarily in confl ict 
with each other—namely, their respective desires to raise or lower wages—there is 
no guarantee that this will lead to workers constituting a collective political identity 
as workers. The relationship between workers and capitalists is competitive, but it 
does not involve the very identity of one party being threatened in the way that, say, 
a putative national invasion in time of war might do. We might refl ect here that the 
bitterest industrial dispute in British history was not a confl ict over wages or work-
ing conditions, but over the threat of  Thatcher government effectively to wind up the 
British coal industry, thereby threatening the social identities of whole communities 
who had defi ned themselves in terms of their place in it (Laclau 1990: 3–41)2. Of 
course, Laclau’s insight, in practical terms, is not new: it was Lenin himself who 
famously concluded that without specifi c political leadership, the working classes 
would never develop a fully self-conscious political identity but would remain for-
ever at the level of ‘trade-union consciousness’, simply organising opportunistically 
to maintain or raise their real wages rather than challenging their very place in the 
social order. We can interpret Laclau here as arguing that it is not, as Lenin and his 
followers believed, because the working classes fail to recognise their true histori-
cal destiny, but because Marxist theory is wrong to suppose that it is necessarily the 
historical destiny of workers qua workers to become revolutionary socialists.
This is not to say that anything in Laclau’s theory or the ideas and practice of the 
anti-capitalist movement necessarily precludes traditional or new forms of labour 
organisation in the pursuit of socialism. It is rather to argue against the imposition 
of any particular model of who will engage in democratic struggle against corporate 
power and how they will do it. Once again, we come to the fact that the anti-capitalist 
movement is characterised by a certain pluralism, an unwillingness to impose any 
one model of social organisation, and a refusal of neoliberal hegemony not on the 
basis of a single class identity or even a single universal human identity, but precisely 
on the basis of a defence of such pluralism against neoliberalism’s tyrannical mono-
mania. In understanding this, it is important to reiterate that one of the most striking 
features of this movement is its refusal of a monolithic concept of socio-economic 
development and its consequent defence of the rights of indigenous and third-world 
peoples to relative self-determination. In this, the attitudes of the movement are very 
close to those informing another branch of recent thought with strong links to cultural 
studies and to the work of thinkers like Laclau. Post-colonial theory is a vast body 
of work taking in many differing political and philosophical perspectives, which we 
will not have time to address in detail in this book. However, it is very important to 
note the extent to which it shares some features with aspects of contemporary anti-
capitalism. Post-colonial theory has its roots in the anti-colonial struggles of the 
1950s (particularly against French imperialism) and has been characterised by some 
very original engagements between Marxism, psychoanalysis and various strands 
(Anti)Capitalism and Culture • 127
of continental philosophy from that point until the present. Much of this work may 
be regarded as post-Marxist in a sense rather similar to Laclau. While it does not 
deny the validity of the Marxists critique of capitalism or the usefulness of Lenin’s 
understanding of imperialism (as a highly developed form of capitalism which ex-
ports capital, and hence exploitation, to non-Western countries and therefore reduces 
political tensions at home: see Lenin 1975 84–118), it is concerned with identifying 
the specifi c mechanisms and effects of colonialism and its aftermath on people in 
colonised countries, on the colonising culture, and on the relationships between the 
two, and in doing so from a point of view which does not automatically assume the 
superiority of Western culture and ideas to those from other parts of the world.
How far this marks an elaboration of a Marxist approach and how far it marks 
a break with it is a matter of intense debate within the fi eld, and it is not one that we 
have space to dwell on here. What is important to note is that this perspective has 
introduced a powerful non-Western perspective into contemporary cultural studies, 
as key fi gures such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy have been heavily involved with 
its development, whereas critics associated more with literary postcolonial studies 
have been heavily engaged with cultural studies on the one hand, with the intel-
lectual sources of Laclau’s post-Marxism on the other (Bhabha 1994). If a single 
thread runs through much of this work, it is a concern with the tendency of the West 
to marginalise, suppress or occlude cultural difference, assuming that that which 
does not fi t the normative models of European culture is by that token inherently 
inferior, whether the case in point be notions of beauty, ideas of democracy, or the 
whole concept of social and scientifi c progress (Hall 1992). In some cases the work 
inspired by this observation is motivated to sustain the well-established critique of 
‘cultural imperialism’ (Gopal & Lazarus 2006), while in other cases it involves more 
oblique attempts to problematise any notion of national or ethnic identity as fi xed 
and stable (Bhabha 1994; Mercer 1994), but in all cases what is always at stake is 
a resistance to any imposition of identity. It is worth refl ecting that in his later work, 
Theodor Adorno himself came to understand the suppression of difference and the 
imposition of identity on heterogeneous objects as the fundamental mode of oppres-
sion (Adorno 1973).
Within this whole spectrum of post-Marxist thought, then, we fi nd a perspective 
which is very close to that of the anti-capitalist movement in its refusal of neoliber-
alism’s impositions and its rejection of classical Marxist modes of engagement. To 
fl esh out and illustrate some of these points, it might be worth fi nally considering 
some actual interventions from the movement in the light of the foregoing remarks. 
Firstly, let us actually return to Naomi Klein’s No Logo. For all of the reasons offered 
above, this book presents an undoubtedly simplistic and largely unoriginal account 
of the contemporary forms of commodity fetishism. However, the book should not 
be judged as a work of cultural theory. Rather, it is an attempt at a particular kind of 
intervention, trying both to report upon and to amplify an existing set of movements 
against corporate hegemony with a particular focus on sweated third world labour 
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and the cultural ubiquity of processes of branding. Now the type of campaigning 
work of which No Logo is an example and on which it reports can be seen as su-
perfi cial in many ways. It has little to say about the systemic nature of capitalism or 
even about the extent to which neoliberalism is a sustained and coherent political 
programme which might require something more than isolated campaigns to chal-
lenge it. However, the book’s sheer commercial success suggests that it spoke to 
a new public in ways which traditional leftist thought does not, and it is not hard to 
see why. For in attacking the ubiquity of branding and the specifi c issue of sweated 
labour, Klein succeeded in making a connection between elements of lived experi-
ence in the Northern hemisphere which are widely and intuitively experienced as 
distasteful—the invasion of public spaces of all kinds, and even of human bodies, 
by corporate branding, and the extension of marketing practices to all sites of social 
discourse (from the promotion of university courses to the campaigning of politi-
cal parties)—and forms of labour exploitation so intense that one hardly need be a 
revolutionary Marxist to fi nd them appalling. From the point of view of readers in 
the North, this helped to make branding and its practices a visible point of confl ict 
between a broadly shared set of public values and the actual practice of neoliberal 
capitalism. The effects have been limited, but nonetheless striking, as a large market 
in unbranded, fairly traded and ethically produced clothing and other produce has 
opened up in the affl uent world, bringing tangible benefi ts to many poor communi-
ties. Now this may not be the kind of revolutionary transformation which Marxist 
critics would prefer, but it is a more successful mobilisation than the socialist and 
communist movements have managed for some considerable time.
Let’s consider another example, revisiting a story that I began to tell in the previ-
ous chapter. Reclaim the Streets, the group who organised a series of pioneering pro-
tests against car culture in the 1990s, was born out of a broad-based local campaign to 
save affordable housing stock and ancient woodland in a mainly working-class area 
of East London, and in the fi rst few years of its existence it was associated with its 
trademark practice, the staging of noisy street parties—complete with truck-driven 
sound systems blaring out rave music—in locations designed to cause maximum 
disruption to traffi c and attract maximum publicity. This deliberately playful policy 
won a large degree of public sympathy, especially amongst the young, although it 
antagonised the authorities from very early on. At this moment the British anti-roads 
movement comprised not only Reclaim the Streets but also a range of other protest 
groups around the country, all of whom used various types of non-violent direct 
 action—from occupying tree-tops to digging tunnels underneath the trees—to dis-
rupt road-building projects, drawing attention to the ecological issues and adding 
massively to the security costs incurred by such projects (Mckay 1998: 100–51). The 
social coalitions involved in the defence of some ancient countryside, such as Twy-
ford Down and woodlands near Newbury, were very wide, including conservative 
middle-class conservationists as well as anarchists and Earth-Firsters. On a national 
level, a high level of public sympathy for the campaign and the extravagant costs 
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being generated by it led government to shelve signifi cant road-building plans and 
to reduce the overall road-building budget each year through most of the mid 1990s: 
a real victory for the movement (Wall 1999: 187–90; see also http://www.eco-ac
tion.org/dod/no7/1–4.html for a snapshot of the movement’s thinking at this time). 
All this changed in the month that Tony Blair was elected Prime Minister, ending 
eighteen years of Conservative Party rule. May 1997 saw the culmination of the Re-
claim the Future project to build an alliance between the new direct-action politics 
and radical trade unionists supporting Liverpool dock workers who had been fi red 
for trade-union activism. The result was an enormous (by the standards of the time) 
demonstration to Trafalgar Square on 1 May 1997, involving for the fi rst time both 
signifi cant numbers of activists associated with projects like Reclaim the Streets and 
masses of trade unionists from around the country. In many ways this was Reclaim 
the Streets’s fi nest moment: the group that pioneered the street party as a form of 
non-violent political protest managed to get a sound system into the road outside the 
National Gallery, fi lling its famous steps with dancers. The combined event became 
a mixture of free rave and traditional rally—trade unionists and Trotskyists listened 
to speakers from the conventional left, while many of the young ravers joined them 
as others danced in the sunshine. The potential for an alliance between the new poli-
tics and the old felt palpable.
Or at least, it did for the fi rst couple of hours. But once the rally had ended, and 
the many ravers and eco-protesters who had listened patiently to a tediously predict-
able set of speeches in support of the dockers went to join the dancing throng, some-
thing both disappointing and profoundly symbolic happened. The trade unionists, 
with a few bewildered and occasionally disgusted backward glances at the frivolity 
on the National Gallery steps, started to leave. Within an hour or so most of them had 
gone home. The momentary alliance had lasted for as long as the kids and ‘crusties’ 
were prepared to participate on their terms, but the idea that any signifi cant number 
of the leftists might join this particular kind of party was simply not on the agenda. 
Those left behind felt suddenly isolated, and they were. Immediately the trade union 
contingents had vacated the square, it was sealed off by police who began a hos-
tile set of manoeuvres intended exclusively to antagonise, intimidate and provoke 
the remaining protesters. The result: for the fi rst time, Reclaim the Streets saw its 
name connected with a violent affray between protesters and police, rather than with 
the creative non-violence which had been its trademark up to that point. It’s worth 
remembering this moment, because just there and then, it was the traditional left who 
were not interested in working creatively with this new political-expressive force. If 
they had to dance, it wasn’t their revolution.
It was immediately after this that Reclaim the Streets and the wider, diffuse pro-
test movement to which it had become unwittingly central shifted attention from the 
local, popular and winnable goal of forcing a change in the direction of UK trans-
port policy, to, as we have seen, the much more abstract objective of confronting 
capitalism itself. Although this move did enable some of the activists of the 1990s 
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protest movement to forge real and important connections with the wider emergent 
anti-capitalist movement, at just the time that the Seattle events and the success of 
No Logo were turning it into an international cause celebre, the British sections of 
that movement have subsequently made very little contribution to its progress on a 
global or European level. By 2005, it was left almost entirely to the NGOs to organ-
ise the major protests against the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, and the 2004 
European Social Forum in London was dominated by the moribund politics of a 
Leninist sect, the Socialist Workers Party.
Precisely what the movement lacked at that crucial moment in 1997 was any 
sense of the texture, the limitations and the potential of what Gramsci famously 
calls the ‘national-popular’: the site at which, within the socio-cultural context of 
the nation state, on the terrain of its everyday life, hearts and minds are won and 
lost. What most of the labour movement lacked was the strategic imagination to 
reach out to this new phenomenon, mesmerised as it was by the prospect of a La-
bour government. So substituting a language which had no resonance with the lives 
of most British people (the rhetoric of anti-globalisation) for one which had united 
sentiments from Glasgow to Middle England (the utopian environmentalism of the 
anti-car movement), Reclaim the Streets lost what little ground they had won in their 
war of position, and they were forced back into an isolated trench, the political ghetto 
of hardcore anti-capitalist anarchism. The trade unions soon learned what New La-
bour government would mean: a few minor reforms which would still leave British 
workers with the poorest working conditions in Western Europe, and a wholesale 
intensifi cation of the Thatcherite programme of public-service privatisation. What’s 
interesting to observe from our point of view is that key fi gures in the history of 
cultural studies have always seen its role precisely in terms of its attempt to generate 
just that sense of the political possibilities of culture which was lacking on both sides 
of this tragic equation. Radical movements are too often willing to ignore the prag-
matic limitations set by the cultural contexts in which they operate. The mainstream 
left is almost always too slow to realise the radical potential in emergent cultural 
tendencies. At its best, cultural studies has tried to address both these problems and 
to understand the connections between them. There is no reason why it should not 
carry on trying to do so.
Beyond Anti-Capitalism?
So am I arguing that Reclaim the Streets was only interesting when it was delib-
erately limited and constricted in its aims, pulling back from direct confrontation 
with capital? Not exactly. From my perspective, the explicitly utopian dimension 
of the Reclaim the Streets project was absolutely integral to its success. Without its 
creative re-imagining of urban space (which included laying turf in the road outside 
the houses of parliament in 2000: see http://www.primalseeds.org/mayslides.htm), 
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it would never have inspired so many people, giving rise to hundreds of local Re-
claim the Streets groups in cities around the world, as it did. Reclaim the Streets’s 
Situationist-inspired challenge to the whole culture of alienation, individualism and 
environmental destruction was brilliantly encapsulated in its opposition to the car 
and provided a concrete glimpse of what a challenge to that culture might look like 
in practice and why it might actually generate something more pleasurable than what 
it challenged. This was an intervention that was effective aesthetically and pragmati-
cally, rather than just ideologically, but it was effective because it successfully made 
connections between a whole set of issues and constituencies which might otherwise 
have remained separated. But this is a point on which a classical Marxist would 
probably concur.
What would be different would be the ways in which we might conceptualise the 
situation. From the point of view of the revolutionary Marxist, an anti-car campaign 
is only really valuable to the extent that the car is a profound symbol of capitalism, 
and an attack on cars must lead implicitly to an attack on capitalism as such. From 
the point of view which I am trying to develop here, the attack on cars is effective 
precisely because it could lead to an attack on capitalism as such, but it doesn’t have 
to in order to be effective. If it doesn’t, then reducing car use, or raising questions 
about the consequences of individualisation and individualism, or promoting public 
transport and a general defence of public space, are all goods in and of themselves 
that might lead to positive social change even if they do not lead to the revolutionary 
overthrow of capitalism as such.
What are the implications of these refl ections? One might be that anti-capitalism 
is just not a very good name for the movement which bears that name. If its most 
vibrant and politically successful manifestations are projects which do not explicitly 
oppose themselves to capitalism as such in toto, then should it be called something 
else? Perhaps, although I would argue that actually anti-capitalism is a good name 
for a movement bound together by no single positive project but by common resis-
tance to neoliberalism.
Are there better names available? Anti-neoliberalism might be more accurate but 
that may be just too ugly a phrase to use. Perhaps the French term altermondialisa-
tion sums up best the position of looking for some alternative to the neoliberal model 
of globalisation. Alterglobalism is an Anglicised version which is popular in some 
circles, and which I personally like, but which does not yet have very wide currency. 
Perhaps the most popular name for the movement in English at the time of writing 
is the global justice movement, and it’s a useful label in some contexts, because 
it sounds unthreatening and uncontroversial. In deference to its current popularity, 
I have used it on occasion throughout this work. However, to my mind this is actu-
ally an appalling label, implying a detached appeal to some imagined standard of 
morality, rather than a defi ant challenge to neoliberal power. That name has become 
popular as issues of trade justice and third world debt have come to the fore (as they 
did during the build-up to the 2005 G8 summit), but it is unlikely to have much 
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resonance in wider contexts. International solidarity against neoliberalism is only 
likely to be possible when citizens of the prosperous West recognise the extent to 
which their own interests are threatened by the neoliberal agenda, rather than simply 
being outraged at the injustices perpetrated on the South. From a rigourous analytical 
perspective, anti-capitalism must remain a key element of the critique of both global 
poverty and the international drive to privatise public services, because it remains 
crucial to bear in mind that neoliberalism and the neoliberal project for globalisation 
are not historical accidents, nor are they entirely contingent and self-constituting 
assemblages of strategies, techniques, institutions and practices (as suggested in 
Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996: 12–16). They are deliberate projects, and they are 
designed primarily to consolidate and extend the power of those social groups and 
institutions which have a vested interest in the maximisation of profi t and the rela-
tive suppression of wage levels. In other words, neoliberalism is a capitalist project, 
and to deny this or seek to obfuscate it is to go further than is reasonable in breaking 
with a classical Marxist analysis. The post-Marxist anti-capitalist position may differ 
from classical Marxism in its understanding of what we can do about capitalism and 
who the we might be that can do anything, but it retains the insight that capital is the 
primary source of the reigning political projects of our age, and that any denial or 
occlusion of this fact suppresses the possibility of meaningful politics in the twenty-
fi rst century.
Lawrence Grossberg, the leading fi gure in US cultural studies, has recently 
 written
I do not believe that many people will be persuaded to join a movement defi ned by its 
opposition to capitalism. Those same people, however, may be convinced—intellectually 
and affectively—to join a struggle to transform society according to a vision that would 
make it a more liveable environment for the majority of people. The centre can be won 
by a vision that seeks a new ‘planetary humanism’, that refuses to give up either the 
project of universality or the recognition of singularity, that offers new forms of affi lia-
tion, and new structures of commonality. But the centre can be moved only by engaging 
it, by entering into a conversation with it. We need a conversation that moves between 
imagination and strategy. (Grossberg 2005: 320)
Grossberg may well be right. As should be clear from the preceding argument, I 
share his scepticism that anything as totalising or abstract as opposition to capitalism 
understood as a total social system can be an effective basis for a popular movement, 
except under very exceptional circumstances. At the same time, however, I have 
tried to argue that a certain attitude of anti-capitalism is indispensable for any current 
perspective which recognises what it is that stands in the way of ‘a more liveable en-
vironment for the majority of people’. What Grossberg draws our attention to—and 
this is a point to which we will return in Chapter 6—is the fact that any movement 
which organises itself on the explicit basis of its anti-capitalism is unlikely to achieve 
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much in the West today, precisely because capitalism is too abstract a process for 
many people to defi ne themselves in opposition to it.
I think that the story of Reclaim the Streets clearly shows that Grossberg is cor-
rect, and that even while a certain self-conscious anti-capitalism is a necessary ele-
ment binding the international movement against neoliberalism, anti-capitalism is 
not much use as an explicit label to be deployed in campaigning contexts such as 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Another way of putting this, in a post-
Deleuzian register, might be to posit anti-capitalism as the ‘fractal attractor’ which 
pulls the diverse elements of the ‘movement of movements’ into a virtual ‘plane of 
consistency’ (Massumi 1992: 67), uniting them at the level of a certain shared im-
manent potential. The successful actualisation of that potential in particular contexts 
will require many different and unpredictable acts of naming and of carefully cal-
culated intervention, which only detailed analysis of specifi c conjunctures can make 
possible. We can see then, that Grossberg is here raising a much bigger set of ques-
tions than those implied by a semantic quibble. In particular he is raising the question 
of what might be involved—for those of us who share an anti-capitalist analysis—in 
actually bringing together those many people who aspire to create a more livable 
environment, but who will not necessarily identify themselves with any self-titled 
anti-capitalist movement. How do we actualise the shared anti-capitalist potential of 
those who will never call themselves anti-capitalists? This is a question which cannot 
be ignored, because it is arguably the constitutive question of all politics: the ques-
tion of strategy (which is also to say, the question of actualisation). We will return to 
it in some detail in the chapters that follow.
Notes
1.  The concept of the antimarket is clearly related to Deleuze and Guattari’s con-
cept of ‘antiproduction’: see Deleuze and Guattari (1983).
2.  We could actually relate Laclau’s position here to Deleuze and Guattari’s claim 
in Anti-Oedipus that capital derives surplus value not from the direct exploitation 
of labour power but only from the differential between variable and fi xed capital. 
In both cases, the claim that exploitation can be located in a simple way at the 
point of production is problematised.
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Ideas in Action: Rhizomatics1, Radical 
Democracy and the Power of the Multitude
Do not forget that ideas are also weapons.
Subcomandante Marcos (Hayden 2001: 315)
There is nothing more practical than a good theory.
James Clerk Maxwell (attributed)
As we can see from previous chapters, the ideas that inform both cultural studies and 
the anti-capitalist movement come from a wide range of sources and take a variety of 
forms. This chapter is concerned with one particular point of interface between these 
sets of ideas: in particular, with those areas of recent political thought which consti-
tute points of overlap between the concepts of the movement and key trends within 
cultural studies and cultural theory. In recent decades, similar circumstances, histo-
ries, goals and concerns have infl uenced the anti-capitalist movement, anglophone 
cultural theory, and several strands of political philosophy. In fact, as should be clear 
from the history related in Chapters 1 and 2, the main components of cultural theory 
have always been formulated in relation to wider political changes and projects, to 
the extent that one might even say that the distinction between cultural theory and 
radical political theory is often impossible to draw. This suggests an important 
axiom for both cultural studies and radical politics: those conceptual resources which 
are most useful for analysing power relationships in culture should also be of poten-
tial use in orienting political action, and vice versa. Every one of the writers whose 
ideas we will consider in this chapter has formulated their ideas with direct reference, 
or in direct response to, particular political problems, events and projects, and in 
the process has produced conceptual tools which are of great value for the analysis 
of power relationships in culture. In particular we will consider here the work of three 
pairs of writers who have written their most celebrated works as teams: Deleuze and 
 Guattari; Hardt and Negri; Laclau and Mouffe. However, before addressing their 
ideas in detail, I want to consider a number of key concepts which are central to 
any attempt to think through the relationship between culture and politics. These are 
power,  complexity, hegemony and creativity.
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Power
As Mark Gibson shows (2007), power is really the central concept of cultural 
 studies—which assumes that power infuses all social relations—and probably the 
most infl uential account of power within the fi eld is that developed in the later work 
of Michel Foucault2. For Foucault, particularly in Volume One of The History of 
Sexuality, power must be thought of differently from the ways in which Western 
political thought has usually conceived it. In his account, power is not something 
that happens to social relations, distorting and transforming them, but is something 
which only exists through social relations, and which is therefore immanent to them. 
On this model, power does not only negate or suppress; it also produces, acting upon 
the world inventively. Power relations are always a complex confi guration of differ-
entials in which there is no one party who simply has power.
–  Power is not something that is acquired, seised or shared, something that one holds 
onto or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the inter-
play of non egalitarian and mobile relations.
–  Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of 
relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but 
are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequali-
ties and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely are the internal 
conditions of these differentiations; relations of power are not in superstructural po-
sitions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly 
productive role, wherever they come into play.
–  Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposi-
tion between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general 
matrix—no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more 
limited groups to the very depths of the social body. One must suppose rather that the 
manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of 
production, in families, limited groups and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging 
effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. These then form a gen-
eral line of force that traverses the local oppositions and links them together; to be sure, 
they also bring about redistributions, realignments, homogenisations, serial arrange-
ments, and convergences of the force relations. Major dominations are the hegemonic 
effects that are sustained by all these confrontations.
(Foucault 1979: 94)
Foucault goes some way towards answering the question of what power actually is 
in his mobilisation of the term power-knowledge. What this term is used to imply is that 
there is simply no effective distinction to be drawn between power and the capacity 
to defi ne a situation. Power and knowledge are merely two sides of the same coin. It 
is not the case that having power (military, economic or political) confers the ability 
to exercise cultural authority on certain groups and individuals who have it, or that 
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acquiring specifi c kinds of knowledge confers particular kinds of power; it is rather 
that what power is is precisely the capacity to set the terms of reference in any given 
situation, defi ning what is to be accepted, implicitly or explicitly, as truth and normality. 
The capacity of the medical profession to designate certain conditions (homosexuality, 
for instance) as normal or pathological is one example. Another might be the capacity to 
designate a range of unruly behaviours in children as ‘attention defi cit disorder’, rather 
than ‘naughtiness’ or ‘high spirits’ (Grossberg 2005: 32–6).
The importance of such a conception of power to cultural studies can hardly be 
overstated, and it is widely accepted that almost all cultural studies accedes to and 
shares Foucault’s account. Foucault’s studies of different forms of modern power—
some of which are only recently coming to light (e.g. Foucault 2004)—continue to 
be a major source of inspiration. Foucault’s approach is also an analytical tool of 
great use to any present or future anti-capitalist politics, because as we saw in differ-
ent ways in the previous two chapters, anti-capitalist theory and practice has a ten-
dency to oversimplify its understanding of the cultural logics of power to the point 
where its capacity to offer effective resistance is severely limited.
At the theoretical level, this oversimplifying tendency is most clearly illustrated 
by John Holloway’s infl uential book Change the World Without Taking Power (2002). 
While in many ways this work is to be welcomed for its creative development of 
a twenty-fi rst-century Marxism, it’s deliberate simplifi cation of the political universe 
into blocs of ‘power’ and ‘anti-power’ is an explicit example of this tendency. We 
can see the problem with it at exactly the moment when Holloway tries to discuss 
the ideas of Michel Foucault. Holloway argues that
[Foucault’s perspective] allows him to elucidate the enormous richness and complexity 
of power relations in contemporary society and, more important from our perspective, the 
richness and complexity of resistance to power. However, the richness and complexity 
are the richness and complexity of a photograph, or of a painting . . . Thus in Foucault’s 
analysis there are a whole host of resistances which are integral to power, but there is no 
possibility of emancipation. The only possibility is of an endlessly shifting constellation 
of power-and-resistance. (Holloway 2002: 39– 40)
Holloway’s argument only works by virtue of a dichotomy, which Foucault refuses, 
between endless amorphous adjustments to power relationships and absolute eman-
cipation. In fact Foucault writes: ‘Are there no great radical ruptures, massive binary 
divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But more often one is dealing with mobile and 
transitory points of resistance’ (Foucault 1979: 96).
Clearly, Holloway’s understanding simply cannot accommodate the actuality of 
Foucault’s position: of course there are real revolutionary ruptures in politics some-
times, but these are not the normative paradigm by which we should understand 
 political antagonisms. Politics happens, change happens and revolutions happen: they 
are just far more complex phenomena than Holloway wants to imagine. This brings 
us to the second key term, complexity.
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Complexity
One reason that Foucault’s account proved so attractive within cultural studies almost 
from the moment of its publication is that it emphasises, as cultural studies always has 
done, the sheer complexity of power relationships. The unwillingness to oversimplify, 
to assume that power relationships operate across simple binary divides or that social 
change is the outcome of Manichean confl icts, has always been one of the hallmarks 
of cultural studies. We can see from this and from examples in earlier chapters that an 
attentiveness to complexity is an important dimension of any effective political analy-
sis. We will keep this in mind over the course of this chapter. But how do we bring this 
together with our fi rst key concept, power? How is power exercised in complex situa-
tions? In fact, this is precisely the question engaged by the thematics of hegemony.
Hegemony
Considering the issues of power and complexity brings to mind this third key theme: 
hegemony. There are different ways to conceptualise hegemony, which we will dis-
cuss in more detail below, but what the various conceptions developed within cul-
tural studies and post-Gramscian political theory have in common is that they see 
hegemony as a condition in which complex and unpredictable sets of power relation-
ships are temporarily stabilised, while something like power-knowledge is effec-
tively deployed by a hegemonic group, institution, individual or idea. The question 
of hegemony is always the question of strategy. As Foucault writes
Just as the network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through 
apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localised in them, so too the swarm 
of points of resistance traverses social stratifi cations and individual unities. And it is 
doubtless the strategic codifi cation of these points of resistance that makes a revolution 
possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional inte-
gration of power relationships. (Foucault 1979: 96)
This is, in fact, almost a precise summary of the neo-Gramscian concept of hege-
mony proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, as we shall see. But now for our fourth and 
fi nal key concept, creativity.
Creativity
Creativity is another key issue for any attempt to theorise politics and culture. The 
issue of creativity—what it is, what are its conditions of possibility, to what extent it 
is a social or an individual phenomenon—was central to the very fi rst work in cultural 
studies: implicitly in Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy (1957) and Williams’s Culture 
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and Society (1958), and very explicitly in Williams’s The Long Revolution (1961). 
One might follow Gibson’s argument (2007) by suggesting that the issue of power 
has since come to occlude this equally fundamental one in some cases, but one might 
equally argue that Foucault’s emphasis on power’s productivity is itself a complex 
way of thinking creativity: certainly Nietzsche, one of Foucault’s great inspirations, 
at times promoted the idea of creativity as the ultimate expression of will-to-power 
( Nietzsche 1968: 272). The anti-capitalist position developed in the previous chapter 
is predicated in part on a distinction between the creativity of innovative groups and 
capital’s attempt to limit, codify, contain and commodify that creativity. The possi-
bility of radical democratic alternatives to neoliberalism is clearly, in part, dependent 
upon the possibility of new modes of collective self-invention being made possible 
by various social groups and communities. In fact, one might go so far as to say that 
if the entire project of cultural studies has just one key message it is this: contrary to 
the assumptions of bourgeois ideology, all creativity is inherently social in character. 
This question of creativity will be another key issue to consider, then.
Bearing these themes in mind—power, complexity, hegemony, creativity—let’s 
begin our survey of three pairs of radical theorists: Deleuze and Guattari; Hardt and 
Negri; Laclau and Mouffe. Any attempt to summarise the views and ideas of such 
complicated thinkers as these is bound to fail to some extent, so perhaps all that we 
can hope for here is to get a sense of the contexts in which they have emerged and 
into which they have intervened, and the overall nature of their projects. In fact, we 
can situate the emergence of each of these bodies of work at one of the crucial junc-
tures outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s fi rst major 
collaboration, the monumental Anti-Oedipus (1983), is widely regarded as being one 
of the major intellectual products of the 1968 moment in Paris. Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy appeared in the United Kingdom 
in 1985, the year after the defeat of the miners’ strike had marked the effective end 
of the socialist labour movement in Britain. Although this book was partly inspired 
by the crisis of traditional left politics at that time, it also implicitly took 1968 as one 
of its key imaginative points of reference. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s major 
recent works Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004) are widely seen as the fi rst great 
intellectual interventions to be inspired by the experience and historical novelty of 
the international anti-capitalist movement and the global neoliberal hegemony to 
which it is a response, writing in the wake of the 1999 Seattle protests, but both 
books are also explicitly in the tradition of 1968.
It would be a mistake to see any of these works merely as products of or responses 
to the historical events in question: each of them is also the outcome of rigourous 
attempts to work through a pressing set of political and conceptual problems within 
and beyond the terms of a particular philosophical tradition. At the same time, the 
relevance of each of these works is absolutely contemporary. The importance of 
Deleuze and Guattari for a growing number of commentators and practitioners within 
both the anti-capitalist movement and cultural studies, and their closeness to the 
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concerns and traditions of key parts of the movement, means that it is very important 
to engage with their ideas. Hardt and Negri, who see themselves as followers of 
Deleuze, are simply as close as anyone apart from Subcomandante Marcos to being 
the offi cial philosophers of the movement, but the status of their ideas as cultural 
theory, interestingly, has really not been explored. Of the three pairs, it is actually 
Laclau and Mouffe who are the least widely read and least understood within the 
anti-capitalist movement and cultural studies, although their work has considerable 
relevance, as we will see. In this chapter, we will try to engage with a range of ideas 
from these authors, with a concentration on those ideas that illuminate the themes of 
creativity, hegemony, complexity, power and with an eye to how these ideas might be 
useful for generating political analyses of contemporary culture, in broad sympathy 
with anti-capitalist aims. The discussion here should not by any means be regarded 
as an adequate summary of the totality of these writers’ works, excellent introduc-
tions to all of which are in print, and of course, there is never any substitute for read-
ing philosophical texts for oneself.
Deleuze and Guattari
When Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari published their fi rst collaboration, Anti-
 Oedipus, in 1972, each was already a well established fi gure in his own fi eld. De-
leuze was a philosopher who had produced a number of infl uential commentaries on 
key thinkers such as Nietzsche, Bergson and Spinoza, along with his major works 
Difference and Repetition (1994) and The Logic of Sense (1990). Guattari had been 
active as a political militant, personally involved in the events of May 1968 and the 
wave of student militancy that had preceded it, and was working as an experimental 
psychotherapist at the celebrated Le Borde clinic.
Anti-Oedipus is a sustained engagement with themes that emerged from both 
of these sets of preoccupations, and it is one of a wave of important works pub-
lished by key French thinkers in the wake of 1968. This moment in French radical 
thought is perhaps characterised by two sets of concerns. On the one hand, there was 
a widespread questioning of the ways in which a previous generation of thinkers 
had deployed Marxism and psychoanalysis within a broadly structuralist intellectual 
framework to produce rather totalising and rigid accounts of human culture. Marx and 
Freud had enjoyed immense prestige amongst French intellectuals in the post-war pe-
riod, but by the end of the 1960s both Marxism and psychoanalysis had come to feel 
to some like stifl ing orthodoxies rather than philosophies of liberation. The structural-
ist emphasis on understanding deep, static patterns to human culture seemed to offer 
no scope for understanding what made social or personal change possible, even in the 
work of supposed revolutionaries such as communist loyalist Louis Althusser (1971). 
On the other hand, there was a reaction against the perceived authoritarianism of 
psychoanalytic institutions, academic institutions and the political institutions of both 
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the state and the organised left. The antipathy of the Communist Party for the student 
movement and the libertarian counter-culture of the late 1960s—and the contempt 
of psychoanalysts for both, as well as for the nascent feminist and gay liberation 
 movements—provoked understandable hostility on the part of militants and radicals.
This was also the high water-mark of the international anti-psychiatry movement, 
most famously represented in the anglophone world by the Scottish therapist and 
philosopher, R. D. Laing. The anti-psychiatrists argued, rather as Michel Foucault 
implied in his History of Madness (2005), that psychiatric treatment caused mental 
illness more than it cured it, by defi ning a range of emotional states and behaviour 
as pathological which had no need to be so defi ned, and by refusing to recognise the 
social causes of those illnesses which did clearly cause great distress to those suffer-
ing from them. Practices such as institutionalisation, pharmacological treatments and 
conventional Freudian analysis (especially the so-called ego psychology championed 
by Sigmund Freud’s daughter Anna in the United States) were all seen as attempts to 
force individuals to behave and even think in particular ways, and to punish and con-
strain those who would not do so. For these thinkers, there was no great difference 
between psychiatric practice in the West and in the Soviet Union, where political dis-
sidents were routinely institutionalised for their ‘insane’ opposition to offi cial doc-
trine. Infl uenced by the revolutionary tradition and its contemporary representatives 
such as Herbert Marcuse, they argued that the inability of the so-called mad to adapt 
to contemporary social norms was not something to be discouraged when the norms 
were those of a violent, militaristic and fundamentally exploitative society. This was 
taking place at a time when the ideologues of the counter-culture were declaring all 
forms of sexual repression to be not, as Freud had argued, the necessary price to be 
paid for a civilised life, but the most pathological and destructive features of modern 
societies, as the surrealist idea that to release the unconscious might be a politically 
revolutionary gesture resurfaced with great vigour.
In this context, many former communists were to produce works arguing for some 
more fundamentally libertarian politics than that envisaged by the previous genera-
tion of Freudo-Marxists. Figures such as Roland Barthes and Jean-François Lyotard 
(who were both to prove infl uential within anglophone cultural theory) rejected 
much of their more orthodox leftist past (Barthes 1990; Lyotard 2004). The ideas 
of Friedrich Nietzsche, previously suspect because of the Nazis’ unfortunate and 
misinformed appropriation of them, were mobilised as the basis for an anti- fascist 
philosophy (Foucault 1983). Arising from such a general atmosphere of revolt, but 
also from a very serious philosophical collaboration, Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze & Guat-
tari 1983) was the most lastingly infl uential product of this ferment. It presents itself 
on fi rst reading as a critique of psychoanalysis and its apparent complicity with bour-
geois culture, but it is far more than this. Indeed, the book is arguably not a critique 
of psychoanalysis as such at all, but an attempt to push the radical implications of 
Freud’s fi ndings further than he or most of his followers had ever been willing to go. 
To put it very crudely: Freud had shown that the modern Western assumption that we 
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are all rational, self-controlled individuals is false, but psychoanalysis had merely 
provided tools to enable individuals to get that bit closer to being rational, self-
 controlled individuals. But what if this was the wrong approach? What if the prob-
lem was not the inability of some individuals to fi t that mould, but the mould itself? 
What if there was something wrong with the whole culture that tried to force all of 
the marvellous, multifarious possibilities of material experience into boxes like ‘I’, 
‘you’, ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘humanity’, ‘nature’, ‘animals’, etc.? Several whole histories 
of radical thought, from socialists, anarchists, feminists, philosophers, mystics, hip-
pies, bohemians, artists, Buddhists, Taoists, thinkers such as Marx or Nietzsche or 
even ancients such as Lucretius and Democritus, all seemed to imply that there was 
something wrong with this kind of categorization of self. What if we needed a whole 
way of thinking about the world that could allow us to step outside of these catego-
ries and act in a very different way?
Anti-Oedipus is actually the fi rst half of a larger work titled Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, which attempts nothing less than such a new way of thinking. The 
title of this work is important to understand, as is the name which Deleuze and Guat-
tari give to their overall project: ‘schizoanalysis’. There is nowhere any clear indi-
cation of how schizoanalysis might manifest itself as concrete therapeutic practice, 
even though we know that it was in fact closely related to Guattari’s therapeutic work 
at Le Borde. Rather, it is presented as a position from which to understand the world 
rather as psychoanalysis can provide the basis for cultural, social and even political 
theory, a position which takes seriously the ‘schizzes’: the fragmentary elements of 
code and experience which are contingently assembled into subjects (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1983: 39). In part the term schizoanalysis marks an affi nity with the radical 
psychoanalytic aspiration to fi nd a non-medical treatment for the psychoses (Lacan 
1977: 179–225), but it also indicates Deleuze and Guattari’s identifi cation of schizo-
phrenia as a concrete manifestation of some important dimensions of human expe-
rience. Put very simply, Deleuze and Guattari see schizophrenia as a condition of 
radical, uncontrolled creativity which is defi ned as pathological by a culture which 
can only sustain itself by limiting and containing creativity at every level of experi-
ence. Crucial here is Deleuze and Guattari’s novel conception of desire. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, desire or ‘desiring-production’ is understood as a positive, produc-
tive, creative, inventive engagement with the world. This is very different from the 
psychoanalytic conception of desire as lack: where for psychoanalysis, all desire is 
symptomatic of our endless search for something we can never have (the perfect con-
tentment which was lost to us the moment we had to leave our mother’s breast and 
go out into the cold, cruel world alone), Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise desire as 
the force which makes everything happen in the world.
For Deleuze and Guattari, psychoanalysis belongs to a philosophical tradition 
which has always been obsessed with the idea that what is real is what is unchang-
ing, static and self-enclosed and which can only conceptualise anything which is not 
in negative terms. The psychoanalytic account of the human condition is essentially 
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tragic: human beings are doomed to a life of relative dissatisfaction, ultimately gov-
erned by desires which can never be satisfi ed partly because of social constraints 
on their full satisfaction, partly because it is in their very nature to remain always 
unsatisfi ed. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise the apparently incomplete, 
unstable aspects of subjectivity as the positive conditions of the connections and pro-
ductive relations which can exist between people and each other, and between people 
and other aspects of the material world. I am offering my own interpretation here, but 
we might understand Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of desire as follows: if we 
never left our mothers’ breasts, we would never know all of the many and wonderful 
forms of love and other experience which we can know, we would never make any 
of the marvellous and beautiful things which people can make, and merely to see 
these as compensations for some deeper loss is both misguided and deeply oppres-
sive. But Deleuze and Guattari do not think that psychoanalysis is simply mistaken. 
They think that ‘Oedipal’ culture really does turn us into subjects who experience 
ourselves in this way, who can never experience full joy because we only experience 
it as something always-already lost; we really do endlessly punish ourselves and our 
lovers for not giving us what we think we need; men really do live in fear of los-
ing their phallic authority and women really do fear and resent men for possessing 
it. This situation, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is the outcome of a very long 
history of thought and practice in the West which can only be understood by analysing 
the social, economic, material, bio-physical and psychic patterns of life throughout 
the history of civilisation. We live in a culture whose psychic structures psychoanal-
ysis understands very well. But for Deleuze and Guattari, understanding them is not 
enough: we have to understand where they have come from, and we have to change 
them or evade them if we can.
What emerges from the attempt is a whole new philosophical vocabulary which 
strives to avoid the problems which beset the Western tradition, and new ways to 
think about creativity, complexity, hegemony and power. Where other philosophers 
of their generation (Derrida, Irigaray, Foucault) pointed out the problems with the 
whole way in which Western culture conceptualises some of the most basic features 
of experience, it was Deleuze and Guattari who went furthest in developing a new 
set of alternative concepts, often drawing on the vocabularies of the physical and 
mathematical sciences. So, for example, Anti-Oedipus opens with an elaboration 
of the concept of ‘desiring-machine’. This concept often confuses readers precisely 
because it is so abstract and so loose. Almost anything can be a desiring-machine—a 
person, a computer, an unconscious drive, a piece of genetic code, a hand holding 
a bat or weapon or tool or brush, a bird, a crowd, a demonstration, a novel, a dream, 
an idea, a factory, a piece of skin, a lung—because a desiring-machine is any con-
junction of elements which somehow intervenes in the world (later, Deleuze and 
Guattari were to prefer the even more general term agencement, normally translated 
as ‘assemblage’, to mean much the same thing). The value of this formulation is that 
it makes it possible to think about a whole range of issues without recourse to some 
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of the basic assumed categories of Western thought. For example, there are many 
reasons why thinkers from various traditions have been troubled by the Western 
emphasis on the single, conscious human subject as the basic unit of experience and 
agency: apart from anything else, some have argued that it is this idea which leads 
to the idea of man as fundamentally separate from nature, which man can then seek 
to dominate and exploit at will, with eventually disastrous consequences. One of the 
implications of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual vocabulary is that it enables us to 
think about the relationships between humans and other parts of the material world 
in quite different terms, as a complex network of conjunctions and disjunctions be-
tween various material elements and mechanisms.
It would take an entire book to detail even a few of the novel concepts proposed 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s work (e.g. Massumi 1992). What we need to concentrate 
on here is the general political character of their ideas, although this in itself is not a 
topic on which commentators agree with any consistency. Broadly speaking, we can 
say that Deleuze and Guattari’s work is very much in the spirit of 1968 and indeed of 
the New Lefts, in that it tries to develop a position which is at once collectivist and 
libertarian in is implications. It is radically opposed to hierarchy and to all concentra-
tions of power. It is suspicious of fi xity of any kind. It valorises the nomadic rather 
than the sedentary, the mobile rather than the static, the productive rather than the 
destructive, invention rather than analysis.
This valorisation is never unqualifi ed, however. For example, in A Thousand Pla-
teaus, the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
draw their famous distinction between the rhizome and the tree. Rhizomes are plant 
stems which grow underground, with roots and shoots growing from their nodes 
to constitute a spreading horizontal network which often extends over a large area. 
Deleuze and Guattari compare rhizomes to trees, which are vertical in shape, with 
roots clearly defi ned at the bottom, a single trunk and branches and leaves at the top. 
They see this contrast as a way of distinguishing between different forms of organi-
sation and even different modes of thinking. Tree-like or ‘arborescent’ systems are 
characterised by a tendency to hierarchy, order, and stability. ‘Rhizomatic’ systems 
are characterised by horizontality, by multiple, complex connections between differ-
ent nodes and points. These distinctions can be applied to actual systems of social 
organisation, from highly ordered and authoritarian societies and institutions (such 
as, say, the Catholic Church) to more democratic or anarchic sets of social rela-
tions (such as those which obtain between internet users engaged in peer-to-peer fi le 
sharing). They can also be applied to systems of thought. So, a strong tendency in 
Western thought since Plato understands and judges things in the world in terms of 
how far they match up to a supposed ideal, and tends to consider material reality as 
a corrupt, incomplete or degraded version of the transcendental ideal. This is an issue 
with which Deleuze was preoccupied in some of his earlier philosophical writing, in 
which he also identifi ed an alternative tradition which tries to see the material world 
as it is without imposing pre-conceived categories on it. We can see the distinction 
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here as analogous to the distinction between the arborescent and the rhizomatic, 
with arborescent thought looking at the world from the transcendental position, tak-
ing a God’s eye view of things, and rhizomatic thought looking at the world from 
the ground up. Subsequent commentators have linked this approach to the micro-
 sociology of Gabriel Tarde, to the development of social history in the twentieth cen-
tury and to all kind of approaches which see social institutions, political events and 
even natural phenomena as the outcomes of smaller ‘molecular’ processes (Alliez 
2001; Delanda 2006). This focus on the molecular is one of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
most characteristic features (Guattari 1984).
Where commentators do not agree is on the question of how far Deleuze and Guat-
tari see this as merely correcting the bias in the Western transcendentalist tradition, 
and how far they really value the rhizomatic over the arborescent. This ambiguity 
arises when we consider almost all of the conceptual oppositions which Deleuze and 
Guattari mobilize in their work. One of the best-known terms from Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia is ‘deterritorialisation’. This terms designates in very general terms 
a process whereby something fi xed and stable ceases to be so, as its boundaries are 
erased and its component parts are rendered mobile. Deterritorialisation could refer to 
the effects of erosion on soil and rock or to what happens to traditional rural farming 
communities when the enclosure and privatisation of land forces them to  migrate in 
search of work, but Deleuze and Guattari mainly use it to refer to processes whereby 
some oppressive or ossifi ed mode of thought or practice is destabilised, creating 
new and exciting possibilities (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 311–22). The opposite of 
deterritorialisation is territorialisation or reterritorialisation, whereby a given set of 
elements or a given space is re-ordered, bounded and partially stabilised. A third 
key distinction for Deleuze and Guattari is between ‘striated’ space which is differ-
entiated, hierarchical and diffi cult to traverse (like a great city), and ‘smooth’ space 
which is continuous, enabling mobility and fl ow (like the sea or the nomad steppes; 
Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 474 –500).
On a fi rst reading it is certainly easy to read Deleuze and Guattari as basically 
advocating an anarchistic politics, aesthetics and epistemology which is inherently 
suspicious of any stable, ordered system whatsoever and which sets up these opposi-
tions merely in order to celebrate the rhizome, the smooth space and all forms of de-
territorialisation, and this is how they are often read. This is a problematic reading for 
several reasons, however. Firstly, Deleuze and Guattari themselves frequently qual-
ify their polemics to insist that it is never enough to be simply for rhizomes, smooth 
spaces or deterritorialisation. Instead, they imply or make explicit at various points 
that these conceptual distinctions are merely useful analytical abstractions: there are 
no pure rhizomes or smooth spaces, and, as they state themselves, every relative de-
territorialisation also involves some kind of reterritorialisation (Deleuze & Guattari 
1983: 316)3. They even warn against the dangers of excessive or too-rapid deterri-
torialisation, against the folly of believing that a smooth space is liberating as such. 
From this point of view, one might say that Deleuze and Guattari draw our  attention 
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to the fact that there is a rhizomatic infrastructure to all sets of social relations ( just 
as the wood in a tree has a cell-structure which is more rhizomatic than arborescent), 
but that there is also an arborescent dimension to any set of relations which are even 
minimally organised at all, and that they produce a set of descriptive conceptual tools 
which do not lend themselves necessarily to any one political perspective or project. 
Indeed, they themselves assert that ‘no political program will be elaborated within 
the framework of schizoanalysis.’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 380).
That doesn’t mean that Deleuze and Guattari did not have particular political al-
legiances. Guattari, in particular, had a lifelong affi nity and involvement with radical 
leftist political movements and projects. Furthermore, schizoanalysis clearly emerges 
from an engagement with a set of problems which are specifi cally problems from the 
point of view of such a politics: there’s no need to invent new ways of conceptualis-
ing social relations if you don’t think there’s something wrong with existing ones. 
Although they rightly and understandably wished to avoid the dogmatism of their 
leftist predecessors, Deleuze and Guattari remain clearly within the same tradition as 
Marx and the militants of 1968 and the New Lefts, trying to fi nd ways of reconcil-
ing a libertarian philosophy with a non-individualist view of politics and the human 
condition. How do we maximize human freedom without making the mistake of 
thinking that freedom is merely a condition appertaining to individuals and is merely 
a question of being as separate and isolated from all other individuals as possible? 
This is the question which the socialist tradition has been grappling with since it 
became apparent in the early-nineteenth century that the freedom of the new middle 
classes to enclose land, expropriate peasants, hire workers for starvation wages and 
employ small children in dangerous industrial occupations was severely curtailing 
the freedom of the poor to live a decent life. It is the question which Deleuze and 
Guattari are still grappling with in much of their work, even if they fi nd it necessary 
to tackle it at a very high level of abstraction.
The implications of Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas for the anti-capitalist movement 
are largely to valorize much of its existing practice. The decentred, leaderless, net-
worked forms which much of the anti-capitalist movement takes is decidedly rhizom-
atic in character. The maintenance of the World Social Forum as an open space and 
a process, rather than the basis for a party with a manifesto, is clearly motivated by a 
suspicion of authoritarian structures and representative mechanisms which is closely 
allied to Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on the molecular dimension of  social and 
political life and the dangers of territorialisation. Deleuze and Guattari’s eschewal of 
humanism in favour of a view which sees humans as only one form of life, indeed one 
form of matter, amongst many, with all of which we share certain properties and char-
acteristics, is very close to the spirit of much of the ecology movement, as Guattari’s 
own turn to ‘ecosophy’ made explicit (Guattari 2000), although it is also potentially 
at odds with the explicit humanism of the World Social Forum charter of principles. 
At the same time the complexity of their approach to capitalism can help shed some 
light on some of the issues facing the anti-capitalist movement. Is it a movement to 
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replace capitalism with some other total system of social and economic relations? 
Or is it an aggregation of different forces and projects opposed to the imposition of 
neoliberalism in every part of the world? Perhaps, in fact, there can be no absolute 
answer to this question: following Deleuze and Guattari, we might say that the at-
tempt to escape the territorial matrix of neoliberalism, with its insistent coding of 
all social relations and all material things in terms of the logic of the commodity, 
requires at least some provisional reterritorialisation in a new vision of the possibili-
ties of the social, even while no such vision must ever be allowed to close off new 
possibilities and new potential connections. As such, the anti-capitalist movement 
can only progress by way of an uncertain oscillation between a ‘molar’ condition of 
coherence and internal stratifi cation and a ‘molecular’ condition of mobile disaggre-
gation, between the ‘paranoiac pole’, ‘which subordinates desiring- production to the 
formation of sovereignty and to the gregarious aggregate that results from it’, and the 
‘schizoid pole’, which ‘overthrows the established power, and subjects the gregari-
ous aggregate to the molecular multiplicities of the productions of desire’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1983: 376).
In terms of the key concepts of power, complexity, hegemony and creativity, we 
can see that Deleuze and Guattari place a fundamental importance on creativity as, to 
some extent, the essential quality of matter itself (a position they derive in part from 
readings of Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson). Desire is not lack, but creativity, and 
creativity is what repressive institutions must always work to block or ‘overcode’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 41; Guattari 1972: 162). Power, within this frame of ref-
erence, is an index of the relative degrees of stratifi cation within a given assemblage. 
That is to say that power is a function of the relative capacity of the component parts 
of an assemblage to liberate fl uxes of creative desire; or to channel, block or limit 
such fl ows:
Our only points of disagreement with Foucault are the following: (1) to us the assem-
blages seem fundamentally to be assemblages not of power but of desire (desire is always 
assembled), and power seems to be a stratifi ed dimension of the assemblage; (2) the dia-
gram and abstract machine have lines of fl ight that are primary, which are not phenomena 
of resistance or counterattack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of creation and deter-
ritorialisation. (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 531)
The geo-physical language deployed by Deleuze and Guattari is perhaps an in-
dication of how relatively far they travel from a vocabulary which would contain 
concepts like hegemony. However, bear in mind that hegemony, as we have argued, 
is precisely the capacity to stabilise a particular situation of power and to determine 
the fi eld of possibilities which it contains. From this point of view, Deleuze and 
Guattari do not represent a break with the analytics of hegemony, but a resource 
with which to understand the psycho-socio-physical complexity of its mechanics in 
a manner which is entirely in keeping with the spirit of cultural studies. In particular, 
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what Deleuze and Guattari draw our attention to is the extent to which relations of 
relative stability and relative speed operate at every level of existence, from the sub-
molecular to the galactic. From this point of view, the idea of hegemony can only 
make sense if it is assumed not to be the name only for the type of political leader-
ship which is exercised by dominant class fractions in advanced capitalist societies 
but also for a type of social/discursive/material/abstract relation which can obtain 
between all kinds of terms (such as ideas, institutions, groups, classes, molecules 
or affects). In fact, this abstraction of the concept of hegemony has been precisely 
Laclau and Mouffe’s key theoretical innovation.
Laclau and Mouffe
If Deleuze and Guattari generally emphasise the importance of the nomadic, molecu-
lar, rhizomatic dimension of politics, then our next two writers are perhaps their logi-
cal obverse. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe are widely regarded as the leading 
theorists of recent times to have developed the crucial concept of hegemony. This is 
a key term in much political and cultural theory of recent decades, where it derives 
almost exclusively from the translated work of the Italian communist leader and phi-
losopher, Antonio Gramsci.
Gramsci’s best known work, his Prison Notebooks, was written during the last 
years of his life, which he spent in a fascist prison, one of the victims of Mussolini’s 
political terror. The work covers a vast range of political, social, economic, cultural 
and philosophical topics (Gramsci 1971). However, his concept of hegemony is by 
far the most infl uential element to have been taken up by the anglophone left, and 
it is the single most characteristic piece of jargon in the whole lexicon of cultural 
studies. Hegemony is often mistakenly understood to mean merely ‘dominance’ or 
‘control’. A better understanding of the term would be ‘leadership’, as a brief account 
of the term’s genealogy in Marxist political theory should make clear. The term fi rst 
emerges importantly in the writing of Lenin, and it emerges in the context of Len-
in’s practical efforts to develop a theory of revolutionary practice, something which 
Marx and Engels had very little to say about. In particular, Lenin was trying to or-
ganize a proletarian socialist revolution in a country (Czarist Russia) which did not 
have very sizeable proletariat, but that did have large numbers of oppressed, hungry, 
increasingly dissatisfi ed peasants. Marxist theory had tended to assume that before a 
revolution could be organised by the working-class majority, a country would have to 
pass through the historical process of capitalist modernisation, which would lead to 
its full industrialisation, the disappearance of the peasantry and the transformation of 
a majority of the population into proletarian industrial labourers. Lenin’s so-called 
Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party believed that it would be 
possible for a revolutionary force made up mainly of peasants to succeed if it was 
effectively led by a well-disciplined party based in the industrial proletariat of the 
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great cities (Lenin 1947). The famous communist symbol, the hammer and sickle, 
represents a social coalition of workers and peasants, and it was this coalition which 
effectively succeeded in replacing Czarism with a workers state following the revo-
lution of October 1917. The concept of hegemony therefore emerged in the context 
of a conception of politics which saw it in terms of the creation of coalitions between 
different social groups, coalitions which the most advanced political forces would 
have to lead.
Antonio Gramsci, a loyal communist operating under very different conditions 
from Lenin, was preoccupied in part with the question of how this conception of 
politics could be developed in a way which would be appropriate to different condi-
tions, such as the conditions of a mass democracy with a developing media culture 
within a much more economically developed and socially variegated society than 
Russia. Perhaps Gramsci’s most lastingly infl uential observation is that hegemony—
 leadership—is not only an issue for those trying to martial potentially revolutionary 
forces in an all-out assault on the ruling class. It is also an issue for those social 
groups who are already in power and want to stay there, and for those political forces 
who want to challenge those in power even if the aim is not immediate revolution. 
In the former case, the hegemonic group has to exercise a variety of means by which 
to persuade the subaltern (non-hegemonic) groups to accept their hegemony, be it by 
brute force or various forms of bribery and persuasion. In the latter case, any radi-
cal political project faces the very diffi cult task of persuading a large and usually 
heterogeneous set of social forces to accept their leadership over that of the currently 
hegemonic group. In either case, however, politics will be not merely a matter of 
elections or military actions: it is also a matter of either side trying to win the hearts 
and minds of various other social groups, through whatever means available.
A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subju-
gate perhaps even by armed force. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 
“leadership” before winning governmental power (this is indeed one of the principal 
conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it 
exercises power, but even if holds it fi rmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well. 
(Gramsci 1971: 57–8)
The press, the churches, the theatre, literature, the cinema, the schools can all be 
seen as places where the battle of ideas, the battle between different ways of seeing 
the world, is fought out between different social forces, their partisans and their rep-
resentatives. This is why the concept of hegemony has proved so crucial for cultural 
studies. In fact, Gramsci explicitly argued that it would be necessary for radicals 
to make a thorough and serious study of all the elements of the culture which they 
inhabited so as to be able effectively to constitute a counter-hegemonic force (1985: 
41–3), and to a large extent this is how many cultural studies practitioners have un-
derstood their own role since the 1970s. Even where such practitioners have had no 
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interest in contributing to some broader political projects, Gramsci’s conception of 
culture as the site of the struggle for hegemony between different social forces and 
their political projects has proved immensely useful as a lens through which to view 
the dynamics of past and present cultures and the ways in which they interact with 
processes of social, economic and political change.
When Laclau and Mouffe published their landmark study Hegemony and Social-
ist Strategy (1985), Gramsci’s ideas were at the peak of their prestige amongst an an-
glophone audience. Interpretations of Gramsci and his concept of hegemony vary, as 
with any such important thinker, and only one strand of interpretation has rendered 
his ideas at the highest possible level of abstraction (which may or may not be a good 
thing to do, depending on your point of view). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
marked both the high point and in some senses the end of this process, as arguably 
the most rigourous examination of the concept of hegemony and the one which most 
decisively detached it from the Marxist context of Gramsci’s thought. The book is in 
part a genealogy of the term hegemony as it evolves through the writings of Second 
International Marxists, Lenin and then Gramsci. It is also, in some senses, an assess-
ment of the entire communist theoretical tradition in the light of post-structuralist 
theory: most notably the ideas of Lacan and Derrida. Put very simply, the argument 
runs as follows. The concept of hegemony as it emerges in Gramsci’s thought in-
volves a move away from any conception of politics as merely the expression of an 
underlying struggle between distinct and defi nite social groups: the ‘class struggle’ 
as Marx calls it. Even Lenin’s project for the hegemony of the Bolsheviks involves a 
radical break with the Marxist idea that the communist party would be merely a po-
litical expression of the social identity of the working class. Lenin came to the con-
clusion that the working class would probably never develop a full political identity, 
full ‘class consciousness’ by itself, and that it required political leadership to enable 
it to do so (Lenin 1947). In making this assessment, he shifted towards politics as an 
active process that shapes the identities of its participants rather than merely gives 
expression to pre-existing identities. Gramsci’s conception of hegemony went much 
further, as he developed a new political vocabulary to talk about the types of group 
which engage in politics. Laclau and Mouffe argue that Gramsci’s notion (borrowed 
in part from syndicalist thinker Georges Sorel) of the ‘collective will’, which would 
be expressed by a class, or a section of a class, or even a ‘historic bloc’ made up of 
sections of different classes, marked a profound break with the ‘class essentialism’ 
of earlier Marxism. Although they think that Gramsci himself remained stuck within 
a class essentialist framework, they argue that he developed the concept of hege-
mony to the point where it already implicitly undermines that framework and that 
the breakdown of this framework can be seen to do so most clearly when understood 
in the light of Lacanian and Derridean philosophy.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Laclau and Mouffe’s fundamental philosophical aim is 
to dispense altogether with any vestige of ‘essentialism’ (1985: 91–145). Essential-
ism is a term widely used in cultural and political theory. It is most commonly used 
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today to refer to any notion of racial, gendered, ethnic, national or sexual identity as 
essential rather than socially or historically determined. So the idea that women are 
all naturally caring and maternal or that black people are all good at sport are essen-
tialist notions. This is true, but it does not quite get at the heart of the conceptual cri-
tique of essentialism which is fundamental to Laclau and Mouffe’s approach. At its 
most abstract, their anti-essentialist approach depends upon the assumption that, in 
effect, no object—actual or conceptual—has any fundamental meaningful identity: 
rather, the social being of all objects is dependent upon their situation in a system of 
relative differences from which they derive their identity. So our ideas about what 
a man really is are entirely dependent upon our ideas of what a woman is, a child is, 
an animal is or a plant is, and it is only this network of ideas about what is not a man 
which creates for us a consistent concept of man.
Now, this conception itself derives from two main sources. One is Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s conception of language (Saussure 1983), which was so immensely 
important to the great structuralist thinkers of the mid-twentieth century (Lacan, 
Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, the early Barthes). Put very simply, Saussure argued that 
a language is a system of differences and that every term in the system only has 
meaning by virtue of its differences from other terms. The word/concept cat only 
has meaning by virtue of its differences from other words (hat, fat, can, etc.) and by 
virtue of the fact that the English language differentiates the world of small mam-
mals such that it conceives of one set of those animals as cats as distinct from other 
sets (mice, dogs, rabbits, etc). We know that other cultures use other words to refer 
to cats, and it’s possible to imagine a culture which did not make a clear distinction 
between cats and dogs, so it is only the arbitrary fact of this particular set of differ-
ences which gives the word/concept cat its meaning. The word cat does not express 
or even name some essential ‘catness’ which exists invariably, outside of culture.
Assume for the time being that we accept this model of how language works. To 
understand Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-essentialism, it is necessary to understand that 
they transcribe this model of how language works into a model of how the whole of 
social experience works. Now, it is important to appreciate that they are not alone in 
this. Philosophers at least since the early-twentieth century have been arguing that, 
in effect, we experience the whole of our reality through the categories of language 
which we use not just to communicate, but to think. As such, as Wittgenstein argued 
‘the limits of my language mean the limits of my world’ (1961). The realisation 
by late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century anthropologists that cultures 
around the world had radically different ways of looking at the world—ways in-
scribed in the words they had or did not have for different elements of it—also gave 
rise to the idea that a language constituted a whole world view. Anyone who has 
spent any time studying a second language will have some sense of this. In French, 
for example, the verb aimer can mean ‘to like’ and ‘to love’ such that the fi ne distinc-
tion made between these two emotional responses in English does not quite apply in 
an equivalent way. So in this sense the categories of language constitute the entire 
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framework through which we experience social reality, to the extent that linguistic 
and social realities are effectively coextensive.
This is the second key source of Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-essentialism: the as-
sumption that if language is a system of differences lacking any positive terms, then 
social reality must be the same, because it is coextensive with language (1985: 110). 
Now this assumption obviously raises all kinds of philosophical problems, and it is 
worth taking a moment to think about them. Firstly, it’s important to understand what 
is not necessarily implied by this notion. It does not necessarily imply that there is no 
real world of material things which is separate from the words we use to talk about 
them. It does not mean that truth is simply whatever people believe or say is true. 
There is a very widespread tendency in casual commentary to assume that think-
ers such as Derrida, Foucault and Laclau, or followers of some imaginary school 
of thought called post-modernism or deconstruction, believe that ‘there is no such 
things as truth’ or ‘everything is just discourse’. This is almost never a correct sum-
mary of the opinions being so described. Many thinkers believe that linguistic and 
discursive categories shape the way we experience reality, and that we can never 
have any access to the real material world other than through the categories of lan-
guage, but this in itself is not a terribly controversial idea, even if we don’t agree 
with it, and it is not at all the same thing as believing that there is no material reality 
at all. Laclau actually goes further, at times suggesting that the logic of language 
is simply identical to or co-terminous with the logic of social relations (Howarth 
2004: 266), but this still does not equate to denying the existence of reality.
The precise nature of the relationship between experience, language and the ma-
terial world is an endless source of philosophical debate, and not one to which we 
are going to fi nd fi nal solutions to here. To understand Laclau and Mouffe’s unique 
theoretical contribution, what we need to understand is their deployment of another 
key term in contemporary political and cultural theory: discourse. This is a widely 
used, little-analysed term (Gilbert 2004b), which has been popularised in cultural 
and literary studies by the work of Foucault (1972), but is also an object of study in 
its own right by sociolinguists such as Norman Fairclough (2003). In the latter case, 
the word discourse is a general term for almost any kind of linguistic activity. In the 
former case, the term is used very loosely, sometimes referring to linguistic activity 
and sometimes referring to other kinds of activity which are also somehow meaning-
ful in character (so wearing a kind of clothing that has particular symbolic value is 
seen as a form of discursive activity). In this context, the term discourse can be said 
to refer to any socially meaningful practice, or any relatively coherent set of ideas 
about a given topic and the practices which embody, reproduce and are informed by 
those ideas. This, generally, is how Laclau and Mouffe use the term, specifying that 
the ‘totality which includes within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistic, is what 
we call discourse . . . In our terminology, every identity or discursive object is consti-
tuted in the context of an action’ (Laclau 1990: 100–2). Laclau and Mouffe use this 
terminology to further develop a certain tendency in Gramsci’s thought away from 
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its roots in Marxism. For the perspective developed by Laclau and Mouffe, politics is 
not a matter of struggle between social classes, but between complexes of meaning-
ful social practice: in other words, between discourses.
Now, some critics see this as a wholly idealist revision of Gramsci, turning the 
theory of hegemony into an account of politics as a ‘battle of ideas’ which com-
pletely loses sight of the Marxist understanding that politics is always about strug-
gles over material resources (Joseph 2002: 104). There are two main points to make 
in response to this. One is that, if we consider the implications of the concept of 
discourse given above, it becomes clear that a struggle between discourses is always 
a struggle between sets of practices, as much as between sets of ideas, or in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s terminology, between ‘assemblages’. This is given a further twist in 
Laclau’s recent work (2005), where it is not simply discourses but demands which 
enter into various relations of struggle.
The other thing to say is that Laclau and Mouffe do indeed see the fundamental 
difference between their position and that of classical Marxism in terms of their at-
tention to psychological issues which Marxism ignores. Put very simply, classical 
Marxism largely assumes that people are rational creatures who can be relied upon 
to act in their own best material interests as long as they are adequately informed as 
to what they are. In the fi nal analysis, Marx expected the proletariat to unite in op-
position to capitalism because it would be the best way to ensure a high standard of 
living for itself. Laclau and Mouffe are heavily influenced by psychoanalysis 
(in particular the work of Jacques Lacan) and by its assumption that human beings 
are at best only occasionally motivated by reason (Laclau & Mouffe 1990). One 
of the politically relevant observations of psychoanalysis is that people, especially 
in groups, will often fi ght to defend a sense of themselves and their place in the 
world—an identity, in other words—at least as hard as they would fi ght to defend 
their apparent material interests. This has been a problem which radical political 
theory has had to cope with at least since the First World War showed that millions 
of workers were prepared to die for their country even when cruelly exploited by that 
country’s ruling elite and when fi ghting in the war meant killing fellow-workers who 
had never done them any harm. In the period leading up to the war, many socialists 
believed that this could never happen, that the workers of Europe would never fall 
upon each other at the command of their own oppressors, their national ruling elites 
(Sassoon 1997: 27–31). In some senses the long search by Marxists for an adequate 
theory of ideology—of the political power of beliefs—was provoked by the disap-
pointment of this disaster. Working in this tradition, Laclau in particular has stressed 
the enormous power of a sense of identity, and of the need for a sense of identity, in 
all kinds of politics.4
Although this all sounds very abstract—and it often is—it does have roots in a 
specifi c set of historical experiences. Laclau’s thinking has been shaped by his ex-
perience of left-wing politics in Argentina, which has historically been characterised 
by the importance of Peronist populism, a form of politics not easily understood 
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in terms of the expression of class interests (Laclau 1977: 143–98). More broadly, 
Laclau and Mouffe’s thinking is widely seen as deriving from the experience of the 
emergence of the ‘new social movements’ and the decline of organised labour and 
the forms of socialism associated with it (Nash 2000). One of the most striking fea-
tures of the post-1968 political landscape for Laclau and Mouffe is the proliferation 
of new political demands from various groups, and the unlikelihood of any single 
project encompassing all of those demands. One of the questions which Laclau and 
Mouffe try to address in this context, is: what is that might link together as many as 
possible of the radical demands of women, non-white people, youth, workers and so 
forth (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 149–93; Laclau 2005: 129–72). For the fundamental 
political implication of Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-essentialism is that there are simply 
no inevitable, inherent, natural connections between different sets of political de-
mands or between specifi c demands and specifi c social constituencies: so if we want 
to create political connections between different projects and different groups, then 
making those connections is an active process. Marxists had traditionally seen the 
process whereby sections of the working class became radicalised as one whereby 
they became class conscious, that is aware of their true social identity (Lukacs 1971). 
Many feminists thought of the politicisation of women in similar terms. The implica-
tion of Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-essentialism is that there is no true working-class 
identity, no essential femininity: rather, a politicised working-class or feminine iden-
tity is only one possible outcome of a struggle in discourse to connect workers or 
women with broader political projects, and Laclau and Mouffe would like to see such 
a project take the form of a general drive to maximise autonomy.
A crucial feature of Laclau and Mouffe’s work is their rejection of any understand-
ing of social formations as fully knowable totalities, and their emphasis upon the 
importance of recognising the complexifi cation of social relations within advanced 
capitalist societies as the necessary terrain of contemporary political struggle.
Every attempt to establish a defi nitive suture and deny the radically open character of 
the social leads to what Lefort designates as ‘totalitarianism’; that is to say, to a logic 
of construction of the political which consists of establishing a point of departure from 
which society can be perfectly mastered and known . . .
But if there is no doubt that one of the dangers which threatens democracy is the 
totalitarian attempt to pass beyond the constitutive character of antagonism and deny 
plurality in order to restore unity, there is also a symmetrically opposite danger of a lack 
of all reference to this unity. For, even though impossible, this remains a horizon which, 
given the absence of articulation between social relations, is necessary in order to prevent 
an implosion of the social and an absence of any common point of reference. (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985: 187–8)
For classical Marxism, the possibility of transcending capitalist society depended on 
the simplifi cation of social structure and the emergence of a privileged agent of social 
change, while for us, the possibility of a democratic transformation of society depends 
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on a proliferation of new subjects of change. This is only possible if there is something 
in contemporary capitalism which really tends to multiply dislocations and thus create 
a plurality of new antagonisms. (Laclau 1990: 41)
From this perspective, complexity is the central feature of social relations which 
makes political struggle necessarily hegemonic in character. Now, here is it is neces-
sary to clear up a common confusion. In arguing that all political struggle must be 
hegemonic in character, Laclau and Mouffe are not arguing that it must strive for the 
total domination of a social fi eld or for ideological uniformity within. In fact they are 
making the opposite argument. For Laclau and Mouffe, there simply are no fundamen-
tal, self-contained historical agents who could successfully engage in such a project. 
There is no singular antagonism which divides the social fi eld. Every political/cul-
tural/social/identity is always already fragmented and criss-crossed by its complex 
relations to others. As such, those temporary stabilisations of the political fi eld which 
we can call hegemonic can only be achieved through processes of articulation.
Articulation is probably the key concept to have been developed by Laclau and 
Mouffe and then taken up in some parts of cultural studies (Slack 1996). Articulation 
is a word which has more than one meaning in everyday speech, and their use of it is 
best understood if we don’t think of articulation as a synonym for expression (as in the 
phrase ‘he articulated his feelings well to her that evening’). Rather, we should think 
of articulation as in anatomy or in the phrase ‘articulated truck’: articulation in this 
sense is a synonym for connecting, in a physical sense. For Laclau and Mouffe, the 
basic operation of politics is the articulation of terms (ideas/concepts/images/signs) 
to each other in highly unpredictable sequences or ‘chains’. In Laclau’s most recent 
work, the issue of what kind of ‘terms’ are articulated is further clarifi ed when he 
writes that ‘the unity of the group is, in my view, the result of an articulation of 
demands’ (Laclau 2005: ix). A typical example of an attempt to create such a unity, 
which we have already referred to elsewhere, would be the effort in France 1968 by 
radical students to articulate their demands for autonomy, self-expression and an end 
to hierarchy with the demands of industrial workers for better pay and conditions. It 
was the failure of this attempt, partly because not enough common terms of reference 
could be found, which foreclosed the possibility of revolution in France at that time. 
Indeed, we might observe that it was in the pursuit of such a common point of refer-
ence that the concept of autonomy became so important to libertarian communist mil-
itants in Italy in the 1970s. For Laclau and Mouffe, hegemonic struggle is precisely 
the search for such common terms of reference, and as such almost always involves 
some partial transformation of the identities of all groups who enter into articulatory 
coalitions. For example (to use one of Laclau’s own illustrations), when a trade union 
starts to articulate its concerns with those of local anti-racist campaigns, trying to cre-
ate a common front between workers and ethnic minorities, it in the process fi nds its 
own identity changing, from being a mere representative of workers’ rights to being 
a more genuinely political agent. Both the strategic coalitions which seek to challenge 
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established hegemonic relations and the practices by which powerful groups seek to 
articulate their concerns to those of others involve such shifts in identity. ‘We will call 
articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their iden-
tity is modifi ed as a result of the articulatory practice’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:105).
Nonetheless, it is clear that even in this last example, there are power relationships 
in play: how many times has an anti-racist group accused a trade union or socialist 
organisation of trying to ‘take over’ its campaign? What happens if radical socialists 
convince anti-racists to subsume their struggle into that of the workers, focussing 
energies on the long-term, unachievable goal of proletarian revolution, thereby ig-
noring immediate local problems of police harassment and racial violence? Isn’t this 
precisely the danger of what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘majority’?
Laclau and Mouffe would probably reply that this is indeed a danger, and it is 
one that can only be averted if we pay careful attention to the mechanics by which 
groups are formed. In their more recent work, both have turned in different ways to 
the issue of how it is that communities, democratic or otherwise, can hold together, 
if it is not because their members share some essential identity. In this they have both 
to some extent been infl uenced by the psychoanalytic strand of thought which sees 
groups as bound together by their members’ common identifi cation with some rela-
tively arbitrary symbol, image, or name. This derives from Freud’s account of group 
psychology, in which he argues that what holds together groups is their members’ 
common identifi cation with a leader (Freud 1985). Laclau has developed this obser-
vation into a rich account of the centrality of ‘empty signifi ers’ to political discourse 
(1996). Empty signifi ers are those symbols or terms shared by a community which 
come to mean literally nothing (or almost-nothing) because they simply signify the 
very idea of the community as a community. For example, in Freud’s account of 
group psychology, a term can take the symbolic place of the leader. We might think 
of the American fl ag or the monarchy in the United Kingdom as symbols with so 
many different associations to different constituencies that they really mean nothing, 
instead standing in for the very possibility of the national community existing at all. 
Different political discourses will seek to link their projects to these empty signifi ers, 
struggling to become the effective source of their content, but the more defi nite the 
meaning of such a signifi er, the less empty it becomes and the less it can do the work 
of simply naming the collectivity of the collective. So in the United States, for ex-
ample, were the religious right really to accomplish their goal of clearly establishing 
an unambiguous correlation between the US fl ag, Christian fundamentalism and re-
sidual white supremacism, the result would be hegemonic crisis in the United States 
and a complete breakdown of American nationhood. All of the other constituencies 
who can still see something of their own traditions as evoked by the fl ag—which 
is for some the symbol of liberal democracy, of anti-imperialist struggle, of En-
lightenment, of secularism, of a Union of the States within which slavery has been 
abolished and the civil rights of blacks and women guaranteed by law—would fi nd 
themselves excluded, unable to identify with the prime symbol of nationhood, and 
the nation would consequently cease to exist.
Ideas in Action • 157
The question this leaves open is how radical democrats should relate to this situa-
tion. What kinds of empty signifi ers should they identify with and what should they 
do about the fact that they know that these signifi ers are merely empty? To some ex-
tent this has been the issue addressed by Mouffe in some of her recent work. Mouffe 
argues that what characterizes a democratic community is the fact that the emptiness 
at its centre is in fact publicly acknowledged and institutionalised. In place of a leader, 
or a single creed, democratic communities have an endless contest between different 
ideas about what they should be and where they should go (Mouffe 2000). It is this 
endless and unresolvable confl ict in exactly the place where non-democratic commu-
nities have something fi xed and stable which defi nes a democratic community. From 
this perspective (which is rather close, but not identical, to that of the postmodernist 
philosopher, Jean-François Lyotard: see Lyotard 1988), one of the worst things that 
can happen is for some ideal vision of the community and its future to become fi xed, 
freezing out the possibility of contestation which is the very substance of democracy 
itself. This is a very interesting formulation, especially when thought of in the light 
of the shared histories of the anti-capitalists movement, the new social movement 
and cultural studies. For what all of these different projects have shared has been a 
determination to question some of the fundamental assumptions which their societ-
ies have regarded as beyond question, to open up for public debate issues which had 
been closed off or never open to such debate. As such, they can all be understood as 
radically democratic projects. Furthermore, there is a fascinating parallel between 
the analysis of Laclau and Mouffe and Subcomandante Marcos’s deliberate efface-
ment of his status as leader: his refusal to take a title that would clearly name him as 
leader, his refusal to be identifi ed as a concrete individual, his deliberate evocation of 
‘Marcos’ as merely a fi ctional stand-in for all of the various democratic constituen-
cies of the world. Indeed, it seems almost impossible that Marcos should have been 
unaware of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s work on these issue when he took the name Dele-
gado Zero, especially given that some of Laclau’s more abstract writing on this topic 
has engaged directly with the concept of zero as the ’empty’ place which makes the 
whole system of modern maths possible (Laclau 1998). Whether he was or not, the 
resonances between radical democracy and Zapatismo are more than striking.
Finally, in considering the affi nities between Laclau and Mouffe’s ideas and those 
which inform the anti-capitalist movement, it is worth considering Laclau’s impor-
tant contribution to the theorisation of universality in contemporary political philoso-
phy. In that fi eld, a universal project or belief-system is usually defi ned as one which 
aspires to encompass the entire human race. Christianity is a universalism because 
it aims to be a religion for everybody. Communism is a universal project because it 
aims to liberate all people from exploitation through the abolition of class society. 
In recent times, postmodernist thinkers such as Lyotard (1984; 1988) have tended 
to condemn all universalisms as inherently totalitarian, suppressing difference and 
dissent with their suffocating vision of truth. Figures such as Alain Badiou, on the 
other hand, have argued that all radical politics must be universalist in nature if they 
are to move beyond the mere defence of ‘particularisms’ (specifi c identities such 
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as nationality or religion; Badiou 2003). Laclau offers a more complex take on this 
problem, pointing out that every form of universality is always contaminated by 
some particularity from which it derives, and that the elevation of one particularism 
into a universal is one of the fundamental hegemonic manoeuvres (Butler, Laclau & 
Žižek 2000). Now, it is important to understand that any one concrete human subject 
could be defi ned in terms of any number of different particularisms: that is, any one 
of a number of distinct identity-traits. I could identify myself as a man, as British, 
as a public-sector worker, as white, as right-handed and so forth. From Laclau’s 
perspective, what a universalist political discourse such as communism does is to 
elevate one such trait to the status of the universal basis upon which a common po-
litical identity could be formed. So the discourse of class struggle which is central 
to communism identifi es one aspect of a person—the fact that they happen to work 
for a wage or salary—and tries to make this the basis for a political identity which 
can be shared by all who possess that trait, identifying them all as members of the 
proletariat.
We might add that from this perspective, the discourse of class struggle was al-
ways a potentially very powerful one. It is certainly true that most human beings 
today survive only by selling their labour, and objectively it seems like a perfectly 
good idea to try to get them to unite for a more equal world on the basis of that shared 
particularism. Unfortunately, this has not turned out to be very effective in practice: 
historically the social and cultural differences between people who work and the pull 
of national and religious identities which cross class lines has been too great for it to 
prove effective. From this point of view, contemporary anti-capitalism might be un-
derstood as a very intelligent substitute for the discourse of class struggle, precisely 
because it offers scope for a common identifi cation between all who suffer at the 
hands of neoliberalism without depending upon any more substantial particularity as 
the basis for that identifi cation.
There is something of a problem with Laclau and Mouffe’s formulations, however, 
at least from the perspective of contemporary anti-capitalism. The psychoanalytic 
tradition from which they draw their accounts of the mechanisms of community tends 
to have a decidedly negative conception of the social. Freud’s account of group psy-
chology, for example, has been criticised for its model of the group dependent entirely 
on a leader for its very existence. There is no room at all in Freud’s model for any 
notion of real solidarity existing between members of a group, and this seems to be 
replicated in Laclau and Mouffe’s understandings of community, which consistently 
insists on antagonism as not only inherent to but constitutive of all social life. Now, 
this is a particular problem from the perspective of the anti-capitalist movement, one 
of whose characteristic features is a preference for horizontal forms (i.e. forms of 
organisation without a clear hierarchy and clearly defi ned leadership) over vertical 
forms of organisation. Within the Freudian perspective, there are no horizontal, trans-
versal social relations at all, or if there are then they are only a byproduct of the verti-
cal relations between leaders and the led5. From an anti-capitalist perspective, it is not 
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enough merely to argue for the emptiness of the place of the leader: it is surely nec-
essary to conceive of groups as at least potentially leaderless and as bound together 
by horizontal relations of solidarity between their members (Gilbert 2004b, 2004c). 
Laclau and Mouffe are famous for their assertions to the effect that there is no such 
thing as society, because all such images of wholeness as that evoked by the idea of 
society or community are effectively illusory: mere fantasies holding together a group 
of variegated and incoherent individuals. But it is not this which is really the problem 
here. From an anti-capitalist perspective we can easily accept that every group iden-
tity is a provisional and partial fi ction. What is more problematic is the assumption 
that it is only through such group identities, rather than through complex processes of 
mutual interaction, that collectivities can come into being at all.
From the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, Laclau and Mouffe’s work remains 
stuck within the psychoanalytic horizon and as such can only see one very limited 
part of the broad spectrum of human experience. From this point of view, we can 
say that of course some, perhaps most, groups function in the way that Laclau and 
Mouffe describe. Perhaps we could even say that all groups function in this way 
to an extent: which is exactly the same as saying that all social relations have an 
arborescent dimension. But what Laclau and Mouffe’s perspective ignores is the 
rhizomatic dimension which all social relations also share, the horizontal, transversal 
lateral relations between members of groups which make truly mutual becomings 
possible (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 348–9). From this point of view, there is little 
attention in Laclau and Mouffe’s work to the ways in which power relationships 
emerge and crystallise from below. Now, this absence in Laclau and Mouffe’s per-
spective has led some critics to see them as implicitly authoritarian in their perspec-
tive, as some  anarchist-infl uenced thinkers tend to see any position which draws on 
Gramsci or Lenin as necessarily authoritarian (Day 2005). This is a very problematic 
critique, for two reasons. Firstly because it simply overlooks what it is that Laclau 
and Mouffe are trying to do in much of their work. Laclau in particular rarely tries to 
say much about how politics should work and is largely concerned with how it really 
does work. This remains a very important corrective perspective for anyone working 
within the radical tradition, which has historically been very good at understanding 
how people ought to behave in order to make the world a better place, but rather bad 
at understanding why they don’t. Any democrat, however radical, has to have some 
understanding of why democracy is so rarely found in real life, why it never quite 
works the way people want it to and why authoritarian relations are so widespread. 
Much of Laclau’s work and Mouffe’s work has been concerned with understanding 
these issues, moving beyond the limitations of a naïve perspective which is constantly 
surprised by these facts of political life.
Secondly, Laclau’s approach to issues such as empty signifi ers and hegemonic 
universality could be read as stressing the extent to which the ‘nodal points’ (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985: 139) around which hegemonic formations crystallise are always rela-
tively arbitrary points in a generalised network of power relations. In other words, 
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hegemonic relations can be understood as relations which emerge between terms 
which are not in any prior or essential relation of superiority or inferiority. In other 
words, vertical relations may emerge from horizontal ones; molecules may coagulate 
into molar formations. The analytics of hegemony is not a prescription, but a descrip-
tion of how such processes operate. So on this particular reading, we could argue 
that Laclau and Mouffe do not accord logical priority to vertical relations but merely 
describe the logic of their emergence. I am not entirely convinced that Laclau does 
not, in fact, accord logical priority to vertical relations, but we can see here that it is 
at least possible to interpret his work in terms which do not. On the basis of such a 
reading, the gulf between Laclau and Mouffe, and Deleuze and Guattari may not be 
so great after all.
However, where there is a clear difference between them is in their contrasting 
conceptions of desire. Laclau and Mouffe are rigourously committed to the Lacanian 
formulation which understands the human subject (collective or individual) as con-
stituted by an inherent lack. For Laclau in particular, the assumption that political 
desire is organised by the quest to locate the absent fullness of the social, or of the 
self, is axiomatic. Even in his most recent work, where Laclau takes the radical step 
of seeing politics as a process of confl ict and struggle between differently articulated 
sets of demands, there is a gap between this formulation and one which understands 
desire in positive terms, as a positive force of production. A demand is always for 
something that one lacks, and a demand is made upon something which might be 
able to fulfi l it. For Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, desire produces: it is produc-
tion itself, in fact.
Now, this brings us to the one of our key themes which we have not dealt with 
at length in this treatment of Laclau and Mouffe: creativity. What is clear here is 
that the gap between Laclau and Mouffe’s ideas and Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas is 
partly a function of the latter’s emphasis on the positive creative force of desiring-
production-power. It would be easy to present this simply as a weakness with Laclau 
and Mouffe’s position, but we should be wary of doing so. In fact, one of the most 
learned commentaries on Deleuze’s philosophy to have appeared in English recently 
argued that it is this belief in groundless creativity that is precisely the problem with 
Deleuze. For Peter Hallward (2007), Deleuze’s romantic faith in the creativity of 
matter amounts to nothing more than mysticism. The position that Hallward would 
probably share with Laclau and Mouffe emphasises that creativity never occurs in a 
vacuum. If it is always social, then it is always relational, emerging from the complex 
and unpredictable interactions between things and people. If we do not demand things 
that we lack, of institutions which might give them to us but do not yet, then what 
is politics all about? In the case of anti-capitalism, the difference between Laclau’s 
articulated demands and Deleuze’s creative desire might be the difference between 
organising a complex coalition to demand that the World Trade Organisation stop 
imposing  neoliberal policies on third world countries and start assisting with pro-
gressive development programmes (a relational, counter-hegemonic articulation of 
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demands), and running off into the Oregon wilderness to live in a teepee and meditate 
(pursuing a line of fl ight, an uninhibited becoming-other which liberates us from the 
limits of capitalism). This is probably a crude reading of the differences: let’s remem-
ber that Félix Guattari was a lifelong militant who never actually did run away from 
direct political confrontation or the diffi culties of counter-hegemonic organisation. 
But it is worth keeping in mind.
We cannot make an exhaustive exploration of differences or similarities between 
Laclau and Mouffe, and Deleuze and Guattari here, but we don’t need to. Both pairs 
of writers furnish concepts and arguments which will prove invaluable for thinking 
through some of the issues which the fi nal two chapters will address. However, it is 
striking that the issues that we have just touched on bear precisely upon the project of 
our fi nal pair of theorists. For if Laclau and Mouffe—expert thinkers of complexity, 
hegemony and power—have little to say about the issue of creativity, then Michael 
Hardt and Tony Negri rarely seem to think about anything else.
Hardt and Negri
Before we get around to looking at strengths and weaknesses of Hardt and Negri’s 
work, we need to know who its authors are. It is at fi rst glance the product of an 
unusual collaboration. While Hardt has an admirable history as a political activist in 
his own right, it’s as a professor of literature and philosophy at one of the most 
comfortably privileged academic institutions in the world—Duke University—that 
he’s best known. Negri, on the other hand, is the last great hero of 1968. A leading 
radical intellectual in Italy in the 1960s and 70s, he fl ed to Paris at the end of the lat-
ter decade after being falsely accused by the Italian government of playing a leading 
roll in the terrorist activities of the Red Brigades: the heroic status which has been 
accorded to Negri since is hardly surprising.
On the other hand, it is perhaps only an accident of history that their respective 
biographies look so different, as Negri himself has always earned his living as a 
philosopher, and his recent solo work is far more abstract than is that co-authored 
with Hardt. Indeed, it is Hardt’s familiarity and sympathy with the political and intel-
lectual traditions of English-language cultural studies (Hardt & Negri 2000: 137–50) 
which really makes their work different from comparable works from other philoso-
phers. What makes Hardt and Negri’s collaborative work refreshingly distinct from 
many other exercises in post-structuralist or neo-Marxist political philosophy is not 
just its passion and commitment but the welcome sense that the authors at least know 
of the existence of life outside the seminar room or the organisational headquarters. 
Hardt and Negri’s commentary on Buffy the Vampire Slayer (2004: 193) may not be 
the most expert, but the world of popular culture is not a closed book to them, and in 
this particular aspect they are arguably more Gramscian in their approach than many 
of their contemporaries.
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While Hardt and Negri’s fi rst book is an interesting but relatively overlooked 
work on the theory of the state (1994), it was their second, Empire (2000), which 
really caught the imagination of a wider public, becoming an international bestseller. 
In it, they argued that the nature of political power was radically changing in the new 
world of networked communications and global fl ows of people, money, ideas. Writ-
ing against those who saw the new world order as dominated by old-fashioned US 
imperialism, they argued that in fact there was no actual centre to world power any 
more, with advanced capitalism depending for its profi tability on a fl uid and multi-
farious set of relationships between economic and political institutions of all shapes 
and sizes. This seems to many like an odd idea at fi rst, but Hardt and Negri draw our 
attention to the fact that historically the great empires—Rome, the British Empire—
did not operate as highly centralised authoritarian regimes, but instead grew accord-
ing to a logic of endless expansion which often left real power distributed throughout 
a complex network of institutional relationships, much like those between national 
governments, corporations and international bodies such as the United Nations and 
World Trade Organisation today.
The emergence of the neo-conservative hegemony in the United States shortly 
after Empire appeared was widely seen as undermining this hypothesis, and Hardt 
and Negri have had some trouble in explaining how Bush’s militaristic nationalism 
could arise in such a context. At a conference at the Tate Britain gallery in London, 
in 2002, in conversation with Stuart Hall, Hardt suggested that the failure of Bush’s 
military adventure would ultimately bear out the thesis of Empire. While subsequent 
events have certainly lent some retrospective credibility to this argument, at the 
time there was a widespread sense that America’s naked imperialism disproved the 
core thesis of Empire. One of the key arguments of Hardt and Negri’s third book, 
 Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (2004), wrestles with this prob-
lem. It does not deal with it particularly well, because Hardt and Negri, although 
often brilliant philosophers, are not very convincing theorists of international rela-
tions. In particular they tend to stretch metaphorical conceptual analogies well past 
breaking point. For example, the hypothetical schema by which this book divides 
up the world into a new ‘aristocracy’ (including the European elites so alienated by 
US unilateralism), an American ‘monarchy’ and so forth is rather clumsy and has no 
obvious analytic value (Hardt & Negri 2004: 320– 4) and does not sit well with their 
characterisation of ‘Empire’ as a decentred network, a kind of enormous, malign rhi-
zome. Nor does it sit well with their parallel argument that we have entered a period 
in which the ‘global state of war’—on terror, on crime, on drugs, on the enemies of 
the United States, on everything that poses problems for Empire—has become the 
ordinary mode of politics (Hardt & Negri 2004: 12–18), because this understanding 
makes much more sense in the light of a more complex and disaggregated con-
ception of contemporary geopolitical power relations. In fact, the former argument 
seems to be motivated primarily by an insistent desire to use Spinoza’s work on 
politics—which is largely concerned with drawing up model constitutions for ideally 
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conceived monarchies—as a template, even where it’s patently inappropriate to do 
so, as opposed to being motivated from any serious attempt to map the specifi cities 
of power in the world today.
I would argue that there is a more persuasive defence of Empire available than 
that made by Hardt in person or in Multitude, in that it does offer a brilliant descrip-
tion of the type of international capitalism which Clinton and Blair were intent on 
implementing in the 1990s. Led by the software industry and the internet boom, in-
fused with the Californian values of social liberalism and hedonistic creativity, com-
mitted to multilateral interventions in defence of its agendas (from GATT to the war 
in Kosovo), this was clearly a new and aggressively borderless form of capitalism. 
However, there was very little on offer here for the industrialists and oil barons of the 
American South and Midwest or those non-metropolitan US populations excluded 
from the new cosmopolitanism. It’s they who went on to form the political alli-
ance underpinning the Bush government and its project to secure access to Middle-
 Eastern oil reserves. The fact that such an analysis is missing from Hardt and Negri’s 
work is not just incidental: their tendency is almost always to speak in terms of 
broad-brush metaphors and abstract generalisations, and in the process they can end 
up making analyses which are just not very political, in that they offer descriptions 
of social states and processes without paying much attention to the actual specifi c 
power struggles which underlie them, or which might change them. Nonetheless, 
from the perspective of the story told in Chapter 2, of the gradual dis association 
of the New Left and mainstream cultural studies from any actual political projects, 
Hardt and Negri’s analyses remain crucial. The moment of Empire is the moment of 
Clintonian capitalism, which I have suggested is exactly the moment at which the 
traditions and hopes of the New Left were fi nally politically neutralised. The task of 
charting the new terrain from that moment on, in a spirit of explicit solidarity with 
the anti-capitalist movement, is exactly the crucial task which Hardt and Negri have 
taken upon themselves. Their attempt to link up many of the traditions and tenden-
cies described in this book is therefore surely to be welcomed, and as such I think 
that all criticisms should be addressed to them only in a spirit of solidarity: it is 
hardly surprising if the results of their experiment are at times uneven. To understand 
something of the strengths and weaknesses of those results thus far, we have to un-
derstand a bit more about Hardt and Negri’s general project, and in particular their 
concept of ‘Multitude’.
Marx showed long ago that even as capitalism concentrates wealth in the hands 
of a few, it ensures that the real work of production is done by the many, amongst 
whom ever-greater levels of real interdependence and silent cooperation are required
(1992: 376–8). Today this means that at the level of global production, cooperative 
communication and networked social power are already a reality, a reality the left 
must learn to build on in the twenty-fi rst century by building a movement for real 
global democracy. This is the basic argument made in Multitude. Hardt and Negri 
use the term multitude to name this vast creative collectivity to which we all now 
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belong, as well as the general condition of creative sociality as a fundamental fact 
of existence. Crucially, Hardt and Negri deploy this concept in order to name a fi eld 
of collectivity which is composed of singularities: unique points of intersection and 
potential self-invention which cannot be subsumed into any simple totality nor re-
duced to the status of individuals. I am a singularity, you are a singularity: but this 
singularity has nothing to do with our individual nature: it is a function of the unique 
position that each of us occupies in an infi nite network of relations, of our specifi c 
modes of dividuality (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 341).
The term multitude, which tries to capture this sense of singularity/collectivity, is 
derived from early modern political philosophy. As already mentioned, the authors 
claim particular inspiration from the writings of Spinoza. In this they follow De-
leuze, who once declared Spinoza the ‘Christ of philosophers’(Deleuze & Guattari 
1994: 60). Within the Deleuzian philosophical current, Spinoza’s rationalist panthe-
ism is understood as an implicit radical materialism which refuses any separation 
between different levels of being: ‘body’, ‘mind’, ‘God’ and ‘world’ are all placed on 
the same plane and understood to share the same basic substance. It is highly debat-
able as to whether Spinoza would have recognised his philosophy in such terms, but 
it is surely signifi cant that he was excommunicated from the Jewish community of 
Amsterdam because his contemporaries certainly did see materialist atheism as the 
logical implication of his philosophy. In developing the concept of multitude—about 
which Spinoza really wrote nothing in any detail—Hardt and Negri remain commit-
ted to the conceptually egalitarian approach implied by Spinoza’s assertion that all 
that exists is composed of a single substance, at the most fundamental level. On the 
other hand, Hardt and Negri’s ideal defi nition of democracy as ‘the rule of everyone 
by everyone’ really stretches the credibility of their claim to be followers of Spinoza: 
Spinoza was very clear that the multitude who should have power in a democracy 
did not include such irrational elements as criminals, children or women (Spinoza 
1958; 2000: 441–5).
Nonetheless, it is this substantive ideal of democracy as ‘rule of everyone by 
everyone’ that sets Hardt and Negri apart from other post-structuralist, post-Marxist 
political philosophers. As we have seen, Laclau and Mouffe tend to stress the rela-
tionality and partiality of all social identities, and their dependence on the shifting 
web of relationships in which all identities are caught up and which always leaves 
them perpetually unstable6. By contrast Hardt and Negri, along with other members 
of the Italian Autonomist tradition to which Negri belongs (Wright 2002), stress the 
creative power of groups and individuals to constitute their own collective identities 
and material realities, of which they see true democracy as the ultimate expression. 
Now, while the strength of this vision is its sheer inspiring poetry, its weakness is 
its failure to consider the relational, negotiable nature of political identities, which 
leaves Hardt and Negri unable to say anything meaningful about the problem of for-
mulating political strategies and specifi c coalitions in the new global context. Hardt 
and Negri’s claims that Empire has no centre and that any attack on any part of it is 
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consequently also an attack on its centre are very problematic: they imply, in effect, 
that there is no need to chose between, say, spending our time producing subvertis-
ments (parodied or defaced advertisements with an anti-corporate message), engag-
ing in national electoral politics or undertaking militant trade unionism because each 
are equally attacks on the overall system of power. This is great news for those anti-
capitalists who don’t want to have to worry about the fact that for the most part they 
have so far completely failed to persuade publics in the North of the need to actively 
resist neoliberalism, but it will not get us very far in terms of addressing that failure. 
Beyond shutting our eyes and wishing very hard, it’s never clear how Hardt and 
Negri imagine that the prophetic character of their work is going to manifest itself in 
some new political reality.
Despite its problems, Hardt and Negri’s work makes a major contribution to con-
temporary radical thought in the courage with which it seeks to ‘name the enemy’, 
as Amory Starr might put it (2000). Whether or not we agree that Empire is a useful 
name for the complex of social relations and institutions against which the move-
ment of movements is ranged, the daring and imagination with which Hardt and 
Negri seek to move beyond the simplicity of simply identifying the corporations as 
the enemy (which is what Starr does in her landmark study) is clearly valuable. At 
the same time, in identifying the we who resists, or might resist, Empire or neolib-
eralism, as the multitude, they do a great service in recovering the powerful Marxist 
observation that it is the irreducibly collective creativity of humans and their ma-
chines which produces the world we inhabit. This is a hugely important observation 
for cultural studies: for one thing, it offers an interesting route through the old debate 
between cultural populists and their critics. From this perspective, populists are right 
to stress the potential agency of the multitude who produce popular culture even as 
they consume it. However, if a celebration of this popular creativity loses sight of its 
inherently collective dimension and becomes a mere celebration of individualised 
consumer sovereignty, then it has simply collapsed into complicity with neoliberal 
ideology. Along similar line, it is striking to note the affi nities between the optimism, 
the faith in democracy and in the power of creativity, and even the implicit teleology 
of Hardt and Negri’s approach, with the tone and argument of Williams’s The Long 
Revolution (1961).
Turning to more recent work in cultural studies, Jason Toynbee’s important con-
cept of social authorship as the basis for musical creativity has strong affi nities with 
Hardt and Negri’s ideas (Toynbee 2000). We can develop this observation to sug-
gest a clear demarcation between the complex networks of creativity by which the 
multitude of producers, musicians, consumers, bloggers, fi le-traders, and so forth 
bring global music culture into being, and the processes by which certain sections of 
Empire—record companies, large media outlets, commercial distributors—seek to 
impose norms of capitalist sovereignty on it, particularly through the courts which 
enforce intellectual property rights. However, as so often with Hardt and Negri, it 
is the very strength of their terminology—it’s bold, polemical way of dividing the 
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world into two clearly demarcated antagonists—which is also its greatest potential 
weakness. The question which really emerges if we try to compare Hardt and Negri’s 
gestures of naming with other frames of reference, is whether these gestures do not 
go too far in simplifying the very complex and uneven terrain of contemporary capi-
talism and the antagonisms to which it gives rise.
We can see, then, that the strengths and weaknesses of Hardt and Negri’s approach 
all pivot on our four key themes: power, creativity, complexity and hegemony. Its 
strength lies in its emphatic demonstration that power and creativity are inseparable, 
and in its investigation of the complexity of postmodern forms of sovereignty. It’s 
danger lies in the possibility that it reduces the complexity of contemporary politics 
with its Manichean dualism, occluding any understanding of the mechanics of hege-
mony which keep Empire in place in multifarious locations. It might even be, from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, that Hardt and Negri’s emphasis on creativity 
leads them to fail to theorise adequately that dimension of power which is manifested 
in the capacity of repressive institutions to stratify, codify, block and constrict, for 
which one name is antiproduction. Empire seems to be a form of capital which is 
entirely parasitic upon the rhizomatic multitude but which does not any longer avail 
itself of those powers of stratifi cation and territorialisation which secure hegemony 
in given contexts: this may be one tendency of current capitalism, but it is not at all 
clear that it is the only one.
Nonetheless, Hardt and Negri’s work remains a tremendous resource: a diagram-
matic map of current systems of power, if not an exhaustive enumeration. Even those 
elements which I have identifi ed as problematic are defensible as strategic gestures. 
It is true that the global scene today presents us with a complex fi eld of interrelated, 
overlapping and disconnected antagonisms. But it is also true that any movement, or 
any analytical perspective, that wants to plot a trajectory away from the hegemony 
of neoliberalism must fi nd ways to identify the common antagonism which so many 
disparate struggles and demands share today. That which stands in the way of so 
many democratic demands, that which blocks so many lines of possible becoming 
today, deserves a name: and Empire is as good a name for it as any. And what better 
name do we have for the possibility that this common antagonism might be realisable 
in political projects for global democratisation, than
the multitude that, as Spinoza says, through reason and passions, in the complex inter-
play of historical forces, creates a freedom that he calls absolute: throughout history 
humans have refused authority and command, expressed the irreducible difference of 
singularity, and sought freedom in innumerable revolts and revolutions. This freedom is 
not given by nature, of course; it comes about only by constantly overcoming obstacles 
and limits. Just as humans are born with no faculties written in their fl esh, so too there are 
no fi nal ends or teleological goals written in history. Human faculties and historical tele-
ologies exist only because they are the result of human passions, reason and struggle. The 
faculty for freedom and the propensity to refuse authority, one might say, have  become 
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the most healthy and the most noble human instincts, the real signs of eternity. Perhaps 
rather than eternity we should say more precisely that multitude acts always in the pres-
ent, a perpetual present. The fi rst multitude is ontological and we could not conceive 
our social being without it. The other is the historical multitude or, really, the not-yet 
multitude. This multitude has never existed. We have been tracking . . . the emergence 
of the cultural, legal, economic and political conditions that make the multitude possible 
today. This second multitude is political; and it will require a political project to bring 
it into being on the basis of these emerging conditions. These two multitudes, however, 
although conceptually distinct, are not really separable. If the multitude were not already 
latent and implicit in our social being, we could not even imagine it as a political proj-
ect; and similarly, we can only hope to realise it today because it already exists as a real 
potential. The multitude, then, when we put these two together, has a strange, double 
temporality: always-already and non-yet.
(Hardt & Negri 2004: 222–3)
In this passage, Hardt and Negri’s evocation of the multitude as a potential evokes 
Deleuze’s understanding of the virtual as the fi eld of infi nite potential, of relations 
without fi xed terms, from which the actual is crystallised (Massumi 2002). And it 
also echoes obliquely some famous remarks of Jacque Derrida’s7.
Even beyond the regulating idea in its classic form, the idea, if that is still what it is, of 
democracy to come, its “idea” as event of a pledged injunction that orders one to sum-
mon the very thing that will never present itself in the form of full presence, is the open-
ing of the gap between an infi nite promise (always untenable at least for the reason that 
it calls for the infi nite respect of the singularity and infi nite alterity of the other as much 
as for the respect of the countable, calculable, subjectal equality between anonymous 
singularities) and the determined, necessary, but also necessarily inadequate forms of 
what has to be measured against this promise. To this extent, the effectivity or actuality 
of the democratic promise, like that of the communist promise, will always keep within 
it, and it must do, this absolutely undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschato-
logical relation to the to-come of an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot 
be anticipated.
(Derrida 1994: 65)
In Derrida’s later work, the promise of democracy ‘to come’, the possibility of 
justice and the potential for new forms of collectivity inherent in all social rela-
tions was an important theme, animating his invocation of a ‘new international’ with 
which to confront neoliberal hegemony. In many ways, it seems that Hardt and Ne-
gri’s multitude is a further elaboration of this concept.
What all of these, admittedly very abstract, ideas allude to is one fact. Neoliberal 
capitalism may appear, at present, to be unshakeably hegemonic across much of 
the globe, but the desire for forms of collective and singular forms of life which it 
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cannot tolerate has not gone away. Wherever that desire can be heard or felt or wit-
nessed, there is the potential for positive change. If cultural studies can do anything 
with these ideas, and with the various conceptual tools delineated in this chapter, 
then it will be to identify both the points at which such potential might be actualised, 
and the real obstacles to its actualisation in specifi c contexts. This is not something 
that one book, or one whole life’s work could do alone. But it is something that the 
next chapter will in part attempt, at least for the contemporary British context.
Notes
1.  The terms ‘rhizomatics’ is posited by Deleuze and Guattari as equivalent to 
‘schizoanalysis’, which is the term I have stayed with for most of this chapter 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 22).
2.  In fact, Gibson argues with great intelligence that the idea of power as infusing 
all social relations has often been assumed or rehearsed in the fi eld, without 
being conceptually interrogated: in other words, cultural studies has a lot to say 
about power, without ever putting the concept of power itself into question. Un-
fortunately, there is not the space or the opportunity here to engage with Gibson’s 
argument: I merely signal its salience to the reader before repeating the very 
gesture which Gibson criticises.
3.  We don’t have space here to get into the distinction between ‘relative’ and ‘abso-
lute’ deterritorialisation in Deleuze and Guattari, unfortunately.
4.  A fi nal point to make with regard to Laclau and Mouffe’s philosophical position 
is that they make an acute and complex defence of their own commitment to 
philosophical materialism (Laclau 1990: 105-12), which critics such as Jonathan 
Joseph (2002) simply fail to engage with at all: we don’t have space to take up 
this debate here, but put very briefl y, Laclau and Mouffe would argue that a 
properly materialist perspective is not simply a question of believing that things 
really exist outside of discourse—which they do not dispute—but of recognising 
that the structure of material reality is not that of logical concepts (which is the 
assumption they attribute to pre-Marxist idealism).
5.  In Guattari’s terms, this means that psychoanalysis cannot think ‘transversality’, 
although ‘transversality’ should probably not be equated directly with horizontal-
ity as such (Guattari 1972: 72-85; 2000: 106-59).
6.  This is in itself closely related to Derrida’s concept of différance, the undecidable 
condition of im/possibility haunting the trace-network which is the infrastructure 
of all phenomena.
7.  Not by chance, I think, because Derrida’s spectral différance, a fi eld of infi nite 
relationality, neither fully here nor elsewhere at any given point, is perhaps very 
close to Deleuze’s ‘virtual’.
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Mapping the Territory: Prospects for 
Resistance in the Neoliberal Conjuncture
What are the prospects for an anti-capitalist politics today, and how can a cultural 
studies analysis enable us to address this question in a positive way? In this chap-
ter, we will address this question with particular, but not exclusive, attention to the 
British experience. In the process, we will hopefully get a sense of which of the 
conceptual tools available to us in the realm of contemporary cultural theory are of 
signifi cant use in understanding the dynamics of current power.
The Abstract Machine of Neoliberalism
The fi rst thing to say on this issue is that the possibilities for any explicit and systemic 
challenge to capitalism in the United Kingdom or elsewhere outside of Latin America, 
are virtually non-existent at the present time. Since the end of the cold war, no sys-
tematic challenge to capitalism so conceived has emerged. In fact, the anti- capitalist 
movement, for better or for worse, has been defi ned by its very lack of a common vi-
sion or coherent programme to implement a different set of socio-economic relation-
ships. In Britain in particular, despite the successful popularisation of some radical 
ecological themes, these have yet to translate into any kind of substantial critique of 
capitalism or the forms of behaviour which sustain it: even those relatively militant 
sections of the ecology movement which are trying to oppose the expansion of avia-
tion in the United Kingdom largely frame their arguments in terms of the polluting 
potential of particular technologies (in particular aircraft), rather than of the incessant 
drive to capital accumulation (see, for example www.planestupid.com).
This situation occurs within the context of the wider success of neoliberalism 
as capital’s key strategy since the collapse of Fordism in the early 1970s. In the 
so-called developed world today, there is virtually no real political opposition to 
neoliberalism, but only a range of ways of manifesting, implementing and accom-
modating to it. Outside of the West and North of the planet, it is radical conservatism 
which offers the only substantial challenge to the culture of liberal capitalism. There 
are exceptions, as we have seen, particularly in Latin America; but conditions there 
are so different that it is diffi cult to see what Northern anti-capitalists could learn 
from the Latin experience. Although some radicals in Western Europe may look to 
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Hugo Chavez as a model of what a socialist government might still do, the conditions 
obtaining in Venezuela are unlikely to be replicated here: very valuable reserves of 
natural resources, a majority of the population suffering relative poverty and a high 
level of social and cultural homogeneity existing amongst that population, making 
mobilisation of that population against US capital relatively easy. The situation in no 
Northern country is ever likely to resemble this one again.
While there are various local reasons why this should be the case, there are also 
key shared factors shaping the political milieu in almost all of the so-called advanced 
capitalist countries today. To understand these factors, it is necessary to consider the 
historical moment which is widely accepted as, one way or another, marking the 
beginning of the present era: the collapse of the weakly social-democratic consensus 
which had informed Western politics in the decades following World War II. The 
post-war settlement combined industrial capitalism with a strong welfare state, full 
employment and a relatively stable and conformist culture: especially in the domes-
tic sphere, where the norms of the nuclear family were rigidly enforced. This was the 
cultural-political complex which Gramsci had fi rst seen emerging in the 1930s and to 
which he had given the resonant name Fordism. For Gramsci, this new form of capi-
talism was typifi ed by the Ford motor company, with its assembly lines, its relatively 
high wages and its moralistic paternalism (Gramsci 1971: 279–318).
Fordism constituted the technical, cultural and economic context for the great 
social compromise of post-war period, whereby the governments of the capital-
ist powers undertook unprecedented reforms, involving themselves in the manage-
ment of the industrial economy, maintaining full-employment, which in turn kept 
the price of labour relatively high, greatly empowering workers and their organisa-
tional representatives, the trade unions. Governments of every political hue pursued 
a broadly social democratic agenda during this period, diverting tax revenues from 
corporations and the wealthy to fund the new institutions of the welfare state and 
contributing to a general increase in social mobility and social equality. In return, 
the labour movement was expected to remain disciplined and moderate, ultimately 
supporting America and its allies in the cold war with Soviet communism.
Like any assemblage, this ‘historic compromise’ (Gramsci 1971: 168) was never 
fully stable, and there were always tensions and resistances from without and within; 
including the communists who always claimed that the achievements of social de-
mocracy would be short-lived without a world revolution, the beatnik refusers of 
Fordist conformity, or the right-wing economists who bemoaned the fate of entrepre-
neurial man in the era of the welfare state (Hayek 1944). During the period lasting 
roughly from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s, the entire arrangement of forces and 
compromises unravelled. Militant challenges to the Fordist settlement came from a 
number of directions: from women who were tired of having all of their desires and 
potential trapped in the bottle of the nuclear family, housewife being the only social 
role available to them as adults; from youth, bored by the monotonous conformism 
of industrial culture; from workers, impatient with gradual reforms handed down by 
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patrician bureaucrats and strongly desirous of greater autonomy at work; and from 
those populations—in particular the colonised of Africa and their once-enslaved de-
scendants in the West—who were still deprived of full access to the means of po-
litical participation and self-determination. These challenges amounted to a set of 
demands which Fordist capital simply could not meet while remaining profi table1.
At the same time, competition with Japanese and West German fi rms began to 
threaten the profi ts of American and British capital (Brenner 2005). However, the 
methods by which such fi rms were able to establish themselves would soon be avail-
able to their rivals too, and this as much as anything has subsequently transformed 
the material landscape of global politics. The emergence of electronic, digital, ro-
botic and cybernetic technologies has made it possible for a new technical regime to 
emerge, within which it is possible for capital to evade many of the mechanisms cre-
ated by governments and organised labour to contain and codify it during the middle 
decades of the last century. Global computer networks now enable corporations to 
shift their locations regularly in search of ever-cheaper labour, without any real cost 
to the ongoing operations of the company. Intensifying competition between fi rms 
in this new technical context led, in the 1970s, to the emergence of a new produc-
tive paradigm—a new post-Fordist ‘regime of accumulation’ (Harvey 1989: 121–2), 
dependent upon rapid, fl exible responses to fl uctuations in demand and therefore 
demanding ever-greater levels of fl exibility and specialisation on the part of corpora-
tions. All kinds of consequences have ensued, including the disaggregation of large 
fi rms into networks of specialised providers occupying ever-shifting sets of complex 
relationships with each other, and the consequent imposition of short-term contract 
work on huge sections of the workforce (Sennett 2006).
This is the context which made possible the staged implementation of the full neo-
liberal project, beginning with a military coup in Chile. Latin America—the United 
States’s ‘back yard’—has often been the site of the most direct confrontations be-
tween US-led post-Fordist capitalism and its enemies, and perhaps the most notable 
historical example dates from the moment of the early 1970s. The US-backed coup 
of 1973 against Chile’s socialist president, Salvador Allende, led not just to the mili-
tary dictatorship of Augustus Pinochet, but also to his implementation of the world’s 
fi rst neoliberal economic programme, directly overseen by students of Milton Fried-
man (Harvey 2005). The enforced privatisation of large sections of the economy, 
the implementation of so-called free-market industrial policies and the ruthless at-
tacks on organised labour all presaged the kind of policy regime which Washington 
would soon be trying to impose on countries all over the world. Now, as much as 
we may detest such policies and their forced implementation, it is worth noting that 
the relative economic success of this project—achieved only at the cost of massive 
social inequality and a long-terms suspension of Chilean democracy—was in stark 
contrast to the economic and cultural stagnation which overtook the Soviet bloc dur-
ing the same period. Having crushed attempts at liberalisation and democratisation 
in Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet command economy could not 
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adopt systems analogous to those which constituted the post-Fordist regime of ac-
cumulation. While the USSR’s last communist leader—Mikhail Gorbachev—seems 
to have well understood that some such programme would be necessary to save the 
communist project, his reforms came far too late. Sclerotic state socialism simply 
could not compete with post-Fordist capitalism in terms of the sheer volume, scale 
and range of production, not could it offer any alternative sources of inspiration for 
a population whose desires were increasingly pulled in the direction of Western con-
sumerism. The resultant collapse of soviet communism in 1989 removed the greatest 
single obstacle to the power of US-led capital; the largest and most highly organised 
territory outside of the world market was smashed open in the early 1990s; and a 
potential source of military or economic support was lost to anti-neoliberal govern-
ments the world over. The consequence has been to leave a world in which the neo-
liberal project meets with only partial and localised resistance at any point.
At this point it is worth asking ourselves just what kind of an entity we think 
neoliberalism is. Neoliberalism is an excellent example of the type of phenomenon 
which political and cultural theorists struggle to name with absolute clarity, pre-
cisely because it functions across a number of spheres. On one level neoliberalism 
is simply a discourse or ‘discursive formation’ (Foucault 1972: 38)—an organised 
set of statements about human nature, economics and politics—which insists upon 
the desirability of market relations as the paradigmatic form of human interaction 
in almost all imaginable social contexts. Almost all commentators would agree that 
this is a discourse which is in some sense ideological, insofar as its implication is 
to fully legitimate an existing set of social relations, neutralising most prominent 
critiques thereof, thereby legitimating the power of ruling elites while occluding the 
historical contingency of existing social relations. However, these accounts tell us 
relatively little about the actual social effects of neoliberalism, which could be both a 
discourse and an ideology without having any success at actually re-modelling real-
ity in its own terms. It is only when conceived as a political programme enacted in 
accordance with its core ideological assumptions that we can get a sense of neoliber-
alism’s varying impacts. Nowhere in the world has neoliberalism been implemented 
in some absolutely pure form. Indeed, it’s not entirely clear what it would look like 
if it was: presumably the kind of stateless anarcho-capitalist utopia dreamed-of by 
Murray Rothbard (2003), or the kind of society imagined by Schumpeter (1954), in 
which democracy is an occasional and largely ceremonial affair, actual governance 
remaining in the hands of a technocratic elite. If neoliberalism is a programme, it is 
not clear that it is one with any absolute objective.
Perhaps the most succinctly sophisticated account of neoliberalism is that offered 
by John Clarke. Clarke makes an important case ‘for treating neo-liberalism as a 
hegemonic project (rather than a singular ideology)’ (2004: 89). In other words, as 
Clarke goes on to show, neoliberalism deploys a complex range of tactics in various 
discursive and individual contexts in order to try to defi ne social reality and politi-
cal possibility entirely in its own terms. In fact, all of the most lucid commentators 
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on this subject (Harvey 1989, 2005; Grossberg 2005; Giroux 2004) make use of 
a Gramscian frame of reference in order to explain the operation of this project. To 
put this matter very simply: how far neoliberalism can go, and what it can actually 
achieve, will vary dramatically according to the balance of forces and the available 
resources in specifi c political contexts. For example, in the United Kingdom, where 
organised labour completely failed to cope, organisationally or intellectually, with 
the shift to post-Fordism, while very strong traditions of liberal individualism and 
social conservatism created a hospitable climate for New Right thinking, neoliberal-
ism has succeeded in almost entirely shaping the political agenda since the 1970s. 
In France, by contrast—just a few miles away from the United Kingdom—a very 
different social and political history has produced a context in which successive at-
tempts by successive governments to implement a fully neoliberal programme have 
been met with resistance, anger and reluctance, eventually producing a general sense 
of national malaise (the country unable to accept neoliberalism or fully to resist it) 
leading up to the election of conservative president Nicolas Sarkozy.
In fact none of these descriptions of neoliberalism are mutually exclusive. Neo-
liberalism is clearly, on one level, a hegemonic project, asserting and reinforcing the 
hegemony of fi nance capital after a period when the latter was relatively subordinate 
to the alliance of industrial capital with industrial labour which defi ned the Fordist 
settlement. As David Harvey puts it, in classically Marxist terms, neoliberalism’s 
aim is the re-assertion of class power by the most ruthless sections of the bourgeois 
class: ultimately, the goal of almost all neoliberal policies is to lower the price of la-
bour, increase the rate of profi t, and remove obstacles to the exploitation of workers. 
However, there are lots of ways in which this might be achieved: the specifi c hege-
monic project of neoliberalism is only one such, and so it is necessary to consider 
its detailed features in order properly to understand it. In discursive and institutional 
terms, the mode of operation of this hegemonic project is to re-shape social relations 
according to market logics (Leys 2001). Crucially, this leads to a situation in which 
the project involves and is supported by various social groups with a direct interest 
in the realisation of its aims but not strictly sharing the class interests of fi nance capi-
tal: thus, management consultants and marketing specialists fi nd themselves with 
particularly privileged roles to play in neoliberal culture, even though they do not 
enjoy anything like the wealth and authority of, say, private equity fund managers or 
merchant bankers. These are the groups particularly animated by what Boltanski and 
Chiapello call ‘the new spirit of capitalism’ (2005) but it crucial to note that the force 
of this new spirit is such that it sweeps up many in its wake: schoolteachers, stu-
dents, criminals, artists, waitresses and surgeons are all enabled to feel powerful and 
free precisely to the extent that they adopt the creative, expressive, individualistic, 
competitive, manically networking mode of existence typical of those hegemonic 
fractions. Furthermore, there is clearly an ideological dimension to neoliberalism’s 
programme, insofar as it will tend to promote a singular ideology—competitive 
 individualism—as explicitly as it can under given political circumstances.
174 • Anticapitalism and Culture
The most important dimension of this account, however, is clearly that which 
stresses neoliberalism as a hegemonic project. From this point of view, neoliberalism 
is a strategy for the coordination of different elements—ideological, institutional, 
material and social—in the pursuit of its objectives. Now, where this strategy is 
successful, it is so precisely by virtue both of what it makes possible and of which 
possibilities it closes off, what it destroys and what it creates. For example, British 
universities have recently seen a protracted struggle over the attempt to create a true 
market in higher education. This was clearly one of the objectives behind the raising 
of student tuition fees in 2003. However, universities have to date largely subverted 
this aim by simply refusing to set differential fees, instead charging the same fee 
for all courses at all institutions. University administrators, teaching staff and stu-
dents have all protested these ‘reforms’ partly on the grounds that, if successful, they 
would make possible a market in higher education only by making impossible a truly 
collaborative relationship between staff and students. It seems unlikely that, given 
the low levels of political organisation amongst all of these groups, the long-term 
neoliberal objective will be thwarted, but to date the outcome of the attempt has been 
complex, uneven and partial: not a true win for either side. At the time of writing, 
both students and academics are aware of pressure to transform higher education into 
a marketable commodity, but as yet a true market in higher education courses has not 
emerged. The attempt to close off and render impossible the experience of education 
as a collaborative pursuit of a public good and to make possible its full commodifi ca-
tion has not yet wholly succeeded.
Considering the hegemonic project of neoliberalism as uneven in its effects, de-
fi ned by what it makes possible and what it closes off, brings our account of this 
hegemonic project close to another potential term with which to understand neolib-
eralism. Using a term of Deleuze and Guattari’s, we might describe neoliberalism 
as a name for the ‘abstract machine’ of post-Fordist capitalism. An abstract machine 
is a functional diagram of the forces animating a concrete assemblage. Conceiving 
neoliberalism as an abstract machine allows us to avoid any charge of ignoring the 
unevenness and relative failures of the various policies and programmes which are 
generally grouped together under that name, perhaps even better than does conceiv-
ing it as a hegemonic project. Neoliberalism does not manifest itself everywhere in 
the same way, or anywhere in it absolutely pure form. Nonetheless, it has a discern-
ible identity precisely by virtue of the similarity of the operations which it attempts 
across a range of spheres which offer varying degrees of resistance to its ‘cutting 
edges’. The diagram of neoliberalism is easily sketched, delineated as it is by the will 
to generate lines of fl ight which are lines for capital and only for capital: all other 
routes are blocked, all other becomings delegitimated; mobility is only permitted 
precisely to the extent that the object, subject or agent in question (e.g. the student, 
education) can take on the form of capital or the commodity. Again, it is not a mat-
ter of choosing between terms here as much as recognising their different emphases 
and uses. (From this perspective, incidentally, we might say that every successful 
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 hegemonic project produces the abstract machine of an actual assemblage, although 
not every abstract machine is effectuated in the form of a hegemonic project.)
Deploying these two terms in tandem has the advantage of emphasising a number 
of interrelated aspects of neoliberalism and post-Fordism. On the one hand, the idea 
of the hegemonic project emphasises the extent to which political, cultural, social 
and economic changes do not just happen by accident: even though their outcomes 
are unpredictable and their contexts contingent, things like neoliberalism happen in 
part because someone, somewhere wants them to. On the other hand, emphasising 
both the abstract and machinic dimensions of neoliberalism importantly draws our 
attention to the ways in which neoliberalism works very much with the grain of 
capitalism’s most abstract logics. Although capitalism should not be equated with 
commodity-exchange per se, there is no doubt that the creation of new markets and 
the transformation of raw materials, services, ideas and people into tradable com-
modities has been fundamental to all processes of capital accumulation. This is why, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is defi ned by the generalised decod-
ing of fl ows (1983: 224): or, to make a more precise translation from the French, a 
generalised decoding of fl uxes (1972: 265). Unregulated and unopposed, the drive 
to accumulation through commodifi cation will destabilise all fi xed forms, be they 
the natural forms of the material world (which must be re-shaped in manifold ways 
before they can become commodifi ed) or the forms of life of settled communities, 
traditional or modern. In Laclau’s terms, we can therefore say that capitalism tends 
towards the dislocation of all structures (1990: 41–5). More precisely, we might 
say that capitalism amplifi es, intensifi es and deploys the dislocatory potential—the 
dimension of immanent instability2—inherent in any structural situation: any form 
of social life, however apparently fi xed and changeless, will fi nd itself disrupted 
and destabilised by the deterritorialising power of capital, revealing its ultimately ir-
reducible contingency. In fact this is very close to Schumpeter’s famous account that 
described capitalism as a process of ‘creative destruction’ (1954).
Now, this is to some extent only an abstract tendency of capitalism. If left un-
checked, its logical consequence is to destabilise all existing social relations, includ-
ing those relations of power which guarantee the hegemony of powerful groups. 
There is nothing to ensure that today’s successful fi rm will not be overtaken tomor-
row by some new technological innovation, that the children of its chief executives 
will not next week fi nd themselves penniless and without powerful connections. 
There is no certainty that the lifestyles of industrial workers will not be transformed 
by new working practices or by the complete disappearance of their industries. The 
comfortable residents of a suburb may fi nd themselves forced to compete or collabo-
rate with immigrant workers to whom the suburbanites used to consider themselves 
inherently superior. The very ecosystem which sustains life in a region or across a 
whole planet might be disrupted beyond repair by the rapacious exploitation of ir-
replaceable resources. As such, capital, and the many social groups and institutions 
which enter into relationships of various kinds with it, must create varying types of 
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institutional, political and technological arrangement in order to try to stabilise the 
fi eld of social relations, maximising profi ts, enabling capital accumulation to go on 
without its very conditions of possibility being completely undermined.
One of the most infl uential ways of understanding the resultant system was the 
idea of the ‘regime of accumulation’, proposed by the regulation school economists 
(but others would argue that this formulation over-emphasises the extent to which 
capital accumulation must be seen as the basis for the entire formation). A potential 
problem with this concept is that it downplays the full interdependence of the social, 
political and economic elements of a social formation (Laclau 1990). From a post-
Marxist perspective—informed by Laclau and Mouffe, Deleuze and Guattari, or all 
four—we would have to insist on the importance of the desiring investments, identi-
fi cations and counter-identifi cations of the various agencies involved. For example, it 
would be impossible to understand the ways in which British capitalism has evolved 
in relation to its key macro-institutional context—the European Union—without 
understanding the economically irrational attachment of British conservatives to 
the national currency; residue, relic and magical symbol of Britain’s long-lost pre-
 eminence in the mercantile universe. Bearing this in mind, we might best understand 
contemporary post-Fordist capitalism as a complex set of overlapping concretes 
assemblages—contingent arrangements of forces—with neo- liberalism as their ab-
stract machine, always working to pull everything in the direction of the frictionless 
market, even if that means pulling down whatever edifi ce is temporarily housing it. 
Much that we today think of as traditional—the nuclear family, the job-for-life, the 
suburban neighbourhood—is actually a product of the decades of Fordism, which 
created very stable conditions of capital accumulation but kept fi nance capital on 
a tight leash, restricting the range of forms of expression (compare the dazzling popu-
lar modernism of early cinema with the output of Hollywood under the Hayes code 
and the studio system). Neoliberalism has dislocated and destabilised the key sources 
of personal and social identity—family, national media, public institutions—which 
that earlier era consolidated, partly by entering into unstable alliances with the 
desires of many for new modes of becoming (feminists, hippies, jazz musicians, 
bloggers, etc.), while attempting to restrict all of those new modes to new types of 
commodifi able identity.
Neoliberalism: Concrete Assemblage
So at certain levels of abstraction and operation we may conceptualise neoliberalism 
as both abstract machine and hegemonic project. However, this will be an empty 
conceptualisation unless we attend to the specifi cs of its instantiation in particular 
contexts, so it is worth refl ecting now on the specifi cs of how the neoliberal  machine-
project is implemented and actualised in Britain today. At the time of writing, the 
mood in the country is one of considerable anxiety, as fears rise that a very long 
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period of economic prosperity—effectively unbroken since the recession of the early 
1990s—might be coming to an end. The banking crises which have already shaken 
US confi dence have been replicated on a (so far) smaller scale with the run on the 
Northern Rock bank provoked by the revelation that it was heavily exposed in the 
US sub-prime mortgage lending market. More signifi cantly, a small fall in overall 
property prices is provoking fears that the substantial slide in property values wit-
nessed in the United States over the past two years might also be replicated here.
The potential signifi cance of this can hardly be overstated. While rates of home 
ownership in Britain have been steadily increasing since the Second World War, 
the Thatcher government’s policy of deliberately selling off social housing stock 
to tenants at well below market values had the effect of vastly increasing the pro-
portion of middle-income earners with property. This was a brilliant strategic move 
which effectively recruited a large section of the working class—in particular the 
aspirational skilled workers who had been the traditional backbone of the labour 
 movement—to the property-owning classes, at no cost to the elite, and at the same 
time isolated those poorest sections of the population still confi ned to social hous-
ing. By the mid-1990s, population growth, changing patterns of occupation (such 
as households shrinking in size as more and more people live alone) and the impact 
of regulations which restricted building of both social and private housing stock 
all combined to produce a chronic housing shortage. As a result, average property 
values in the United Kingdom have tripled since 1997. Low interest rates and a 
much freer fi nancial regime than that typifying earlier decades have made it easy for 
the majority of adults who own their home to borrow against the increasing value 
of their properties or use various fi nancial instruments to convert the rising market 
value of those properties into cash. The result has been an unprecedented orgy of 
consumer spending, further enabled by the low price of manufactured goods coming 
from China. At the same time, a series of crises have revealed the unreliability and 
instability of pension schemes heavily invested in the stock market. An ageing popu-
lation, unable to rely on secure occupational pensions or generous state provision, 
has increasingly come to see property investment as its only guarantee of security. In 
short, both the immediate spending power and the perceived security of most Britons 
has become largely dependent on the market value of their homes.
This is a fascinating shift in the class dynamics of British society. The property 
boom has created a situation in which, if only temporarily, whole trenches of the 
population have earned more cash income from increased market value of their 
homes (in particular insofar as this is treated as security against cash borrowing) 
than they have from work. Technically, this arguably makes them capitalists, at 
least as long as the situation obtains, which it almost certainly cannot do indefi -
nitely. Even for those citizens to whom this formulation would not apply, the fact 
of being property- owners, with their incomes and their future security tied closely 
to property values and interest rates, clearly alters the social position of these work-
ers in a fundamental way. This, it is worth refl ecting, is what hegemony means in 
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practice: subaltern groups are not merely dominated or duped into consent to the 
existing social relations, but rather they are differentially included in the overall as-
semblage, in a manner which both signifi cantly affects the real dynamics of power 
within it and materially affects the situations of all of its constituent elements.
Of course, access to the new consumer economy is largely through mechanisms 
of so-called cheap credit. The progressive dematerialisation of currency which cha-
racterises the whole history of capitalism reaches a new level here, as credit is ex-
tended to consumers on the basis of the rising market value of a non-productive asset, 
and their willingness to take advantage of that credit in order to facilitate consump-
tion is widely seen as necessary to the health of the entire economy. This is a crucial 
point to understand, because whilst it seems to be more-or-less only this extension 
of buying-power which has so far persuaded large section of the population to acqui-
esce to the wider neoliberal and post-Fordist regime, many aspects of it are highly 
unpopular. At the same time, despite the widespread perception that the market is 
now effectively closed to new entrants—with fi rst-time buyers priced out—and that 
this is a social problem in which government should intervene, it is by no means clear 
that any section of the political elite is prepared for the actual possible consequences 
of a decline in property values. I suggest that such consequences could be dramatic, 
simply because on most indicators, it seems that the British people, like most Euro-
peans, are not very happy with the way in which their society is evolving. My con-
tention, is that it is more or less only the feeling of prosperity created by the ten-year 
property boom and the levels of consumer spending which it has enabled which has 
so far secured the effective acquiescence of the British public to the neoliberal policy 
regime implemented by successive governments for the past thirty years.
What are the signs of this generic discontent? Social research routinely shows a 
general sense of pessimism and discontent with features of life such as ‘work/life 
balance’ (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/apr/08/tonyblair.labour3). There 
is no question that overall average workloads have increased signifi cantly in the past 
twenty years, yet no opinion poll has ever shown a generalised desire for more time 
at the offi ce. In February 2007 a widely covered UNICEF report found the United 
Kingdom to have the unhappiest children in the wealthy world (with the United 
States not far behind), despite the country’s relative affl uence: an outcome generally 
attributed to the culture of long working hours for parents, highly competitive forms 
of individualism and consumerism prevailing in the culture of young people, and to 
high levels of social inequality (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6359363.stm). Shop-
ping, it seems, is the only consolation for an otherwise depressed and discontented 
population.
What about those who are not able to participate in the massive increase in con-
sumer spending which has characterised this period? It is worth noting that while 
overall inequality continues to rise in the United Kingdom, this is partly a func-
tion of the massive increase in wealth enjoyed by those with the most valuable re-
sources. This is typical of a property bubble. The proportion of the population living 
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in  relative poverty has declined slowly but markedly since the shift from the ruthless 
anti-welfarism of the Thatcher years to the more careful and marginally more egali-
tarian programme of New Labour. New Labour has placed a high priority on bring-
ing the unemployed into the labour market and has improved pay and conditions for 
those at the very bottom end of that market. However, it is striking to note that job 
growth has been almost entirely in sectors with weak traditions of unioni sation and 
high proportions of short-term contract work (retail, low-grade IT services, etc.). 
The most striking fact about poverty in the United Kingdom is perhaps the very 
high proportion of the poor who are working women or single parents, on whom the 
burden of childcare and other family responsibilities still largely falls. At the same 
time young men from the poorest backgrounds are suffering disproportionately, with 
high levels of unemployment, high likelihood of involvement in crime, violence, and 
rocketing rates of young male suicide. As in the United States, these factors seem 
to affect young men from ethnic minorities to a disproportionate degree. What these 
various observations show is precisely the extent to which the socially excluded of 
contemporary Britain are precisely those groups least able to adapt to the conditions 
of the highly competitive, highly individualised labour market, in which long years 
of very disciplined and specialised training are required, and dependence upon com-
munity or social institutions is likely to leave participants at a grave disadvantage. 
Such groups are either largely excluded from the consumer economy, or are enabled 
to participate only by subjecting themselves to the long-term penury of unsustain-
able debt, or else they construct a consumer economy of their own. Consider the 
persistence of gangsta culture, which is today the most visible manifestation of the 
collaborative capacities of black youth (once considered the very standard of radical 
collectivity). What is this but an assemblage for the short-circuiting of radical desire? 
It glorifi es a criminal economy, focussed on the drugs markets, which leads many 
of its more innovative and entrepreneurial participants to incarceration. It is infused 
with an ethic of conspicuous consumption and ruthless competition which simply 
mimics in extreme form the offi cial labour market. It strives to ensure that for the 
fi rst time in several generations, the common sense of black youth is not informed 
by a critique of capitalism and racism, but by an acquiescence to the expectations of 
a racist capitalist culture. Given the power of its disjunctive synthesis with the wider 
assemblage of neoliberalism, it is remarkable and noteworthy that so many young 
black men continue to refuse its dictates (c.f. Penn 2007: 163–6).
So we have a situation in which a certain degree of prosperity and personal satis-
faction for a majority of the population accompanies a general dissatisfaction with the 
current possibilities for personal and collective life outside the channels of consumer 
culture, and the general exclusion of those who cannot participate at all on its terms. 
Insofar as the desire of the British can be channelled, confi gured and coded into the 
commodity-form, it is enabled to develop, proliferate and produce almost whatever 
it will. Desire which cannot be manifested in this way—desire for public life, for 
forms of personal experience which depend either on stable forms of collectivity 
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(the experience of community, conviviality and solidarity with one’s neighbours, for 
example) or on freedom from the regime of work (learning to paint without having 
to be a professional artist, taking a stroll by a canal on a weekday afternoon)—is 
curtailed, codifi ed or denied. This is the reality of the neoliberal regime.
The lineaments of this regime fi rst began to appear in the 1970s, as both conser-
vative and labour administrations took reluctant and haphazard steps towards the 
deregulation of labour and fi nancial markets along with curbs on taxation, public-
spending and union power. In the 1980s Margaret Thatcher managed to popularise 
the key elements of this policy agenda by linking council house sales and tax cuts to 
a programme of socially conservative authoritarianism which promised to restore ‘law 
and order’ and curb immigration, articulating a socially authoritarian set of demands 
to a general desire for self-improvement which was codifi ed in wholly individualist 
terms (Hall 1988: 1–92). However, with the decline of so-called traditional social 
values and the success of a liberal agenda on issues such as gay rights and abortion, 
this was no longer a viable strategy, and its continued dependence on it doomed the 
Conservative party to at least twelve years in opposition from 1997. Tony Blair’s 
New Labour government, having fl irted with rhetorical appeals to collectivism, egal-
itarianism and community, in fact went on to intensify the neoliberal programme, in 
particular pursuing an agenda to hollow out the public sector, handing over more and 
more of its functions to private agencies, while actively promoting a re-modelling 
of the relationships between services users and service providers to resemble more 
closely relationships between consumers and service retailers. This programme has 
gone along with a continued resistance to any efforts to regulate the labour market 
beyond the implementation of very minimal wage standards, with British workers 
enjoying some of the lowest levels of protection and security in the developed world. 
The consequence, as we have already noted, has been the emergence of a culture 
of very intense workloads supporting consumption-heavy lifestyles for the affl uent 
and a continued struggle for survival for the less so. While economic inequality and 
social stratifi cation have increased, various indicators of personal happiness have de-
clined across the board, suggesting a population which is overworked, insecure and 
dissatisfi ed. There has been no enthusiasm for the direction of reform in the public 
services, or for the government’s Atlanticist foreign policy.
So what sustains this regime? This is perhaps the key cultural studies question 
to ask of this situation. Conventional political sociology can tell us a good deal. For 
one thing, it can tell us that the British electoral system creates a situation whereby 
the views of affl uent property-owners working in the private sector and living in 
the South of England, far away from the industrial areas where the labour move-
ment was traditionally strongest, are today disproportionately important to the out-
comes of national elections. Conventional political sociology also reveals the almost 
entirely unregulated press sector is dominated by right-wing tycoons with a heavy 
stake in the persistence of a low-tax, low-wage neoliberal regime. What it cannot tell 
us so well, however, is why these comparatively small sections of the population are 
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allowed to set the political agenda so decisively. This is where a distinctively cultural 
analysis is required to answer the age-old question: what leads so many sections 
of a population like that of the United Kingdom to acquiesce to a political regime of 
which they are not the main benefi ciaries? In other words, what persuades them to 
accept a subaltern position in the power dynamics of the country?
This is a complex question requiring a multidimensional answer, part of which 
we have already begun to outline. At the material and affective level, the shift to 
neoliberal post-Fordism has been accompanied by a real alteration in the position of 
large sections of the population. To put it simply, many workers have got a great deal 
of what they wanted from this arrangement: their own homes, cars, foreign holidays, 
cheap clothes, good food from around the world. These are all things which were 
beyond the reach of most British people in 1973 and are now a normal part of major-
ity life. The project to channel all desire through the commodity-cutting machine has 
produced a vast range of often innovative and exciting new commodities to which 
many are genuinely and understandably attached: people love their cars, their games 
consoles and their wardrobes. While radicals may tend to see these as poor substitutes 
for bigger dreams of collective liberation, we would do well not to overlook the sheer 
attractive force of these pleasures. If the cultural populist tendency in cultural studies 
has a message it is this: underestimate at your peril the real affective power, the par-
ticular forms of corporeal affi rmation and non-corporeal transformation (Massumi 
1992: 28–9, 98) made possible by Levis jeans, Barbie dolls and  Nintendo consoles. 
They brought down communism, after all.
Now, at the same time as these real gains are offered to large sections of the pub-
lic, it is clear that they must also be persuaded that this is the best offer available to 
them, that other pleasures could only be achieved at the expense of these ones and 
would not compensate, that ‘there is no alternative’ to neoliberalism that would not 
be worse. To some extent this is the logically necessary function of any discourse 
which animates a hegemonic project. The necessity, normality and inevitability of 
a given course of action and the entire frame of reference which justifi es it must be 
asserted, at times explicitly and at time implicitly. However, against crude simplifi -
cations of hegemony theory, we should emphasise that it will not always be neces-
sary to convince the majority of a population of a particular view of the world in 
order to prosecute such a project successfully. Given a particular balance of forces, 
it may only be necessary to persuade a relatively small section fully, as long as there 
is no clear majority behind any coherent counter-project and as long as institutions 
can be re-shaped successfully in order to determine the limits of behaviour of key 
social actors. To put this latter point more simply: it doesn’t really matter if you 
agree with the discourse of neoliberalism or not, as long as the people running your 
company, school or government agree with it and you are not part of an organised 
movement against it. In such a situation, you will fi nd yourself forced to follow the 
rules of behaviour laid down for you—competing with colleagues, submitting to ap-
praisals, signing short-term contracts—whether you want to or not (this an important 
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 dimension of the ways in which both Althusser and Foucault have conceived institu-
tionalised forms of social power). This is why it has been so crucial for managers and 
communications experts to be wholly recruited by the new spirit of capitalism.
However, this new spirit, as Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) convincingly argue, 
did not only come about as a way to enforce the norms of neoliberalism. In fact, 
they show that it has in part emerged as a real concession to the militant attacks 
on managerialism and conformism which characterised the bohemian radicalism of 
the counter-culture. This is a crucial point to consider. Boltanski and Chiapello are 
concerned primarily with the ways in which the discourse of management-theory 
in the 1990s adopted many of the emphases and affective resonances of the radi-
cal discourse of 1968: although the authors confi ne themselves to French examples, 
this is a phenomenon which is easily observed in equivalent anglophone literature. 
The virtues of untrammelled creativity, autonomous self-organisation and horizontal 
organisation were championed in cutting-edge management theory some time be-
fore hortizonality and networks became buzzwords for the global justice movement. 
However, where some might see this as proof that such ideas, along, in fact with the 
rhizomatic thought of Deleuze and Guattari, are nothing but the obverse of contem-
porary capitalist ideology, Boltanski and Chiapello insist that it has been necessary 
for capitalism to adapt itself in some ways to the demands of those creative, energetic 
sections of the working population who were in the forefront of the events of 1968. 
This chimes somewhat with Toni Negri’s parallel insistence that post-Fordism be un-
derstood as a necessary response on the part of capital to the organisation of militant 
workers and other group-subjects against the discipline and regulation of Fordism 
and its assembly lines, and it is a persuasive line of argument to anyone who thinks 
that anything at all has improved for working people in the West since the 1960s. 
This is a crucial issue for contemporary anti-capitalist thought and action to take on 
board: the challenge before us is to hold onto what remains of the social democratic 
legacy of Fordism, even to extend it, without giving up the libertarian gains of the 
post-Fordist era. It will not be easy.
That it will not be easy is clearly indicated by the fact that the main opposition to 
neoliberal culture today comes not from egalitarian radicals but from various forms 
of authoritarian collectivism. However, this itself is indicative of the relative success 
of the general project of social liberalisation which began with the so-called permis-
sive era of the 1960s. Both legal frameworks and wider social attitudes since that time 
have evolved to constitute a very different cultural climate to that of the previous era. 
In 1978, Margaret Thatcher could speak on British television of her sympathy with 
those native Britons who ‘feared they might be rather swamped by people with a dif-
ferent culture’ and go on to win a general election. In 2004, the right-wing Conserva-
tive party leader Michael Howard sacked a member of parliament for making a racist 
joke at a private dinner. Today there are out gay Members of Parliament representing 
not just the parties of the left, but the Conservative party as well: this would have 
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been unthinkable even at the beginning of the 1990s. This radical shift in attitudes 
has been replicated across most of Western Europe, but it is perhaps one of the most 
striking differences between Europe and the United States that moves towards such 
liberalisation in some quarters there has provoked an extreme conservative reaction 
in others. The reasons for this liberalisation are complex, but the sheer success of 
social liberalism as a political discourse, which has clearly become the hegemonic 
common sense of Western European culture, is at least in part due to its affective 
resonance with the materially individualising processes of neoliberalism’s abstract 
machine. The capitalist tendency towards generalised decoding surely makes it rela-
tively easy, at least for the prosperous, to accept the relativisation of values and the 
proliferation of lifestyles which characterise so-called postmodern culture: why fi ght 
this tendency in defence of a system of fi xed norms and social values which would 
require a great deal of work and desiring-investment to maintain?
Following this line of reasoning, we can see that the neoliberal regime has itself 
intensifi ed a number of ongoing changes to British culture. In particular, the mo-
bilisation of complex and unpredictable fl ows of people which open labour markets 
demand continues to promote the ‘cosmopolitanisation’ (Beck 2006) of the culture. 
Rates of immigration have been at a historic high, suppressing the price of labour at 
the lower end of the social scale and maintaining the high demand for housing. This 
has provoked some anxiety amongst the settled population and sections of the con-
servative press, although how substantial this anxiety is is very hard to judge. There 
is little political support for the far right, and the Conservative party only began to 
recover from its historic slump in opinion polls once it began to distance itself from 
the anti-immigration, ‘law’n’order’ rhetoric of its disastrous 2005 general election 
campaign. There is little evidence of actual racism or crude xenophobia amongst the 
British public outside of some highly marginal poor white communities, and most 
public discourse on the largest group of recent immigrants—Poles—has focussed 
on the benefi ts that a new supply of cheap, skilled manual labour has brought to 
sections of the economy (as would be expected within a vigourously neoliberal con-
text; e.g. Barton 2006). Yet opinion polls routinely show immigration to be a key 
object of public concern. One can conjecture here, with reference to a long and well-
 established literature (e.g. Hall et. al. 1978), that in such circumstances immigra-
tion, like crime, is a often a metonym for a very general, amorphous set of social 
changes over which publics perceive themselves to have no control, rather than des-
ignating any specifi c fear of nameable groups or eventualities. The rhetoric of anti-
 immigration today tends to focus less than it once did on the perceived dangers to the 
racial purity of the nation, or on the inevitability of confl ict between distinct ethnic 
groups, and more on the issue of whether governments are adequately in control of 
their borders. Surely, then, this is what is really at issue here: governments are clearly 
not in control of their borders as they were in an age of regulated markets, industrial 
technology and relatively slow-moving information, and anti-immigration discourse 
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today seems to function more as an expression of displaced nostalgia for the lost ca-
pacity of national governments—and hence, by extension, the national communities 
to whom they were accountable—to determine their own destinies.
This is the reality of globalisation as it is lived by most people in the British 
context, and it is bound up intimately with the individualising tendencies of capital-
ism in general and neoliberalism in particular. Capital’s deterritorialising, decoding 
force tends to disaggregate communities and codify human experience in terms of 
individuals, consumers and competitors (Massumi 1992: 136). Of course, this need 
not lead to libertarian or even liberal political outcomes: one of the consequences 
of a world where people are increasingly mobile and feel less directly connected to 
each other than in the past is that the general fear of strangers can increase, leading 
to authoritarian and even fascistic attempts to contain cultural difference, protect ma-
jorities from minorities and to police the borders and interstices of countries, cities 
and cultures. There are some signs of such attitudes gathering strength in the United 
Kingdom, and they have certainly animated both restrictions on immigration and the 
British  governments participation in the so-called war on terror, which has led to, 
amongst other things, draconian curbs on the right of habeas corpus. More funda-
mentally, however, globalisation and individualisation have combined fundamentally 
to weaken almost all forms of social power other than fi nance capital. Industry, or-
ganised labour, national and local governments, community groups, churches, public 
media outlets, schools, universities, hospitals: almost all have found their general ca-
pacity to act diminish in comparison to the deterritorialised might of fi nance capital, 
whose speculative mobility enables it to decide the fate of national currencies, whole 
populations of workers, global media institutions, and so forth. The consequence 
is a general retreat from politics as such, as collective action— institutional or 
otherwise—seems unable to have any signifi cant bearing upon material outcomes.
Perhaps the most striking symbol of contemporary responses was the public re-
action to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The largest national protest demonstration in 
British history might have been expected to lead to a sustained and vigourous cam-
paign against the most unpopular war in living memory, but the campaign that carried 
on after the February march in London involved few new recruits to oppositional 
politics. The population which was mobilised for the fi rst time in signifi cant numbers, 
Moslem youth, was quickly contained by that traditional neutraliser of British radical-
ism, the Socialist Workers Party. In a manoeuvre which was absolutely typical of its 
thirty-year history, the Socialist Workers Party set up a new political organisation—
the Respect Party—in alliance with various Moslem groups. Having recruited most 
of the newly radicalised groups into the ranks of the new organisation, the Socialist 
Workers Party proceeded to wreck it with their obdurate (but absolutely characteris-
tic) refusal to cooperate with other constituent elements. The result: like peace cam-
paigners in 2004, socialists looking for a an effective electoral strategy for the 2001 
general election, and two generations of anti-racist campaigners before that, a whole 
cohort of young militants found their fi rst experience of politics to be  thoroughly 
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enervating, dispiriting and disillusioning, thanks to the counter- revolutionary genius 
of the Socialist Workers Party’s antipolitics machine. The wider consequence of the 
anti-war movement’s failure—a result of Tony Blair’s self- evident concern to main-
tain the Atlantic alliance irrespective of public opinion—was to further deepen the 
sense of general despair amongst a wide cross section of the public at the possibilities 
of political action. It is no surprise that the holding of the European Social Forum in 
London in 2005, dominated as the organisation was by the Socialist Workers Party, 
has produced no long-lasting effects. If anything, it marked the end of any visible 
anti-capitalist movement in the United Kingdom at all.
Resistance—Opposition—Escape
This, then, is the parlous situation in which the radical left fi nds itself Britain today. 
Almost devoid of the kinds of institutional framework and alternative media networks 
which sustain even the American left, there are very little grounds to believe that any 
kind of anti-capitalist intervention will achieve anything for a generation to come. In 
Laclau’s terms, we could say that the current British political scene is almost entirely 
dominated by ‘institutionalist’ forms of politics (Laclau 2005) which do not admit the 
possibility of real, visible political antagonisms, but instead simply offer to admin-
ister the social sphere according to a technocratic logic of differentiation. No major 
political party, no signifi cant dissident within any such party, no mainstream media 
outlet, no major NGO and only a muted few voices from the labour movement makes 
any kind of explicit critique of neoliberal policy assumptions. The nearest thing to 
a public voice for a critical position is the internal Labour party pressure group Com-
pass, which argues for a moralistic social democratic position that would have been 
considered mainstream, even relatively conservative, in 1975. We might add that this 
torpor and this prevalence of institutionalist politics is typical of a political situation 
in which, broadly speaking, one project is fully hegemonic, the political space almost 
entirely territorialised by a singular machine. This does not mean that there is no 
scope for resistance, escape, invention and disaffi liation, but it does mean that until 
something changes—until some kind of radical dislocation occurs—then such scope 
will be severely restricted. So how can one respond to such a situation?
There are a number of possible responses. One is simply to wait it out. As I have 
already suggested, the current situation is in many ways unstable, in particular given 
its dependence upon an arguably unsustainable property boom. But if a crisis in the 
property market, or a rapid increase in the cost of Chinese-manufactured consumer 
goods, or an intolerable intensifi cation of the effects of climate change, were to dis-
locate the situation, then various political projects other than neoliberalism would 
be presented with an opportunity to assert themselves. Unfortunately, there can be 
little doubt that, given such an eventuality, it is some kind of authoritarian conserva-
tism that would be the most likely victor. In any situation of political crisis (radical 
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 dislocation/deterritorialisation), various discourses compete to offer an account of 
the situation which can recruit enough of the population to win control of the political 
space (hegemonising/deterritorialising it). For example, the success of the Christian 
right in the United States in part must be understood as a consequence of evangelical 
Christianity’s capacity to explain the various social changes which poor and middle-
class rural whites were affected by in terms which were more appealing and no less 
convincing than any available alternative; offering an optimistic narrative which cast 
God-fearing Americans as the heroes of a simple struggle against evil. Up until the 
1950s the American left might still have offered many of the rural poor a radical social 
explanation for their woes and fears, drawing on the history and vocabulary of agrar-
ian populism, although evangelical Christianity and biblical literalism were already 
strong elements of vernacular culture at that time. With the fi nal rout of the popular 
left in the 1950s, and in particular with the recruitment of leading evangelists to the 
cause of fanatical anti-communism, evangelical conservatism was simply left as the 
only explanatory narrative which differed at all from that originating with the urban 
elites; and the elite urban story simply told the rural citizenry that they were back-
wards and should learn to accept that modernisation meant liberalisation. This is a 
grossly simplifi ed account (see Grossberg 2005 for a far more sophisticated one), but 
it should suffi ce to illustrate the fact that the conditions which enable a discourse such 
as evangelical conservatism to hegemonise a dislocated space are many and com-
plex. They involve the possibilities for affective resonance between various subject- 
groups and various political assemblages, as well as the sheer strength of the physical 
resources available to the various competitors. In a post-neoliberal Britain, which 
discourses and affective assemblages would be the ones most likely to succeed in 
promoting and replicating themselves at the expense of their competitors? Surely 
the initial advantage would be with those variants of neo-conservatism which can 
resonate with the xenophobia (literally ‘fear of strangers’) which neoliberalism itself 
helps to generate, which are already inserted into the wider global assemblage of 
the US-led ‘war on terror’ and which would be widely supported by the conserva-
tive press. In such a case, the press and capital will almost always work in parallel to 
promote the success of an authoritarian and anti-democratic set of responses. At the 
same time, the materially produced reality of everyday life under neoliberalism gen-
erates an affective fi eld which easily resonates with such responses, as it often com-
pels its subjects to experience fear and isolation whether they want to or not. Under 
such circumstances, there can be little doubt that some form of conservatism would 
have the best chance of winning the struggle to hegemonise and territorialise the dis-
located situation. If this is not to happen, then radical democrats and anti- capitalists 
will have to mobilise some other discourses, some alternative stories, which have 
greater affective pull for signifi cant numbers of people than do those of authoritarian 
conservatism.
Of course, from one point of view, this might not matter at all. If we abjure any 
notion of a society as a totality, then can’t we hope simply to evade capture by the 
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capitalist or state machines, plotting our own lines of fl ight and becoming, living 
minoritarian in the margins and interstices of whatever assemblages we encounter? 
Well . . . no. For it is precisely the fact that society does not amount to a coherent 
totality with a clear centre that makes it impossible to think in terms of margins. As 
Hardt and Negri point out, Empire has no outside (2000: xiv): but that also means 
that it has no perimeter. The abstract machine of neoliberalism cannot be simply 
evaded, because its cutting edges are not simplistically located in time or space, 
instead constituting a set of modes for the actualisation of specifi c potentials under 
specifi c circumstances, which will not allow for any such tactic of evasion. It can 
only be submitted-to or contested, although the nature of its contestation will al-
ways be local and specifi c to a situation. To put this another way: you can run and 
hide, in your commune, squat, art gallery, laboratory or university department, but 
neoliberalism will fi nd you soon enough. If you don’t want to be deterritorialised 
and recodifi ed by it, then you had better start looking for allies with which to form 
a ‘war-machine’ against it (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 351–423). From this perspec-
tive, then, the task will always be to try to identify points of potential convergence 
between the radical desire to break down all concentrations of power, in particular 
those manifested in the freedom and authority of corporations and fi nancial institu-
tions, and the more immediate desires, hopes and fears of those who do not spontane-
ously identify themselves with any radical political project.
There are at least two ways to conceptualise the analytical task which such a strat-
egy demands. One, derived from Laclau’s framework, is to think in terms of the need 
to identify potential points of antagonism between currently hegemonic projects and 
widely shared sets of popular aspiration and assumption. In other words, to ask the 
question, where in contemporary culture do we fi nd hopes, fears and beliefs which 
can be brought into direct confrontation with the implicit assumptions of neoliber-
alism? How could they be articulated into a common front with radical ideas and 
movements, avoiding their articulation to conservative and authoritarian alternatives? 
How could contemporary desires and discontents be connected and translated into 
a coherent set of democratic demands (Laclau 2005: 125–8) which would present 
a positive alternative to neoliberalism? Now, there is a very important point to make 
here. From Laclau and Mouffe’s perspective, all identities (political, social, cultural, 
physical) are constitutively relational: they depend upon the network of terms within 
which the given identity is just one position. Any alteration in this network of terms, 
this set of relations, will therefore alter the identity of every component, however 
marginally. This applies to the hegemonic components just as much as any others. 
So any alliance or coalition between different social groups, projects, individuals or 
ideas will partially alter the identity of all those involved, including the so-called 
leading elements. In short: those who want to organise counter- hegemonies must be 
prepared to lose their own identities in the process.
Another way to conceptualise this issue is in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s logic 
of becoming. Keep in mind that Deleuze and Guattari work from the assumption 
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that everything that exists is always in a state of relative fl ux, that everything (peo-
ple, nations, political organisations, buildings, oxygen, water, stars, cells) is only 
ever in a condition of relative stasis, and that understanding anything is in part a 
 matter of understanding the precise level of stability of it and its various aggregate 
parts, relative to all the others and to their own current, past and potential-future 
states. They deploy the concept of becoming to denote a space of transition/ 
undecidability between  potential states. When two terms, groups or individuals 
enter into some kind of relation, from this point of view, an interference-pattern is 
set up between them which marks the real emergence of something new, something 
not defi ned solely by either term or by some predictable approximation or aver-
age of the two. So for Deleuze and Guattari, the question of how terms relate to 
each other is always also the question of what it means to move from one state to 
another:
A point is always a point of origin. But a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, 
departure nor arrival, origin nor destination; to speak of the absence of an origin, to make 
the absence of an origin the origin, is a bad play on words. A line of becoming has only 
a middle. The middle is not an average; it is fast motion, it is the absolute speed of move-
ment. A becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle. A becoming 
is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the border or line 
of fl ight or descent running perpendicular to both. If becoming is a block (a line-block), it 
is because it constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man’s land, a non-
localizable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into 
the proximity of the other—and the border-proximity is indifferent to both contiguity and 
to distance. The line or block of becoming that unites the wasp and the orchid produces a 
shared deterritorialisation: of the wasp, in that it becomes a liberated piece of the orchid’s 
reproductive system, but also of the orchid, in that it becomes the object of an orgasm in 
the wasp, also liberated from its own reproduction. (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 293)
Famously, they undertake a consideration of these issues by imagining what it 
might mean to undertake the sorcerous enterprise of trying to become a dog:
An example: Do not imitate a dog, but make your organism enter into composition with 
something else in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed 
will be canine as a function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proxim-
ity, into which they enter. (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 274)
Brian Massumi offers an excellent and highly relevant refl ection on this idea:
It rarely happens that becoming-other pivots on a single body. Most becoming-others 
are initiated by preexisting populations who develop a collective sensitivity to the molar 
constraints applied to them and join to counter-actualize them. Becoming can only pro-
liferate with carefully formulated group strategies (whether the group is yet to come or 
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is already here—and it is preferably both). Becoming-other is thoroughly political. The 
social movements of Blacks, aboriginals, feminists, gays and lesbians—of groups rel-
egated to sub-Standard conditions—provide far better frames of reference than Standard 
Man alone. (Massumi 1992: 102–3)
What does all this abstraction mean for us? In effect, it means the following: 
any counter-hegemonic politics, which seeks ultimately to displace the hegemony of 
neoliberalism, must try to plot vectors of potential becoming which do not merely 
subsume one set of identities or demands into another. What must be sought are 
both affective resonances and potential points of symbolic and discursive articula-
tion between existing groups, sentiments, ideas and discourses, but also processes 
of exploration and invention which might allow unpredictable new becomings to 
emerge. The question then, of course, is where might we fi nd the resources with 
which to actualise such a project?
Resource of Hope: Political Ecology
Well, it is worth considering what successes radical politics has had in the past de-
cade or so3. Since the early 1990s, arguably the only issues on which forces to the 
left of New Labour have achieved anything at all have been a series of ecological 
campaigns, the most notable success being the campaign against the production and 
marketing of genetically modifi ed food in the fi rst years of this decade. The most vis-
ible, and temporarily successful, manifestation of a coherent, original radical project 
was Reclaim the Streets’s brief period of high-profi le activism and widespread pub-
lic sympathy in the mid 1990s (see Chapter 3). Now, these are important examples, 
because they point to a deep and not altogether surprising vein of popular sentiment 
in the United Kingdom, particularly in England, organised around a sentimental at-
tachment to the pastoral ideal of the country as a green and pleasant land. Histori-
cally, of course, this is an almost entirely artifi cial artefact (Boyne 1993). The United 
Kingdom was the fi rst country in the world to go through the industrial revolution, 
to see a majority of its population living in towns and cities, and to achieve the kinds 
of population density typical of urban modernity. The cliché of pastoral England was 
largely invented in the 1890s and 1900s and was always a politically polyvalent con-
struction. Partly, it was part of the broader mobilisation of a conservative imperialist 
imaginary, portraying the English to themselves as a nation of rural quietists, against 
the threat of socialist radicalisation spreading from the industrial centres of Man-
chester, Sheffi eld and Leeds. Up until this time, the English had seen themselves, and 
been widely seen abroad, as in the vanguard of industrial, scientifi c, liberal moder-
nity (Perkin 1969). So it was partly the need to win support for the project of the Brit-
ish Empire, which by this time was diverting a good portion of the national resources 
and manpower, and to stave off the threat posed by the new wave of trade-union 
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militancy centred on the organisation of dock-workers, that led to the mobilisation of 
this stereotypical idea of Englishness. On the other hand, socialist romantics such as 
Ruskin and Morris were equally instrumental in articulating this structure of feeling, 
as an imagined pre-modern idyll became the standard against which the deprivations 
of modern urban life could be judged and found wanting.
This was, in Foucault’s terms, a classic struggle over power-knowledge: those 
with the capacity to do so used newspapers, music-halls, popular and classical music, 
sentimental literature, public events and various national occasions to articulate com-
peting defi nitions of normative ‘Englishness’ which were quiet different from that 
which had prevailed earlier and which necessarily shared certain key traits. These 
discourses worked to create what Laclau and Mouffe call ‘chains of equivalence’ 
between the idea of Englishness and an ideal of rurality, but they differed precisely as 
to whether they included social deference, bucolic conservatism and abject imperial-
ism in this chain, or whether they instead linked English pastoralism to a romantic 
and utopian ideal of a society free of exploitation, with ideals of craft, beauty and 
naturalness at its heart. These discourses competed not just through what they said 
and depicted, but through the affects that they mobilised and the way that they or-
ganised bodies in space, and it was on this level that the conservative version won 
out. Sentimentality, self-righteousness and a romantic attachment to the understated 
southern English landscape were all present in older elements of English culture, 
going back to the early middle ages, but it was the power of this discourse/machine 
to assemble them and to discipline bodies to make them resonate with its particular 
harmony—through the new public rituals centred on the monarchy, the jingoism of 
the music hall and organisations such as the Boy Scouts and related reforms in the 
military and in education—which made it so successful, preparing the British work-
ing classes to be slaughtered en masse in the Great War that would soon follow.
As Foucault has argued, however, even conservative discourses can be reappro-
priated and mobilised against regimes of power under the right circumstances, and 
it seems that where a sentimental, conservationist aesthetic can be articulated to a 
militant project, it can also sometimes succeed in mobilising the British in unex-
pected ways. It is worth refl ecting that the most popular work of fi ction in the English 
language, by a very long way, is J.R.R. Tolkien’s fantasy epic The Lord of the Rings. 
Taking into account the phenomenal sales of theses books along with the success of 
the recent fi lm adaptations, one clearly has to see this as the kind of phenomenon that 
cultural studies must try to explain and to learn from. Anyone who takes the time to 
study these texts will fi nd a curious phenomenon. Tolkien’s tales of aristocratic in-
transigence and feudal loyalty in the face of undifferentiated evil are set in a mythical 
world which is more-or-less precisely what Northern Europe would have looked like 
if all technological and social change had simply stopped around 1100. One notice-
able aspect of Tolkien’s fantasy is the extraordinary longevity of the political and 
dynastic formations which compose Middle Earth. Blood lines and city states last 
not for decades or centuries but for centuries or millennia. The nature of the fantasy 
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is clear: imagine if the very first glimmerings of modernity has never been seen 
in the mercantile cities of Italy, if instead, the technical and social forms of the early 
middle ages had simply remained more-or-less static ever since, what would the world 
be like? It would be like Tolkien’s Middle Earth. Of course, his is a world peopled 
with elves, dwarves, goblins and wizards, but that is much how people in eleventh-
century Northern Europe seem to have imagined their own universe. At the affec-
tive and experiential level, to live in Middle Earth is to live in England or Denmark 
some time immediately before the appearance of the very fi rst signs of  modernity-to-
come, safe in the knowledge that it never will. The critic Patrick Curry has actually 
argued for The Lord of the Rings as an ecological fable, to be welcomed as largely 
progressive in an age when green thinking is the most radical form of opposition to 
remorseless post-industrial capitalism (1997). Certainly it is possible to read this 
into much of the imagery and language of the story (in particular when a race of 
sentient trees destroy the fortress-factory-barracks of the evil wizard Saruman). But 
it is also possible to read more sinister implications into the fact that the story is 
peopled with dark-skinned and ‘swarthy’ multitudes who are always harbingers of 
evil: the mute humans from the hated ‘South’ and sub-human, pseudo-proletarian 
‘Orcs’ leave little room for positive interpretation. No wonder that the book was 
condemned by Michael Moorcock as implicitly fascist (1978) and is popular with 
members of the extreme Right. However, it is also popular with hippies and radical 
greens like Curry. The lesson would seem to be that this sentimental scepticism to-
wards modernity in general, which tends to take on a conservationist and ecological 
hue, is a very powerful element of English culture, but that it can be articulated to, 
or territorialised and activated by, progressive or reactionary forces, depending on 
the circumstances and the outcomes of particular struggles. The question then is how 
to go about trying to set up such possibilities for the future, actualising the radical 
potential in English conservationism and counter-actualising its potential to translate 
into narrow-minded defensiveness.
The implication of this analysis is that the basic intuition of Reclaim the Streets—
that the key to promoting an English anti-capitalism lay in articulating it to ecologi-
cal conservatism, and to a critique of the logic of privatisation which the car culture 
embodies—remains a brilliant one. The project of Reclaim the Streets was precisely 
to create a discursive and affective link between resistance to the destruction of an-
cient woodlands, the explicitly social and public pleasures of carnival, critique of 
the wider logic of social privatisation, the desire for alternatives to the commodi-
fi cation and competition embodied in the individualised culture of ‘automobility’ 
(Featherstone, Thrift & Urry 2005), and a general critique of neoliberal capitalism 
as such. Perhaps the only mistake that Reclaim the Streets made was to move too 
fast, much too fast, on a line of fl ight that took it away from the counter-molarity 
that it was in the process of gathering against neoliberal hegemony. Perhaps if its 
rhizomatic network of localised, molecular connections to other sites—to campaigns 
against the privatisation of local services, for example—had been given time to grow 
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denser, more fruitful, more dynamic, then it could have imparted some of this speed 
to a wider fi eld of forces, creating a much more effective ‘war machine’ against its 
enemies. This would have involved what Gramsci calls a ‘war of position’ (1971): 
precisely, a rhizomatic extension of resistant conjunctive and disjunctive syntheses 
(Massumi 1992: 47–57), rather than a sudden rush for victory. But instead Reclaim 
the Streets limited its efforts to the attempt to detonate a spontaneous overfl ow of de-
sire. This never works, precisely because, as Deleuze and Guattari themselves insist, 
desire is always assembled. Anti-capitalists need rhizomes, but they need them in the 
form of relatively rhizomatic assemblages—that is, networks of institutions—not 
just empty fl ows of utopian urgency.
In a purely speculative vein, we might suggest that the impending ecological 
 crisis is the material factor most likely to render neoliberalism unsustainable in the 
long term. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee, nor even any great likelihood, that 
a post-neoliberal response to the crisis will produce a more desirable regime than 
the current one. The obvious solution to a situation of radical social and ecological 
dislocation might well be an authoritarian, centralising, militaristic extension of state 
power without any renewal of democratic control over/within/beyond/against state 
institutions. This is one reason why libertarians who are sceptical of the value of de-
mocracy and its ‘majoritarian’ politics (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 108) should none-
theless wish to ally themselves to the project to extend, renew and proliferate forms 
of democratic engagement: the alternative will not be freedom-from-belonging, but 
domination at the hands of an eco-totalitarian state. From this point of view, the 
ongoing project to articulate English ecological sentiment with radically democratic 
politics will be an urgent task. Curry’s Tolkien-as-eco-warrior reading-machine and 
Reclaim the Streets’s simultaneous invocation of a public, a democracy, a people and 
a planet to come (Derrida 1994) might yet have much to teach us here.
Resource of Hope—The Cosmopolitan Vision
The attentive reader might have noticed the quiet sidestep from discussing the British 
situation to discussing the English one in the preceding pages. This is not an issue 
which we have time to dwell on in any detail, but it is worth refl ecting on the multi-
national nature of Britain and its political implications. In recent years, an ambivalent 
nationalism has made itself felt in the two main Celtic components of the United 
Kingdom: Wales and Scotland. In fact the Scottish Nationalist Party has recently taken 
control of Scotland’s national parliament for the fi rst time. I call this nationalism ‘am-
bivalent’ because, while commentators such as Tom Nairn have long predicted the 
eventual ‘break-up of Britain’ (1977), there is relatively little support for full national 
independence in Scotland and virtually none in Wales. Rather, the trend has been to 
greater federal autonomy for these regions, while retaining the structures of the union 
fi rmly intact. This is good news for the Labour party, which would be fi nished as 
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a political entity if either of those countries did leave the United Kingdom: Scotland 
and Wales have long been key centres of support for it. Interestingly, both the Welsh 
and Scottish nationalist parties advocate and pursue policies well to the left of New 
Labour, and the national identities of these countries are strongly marked by the sense 
that they are more egalitarian and collectivist in their outlooks, more forward- thinking 
in their commitments to democracy, ecology and social liberalism than the stodgy, 
self-centred, slow-witted English. While there are those who argue that an equiva-
lent, positive English nationalism is the only way for the left to move forward on the 
postmodern terrain of particularist identity politics (Bragg 2007), this seems to me to 
be an utterly utopian proposition, which ignores the very deep entrenchment of indi-
vidualist thinking in English culture (Macfarlane 1978) and the historical dependence 
of the British labour movement on its ‘Celtic’ components, including the Irish im-
migrants who helped to make the English labour movement in cities like Manchester 
in the early nineteenth century (Thompson 1963). There surely seems to be a better 
chance of articulating a radical Britishness by generating a resonant fi eld between 
the positive poles of the new Celtic nationalisms, the democratic elements of English 
pastoralism and the striking vernacular cosmopolitanism which has become central to 
the self-image of London, the nation’s ever-expanding capital, in recent years. These 
might yet become the coordinates of a new ‘mattering map’ of Britain, to borrow a 
phrase from Lawrence Grossberg (1992: 398): a ‘structure of feeling’ (Williams 1977) 
which can subtly redefi ne the affective and political priorities of twenty-fi rst-century 
British identity in a way which allows us as much as possible of its potential for prolif-
erating, molecular invention and becoming to express itself, without simply deterrito-
rialising the country entirely, dissolving it into the fl ows of transatlantic fi nance capital 
(which is certainly one of Britain’s possible fates within the foreseeable future).
The sources of and evidence for this vernacular cosmopolitanism are easy to see. 
Explicit racism is rarely encountered in contemporary London, and an extraordi-
nary range of communities live and mingle in the city (Nava 2007). The idea that 
this is explicitly something to be proud of is a powerful element of public and 
popular discourse. The offi ce of the mayor of London has sponsored on ongoing 
campaign—‘One London’ (http://www.london.gov.uk/onelondon/campaign/index.
jsp) —celebrating the idea of London as a city characterised by the productive and 
peaceful coexistence of multiple ethnic communities, and in 2007 two comedians 
undertook a campaign ‘to prove that London is the most cosmopolitan city in the 
world and therefore we think the best city in the world’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/england/london/6705871.stm). While Stuart Hall has rightly pointed out 
that deep inequalities and complex forms of geo-cultural segregation continue to 
characterise life in the capital—disappointingly for those who hoped that vernacu-
lar cosmopolitanism might mean take a more egalitarian form (Hall 2004)—it is 
not clear that this means that vernacular cosmopolitanism has not arrived at all (Gil-
roy 2004a). Cosmopolitanism and egalitarianism do not necessarily imply each other 
as virtues. Cosmopolitanism implies a tolerance of diversity, and there is nothing in 
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such tolerance to guarantee that social inequalities should be an object of concern. 
Rather, articulating cosmopolitanism with egalitarianism might be a precise political 
task facing radical democrats today.
Indeed, this is surely the aim of a number of key writers on these topics of re-
cent times. Jacques Derrida evokes the world’s many traditions of hospitality—the 
welcome extended to the stranger—in order to think through what a cosmopolitan 
ethic might mean today. Invoking a Levinasian ethic of infi nite responsibility to the 
Other, Derrida calls for an ethics of unlimited hospitality to the strangers who might 
arrive on our shores and on our streets (2001). In a similar vein, Paul Gilroy calls 
for a ‘planetary humanism’ as the political ethic for the twenty-fi rst century (Gilroy 
2004b). Hardt and Negri go further, if anything, positing the removal of all border 
controls affecting freedom of movement for people as one of the key demands of 
their imagined global radicalism, expressive of the multitude’s freedom and will to 
democracy (2000: 396–400; 2004: 268–358). This is an interesting position, mani-
fested in the activities of the No Borders Network (http://www.noborder.org/ ) whose 
constituent members and groups campaign for freedom of movement and for the 
rights of refugees of asylum-seekers everywhere.
One objection which might be made to these libertarian positions is that the mo-
bility of migrants is rarely chosen and rarely benefi ts their new neighbours. To put 
matters very crudely, immigration to the United Kingdom has been encouraged in 
recent years as a way to keep the price of labour low and the demand for accom-
modation (and hence the price of property) high, not because of any ethical im-
perative to welcome the stranger: the UK government has never had any qualms 
about brutalising those potential refugees unlikely to contribute signifi cantly to the 
workforce. While this benefi ts property-owners secure enough to feel unthreatened 
by new neighbours—happy to employ the services of cheap and competent build-
ers, plumbers and cleaners from Eastern Europe—and social groups comfortable 
enough to enjoy the proliferating range of new cuisines that immigrant groups al-
most always make available (where I live in North-East London, one can purchase 
West African, South African, Jamaican, North Indian, Keralan, Kashmiri, Nepalese, 
Turkish, Greek, Algerian, Japanese, Cantonese, Thai, Malaysian, Szechuan, Polish, 
Jamaican, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Italian, American and English food, within a few 
minutes walk of home: this is by no means atypical), it brings less tangible benefi ts 
to those established populations who must compete for low-paid work and afford-
able accommodation with the new arrivals. Access to high-quality public services, 
especially schooling, is notoriously poor for the residents of those areas most heavily 
populated by poor immigrants. This does not mean that I am about to argue for im-
migration controls, merely that those of us who oppose them must keep in mind the 
full complexity of the situation.
Now, as I have already indicated, the public response to this is ambivalent: 
a mixture of growing unease with the apparently unplanned and uncontrolled na-
ture of cultural change and an increasing sense that classical racism is a residual 
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 sentiment, inappropriate to the twenty-fi rst century. Anxiety around immigration 
does not necessarily translate into antipathy towards minority ethnic groups who 
are well- established as neighbours and co-citizens, but rather tends to focus on the 
shadowy threats posed by ‘immigration’ (never ‘immigrants’), ‘asylum-seekers’ and 
‘terrorism’. But I do not make these remarks in order to justify anti- immigration 
policies or rhetoric in any way. Rather, I think that the situation demonstrates the 
inadequacy of any simple appeal to cosmopolitan virtues of cultural tolerance if an 
authoritarian xenophobia is not to be allowed to fl ourish. Cosmopolitan virtues can 
easily articulate to a liberal individualism which quickly becomes defensive once 
strangers are perceived to be a threat rather than a resource for one’s material pros-
perity. An egalitarian ethic of hospitality, a general recognition of the global right to 
mobility, can only be promoted on the basis of what we might call an ethic of soli-
darity which extends beyond the immediately known community. But cosmopolitan 
solidarity might not best be thought of as an ethic so much as an aesthetic. It’s poten-
tial resources are to be found not in abstract notions of justice and responsibility but 
in the visceral pleasures which ‘cosmopolitanisation’ makes possible, from eating 
to dancing to lovemaking. That the British visibly do take such pleasure, as demon-
strated by the continued vibrancy of Britain’s contribution to the sonic culture of the 
‘Black Atlantic’ (Gilroy 1993), by the popularity of Indian food (a bigger industry 
than steel in the United Kingdom) and by the relatively high rates of ethnic intermar-
riage in the United Kingdom, is one potential resource for any attempt to plot radical 
democratic futures for the United Kingdom.
Resource of Hope—The Creativity of the Multitude
Of course, such pleasures do not have any simple meaning or effect. They can easily 
be codifi ed by the logic of consumerism, made the basis for a comfortable lifestyle in 
which so-called exotic pleasures distract from the reality of exploitation, in particular 
in those parts of the world where most actual production now takes place. On the 
other hand, the growing interest in fair trade and ethical consumption indicates the 
extent to which even such codifi cation can itself become a site of contested politici-
sation (Littler 2008). At the same time, this double-potential seems to be manifested 
across a range of emergent sites in contemporary culture. For example, any idea that 
the current scene is simply characterised by the breaking of social bonds and the 
prevalence of individualised anomie is problematised by a range of other develop-
ments. Most strikingly, the exponential growth in social-networking services and au-
tonomous media-distribution sites (MySpace, Facebook, YouTube) might well seem 
to mark a new era of collective creativity and global networking, of voluntarily com-
munities not bounded by locality or even identity. In fact, Boltanski and Chiapello 
argue that the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ is not simply individualistic in nature, but 
rather promotes an ideal of personhood which emphasises the value of being multiply 
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connected to as many different points, people and projects as possible, as long as 
those projects have some chance of success. This ‘connexionist’ ideology demands 
not simply individuality, but a particular kind of fl exibility and openness, as well as a 
certain ruthlessness: the successful networker has to know where and when to make 
and substantiate connections, as well as where and when to cut and run from connec-
tions that will only absorb precious time and attention without profi t (Boltanski & 
Chiapello 2005: 459–66). Boltanski and Chiapello wrote their fascinating study 
before the rise of Facebook and MySpace, but certain features of the culture around 
these sites seem to bear out their hypothesis perfectly. One of the most obvious fea-
tures of these sites is the extent to which users are encouraged to compete to list the 
most ‘friends’ on their profi le pages. This is surely the ideology of connectivity at its 
most obvious: a neurotic obsession with the quantity of connections with almost no 
regard to their quality.
Actually, it would be too glib to draw this analogy without further qualifi cation. 
The management literature which Boltanski and Chiapello base their arguments 
on clearly does advise its readers to judge the quality of their connections and to 
eliminate the poor quality ones, although in this case quality is a function of the effi -
ciency and profi tability of the projects which connection can generate rather than the 
substantial quality of the relationships themselves. At the same time, Boltanski and 
Chiapello are only two amongst a number of recent commentators (Castells 1996; 
Terranova 2004) to observe that the morphology of networks is critical to the opera-
tion of contemporary power relationships. In post-Fordist global capitalism, so the 
argument goes, power differentials are precisely a function of the relative density of 
networks. Those nodes in the global web of relationships which have the most links 
to others—powerful governments, corporations such as Microsoft, and so forth—are 
the points where the most power is concentrated. Perhaps we might bring all of these 
observations together to observe that in the network society, multiple links are an 
immediate resources advantage for any individual or institution, and the emphasis on 
friends in the world of MySpace and Facebook manifests an implicit understanding 
of this reality, but the effective activation of those links requires a degree of skill, 
discretion, fl exibility and ruthlessness which is typical of the post-Fordist capitalist, 
but not necessarily typical of the MySpace user.
What this discussion brings to our attention is the problem inherent in any simplis-
tic valorisation of rhizomes. It’s clear enough that today, not just radical movements, 
or creative networks, organise themselves through dispersed, de-centred, horizontal 
networks. Today capital organises itself this way too. Perhaps, to some extent, it 
always did (Braudel 1984). So there can be no question of simply preferring rhi-
zomes to trees. From any kind of political perspective, it is necessary to distinguish 
between different types of rhizome, different deployments of rhizomatic technique. 
In fact, this is much what Hardt and Negri have undertaken to do with their account 
of ‘Empire’ confronting ‘Multitude’. From their viewpoint, Empire is always para-
sitic upon the creativity of multitude. To put this another way, the rhizomes which 
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capital has to create in order to remain competitive are only ever reactive, negative, 
attempts to ‘capture’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 424 –73), commodify and regulate 
the complex, unpredictable, unmappable creativity of the rhizomes which workers, 
artists— everyone, in fact—are always in the process of generating. Following this 
line, we might see the social-network universe as both an embodiment of the poten-
tial for new, dynamic forms of culture in which production (of music, fi lms, ideas, 
subjectivities, etc.) is always clearly social and always initially outside of the circuits 
of commodity fetishism, and a site of struggle between multitude and the forces that 
will seek to codify its desire, activating neoliberalism’s abstract machine wherever 
possible.
In November 2007, Facebook launched a new ‘viral’ marketing system whereby 
advertisers could make use of the detailed information which the site holds about 
users and their activities in order to target advertising directly at individual users. 
Having established a global community of users, many of whom are now highly 
dependent upon the site for their social lives, Facebook intends to make use of this 
captive market, segmenting it, classifying it, codifying its components according to 
a logic of identity which is amenable to neoliberal capitalism’s logic of relentless 
commodifi cation. This draws our attention to a very interesting question about the 
possibilities for collectivity, community and sociality in the new networked world. 
For while this context may offer us the opportunity to develop friends, contacts 
and allies all around the globe, it may at the same time encourage us only to make 
contact with those with whom we share some specifi c interest or belief. Consider 
the ancient ideal of the cosmopolis, the ‘universal city’ as a meeting point for all cul-
tures and people’s, promoting an attitude of worldly tolerance and urbanity (Donald 
1996). Now, consider that this ideal is to some extent dependent on the assump-
tion that the members of the city’s multifarious communities will fi nd themselves 
forced to share the space of the city. Some co-mingling, some substantial interaction 
would thereby be inevitable. What becomes possible in the world of the web—and 
perhaps also in a postmodern metropolis—is that this compulsion to share space 
is no longer in place: it can be escaped easily, and one is able simply to seek out 
those with whom one already feels a close affi nity. Rather than a universal culture, 
the result might be a culture in which the particularistic logic of identity governs the 
entire fi eld. We might see the emergence and dissemination of the most violent and 
paranoid forms of Islamic militancy in just these terms: the internet has allowed iso-
lated individuals and communities to enter into a global community obsessed with 
the paranoid–suicidal defence of its own identity, cut off from all engagement with 
the diverse communities who make up the actual neighbourhoods that they inhabit. 
In such an instance, the network becomes a site at which becoming is shut down, 
or channelled along only the most murderous and futile line of fl ight: becoming-
bomb. However, Hardt and Negri’s gambit is to argue that such logics are really 
secondary to the virtual reality of Multitude, as are the logics of commodifi cation, 
market-segmentation and  individualisation. For Hardt and Negri the actualisation 
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of Multitude’s true potential would involve a certain becoming-universal of every 
singularity in the achievement of true democracy: ‘the rule of everyone by every-
one’ (2004: 247).
Whether or not we think that this gambit is likely to succeed, we can see this 
confl ict between rhizomatic creativity and imperial logic operating at other sites as 
well. Consider the enormous popularity of celebrity culture and reality TV. There 
can be little doubt that pop cultural histories of this decade will remember the rise 
of Big Brother and American Idol as emblematic of the times. The most obvious 
way to understand these phenomena is as dramatisations of the ideological norms of 
neoliberalism. The ideology of competitive individualism—the idea that the normal, 
desirable mode by which individuals relate to each other is as competitors rather 
than collaborators—is the core tenet of neoliberal discourse. The attempt to force 
all behaviour and all becoming to conform with this template is an axiomatic opera-
tion of the neoliberal machine. What is on offer for the victors of these game shows 
is nothing more or less than fame itself, or at least, a greatly enhanced opportunity 
to achieve ‘celebrity’ status. And what is a celebrity apart from the most individu-
alised model of the successful networker? The celebrity is connected, is recognised, 
has privileged access to those who are even better connected; but unlike the ideal 
networker, they are fi xed in the public eye, stereotyped, type-cast, locked in by the 
individualist logic of ‘faciality’ (Gilbert 2004c). However, there is another side to 
this story. Much of the public commentary on Big Brother in the United Kingdom 
dwells on the dubious ethics of the various stratagems which the producers of the 
show engage in in order to generate confl ict and intensify competition between the 
house-mates. Often it seem that, left to their own devices the housemates would 
collaborate and cooperate throughout the run of the series (who wouldn’t?). What is 
frequently evident, then, is how far the producers (those embodied representatives of 
the New Spirit of Capitalism) have to go in order to impose their model of the social 
as a spontaneous site of individualised, competitive confl ict on an otherwise peace-
ful scene. Furthermore, surely a key reason for the popularity of shows like these 
is the opportunity they offer the audience to participate: to form opinions, to share 
opinions, to voice opinions, to engage in a democratic process which actually makes 
a difference to an outcome. Empire (Fox, Endemol, etc.) may keep working to over-
code this desire, to articulate its terms to those of a purely neoliberal discourse, but 
the desire itself is a desire for democracy.
This then, might be another ‘resource of hope’ in contemporary culture. The de-
sire for participation, for democracy, for collaboration and cooperation, for free ex-
change of ideas and expressions outside of the logic of the market, for connection 
and collective becoming: these are all part of what makes possible the popularity of 
social networking sites, even of Big Brother. Let’s be clear what is being suggested 
here. There is no question of implying that Facebook and Big Brother are inherently 
democratic, or even potentially progressive. If anything, the opposite is true. My 
personal, instinctual responses to these phenomena are almost entirely negative, and 
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the vacuity of celebrity culture and the reality shows at the heart of it depress me on 
a daily basis. I can’t watch Big Brother and, in fact, I instinctively mistrust anyone 
who can. But it is also undeniable that their popularity indicates in part a certain de-
sire for participation, for collective agency, which neoliberal culture renders increas-
ingly unrealisable elsewhere. It is here, perhaps, that another glimmer of possible 
hope can be discerned.
The question which all of this leaves open is just how it might be possible for these 
positive potentialities to be actualised. What would have to happen for the conserving 
instincts, the taste for cosmopolitanism and the desire for participation of many sec-
tions of the British public to organise themselves into a radically democratic political 
alternative to neoliberalism? Well, a number of things would have to happen. Firstly, 
as has already been suggested, some kind of popular narrative would have to get into 
wider circulation, highlighting the connections between a drive for limitless capital 
accumulation and the various features of contemporary culture which worry people 
so much and which can be associated with it closely. It wouldn’t be hard to connect 
anxieties about the failed socialisation of children (Grossberg 2005) with a critique 
of the culture of long working-hours and the competitive mentality celebrated by Big 
Brother. However, this is easy to say, and much harder to imagine actually happening 
on a popular level. Can we imagine, merely hypothetically, what might make pos-
sible such a development? Well, there is no point simply imagining what if scenarios 
here, but one thing is certain; such a politics could only emerge in conjunction with 
some mobilisation of the groups, institutions and individuals who still, in large num-
bers, remain attached to, invested in and organised by the history of social democracy 
and the labour movement. The trade unions, much of the public sector, much even 
of the Labour Party membership, clearly remain attached to the social democratic 
project to build institutions which can protect many areas of collective and personal 
life from the ravages of capital; from commodifi cation and the forced imposition 
of market relations; from the demand for profi t, competitiveness and effi ciency at 
the expense of creativity, collaboration and experimentation. Indeed, it can well be 
argued that, as disorganised and uninspired as residual social democracy may be, 
there is simply no comparing its political signifi cance in the United Kingdom to that 
of those utopian fragments who claim explicit allegiance to the global justice move-
ment, anti- capitalism and the World Social Forum project. The latter simply have 
no current resonance with a wider public whatsoever. In 2007 the left-wing Labour 
member of parliament John McDonnell did actually stand for the leadership of the 
party under the explicitly anti-capitalist slogan ‘Another World is Possible’: despite 
a vigourous campaign, he ultimately failed to secure enough nominations from his 
fellow Members of Parliament even to appear on the ballot paper.
While the remnants of social democracy have no vision, and a very weak analysis 
of what has happened to them, the anti-capitalist movement has no base, but what it 
does have is a vision and an analysis of the current situation which is in many regards 
more realistic and more clear-sighted than that which informs much of the politics 
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of residual social democracy. In the meantime, large sections of the British public, 
arguable a majority thereof, are expressly unhappy with most to all of the neoliberal 
agenda. If there were to be any moving on from this moment, then it would surely 
have to involve some reactivation of the forces of social democracy, but those forces 
could only be so activated if they could be persuaded to accept the extent to which 
the very success of neoliberalism has undermined their received assumptions. Let’s 
expand upon this point briefl y before going any further.
There is an implicit argument for the project of neoliberal governance advocated 
by the architects of New Labour, and the main advisors to Bill and Hilary Clinton 
(e.g. Penn 2007). The argument goes something like this: representative democracy, 
mass participatory politics and genuinely egalitarian social democracy are now 
historical artefacts. They belong, more-or-less exclusively, to the period of Fordist 
capitalism, which depended upon a higher level of social integration than any form 
of capitalism before or since. None of these institutions possesses the fl exibility or 
dynamism to cope with the complexity of contemporary, postmodern societies or to 
withstand the pressure of globalising capitalism and its corrosive fl ows. In this con-
text we must accept that the only effective form of democracy is the market. Hence, 
only the marketisation of public services can hope to make them subject to any form 
of effective democratic accountability. In this new context, government will inevi-
tably fall to technocratic elites who, if they are benign, will use the most powerful 
consultation techniques available (namely, those by which corporations consult their 
customers: focus groups, market-research) to ensure that they give people more-or-
less what they want, in so far as it in their power to do so. Beyond this, the most that 
government can do for its customer-citizens today is to equip them as best it can 
to survive in the harsh and competitive environment of the global labour-market. 
Old-fashioned ideas like holistic education or generous public pensions may exert 
a certain sentimental pull, but that only makes them all the more dangerous, as today 
they are untenable goals whose fruitless pursuit will only prevent us from adequately 
equipping our citizens to look after themselves in a world from which government 
cannot protect them. Students must follow degree programmes which make them at-
tractive to employers. Citizens must save for their own futures, or perish. The private 
sector is the only possible source of investment in public services, given the impos-
sibility of raising adequate funds through direct taxation. This is the core argument 
in favour of what Anthony Barnett has called ‘corporate populism’, and the basis of 
what Finlayson calls the ‘Schumpeterian workfare regime’ (Finlayson 2003).
The trouble with this argument is that it seems to be right. Nothing that has hap-
pened anywhere in the world since 1973 offers serious evidence with which to 
contradict it. As Colin Crouch argues in his book Post-Democracy (2004), we are 
now living in the era when voter turn-outs plummet as electorates, explicitly or im-
plicitly, realise that democracy simply does not work any more. Governments do 
not merely pursue occasional unpopular policies: they pursue entire social agendas 
which their publics explicitly oppose. Even in Eastern Europe, where the euphoria 
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of  democratisation is still part of living memory, electoral participation rates are in 
free-fall. Taking all this into account, it now seems fair to say that effective represen-
tative democracy—which broadly forced governments to act in line with the express 
wishes of the electorate—was, like social democracy, a historical phenomenon spe-
cifi c to the moment of Fordist modernity. That era ended a generation ago. This is 
an analysis which is strikingly rigourous and consistent so far as it goes, but which 
can only retain its pessimism about the prospects for democracy only if it assumes 
that representative democracy on the twentieth-century model is the ultimate end-
point of the ‘democratic revolution’ (Lefort 1994). There is no logical reason at all to 
assume this.
So the argument of the global justice movement, particularly as manifested in 
the World Social Forum project, is that much of this analysis is correct. But the dif-
ference is that it proposes, as an alternative to the imposition of market relations on 
every sector of the social, a new wave of experiments in participatory democracy, a 
proliferation of new sites for democratic deliberation and for the invention of new 
forms of both representative and non-representative democracy. In this it is actually 
proposing nothing new. The New Left fi rst made arguments along these lines at the 
very beginning of the 1960s. What the impasses of the current conjuncture suggest 
is that far from being relics of the utopian 1960s, such ideas are more relevant today 
than ever before. However, if those of us who share this view—and are inspired by 
it—are to have any chance of persuading our potential allies to feel likewise, then we 
are going to have to think carefully about how we go about doing that, about what 
kind of connections we can make with those who do not spontaneously share our 
feelings, our assumptions, or our identities. In short, contemporary anti-capitalists 
will have to consider much more than they are often inclined to do, the fundamental 
question of political strategy. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Notes
1.  For a related analysis of the politics of social democracy and its challengers, in a 
more rigourously Deleuzo-Guetarrian vein, see Massumi (1992: 120-40).
2. The ‘play’, in Derrida’s terminology.
3. I’ve lifted this phrase from Raymond Williams (1989).
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Beyond the Activist Imaginary: Nomadic 
Strategies for the New Partisans
This book set out to initiate a kind of dialogue between cultural studies and contem-
porary anti-capitalism, and to the best of its ability this is what it has done. It could 
have stopped with the last chapter, perhaps. After all, that chapter tried to do what 
cultural studies has always done best, which is to offer an analysis of current power 
relationships which might prove useful to radical political forces. However, the title 
of this book is Anticapitalism and Culture, and while it has worked through the pos-
sible ramifi cations of this phrase from many different angles, there is one way of 
approaching it that has not yet been fully explored: to offer a critical consideration of 
the culture of anti-capitalism itself, both as it is and as it might be.
The Activist Imaginary
Partisans of the radical democratic, anti-capitalist left, residing in any part of the English-
speaking world today (apart, arguably, from New Zealand), fi nds themselves in an 
awkward position. The enormous success of neoliberalism in the so-called Anglo-
Saxon world has created a situation in which the likelihood of any serious political 
challenge to the prevailing order at home seems decidedly slim. While the painful 
dismantling of Western European social democracy still has far to go, and may yet 
meet with decisive resistance, publics in these countries have largely acquiesced to the 
neoliberal trade-off: an end to almost all forms of egalitarian or communitarian social 
provision and a return to very high workloads in return for historically unprecedented 
opportunities for personal consumption. In the United States and the United Kingdom 
particularly, this situation has obtained for long enough now that it is hard to imagine 
any event less cataclysmic than, say, the British experience of World War II provok-
ing suffi cient opposition to it to reverse the trend1. At the same time, the concomitant 
feelings of despondency on the left make little sense in a more global context. The 
palpable instability of American imperial hegemony and the emergence of new and 
dynamic forms of collectivist, democratic resistance to neoliberalism suggest that in 
the arena of world politics there is a great deal to play for, and much reason for cau-
tious optimism on the part of democratic anti- capitalists. Those of us identifi able in 
such terms therefore fi nd ourselves partisans of an  emergent international  political 
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movement with relatively little chance of making a real impact on the domestic 
political scene.
This ambivalent situation can provoke a range of emotional, intellectual and po-
litical responses, but most typically leads to a recognisable set of reactions which 
are deeply problematic. Activist culture since the late 1990s has tended to take on 
a defensive or millenarian character which simply evades the diffi culties which the 
historical circumstances engender. The particular way of conceiving political activ-
ity, those who engage in it, and their relationship to the wider culture they inhabit 
which emerges in the practices and literature of the movement constitutes what 
I will call here an ‘activist imaginary’: that is, a phantasmatic way of relating to the 
world typical of those who identify themselves primarily as activists. This is the 
basis for the ideology of those ‘activismists’ criticised so skilfully by Featherstone, 
Henwood and Parenti in their essay on ‘Left Anti-Intellectualism and its Discontents’ 
(2004). The assemblage which supports this imaginary, I would suggest, includes 
not only the writings and activities of self-styled activists but those of political theo-
rists and philosophers organically or hypothetically connected to the movement of 
movements and to militant anti-capitalism of more classical varieties: writers such 
as Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou and, at times, Hardt and Negri. At the level of political 
discourse, this mentality is manifest in the valorisation by both Badiou (2003) and 
Hardt and Negri of the fi gure of ‘the militant’ (in other words, the ideal activist of the 
activist imaginary). As Nicholas Thoburn writes
From feminist, countercultural, left communist, situationist perspective, the militant has 
been challenged as an ascetic model of political practice that forms through a fetishised 
mode of commitment to ‘action’. It is a model immanent to the formation of what Ca-
matte calls ‘political rackets’, where groups emerge in equivalence to political concepts 
and theories against those outside the group—those with a less ‘militant’ attitude—and 
are propelled by the motive force of commitment and action to ever-more self-certain 
and self-important activity. Rather than accelerate political change, militant forms tend 
to end up producing specialised roles, hostility to others, fears of models and struggles 
outside their own variety of political truth.
(Thoburn 2003: 144)
Support for this analysis comes in part from a key piece of activist literature which has 
already, less than a decade after its initial publication, achieved the status of a minor 
classic. ‘Give Up Activism’, an essay published anonymously as one of the contri-
butions to the ‘Refl ections on J18’ document in 1999, warns against the adoption of 
what the authors term an ‘activist mentality’, arguing that radical activity should not 
be ‘the affi rmation of the separateness and distinctness of a particular group’ and 
pointing out that the adoption of a sectional and sectarian identity by a political 
minority is a sure route to political ineffi cacy and irrelevance. Appearing less than 
a year before the publication of the movement’s fi rst key text—Naomi Klein’s No 
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Logo—the essay was remarkable both for its prescience and for its completely atypi-
cal character as a piece of effective auto-critique. As the author of ‘Give Up Activism’ 
was later to point out (see http://www.eco-action.org/dod/no9/activism_ postscript.
htm), the publication in which it fi rst appeared was full of routine denunciations of 
the destructive inequities of capitalism, rehearsing a perspective which was merely 
the starting point for that essay’s refl exive considerations of the strategic limits of 
actually existing anti-capitalism at the time of its publication. As such, many of the 
articles in this document, which was supposed to constitute a set of refl ections on 
the relative successes of the 18 June 1999 demonstrations against finance capital 
(the ‘Carnival Against Capitalism’), simply restated the already shared presupposi-
tions of all of its authors and all of its possible readership, without asking any serious 
questions about the political effectiveness of their consequent actions.
This criticism can be extended much more widely to the entire—now quite 
 extensive—fi eld of recent anti-capitalist literature. Since the publication of No Logo 
an entire publishing genre has emerged made up of books largely modelled on that 
work and largely undertaking similar tasks. The standard form which the literature 
of the movement takes is what we might call the anti-capitalist catalogue: a gaz-
etteer surveying a disparate range of current organisations, movements and cam-
paigns, with often no direct and very little indirect links between them beyond the 
imaginative assertions of their chroniclers that they do indeed add up to some kind 
of large-scale global movement (e.g. Klein 2000; 2002; Mertes 2003; Kingsnorth 
2003; Notes from Nowhere 2003; Yuen, Katsiafi cas & Burton 2004). Of course, 
the very act of writing about them as such might be understood as a performa-
tive act of political articulation, creating links and equivalences between otherwise 
disconnected strands of a potential movement. As we shall see below, however, 
some strands of political theory associated with the movement are positively hos-
tile to any such interpretation of its politics. Leaving aside this theoretical debate 
for one moment, we can see that there is already an implicit resistance to such an 
understanding in these texts insofar as the question of how connections might be 
made between otherwise heterogeneous political actors, groups and traditions is in 
general conspicuously absent from them. Instead, it tends to be merely assumed that 
these phenomena already share a fundamental identity and that little more is needed 
for that common identity to be realised than for the general features of their strug-
gles to be described. To be clear, I do not intend this as a criticism of these books 
in themselves. Works such as We are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global 
Anticapitalism, edited by the Notes from Nowhere collective (2003) and featuring 
contributions, reports and essays from a fabulous myriad of sources, from all over 
the world, form an invaluable resource. What’s more, the editors of that exemplary 
volume, for one, conclude by quoting from ‘Give up Activism’ and commenting on 
the need for the movement to move beyond the stage of initial activist enthusiasm, 
much in the spirit of present work. It’s in a spirit of solidarity with that gesture itself, 
and as part of the auto-critique of the movement, that I offer these refl ections on the 
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limitations of any merely descriptive account of disparate modes of hypothetically 
anti-capitalist activity.
The fact that such descriptions make no particular claims to objectivity, being 
almost entirely partisan celebrations of the mere existence of resistance in various 
quarters, does not alter the fact that all that is offered is straightforward descrip-
tion rather than any kind of strategic assessment of their relative potentials, weak-
nesses, strengths and problems. Importantly, this reliance on description shares key 
features with a longer-established mode of left discourse whose objects are different 
but whose political shortcomings are exactly the same. Perhaps the most notable and 
popular intellectual of the anglophone left in the world today (and for some time) 
is Noam Chomsky. There is no question that Chomsky is a great contributor to the 
fi eld of linguistics, an innovative and effective publicist of major political issues 
(for example, the relationship between the US government and the repressive Israeli 
state in the 1980s: see Chomsky 1983) and a useful rallying point for a certain kind 
of left liberal sensibility in the United States. However, Chomsky’s political writings 
and oratory function almost entirely in a declarative mode, listing and detailing the 
depredations wrought by American corporate power in collusion with the United 
States and other governments and supra-governmental bodies, without ever propos-
ing possible political solutions to the basic problem that allows them to be wrought 
in the fi rst place: the continued global hegemony of American capital. It might seem 
far-fetched to imply that Chomsky apparently believes that nothing more is required 
of effective political intervention than that the evils and iniquities of globalised capi-
talism be simply asserted and re-asserted as often as possible, but this certainly is 
an explicit belief held by some in the anti-capitalist movement. During their 2000 
public appearance, sharing a platform at an event organised by the World Develop-
ment Movement in London to launch its public campaign against GATS (General 
Agreement on Trade in Services—one of the series of multilateral treaties by which 
the World Trade Organisation has sought to outlaw the most basic forms of resistance 
to neo-liberalism—Naomi Klein and George Monbiot both responded to questions 
along the general lines of ‘What is to be done?’ in terms which were revealing, and 
troubling. Klein propounded what she termed the ‘vampire theory’: the idea that phe-
nomena such as GATS, when exposed to the light of publicity, simply shrivel up and 
die. Monbiot likewise tends to imply (and sometimes assert) that letting people know 
about the extraordinary destructive effects of contemporary capitalism is the primary 
task of radical politics. The explicit discourse shared by both of these writers, and 
that implicit in their tendency to write detailed expositions of how bad things are, 
while paying little attention to the question of how they might be changed, amounts 
to a politics of disclosure, which assumes that informing an uninformed public about 
the evils of capitalism is the aim and end of political activity.
There are a number of issues to consider when refl ecting upon the shortcomings 
of a politics of disclosure, all of which touch upon long-running debates on the na-
ture and functioning of ideology in advanced societies. The ‘vampire theory’ rests on 
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the crudest possible understanding of the relationship between power, information 
and knowledge, assuming as it does that hierarchies of power remain in place only 
so long as the majority are unaware of the facts. In this it makes two key assump-
tions. Firstly, it assumes a simplistic distinction between, on the one hand, knowing 
the truth and being able to act on that knowledge and, on the other hand, remaining 
acquiescent in passive ignorance. Secondly, it assumes that the acquiescence of the 
majority is conditional only upon their ignorance, which it also confi dently assumes. 
It therefore makes no distinction between ideology and ignorance, and sits in the 
long philosophical tradition which has asserted since ancient times, despite all evi-
dence to the contrary, that knowing the truth will automatically make the knower 
virtuous. These are all assumptions which any critical engagement with the issues at 
hand has to abandon.
The fi rst of these assumptions that I want to take issue with is the most basically 
empirical: the assumption that people en masse do not act against the iniquities of 
liberal capitalism simply because they do not realise how bad it is. It is worth noting 
here that writers such as Monbiot, Klein and Chomsky are not, to their credit, just 
liberal journalists denouncing individual acts and policies carried out by corpora-
tions or governments. They invariably see such actions as symptomatic of an entire 
social system whose endemic barbarism they wish to expose. However, this observa-
tion draws attention to the fact that it is never simply ignorance of particular histori-
cal details which they seek to correct in their imagined audience, but ignorance of the 
entire system of social relationships in which they participate. It is such ignorance 
which they clearly assume in their readerships.
This is an assumption which was challenged some time ago by Abercrombie, Hill 
and Turner. In their book The Dominant Ideology Thesis (1980), the authors suggest 
that there is simply no need to postulate a ‘dominant ideology’ as effective in societ-
ies in which a highly differentiated and specialised division of labour leaves most 
people entirely dependent upon the existing set of economic relations for day-to-day 
subsistence, as a range of factors other than actual conscious concurrence with the 
belief-system of a ruling elite will prevent large numbers of people from engaging in 
sustained revolutionary activity most of the time (Abercrombie et al. 1980: 158–86). 
Put very simply: it is quite possible to be fully aware that one is, like most of one’s 
fellow-citizens, a victim of exploitation by a minority, without being suffi ciently 
motivated by the fact to try to do anything about it. The motivation to act is even 
weaker where the victim of direct injustice is another, or even, say, future genera-
tions. Importantly, material constraints on political action are likely to be strongest 
on the weakest members of society: if feeding one’s children is a struggle, but none-
theless an achievable goal within the parameters of the prevailing social order, then 
one is likely to concentrate on it rather than on trying to change the parameters of social 
order. In more general terms, it might well be that very large numbers of the popula-
tion of a country like the United Kingdom would not disagree with any of the basic 
beliefs of a Monbiot or a Michael Moore, and perhaps more importantly would not 
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be surprised by anything he had to tell them even if they were not knowledgeable 
about the specifi c details of current neoliberal policy. In which case, supplying them 
with such details is, on its own, unlikely to change their outlook or behaviour.
Indeed—and this will bring me to my second key criticism of the politics of 
disclosure—it might have the opposite effect. What if the effect of simply providing 
endless quantities of evidence for the sheer awfulness of capitalism is ultimately to 
reinforce the feeling of those receiving it that capitalism is indeed, in many ways, 
awful, but that its continual and unabated awfulness simply demonstrates how un-
alterable and unmovable it is, and thus how pointless it would be to act against it? 
What the politics of disclosure entirely fails to take account of is this: historically, 
people do not act against a given social order unless they believe that there is a good 
chance that it can be changed and that the likely benefi t to them of changing it will 
outweigh the likely risks involved in the attempt. Simply telling people how bad the 
order is and why does nothing to convince them of this. To put this another way: the 
semantic effect of this discourse may be to build up evidence against capitalism, but 
its affective consequence may be to contribute to the stratifi cation of those social re-
lations which it criticises. To put this yet another way: revolutions only happen when 
the desire for revolution is strong enough, productive enough, wide enough. This 
discourse promotes fear, but it does not engender revolutionary desire.
There is still more to this. Recent theorisations of the political functioning of 
discourse have gone considerably beyond debates over the nature of ideology, domi-
nant or otherwise. A number of theorists, most notably Judith Butler, have revis-
ited J. L. Austin’s concept of the performativity of language: that is, the capacity of 
language to act in the world rather than simply to describe it (Austin 1962). When 
combined with an approach which stresses the discursive-pragmatic constitution of 
social reality and the normalising function of discourse and power-knowledge (Fou-
cault 1979), this perspective draws attention to the role that all discourse plays in 
normalising that which it describes. Incidentally, Butler’s work on the ‘performa-
tivity’ of gender-discourse has been widely and routinely misunderstood precisely 
because of a misunderstanding of the concept of performativity, which is often as-
sumed to imply a voluntaristic conception of identity as a simple product of wil-
ful self-creation (a ‘performance’). This reading overlooks the normalising function 
which Butler attributes (following Foucault, Austin and Derrida) to the performative 
dimension of discourse, a function which is not limited to situations which involve, 
for example, the reinforcement of socially sanctioned gender roles. Sociolinguists 
have long pointed out the ways in which even the most minor elements of every-
day discourse serve to reinforce the invisible norms of socially constituted reality 
(Berger & Luckmann 1966: 65–146).
Considered in this light, what is the performative function of a discourse which 
endlessly rehearses the gesture of discovering (as if for the fi rst time) the true iniq-
uities of capitalism? It may be—in those very few cases in which the audience is 
genuinely unaware not just that this particular government or corporation was guilty 
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of this or that crime but that such things can possibly happen at all in a modern 
democracy—that the effect will be to shock the listener or reader out of their com-
placency. But if the audience in question already has any suspicion that modern de-
mocracies largely serve the interests of fi nance capital, then such disclosure is more 
likely to reinforce the existing views of the audience in relation to that situation 
while also reinforcing their suspicion that the speaker or writer, in their very outrage 
at this wholly unsurprising event, is a representative of a position and world view 
fundamentally more naïve, and hence probably less effectual, than their own. More 
fundamentally, simply to describe such a situation without doing anything to expose 
its historical contingency or its potential alterability (by suggesting what might done to 
change it), might be, in fact, rhetorically to reinforce the general assumption that such 
a state of affairs is normal and inevitable.
This, then, might be said to be the fi rst key feature of the activist imaginary: its 
state of perpetual outrage and surprise at the exploitative and undemocratic character 
of capitalist society and its implicit assumption that the appropriate political response 
is to seek to engender this state in an audience it assumes to be naïvely ignorant of the 
facts. This outrage is a species of what Nietzsche calls ressentiment—the moralistic re-
sentment of the weak—and it can never be the basis for the kind of joyous becoming-
other which any democratic opposition to neoliberalism would require. This fi nds its 
culmination in the affective modes which activist discourse works to provoke in its 
audience: an anger and outrage which will be manifested in various forms of protest.
Now, this is, admittedly, a caricature which many activists would reject. We would 
surely have to distinguish between, say, the moralistic outrage of an anti-capitalist pub-
lication such as New Internationalist magazine and the wit of an activist-artist such as 
Reverend Billy of the Church of Stop-Shopping (whose invented persona mocks the 
didactic moralism of anti-consumerism even while it enacts it). Indeed, much of the 
language of the movement has tended to abjure the notion of protest against injus-
tice in favour of an emphasis on direct action against forms of oppression. However, 
this latter concept has itself been expanded to the point where any clear distinction 
between direct action and symbolic protest has all but been erased. The conceptual 
and terminological slippage is worth unpacking here, as it reveals a great deal about 
the range of effects which derive from one of the activist imaginary’s fundamental 
features: its constitutive blindness to questions of political strategy. As Featherstone 
and colleagues write, ‘the real price of not thinking’ amongst action-oriented activists 
‘is the reduction of strategy to mere tactics, to horrible effect’ (2004: 310).
In Search of Strategy
We can get a sense of what is at stake in this blindness to questions of strategy by 
considering a slippage which seems to have occurred in the usage of certain terms 
within the anti-capitalist movement during the last twenty years.
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One of the hallmarks of the so-called new oppositional politics which emerged 
in the United Kingdom in the 1990s was the extraordinary fetish that its partici-
pants made of the phrase direct action. Direct action was presented in the slogans 
and literature of the emergent movement as the antidote to the degraded banality 
of parliamentary politics and its self-evident failings, and in many sections of the 
so-called anti-capitalist movement this remains the case today. What direct action 
actually meant in almost all such cases was forms of highly theatrical and frequently 
destructive protest whose function was to draw media attention to particular issues 
of political concern. In the particular case of the anti-roads movement, the aim went 
further, insofar as at least some of the tactics of the radical ecologists were aimed 
at making road-building prohibitively expensive, by massively infl ating the secu-
rity costs for construction fi rms involved. However, only the most conservative sec-
tion of the movement—that concerned with protecting ancient woodlands in what 
amounted to a politics of militant conservationism—actually deployed this kind of 
tactic with any regularity. Those sections concerned with wider social issues of urban 
planning, housing and economic inequality only ever resorted to forms of action 
which effectively had the status of, in the words of the political commentator and 
activist George Monbiot, ‘political street theatre’. Even the great clashes with police 
at Prague, Genoa and Seattle were ultimately nothing more or less.
The conceptual and terminological elision which allowed all of these types of 
activism to go under the heading of direct action had a longer history, of course. The 
use of tactics aimed at making it physically impossible, or prohibitively expensive, 
for corporations to carry out certain kinds of environmental despoliation, has a long 
history in the environmental movement (Wall 1999). Similarly, certain strands of 
anarchist politics have always laid a stress on the importance of making sustained 
physical gains in the course of political struggle, as exemplifi ed in the success of the 
squatting movement in some parts of Europe (although whether, after the apparent 
defeats infl icted on that movement in places such as the United Kingdom and Den-
mark, we can still refer to much of that as success, is not clear). When I was growing 
up near Liverpool in the 1980s, I was more impressed by the anarchists than by any 
other left group in the city because they put their energy into trying to organise social 
centres and support services for squatters as well as trying to provide certain kinds 
of social service for local pensioners, while the other left groups talked idly about 
proletarian revolution and the correct analysis of the Russian revolution. For that 
particular group of anarcho-syndicalists, direct-action meant low-key attempts to 
build alternative social infrastructures, not highly public acts of spectacular protest, 
for which they had nothing but contempt.
The contempt in which such activists have traditionally held the very concept of 
protest raises a number of interesting conceptual questions. What exactly is a protest? 
Or rather, what is implied, logically, in the very concept of a protest? On one level, 
any protest implies an appeal to a shared set of norms against which the injustice of 
some action or situation can be measured, or to a higher authority who can be called 
Beyond the Activist Imaginary: Nomadic Strategies for the New Partisans • 211
upon to adjudicate and to pronounce a verdict of injustice. If such an authority really 
does not exist, then there is little to be gained by appealing as if it did, and if those 
authorities that do exist—government, media, corporations—can be assumed to be 
hostile to the aims of the protestors, then what is the point of protesting to them?
This, of course, is the old revolutionary criticism of any kind of protest politics. 
In certain strands of anarchism, this has historically led to an emphasis on the value 
of direct action in the ‘here and now’ in order to solve social and political problems. 
Intriguingly, however, the concept of direct action which became central to the emer-
gent anti-capitalist movement in the 1990s largely lost the critical edge which this 
perspective had given it in the past. The phrase direct action had in the past desig-
nated a range of activities which at their mildest were intended to make it impossible 
for corporations to carry out environmental destruction unnoticed and unhindered, 
and at their strongest were intended to constitute permanent gains for revolution-
ary forces (whether that meant merely the permanent occupation of unused build-
ings by autonomous collectives or the coordinated occupation of factories, railways 
and other key sites of production and distribution in a consciously pre-revolutionary 
manoeuvre). Over the course of the 1990s, the term came to be used to designate 
any form of public protest involving destruction of property or spectacular theatrics. 
Consequently, today many participants in the anti-capitalist movement confi dently 
believe themselves to be engaging in direct action, which they construe as inherently 
more valuable than engaging in representative politics of any kind, despite the fact 
that their anarchist, communist or even militant Green forebears would have scoffed 
at this description at their activities and subjected it to the same critique to which 
they subjected other kinds of protest politics.
Of course, this does not mean that the critique of protest politics was itself un-
problematic. For example, we might defend the idea of the protest by arguing that a 
protest made in the absence of any clear legitimate authority or set of shared norms 
can be understood as a conscious attempt performatively to install such a set of norms 
or imagined authority where one does not actually (and perhaps cannot really) exist2. 
However, a protest will only function effectively in this way if it is informed by some 
strategic orientation which takes account of the larger political context and the partic-
ular aims of a wider project to intervene in that context. But what does would it mean 
to have such strategic orientation in the present era? When political parties no longer 
function as the organisational mechanisms whereby a range of political activities can 
be coordinated into a coherent strategy, how can such organisation take place at all?
There is an argument that could be made today, and that some activists and theo-
rists do make (although I’ve yet to fi nd an example of anyone doing so convinc-
ingly in print), that strategy as such is simply a redundant concept in this age of 
micro politics, molecular revolution and social invention. The recent revival of in-
terest in the ideas of Gabriel Tarde led by Eric Alliez (2001; 2004) and Maurizio 
Lazaratto (2002), the implicit spontaneism of Hardt and Negri, and a particular 
current of thought which takes in a Guattarian /Deleuzian emphasis on the molecular 
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 dimension of political activity, converge with the culture and practice of much 
activist politics on a position which simply refuses any suggestion that the multiplic-
ity of political tactics deployed by activists, artists and intellectuals should or could 
ever be disciplined by subordination to some overall strategic project. Ironically, this 
resistance mirrors the reluctance of many NGOs to engage in long-term strategic po-
litical campaigns rather than only lobbying for short-term technocratic reforms. This 
is entirely understandable in both cases. There is an obvious resistance amongst ac-
tivists today to anything that looks like an attempt to revive the discredited practices 
of party politics, revolutionary or reformist, whilst NGOs do not wish to compro-
mise their tactical effi ciency and autonomy for the sake of making dangerous com-
mitments to highly tenuous political campaigns. What’s more, there is a widespread 
recognition that such strategic coordination is always constituted by hegemonic acts 
which create and stabilise power relations between different components of a group, 
organisation or movement. The emphasis on the value of multiplicity, minority and 
invention which shapes the rhetoric of most Deleuzian thought clearly tends to gen-
erate an allergy to anything like a strategic orientation, which it is easy to associate 
with the great transcendental ontologies of modernity which it wishes to escape 
from. Strategies, for this perspective, are things deployed by the state, the proto-state 
of the party machine, and the party-state assemblages of fascism and Stalinism. Nick 
Land sums up such a stance when he claims that ‘Foucault delineates the contours 
of power as a strategy without a subject . . . Its enemy is a tactics without a strategy, 
replacing the politico-territorial imagery of conquest and resistance with nomad-
 micromilitary sabotage and evasion, reinforcing intelligence’ (2003).
Unlike Land, no serious political philosopher seems willing to defend such a 
position with any conviction. Deleuze and Guattari were quite explicit in refusing 
to advocate a simple politics of disaggregation, insisting that what they called the 
molar dimension of politics could never be avoided (1988: 276, 506, etc.). Negri has 
written explicitly of the need for the anti-capitalist movement to develop counter-
 hegemonic strategies in order to constitute ‘counter-powers’ to Empire. Similarly, the 
neo- Tardian position is not one which logically forecloses the possibility of strategic 
thought, and it is in fact Brian Massumi, Deleuze and Guattari’s most important 
translator and expositor to the anglophone world, who has offered one of the most 
precise and useful defi nitions of the term strategy to date:
“Strategies” is the best word for ways of becoming: they are less theories about becom-
ing than pragmatic guidelines serving as landmarks to future movement. They have no 
value unless they are immanent to their “object”: they must be verifi ed by the collectiv-
ity concerned, in other words submitted to experimental evaluation and remapped as 
needed. (Massumi 1992: 103)
This account of ‘strategies’ gives us some important clues as to what any minimal 
defi nition of strategy might have to include: an emphasis on pragmatics—on the 
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question of ‘what is to be done’—and an orientation towards some at least partially 
determinant imagined future. At the same time, of course, Massumi reminds us that 
strategies must always be experimental and therefore provisional: that’s the differ-
ence between strategy and dogma. But recognising this difference need not lead us to 
abandon the notion of strategy altogether. A rigourous Deleuzean like Massumi well 
understands that politics cannot be thought effectively without it.
However, there is at least one representative of a consistently and resolutely 
anti-strategic mode of thought on the contemporary philosophical scene. The French 
philosopher Alain Badiou, despite writing in French since the 1960s and being 
well-established as an academic and playwright in his native country, has only 
recently come to the widespread attention of anglophone readers. Badiou’s is a no-
toriously abstract and diffi cult body of ideas in places, in particular because of his 
reliance on advanced mathematics (specifi cally, post-Cantorian set theory), to which 
he accords a special ontological status (Hallward 2003). We won’t have space here 
to go into even the essentials of Badiou’s philosophy in any detail, but we can at 
least consider some of its political implications. Broadly speaking, Badiou asserts 
a philosophical and political position which is in effect directly opposed to that 
which emerges from the work of thinkers such as Derrida and Laclau and which 
implicitly informs most cultural studies. In general terms, these writers tend to 
stress the impurity of philosophy as a discursive genre, and by extension to stress 
the interconnectedness of different modes of being and types of practice (politics, 
art, etc.) alongside the non-fi nality of any event, conclusion or process. Badiou, by 
contrast, is committed to an understanding of events, truths and subjects as abso-
lutely singular and self-founding in nature: what makes an event authentic, a truth 
true, or a subject something more than just a person, is precisely the force with 
which it separates itself from what precedes and surrounds it. Badiou’s distinctive 
approach is probably best summed up in his key concept of ‘fi delity to an event’ 
(Badiou 2003: 42): that  keeping-faith with the singular specifi city of an event 
which characterises subjective authenticity. Examples of the type of event under 
discussion here would be moments of religious conversion, political revolution or 
falling-in-love. Importantly, Badiou sees these types of events as actually occurring 
only rarely. Like many French philosophers of recent decades, Badiou is fascinated 
by the concept of the event: the moment when something truly new or permanently 
transformatory occurs in the world. This is an obvious issue of concern for anyone 
with an interest in the possibilities of political change in any context: how do we 
know when something has really changed? How do we induce such changes when 
we want them? How do we respond to them when they occur? For Badiou, true 
events are few and far between, and authenticity can only ever be achieved by way 
of a commitment on the part of individuals to following through the logic of events 
to their ultimate conclusion. Importantly, however, this commitment is not simply 
an emotional orientation on the part of a pre-existing subject, it is rather the very 
thing which brings the subject qua subject into being.
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We can see from this brief summary that Badiou’s philosophy is profoundly anti-
processual in nature. Change in Badiou’s world does not come about as a result of 
overlapping and complex tendencies interacting to create tipping points. It does not 
come about because of the patient work of long-term, broad-based political cam-
paigns. Exactly how and why it does come about is never clear, and it may be that 
this question can simply never be answered. In this, we can see that Badiou’s posi-
tion is radically different from any politics or philosophy inspired by Gramsci. From 
this point of view, the ‘war of position’ does not even count as truly political activity 
and the idea of building counter-hegemonic coalitions is an anathema. Indeed, it 
follows from this perspective that even the kind of ‘conjunctural analysis’ called for 
by Gramsci and typical of the best cultural studies (e.g. Hall et al. 1978), a careful 
attempt to weigh up the balance of political forces in a given situation, is simply 
pointless because it is only an irruption which breaks the knowable limits of any 
given conjuncture that can actually achieve anything.
In fact, the logic of Badiou’s position might well be understood as correlating pre-
cisely to the political practice of those far-left sects from which both the Gramscian 
New Left and the key strands of the anti-capitalist movement have always sought to 
distance themselves. Indeed Badiou was an explicitly committed Maoist for many 
years, a position so sectarian and ultra-leftist as to have had no real equivalent in 
the landscapes of post-war anglophone left politics or in any Western country today. 
Where Badiou’s political thought and practice have subsequently broken with Mao-
ism, however, it has done so in precisely such a way as to distance itself from this 
sectarian tradition, by asserting itself as a ‘politics without party’ (Hallward 2003: 
43), and by its engagement with a range of social struggles (such as the struggle of 
illegal and undocumented immigrant workers in France) which it makes no effort 
to subsume into an overall narrative of progress or understand in terms of a simple 
logic of partisanship. It’s worth noting that even while this position breaks with the 
stifl ing sectarianism of traditional leftism, it also marks out Badiou’s philosophy 
as more clearly than ever anti-Gramscian in character, because Gramsci is usually 
understood to have advocated an expansive model of the political party as a neces-
sary agent of social change, which is quite different from advocating a break with 
the notion of party altogether (Gramsci 1971: 147–57). In political terms, how far 
Gramsci seriously advocated something different from the Leninist model of the 
highly disciplined and centralised party remains a matter of dispute and competing 
interpretation, but that debate need not concern us here. What is more relevant is the 
extent to which this question of party marks a point of difference between Badiou 
and the contemporary thinker with whom he is most often linked in the minds of an-
glophone readers: Slavoj Žižek. Žižek, a fascinating and infuriating thinker (Gilbert 
2007), who claims his main inspirations are from Hegel and Lacan. He is a noted 
admirer of Badiou and is particularly close to him in his belief that the subject is es-
sentially self-founding (Žižek 1999: 159). While Žižek—who is generally contemp-
tuous of both cultural studies and the anti-capitalist movement—shares an ‘evental’ 
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philosophy with Badiou and a commitment to the idea of revolution, he has in recent 
years vociferously advocated the Leninist ideal of the disciplined and ‘intolerant’ 
revolutionary party. We will come back to this issue shortly.
How far can we understand the anti-capitalist movement in something like Ba-
diou’s terms? Well, it would certainly be possible to do so. A number of key moments 
might be cited as ‘events’, ‘fi delity’ to which has constituted new political subjects 
since the early 1990s. Most notably, the Zapatista uprising of 1994 might be seen 
as such, and in many ways the history of the subsequent struggle in Chiapas makes 
it look much like a distinctive political ‘series’ (a sequence of happenings follow-
ing on directly from a singular event) as conceptualised by Badiou. The Zapatistas 
emerged as a distinctive new form of politics which could not be assimilated by any 
of the pre-existing categories of politics discourse—class, party, etc.—and which 
were absolutely specifi c to the very situation—Mexico in 1994—whose pre- existing 
political limitations they exceeded. The fact that, while remaining an inspiration to 
the world, the Zapatistas have not formed any very signifi cant lateral connections 
with other groups and organisations around the globe—even with the new wave of 
Latin American socialist governments—would further reinforce the idea that they 
are best understood in terms of their singularity rather than their exemplarity. The 
protests against the World Trade Organisation summit at Seattle in 1999 might be 
understood in similar terms, with the series of major summit protests which followed 
in subsequent years constituting a distinct series, although the fact that they do not 
seem to have had any impact at all on the functioning of neoliberal institutions would 
problematise such a reading. Finally, the convening of the fi rst World Social Forum 
in 2001 might also be considered an event, although exactly the same criticism of 
such an understanding could be made. In fact, the further we progress through this 
list of potential Badiouean events, the less sustainable any such characterisation of 
them becomes. For example, the World Social Forum’s explicit assertion that it is a 
‘process’ rather than an event would seem to undermine any such characterisation, 
and the very project of the forum—to create a space for dialogue and possible link-
age between different opponents of neoliberalism—is one which cannot be under-
stood as authentically political or ‘truthful’ in Badiou’s terms.
Badiou’s perspective is interesting because it represents the limit-point and the 
most rigorous example of an ‘anti-strategic’ mode of political thought. For Badiou, 
it is the self-constitution of a political subject, brought into being by the event of a 
singular truth, which is the substance of real political activity. This may be a fas-
cinating and at times inspiring perspective, but it is also one from which it would 
simply be impossible to understand the idea of the anti-capitalist movement as hav-
ing any validity at all, because the very concept of such a movement is dependent, 
to some extent, on the assumption that the various struggles which make it up are 
not necessarily discontinuous from each other, but can and should work together as 
part of some broader coalition against neoliberalism. Without strategy, there might 
be struggles, but there can be no movement. We might put this another way, and 
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say that if we conceptualise events such as the Zapatista uprising in Badiou’s terms, 
then we can only understand them as generating a series of tactics directed at their 
enemies and at the unfolding of their own distinctive mode of being, but we can-
not conceptualise them as even potentially bound together by any kind of a common 
strategy. The anti-capitalist movement as such, if it is to be anything more than a 
set of isolated and mutually irrelevant struggles deploying wholly localised tactics 
against their enemies, simply cannot dispense with strategic thought.
What Is a Strategy?
The question which this line of argument raises is that of how, if at all, we can recog-
nise strategic thought when we see it. Ernesto Laclau has commented recently, in a 
review of Empire, on the relative instability of the frontier between strategies and 
tactics (Laclau 2001: 7), and it is clearly an aspect of any non-teleological politics 
that that frontier cannot be defi ned with absolute certainty, insofar as the long-term 
consequences of any action can never be known fully, if at all. In other words, we 
can never be wholly sure if what we are doing at the moment is really part of a long-
term strategy or not, because we never really know what the long term will look like. 
Nonetheless I am going to argue that it is necessary to distinguish between strategic 
and tactical dimensions of political thought and action, and I am going to try to offer 
some schematic considerations of how that distinction can be made, however provi-
sional and unstable such distinctions might always have to be.
Standard defi nitions of the distinction normally state that strategy is to be under-
stood in terms of a long-term goal and that tactics is to be understood in terms of the 
short-term resolution of problems encountered or expected, either in reaching such 
goals or in defending an existing position. However, in the case of some general 
distinction between political strategies and tactics appropriate to the anti-capitalist 
movement, this distinction could only work in just these terms if there was a clear 
sense of an ultimate political objective: for example, the revolutionary overthrow 
of capitalism and its replacement with socialism, or a goal equally determinate. In 
the absence of any such clear goal (and it is clear that such an absence is one of the 
characteristic features of the movement as such), this particular way of formulating 
the distinction cannot hold. In its place we might merely make a distinction between 
making or aiming for potentially permanent and clearly temporary political gains. 
Take for example, the act of occupying a disused building and using it for some 
social purpose (an independent media centre, a social centre, a free crèche, etc.). 
If there is a real chance that the occupation might become permanent, that it might 
therefore constitute a permanent gain for the local community or wider democratic 
forces, then we can say that the action, however localised, has a strategic orientation 
towards the goal of a more equitable, social and democratic distribution of resources. 
If it is well known that the building is about to be demolished and there is no real 
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chance of saving it, then this dimension is absent. Of course, there may still be a 
strategic element to the action if it is calculated that the eviction will cost the owners 
or the authorities so much that it will erode their commitment to carrying out such 
evictions in the future, or that the symbolic value of the occupation will be to effect 
a permanent consciousness-raising amongst at least some of those involved or some 
of those who learn about the event indirectly; but in any such case the strategic di-
mension is to be located in some effect of the occupation as a symbolic, economic or 
experiential event rather than as an action in itself. If the establishment of a ‘tempo-
rary autonomous zone’ (Bey 1985) with no likely permanent consequences is to be 
achieved, then what we have is a pure tactic, rather than an action with any strategic 
orientation at all.
Arguably this distinction is close to the classic account of the tactics versus strat-
egy distinction offered by Michel de Certeau in The Practice of Everyday Life:
I call a strategy the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes 
possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city) can be 
isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from 
which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or competi-
tors, enemies, the country surrounding the city) can be managed . . .
By contrast with a strategy . . . a tactic is a calculated action determined by the absence 
of a proper locus. No delimitation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition 
necessary for autonomy. The space of a tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must play 
on and with a terrain imposed on it and organised by the law of a foreign power . . .
. . . strategies are actions which, thanks to the establishment of a place of power (the 
property of a proper), elaborate theoretical places (systems and totalising discourses) ca-
pable of articulating an ensemble of physical places in which forces are distributed . . . At 
the very least they attempt to reduce temporal relations to spatial ones through the analyti-
cal attribution of a proper place to each particular element and through the combinatory 
organisation of the movements specifi c to units or groups of units . . . Tactics are procedures 
that gain validity in relation to the pertinence they lend to time—to the circumstances 
which the precise instant of an intervention transforms into a favourable situation, to the ra-
pidity of the movements in that change the organisation of a space, to the relations among 
successive moments in an action, to the possible intersections of durations and heteroge-
neous rhythms, etc. In this respect, the difference corresponds to two historical options 
regarding action and security (options that moreover have more to do with constraints than 
with possibilities): strategies pin their hopes on the resistance that the establishment of a 
place offers to the erosion of time; tactics on a clever utilisation of time, of the opportuni-
ties it presents and also of the play that it introduces into the foundations of power. Even if 
the methods practiced by the everyday art of war never present themselves in such a clear 
form, it nevertheless remains the case that the two ways of acting can be distinguished 
according to whether they bet on place or on time . . .
In short, a tactic is an art of the weak.
(de Certeau 1984: 36–7)
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de Certeau’s characterisation of the tactic as ‘an art of the weak’ and of the strategy 
as an operation of the powerful has had a lasting impact, and clearly resonates with 
an important element of the activist imaginary even amongst those participants in it 
who may never have heard of de Certeau. The analytical strengths and weaknesses 
of de Certeau’s account are easily lost sight of under the effect of his persuasive 
and subtly charged imagery, but as such it is important to understand the appeal and 
rhetorical effect of that imagery. Few of de Certeau’s imaginable readers, and few 
self-identifi ed anti-capitalist activists, are likely to identify themselves with armies, 
walled cities or corporations: the imagery of the artful, cunning, mobile guerrilla, 
which his account of ‘tactics’ evokes, is clearly far more appealing than that of the 
domineering and powerful institution defending and extending its territoriality. This 
imagery distinctly prefi gures Deleuze and Guattari’s celebration of the nomadic war 
machine, always escaping the boundaries of the state, although Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s analysis is actually far more subtle and complex (1988: 351–423). Note the 
appeal to a certain identity which is implicitly made here and the aestheticisation 
of the position of ‘the weak’ which results. It’s this identifi cation with the romantic 
position of the marginal which can be seen as one of the fundamental elements of 
the activist imaginary, and which is exactly what the author of ‘Give up Activism’ 
warned against.
The romantic rhetoric of this passage leads de Certeau into an analysis which is 
in certain respect very weak. Its most striking feature is its entirely static character: it 
makes sense only from a perspective within which the overall position of the strong 
vis-à-vis the weak is unchanging and unchangeable: strength and weakness are pos-
ited here as identity positions rather than as relational effect of contingent power 
relations. The strong are presented as defending and possibly extending a place of 
power, but there seems to be little sense that that space and the power which enables 
its constitution might themselves have to be reproduced, or to have been produced or 
won in the fi rst place. The notion that the weak might want to try to stop being weak, 
to challenge and re-order the power relations which leave them weak, is not really 
on the agenda here at all. Logically, for such a desire to be entertained and acted on, 
it would be necessary for the weak to engage in just the sort of calculations as to 
what actions might lead to permanent advantage and might overcome threats to the 
realisation of such goals which de Certeau understands as strategies.
The fact that the analytics of power presented in this passage does not allow for 
any such possibility is telling. It is precisely this inability to conceptualise power 
in a way which is appropriate to the perspective both of those seeking to retain and 
extend concentrations of power and those seeking to dismantle them which is typi-
cal of the activist imaginary. In other words: that activist imaginary cannot think 
hegemony. The activist imaginary fi nds it very hard to conceptualise strategy even 
for the purpose of ‘changing the world without taking power’ (Holloway 2002). This 
is illustrated most clearly by the treatment of such ways of conceptualising power in 
literature which is exemplary of current activist thought. One recent work  illustrates 
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this trend perfectly: Richard Day’s Gramsci is Dead. Day tries to articulate a 
contemporary postanarchism which is in many ways useful and interesting, but 
which can only distinguish itself from Laclau and Mouffe’s radical democracy by 
offering a misleading and misinformed caricature of the latter. In fact, Day simply 
misses the entire point of the post-Marxist turn in Gramscian theory. Laclau and 
Mouffe’s most radical innovations have been precisely to liberate the analysis of 
hegemonic relations from any assumption that those relations necessarily confi gure 
a singular social totality (93–127) and to predicate their analyses on the assumption 
that all identities are inherently relational, unstable and ultimately incomplete. He-
gemony, for Laclau and Mouffe, is not a thing, or a structure, or a particular location 
in the topology of the social, but simply a type of relationship which can operate in 
many different kinds of context. Identity, for Laclau and Mouffe, is simply never 
really achieved as such: it is rather, in the words of Judith Butler, ‘the lived scene of 
coalition’s diffi culty’ (1993: 115). Yet Day writes under the assumption that to speak 
of hegemony is not just to speak of a particular type of relation but to assume that we 
can conceptualise society as a totality with a locatable centre of power.
Day entirely misses these core points in assuming that the logical conclusion of 
Gramscian political analysis can only be political projects which demand subservi-
ence to a singular ideology on the part of all their participants, projects which seek to 
‘integrate’ minority elements into liberal society. The contradictions become abso-
lutely stark when Day tries to conclude his fl awed polemic. Day argues—correctly, 
if without any originality—that ‘one of the basic problems of contemporary politics 
is fi guring out how to get more people in more places to overcome not only their 
desire to dominate others, but their desire to be dominated’ (2005: 203). However, he 
completely fails to recognise the extent to which any such process of ‘getting more 
people to’ do anything at all that we want them to do and they aren’t spontaneously 
doing is, by defi nition, a calculated exercise of power and an attempt to get them to 
alter their identities, however minimally, in line with our desires: in other words, is 
a hegemonising act. Day goes on to warn against the politics of ‘converting others’ 
while making the absurd claim that ‘a hegemonic orientation . . . sees only two pos-
sibilities: being the ones “on top” or one of the many “at the bottom” ’ (2005: 206). 
What’s really instructive here is the precise blind spot which emerges in Day’s think-
ing. He wants to imagine a politics in which the business of getting other people 
to change their behaviour, to bring it in line with his own, somehow just happens 
without anyone having to do anything to make it happen: in other words, he wants a 
politics in which the question of strategy, the question of how you persuade others 
to agree with you, is simply occluded. Day spends his entire book caricaturing any 
position which takes this issue seriously as wanting to practice a politics of absolute 
domination, but he is ultimately unable to distinguish his own politics—insofar as it 
is a politics at all—from that which he criticises.
It’s worth spelling out in a bit more detail what a more accurate understanding of 
the ‘strategic orientation’ might involve. From its earliest beginnings, the tradition of 
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theorisations of hegemony which includes Lenin, Gramsci and Laclau is concerned 
with the question of leadership, however abstractly we may wish to understand it. 
Any theory of hegemony is a theory of leadership: not, as contemporary commen-
tators such as Day continue to assert to this day, a theory of domination as such, 
although domination may, and may not, come into it. It is a theory of the processes 
whereby distinct social groups persuade other social groups to acquiesce to their po-
litical agendas (even if those agendas only involve being left alone). Leadership so 
conceived does not necessarily imply the imposition of a singular will on others but 
any process by which the direction of travel of a group or individual is infl uenced. 
This may involve, rather than an imposition of identity, many different types of me-
chanics: seduction, imitation, persuasion or self-transformation, for example. The 
element which leads may well (as the Taoist classics emphasise) have to alter its own 
mode of self-composition in order to allow change to occur; it may even have to en-
gage in a ‘becoming-imperceptible’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1988), a partial dissolution 
of itself. But still, as long as some change occurs which the leading element willed, 
or even which is only the outcome of a process which that element deliberately cata-
lysed, then to some extent ‘leadership’—persuasion, hegemony—has occurred. Any 
process which sets up an alteration in the direction or composition of a group or situ-
ation or any process which induces change which is anything other than absolutely 
autarchic in nature, involves some element of hegemony.
Let’s be very clear here. To advocate a wholly posthegemonic or non- hegemonic 
conception of politics—as do Day or Scott Lash (2007) or Nicholas Thoburn 
(2007)—is to imply that relations of infl uence never occur between different ele-
ments in a political process (or that they should not). In practice, advocates of such 
a ‘posthegemonic’ or non-hegemonic position can only logically do so on condition 
that they regard it as matter of complete indifference whether anyone, anywhere, 
ever agrees with them or not. If such writers are confi dent that they are never going 
to suffer because someone somewhere does not agree with them (closing the depart-
ment that they think should be kept open, refusing to collect the household refuse 
that they think should be collected, sending them to prison for an act that they do not 
think should be illegal, etc.), then so be it. Otherwise, this is nonsense.
Within the Gramscian tradition it is axiomatic that any theory of leadership 
(which, importantly, could just be a synonym for persuasion or infl uence) must ac-
count for the processes both by which power is maintained in hierarchical situations 
and also by which it can be challenged. At their most basic, all theories of hegemony 
have asserted that the success of any political project depends on the capacity of its 
proponents to persuade or infl uence diverse constituencies and to coordinate them 
for as long as it takes to realise its key goals (which might be only a moment, a sin-
gular point of convergence, just long enough to make something happen; or might 
be for a very long time). This holds for Lenin’s assertion that the revolutionary pro-
letariat must lead the peasantry in a united coalition, Gramsci’s argument that any 
revolutionary class must widen its socio-political role such that it is seen to represent 
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the interests of most people in society (rather than the corporate interests of a nar-
rowly defi ned group) and Laclau’s far more abstract formulation according to which 
hegemony relies upon the production of equivalence between otherwise disparate 
terms. Laclau’s work is of particular relevance here, as it demonstrates convincingly 
that the type of operation described by de Certeau as strategies must be undertaken to 
some extent by any political project which aspires to any kind of demonstrable suc-
cess at all: including the kinds of libertarian projects advocated by Day and Thoburn. 
Any political project which seeks either to change or to reinforce existing power 
relationships (and any project which does not seek either of these goals is clearly 
not political in any meaningful way) must to some degree seek to render itself, as de 
Certeau phrases it in the passage cited above, ‘capable of articulating an ensemble of 
physical places in which forces are distributed’ and to establish relations of exterior-
ity between itself and that which it opposes or opposes it.
Laclau further emphasises the extent to which politics is always in part a question 
of making connections between otherwise unconnected elements of the socio-discursive 
fi eld (which is always also the fi eld of social practice) through the construction of 
‘chains of equivalence’: for example, Thatcherism famously managed to create an 
equivalence between nationalist authoritarianism and free market economics, char-
acterising both immigrants and native trade-unionists as enemies, which was by no 
means inevitable or even particularly logical (Hall 1988: 123–49). This process of 
articulation which creates horizontal connections between ideas or constituencies 
which would not otherwise have been articulated can be understood as one of the 
fundamental features of political strategy as such. Laclau has written extensively 
on the centrality to political projects of the process by which the particular mean-
ings of key discursive terms are attenuated as they enter into ever-wider chains of 
equivalence, and we can follow him in arguing that at least the aspiration to such 
horizontal extension of a group’s or idea’s (a ‘demand’s’ in Laclau’s latest terminol-
ogy) political affi liations is one of the features which characterises an action as hav-
ing a strategic orientation. Put very simply, a strategic orientation involves trying to 
persuade other people who don’t already agree with you to do so: persuading them 
to link their demands with yours (Laclau 2005: 67–83). A certain orientation towards 
a universalising horizon is therefore one of the characteristics of a strategic orienta-
tion. That also means taking account of those power formations, those assemblages 
of assemblages, which are relatively universal in their effects. This is not the same 
as saying that every hegemonic or counter-hegemonic project has to defi ne fully the 
identity of every group and individual who participates in it. In the case of the anti-
capitalist movement, for example, it is clear that many groups and individuals with 
diverse agendas can take part in it without subsuming their identities into it, but it 
is also clear that there must be some points of agreement, convergence or common 
antagonism between participants for a movement to exist at all (Starr 2000: 166–7).
Following this logic, we can develop another aspect of de Certeau’s account. Ac-
cording to Laclau, the logic of equivalence which governs articulatory practices has a 
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strict conceptual opposite (which is also its necessary complement and correlate): the 
logic of differentiation. The logic of differentiation is simply the logic which governs 
the emergence of all meanings (and hence all identities, all demands, and all political 
positions), following Saussure’s observation that all signs within a system of meaning 
acquire their signifi cance only from their position within a system of differences. Ac-
cording to Laclau’s scheme, it is not possible for a number of particular political de-
mands to be articulated with each other, overcoming the logic of differentiation which 
governs their emergence as specifi c demands, without the creation of a relation of 
exteriority—a ‘dichotomic frontier’—between the resultant chain of equivalence and 
that with which it is in a relation of antagonism (Laclau 2005: 72–124). Thus de Cer-
teau and Laclau would be in strict agreement that what I am calling a strategic orienta-
tion would involve the positing of a frontier between a given political project and its 
presumed antagonist/s. We can take this further and suggest that, by the same token, 
tactics work along the axis of differentiation rather than that of equivalence: this is 
precisely what would be meant by de Certeau’s assertion that tactics are defi ned by 
the absence of a ‘proper locus’. If we follow Laclau in seeing the proper locus as ten-
dentially produced by articulatory practices which work along the axis of equivalence 
while producing a dichotomic frontier—a relation of exteriority—then the tactic can 
be conversely understood as that action which is not oriented towards the production 
of any such set of relations, but which rather furthers the logic which differentiates the 
particularity of a specifi c demand. To return to our hypothetical occupation of a build-
ing, we can now say that the action would possess a strategic dimension insofar as it 
aimed to create some relation of equivalence between otherwise particular demands 
(perhaps, for example, the demands of local residents for affordable housing and of 
local youth for relatively autonomous spaces in which to congregate), and a purely 
tactical dimension insofar as it simply foregrounded the particularity of one demand 
or group (for example, most social centres in London merely serve as public sites for 
the expression of a very homogenous and relatively exclusive anarchist bohemian 
identity). The kind of politics of minority or the act favoured by commentators such 
as Day might therefore be understood as purely tactical in nature.
Now, it might be asked how this notion of strategy could be thought of as com-
patible with Massumi’s Deleuzian defi nition that was discussed above. Becoming is 
often understood as a purely ‘immanent process, without reference to exterior terms 
or phenomena, and Deleuze famously equates difference and differing with creativ-
ity and becoming as such (1994: 222–261). However, it is worth considering that 
for Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is almost never simply a process in itself. Every 
becoming is a becoming-something: becoming-animal, becoming-child,  becoming-
 woman, and so forth. Becoming always involves a destabilisation of an existent 
identity and a vector of travel, possibly just a swerve3, in the direction of something 
else. It is therefore emphatically not a mere process of autarchic self-creation. At the 
same time, it must be emphasised that for Laclau and Mouffe, the hegemonic articu-
lation of ‘chains of equivalence’ will always destabilise and transform the identities 
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of all terms in the chain, including the hegemonic terms—hegemony is not merely 
a situation in which one group or individual or idea forces itself upon others, but one 
which alters the identities of all concerned—and this process of destabilisation is not 
entirely unlike Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of becoming. Massumi empha-
sises the pragmatic and future-oriented nature of strategies, and this again chimes 
nicely with the notion of strategy that has been elaborated here. Now, it would be 
pointless and impossible to deny that there are real philosophical and political dif-
ferences between Deleuze, Guattari, Massumi, and Laclau and Mouffe, but there is 
more of a convergence and a greater degree of complementarity here than is often 
realised. Where the strategic question, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, might be 
‘how will we connect our project with others, without losing sight altogether of our 
original aims and identity’, the strategic question from Massumi’s perspective might 
be ‘With what potential future-states will we try to enter into a relation of becom-
ing, and how? In what direction should we move, and by what means?’ This is not 
necessarily a question of identifying a goal, but of deciding upon or pointing towards 
a vector of travel from where we are now: not a plan, but an orientation. In other 
words, insofar as such an orientation emerges with any reference whatsoever to a 
wider horizon of the present/future than the narrow confi nes of the moment, and as 
long as it is the product of a decision rather than a wholly passive reaction, then it 
must have a strategic dimension. To refuse such a strategic dimension is to insist on 
staying exactly where we are. This is why there can be no purely tactical politics: 
pure tacticality can only be a refusal of politics in favour of a paranoid insistence 
upon an unchanging identity.
Having said this, let’s now give Richard Day his due. He may not have succeeded 
in killing Gramsci, but he does draw our attention to an important issue: the history 
of the left is full of instances in which the commitment to some overarching strategy 
has been the pretext for the suppression of all difference, all becoming, all invention. 
The French Communist Party did not see the radical students of 1968 as part of its 
strategy for proletarian revolution. The Comintern’s attempt to hegemonise the anti-
fascist forces during the Spanish Civil War helped smother the emergent culture of 
collective libertarian experiment which was emerging there. Bill Clinton’s strategy 
of ‘triangulation’ made it impossible to launch an effective attack on corporate privi-
lege and so doomed his healthcare reforms to failure. The list could go on. I want to 
suggest two possible, complementary routes out of such traps, which can only work 
effectively if they work together: partisanship and nomadology.
Taking Sides: The Strategic Orientation 
of the Partisan War-Machine
The model of effective politics which emerges here is one which would have a num-
ber of implications, many of which might be contested by the representatives of the 
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activist imaginary, and all of which would problematise some of its most characteris-
tic assumptions and habits. In the case of the anti-capitalist movement, for example, 
such a perspective would give rise to the observation that the emergence of a global 
movement of movements cannot be taken for granted and cannot be regarded as the 
simple result of a range of different groups and demands realising their fundamen-
tal identity. If a minimal political identity is to emerge which can make a coherent 
movement out of even a few of the many sets of demands which could can be under-
stood as antagonistic to neoliberalism, then it will only be the result of diffi cult and 
deliberate political work. This can be contrasted to Hardt and Negri’s claim that
Faced as we are with a series of intense subversive social movements that attack the 
highest levels of imperial organisation, however, it may no longer be useful to insist on 
the old distinction between strategy and tactics. In the constitution of Empire there is no 
longer an “outside” to power and thus no longer weak links—if by weak link we mean 
an external point where the articulations of global power are vulnerable. To achieve 
signifi cance, every struggle must attack at the heart of Empire, at its strength. That fact, 
however, does not give priority to any geographical regions, as if only social movements 
in Washington, Geneva or Tokyo could attack the heart of Empire. On the contrary, the 
construction of Empire, and the globalisation of economic and cultural relationships, 
means that the virtual centre of Empire can be attacked from any point. The tactical pre-
occupations of the old revolutionary school are thus completely irretrievable; the only 
strategy available to the struggles is that of a constituent counterpower that emerges from 
within Empire. (Hardt & Negri 2000: 59)4
Apart from the fact that the fi nal conclusion is something of a non sequitur (one 
can agree with it without acceding to any of the paragraph’s previous assertions, 
as one can accede to any one of them without acceding to the others), the passage 
poses some serious problems. In brief, it implies that capitalism has reached such 
a complete and terminal stage that the logic of combined and uneven development 
(Löwy 1982) no longer applies: capitalism is now so fully developed that there is an 
absolute consistency in its formation that renders strategic orientation unnecessary, 
as Empire can be attacked with equal success at any point. The response to this situa-
tion which the passage recommends is interesting. Essentially, it evokes the Grams-
cian distinction between ‘war of position’ and ‘war of manoeuvre’, only to assert—in 
a reversal of Gramsci’s argument—that the only appropriate mode of politics now is 
the war of manoeuvre: the singular assault on the central locus of power, which can 
now be reached from anywhere5. The war of position—the ‘trench warfare’ whereby 
anti-capitalist forces must seek to extend their range by an uneven process of occu-
pation, transformation and annexation of various parts of the complex terrain of 
contemporary societies—is no longer necessary, and nor are the complex strategic 
calculations which would go with it.
This is clearly an appealing conclusion for participants in the activist imaginary 
and has clear echoes of Badiou also, for its implication is that we no longer have 
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to worry about the issues raised by the ‘Give Up Activism’ essay. We don’t have to 
worry about whether our actions have any political effi cacy. We don’t have to worry 
about the question of whether we are connecting at all with people outside of our 
activist subcultures, because every action we undertake is always already making a 
successful direct hit against the very heart of Empire. How convenient.
The split between this conception of politics and that typical of the Gramscian 
tradition could not be more decisive. For Gramsci and his followers, the ‘war of 
position’ has always involved a diffi cult but necessary engagement with the popular: 
that is, with the lives, attitudes and priorities of people outside the immediate po-
litical milieu (Gramsci 1971: 229–39). The tradition of British cultural studies was 
profoundly shaped by two generations of intellectuals infl uenced by this perspective, 
implying as it does that the general fi eld of popular culture and everyday life is a 
necessary terrain of political struggle. One of the characteristic features of the activ-
ist imaginary is precisely a refusal to make any such engagement. One of the striking 
features of activist media is the almost complete lack of engagement with any aspect 
of contemporary culture which does not constitute an immediately recognisable ele-
ment of the milieu of activist subculture in anything other than censorious terms. 
As we have mentioned already, follow the culture links on most Indymedia sites, 
and you might fi nd news about squatted punk gigs, samba classes and Earth First! 
gatherings (as is right), but there are few, if any, references to the world of music, 
TV, literature, fashion and food, in which most of the population of the North lives. 
Discussions of how supporters of the movement might go about the business of per-
suading non-supporters of the rightness of their cause are simply not on the agenda.
This draws attention to a further interesting element of the distinction between 
strategy and tactics: culture—the fi eld of shared meanings and shared modes of ex-
periential organisation (Williams 1961: 57–88; Gilbert 2006)—is, I would suggest, 
the fi eld in which political strategies as such are deployed. Insofar as strategy works 
along the axis of equivalence and combination, it operates always in the sphere of 
commonality for which culture and the popular are synonyms: in the sphere of what 
Deleuze and Guattari call ‘concrete assemblages’. To be precise, in the language of 
Deleuze and Guattari, cultures are ‘constellations’ of assemblages (Deleuze & Guat-
tari 1988: 406). This is an observation with wide applicability. For example, in the 
domain of creative practice, we could characterise art as a site of tactical innovation, 
constantly developing new aesthetic, affective and communicational techniques, 
which can be articulated with and assembled into any number of possible strategic 
projects (from those of radical social movements to those of global corporations), 
and whose potential for such re-articulation is never limited by the nature of the 
tactics themselves.
From this perspective we could say that a lack of strategic thought, or even an 
active resistance to it, is common to the practice of much of the anti-capitalist move-
ment and that of many intellectuals and artists today who might identify themselves 
as having a critical relationship to neoliberal culture. Like much contemporary theory 
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and art practice, the spectacular tactics of the movement try to provoke its audience 
into a problematic relationship with its situation, to promote a certain refl exivity 
with regard to accepted cultural norms and socio-economic arrangements, but with-
out prescribing any predetermined solutions to the problems which it invites us to 
acknowledge. In the process, these fi elds of practice all generate what amounts to 
an ever-proliferating array of tactical innovations without any strategic orientation. 
Thus the development of new organisational techniques, new uses for various tech-
nologies, new concepts or new modes of perception is carried on without any view 
to the uses to which they might or should be put; and inevitably such invention is 
almost entirely appropriated and exploited to its fullest by capital, all in a manner 
largely analogous to the workings of experimental science. In this sense, we might 
say that the various avant-gardes of art practice, philosophy and political activism 
amount to tactical laboratories existing in relative isolation from any wider political 
project which might protect their inventions from exploitation by capital. Groups like 
the Space Hijackers, who organise ‘spontaneous’ parties on the London Underground 
train system are a case in point—while they see their activities as inherently anti-
capitalist in nature, their tactics and methods have already been borrowed by cutting-
edge corporate marketers, while they themselves have had no discernible impact on 
neoliberal culture in the United Kingdom (http://www.spacehijackers.co.uk).
Now, let me clarify what I am saying here and what I am not. I am not saying that 
all these awful people are just frivolous time-wasters, bourgeois dupes of corporate 
hegemony. I am not saying that they are morally weak or politically untrustworthy 
or anything of that nature. All I am saying is the following. Capital clearly acts on a 
strategic plane. Neoliberalism is the name we give to the current hegemonic strategy 
of capital’s leading sections, and it is clearly manifested in initiatives such as the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (Whitfi eld 2001) and the project for the 
European Union constitution and their various equivalents at the national, regional 
and municipal level the world over. Even in the absence of anything resembling a 
political strategy, the power of post-Fordist capital to deploy its abstract machine 
is undeniable: its capacity to propagate its social logic is unmatched by that of any 
organisational or economic rival in the world today. As such, isolated tactical innova-
tions lacking any kind of protection or any capacity to organise themselves into what 
Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘war machine’ will always fi nd themselves re-captured 
by more powerful agencies.
It’s no doubt a recognition of this weakness which provokes much of the hostility 
aimed at activist politics and radical theory by fi gures such as Slavoj Žižek. At the 
other end of the scale from anarchist-inspired thinkers such as Day, implicitly refus-
ing any notion of strategy as inherently totalitarian, Žižek calls for a return to Lenin 
as the great strategist of revolutionary communism and the great advocate of the 
party form as the means by which political strategy should be formulated and imple-
mented. Žižek suggests that we should return to Lenin while acknowledging that the 
specifi c content of his project in 1917 is no longer relevant to our situation today. 
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Pursuing a line of argument partly borrowed from Badiou, Žižek insists that Lenin’s 
great contribution is to assert both the irreducible value of the all- transforming revo-
lutionary act, and the necessity of disciplined, dogmatic ‘intolerance’, for any effec-
tive revolutionary organisation (Žižek 2002).
Žižek is certainly right to discern a chronic and disabling lack of strategic think-
ing on much of the contemporary radical scene, and a similarly disabling distaste for 
militancy amongst so-called radical intellectuals, and he is right that no attempt to 
get past the resulting impasse can avoid an encounter with Lenin. Žižek is impressed 
by Lenin’s willingness to break with Marxist orthodoxy, according to which Russia 
was nowhere remotely close to being ready for a proletarian communist revolution 
in 1917, and thereby to take advantage of a historically unprecedented situation of 
socio-political crisis in order to transform the historical scene in which he found him-
self (Žižek 2001; Žižek 2002: 7–12). He is also impressed by Lenin’s willingness to 
abjure the niceties of consensual liberalism in order to defend a militant position of 
revolutionary anti-capitalism (Žižek 2001; Žižek 2002: 167–78).
However, while it is clearly true that Lenin’s break with Marxist orthodoxy was 
in some senses exemplary, both theoretically and pragmatically, Žižek’s characterisa-
tion of the nature of this break is both reductive and counter-productive in its impli-
cations. Žižek almost invariably presents Lenin’s break an example of pure volition, 
unmediated will, a fundamental act in the most metaphysical and individualistic 
sense (Žižek 2001: 26). By contrast, I would argue that Lenin’s decision to push the 
revolution to its logical conclusion was not some miraculous accession to grace, but 
the product of a careful strategic calculation and a willingness to recalibrate the terms 
of that calculation in the face of emergent events. Far from being the singular inter-
vention which changed everything, Lenin’s decision was the product of a willingness 
to accept that he could not control events and that no theoretical dogma could predict 
them. Lenin had to accept the fact that the revolution was not unfolding accord-
ing to the classical Marxist scheme and hence to take political opportunities as they 
arose. It was therefore an openness to the incalculability of the future which charac-
terised Lenin’s perspective and distinguished it from later Stalinist dogmatism. It was 
a willingness to accept the fact that his actions were always already caught up in a 
destabilising network of causes and effects which forced Lenin to act as he did, not 
some pure moment of revelation. In fact Žižek does seem to acknowledge this much 
when he describes Lenin’s attitude as one of ‘authentic historical openness’ (2001). 
Furthermore, when Žižek writes against the notion of ‘politics without parties’, he 
does so in a register which seem to assume that everyone who has ever questioned 
the organisational appropriateness of Bolshevism in the twenty-fi rst century has ad-
vocated a complete renunciation of all party organisation whatsoever. In fact, much 
of Žižek’s substantial point on the need for parties and intolerance in politics can be 
boiled down to his insistence on the need to take sides in politics, a position which 
can just as well be derived from Chantal Mouffe’s reading of Schmitt, amongst 
other sources (Mouffe 2000). While these two writers would clearly disagree on 
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fundamental issues—most notably the centrality and viability of the concept of re-
volution to radical democratic struggle—they can both be read as arguing that there 
can be no effective politics without contestation.
Which brings us back, once again, to the question of strategy; and of how to 
coordinate a disparate and dispersed array of political actors and actions against 
a common enemy as vast and powerful as neoliberalism and in favour of—if not 
a singular vision of the future—at least a range of visions which are not mutually 
exclusive and which are generally democratic in character. In this sense, there is 
a clear need for some kinds of political practice to do the work of connecting a dis-
parate range of political tactics (from demonstrations to media interventions, from 
strikes to factory occupations, from election campaigns to government lobbying) 
with some kind of overall set of social objectives informed by a broadly coherent 
set of ethics and values. This is exactly what the political party used to try to do, and 
Gramsci’s ‘The Modern Prince’ remains the classic vision of this whole gamut of 
functions being carried out by a single organisation. The reasons why such a vision 
has become untenable today are well-known. Postmodern societies are too complex, 
too differentiated and too porous for any one organisation to carry out this range 
of functions effectively and with any kind of legitimacy, unless it were to be the 
vehicle of some new kind of fascism. More than this, many of us may well be suspi-
cious that the twentieth-century party form was always too fascistic in its tendencies. 
However, this only leaves us in a trickier position than ever. If we recognise that we 
need something like the kind of strategic coordination which the political party used 
to provide, but we reject Žižek’s calls for a return to vanguardism, and the even the 
whole history of centralised party organisation, what, then, is to be done?
One answer—partly inspired by Hardt and Negri’s turn to early modern  phi-
losophy—might be to return to a pre-twentieth-century concept of party, meaning 
not a tightly structured membership organisation, but a more diffuse assemblage of 
mutually resonant opinions and goals. In English at least, the notion of party is as 
old as political democracy, and for most of its history the term simply designated 
a common body of opinion oriented towards a shared set of political goals, short and 
long term. It might seem simple enough, even completely banal, to suggest reviving 
this usage in order for anti-capitalists to recognise themselves as ‘a party’. It might 
well be argued that the concept of the movement of movements is one which already 
serves just this function. But I think that we have identifi ed a number of problems 
with current thinking on the nature of political identity and strategy which indicate 
that making such concepts effective will prove to something of a challenge, and will 
require a very subtle, but very specifi c understanding of the relationship between 
tactics and strategies. For what is required for tactical interventions against neolib-
eral hegemony—from street protests to academic journal articles, policy propos-
als to fi lm reviews—to be effective, is a certain strategic orientation, which is not 
the same thing as saying that they need to be informed by a singular ideology or 
oriented towards a singular imagined goal. A deliberate orientation away from the 
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normativity of neoliberal assumptions and practices, toward the possibility of their 
democratic transcendence, but without a singular political identity or ultimate goal, 
would be quite different from either the strategyless tactics of the avant-gardes or the 
totalitarian intolerance of the Žižeko-Leninist vanguard. It would be an orientation 
made in the spirit that Amory Starr so eloquently evokes when she observes that ‘The 
international invitation to be a Zapatista mirrors the invitation to be queer—it is a 
moral solidarity around a political economic critique, not any kind of claim around 
interiority or essence’ (2000: 167).
In practice, this would mean that the current task for those us seeking to move 
beyond the spectacular protests of the post-Seattle period towards some more sub-
stantial project to remake democracy for the twenty-fi rst century might be to work 
on making possible the productive synthesis of new specifi c connections between 
the already vast, but hugely dispersed range of opinions and social actors opposed to 
the hegemony of neoliberalism and to its authoritarian opponents. Making this pos-
sible would depend more than anything on the opening, and intensifying, of spaces in 
which the unpredictable self- coordination of multiple elements might become pos-
sible, allowing new practices of democracy and collective self-invention to emerge. 
This touches on a very important point. There exists already in much of the West a 
large number of groups and individuals—arguably a clear majority—who are dis-
satisfi ed and displeased with the hegemonic persistence of neoliberalism and its so-
cial, political and cultural consequences, who value much of the social democratic 
legacy and who do not wish to forego the liberal social and cultural gains of the 
past 40 years. These range from the militant activist to the Christian Aid volunteer; 
from the Italian garment-industry worker to the disillusioned French voter, voting 
against the incumbent government in every election in living memory; from the con-
ceptual artists and independent fi lm-makers to the public-service broadcasters and 
the Archbishop of Canterbury. It’s in the facilitation of connection and the creation of 
opportunities for common strategising between actors and thinkers from a range of 
social sectors that the possibility of democratic transformation must lie. To be clear 
then, this is not a matter of unifi cation, homogenisation or centralisation, but of the 
creation and intensifi cation of relays, the actualisation of potential nodes and points 
of concentration, the active production of ‘commons’.
This is why the emergence of the social forums is so important, but, importantly, 
large-scale social forums are not the only form which this kind of politics can take. 
On some level, the social forum is the model for the type of space of engagement 
that we need at almost every scale, from the global to the micro-institutional. From 
the school to the nation-state and the supra-national state, anti-neoliberal radical 
democratic forces will need to keep working to create spaces of engagement wherein 
the strategic orientation of a vast range of political and potentially political activi-
ties can be sharpened, adjusted, amplifi ed and problematised, in a process which 
practically manifests what Laclau has called the ‘multiplication of public spaces’ 
(1990: xv). Žižek is right, I think, to remind us that simply constituting democratic 
230 • Anticapitalism and Culture
spaces would be insuffi cient: these spaces will only be politically effective if they 
are, like the social forums, constituted on the basis of a shared understanding that, 
at the very least something is happening (globalisation, neoliberalism) which none 
of us asked for—in which we are all nonetheless implicated—and which it behoves 
us to name as some kind of an enemy (Starr 2000); and on the basis of a willing-
ness to at least countenance the possibility of a defi nitive militancy in countering it. 
But it is in the constitution of such opportunities to strategise, and not simply in the 
heroic declaration of a new vanguard, that the possibility lies of effective strategies 
emerging. Deleuze and Guattari’s evocation of the rhizome comes here to be entirely 
relevant: rhizomatic is precisely what the nature of the connections so created should 
be, and what the nature of such strategising will have to be.
I have already hinted, and would like now to suggest explicitly, that the social 
forums thus conceived must have something of the quality of the ‘war machine’. 
This is a key phrase from Deleuze and Guattari which does not necessarily designate 
a military organisation at all. The war machine is a particular type of assemblage 
which is defi nitively distinguishable from the State and which ‘in no way has war 
as its object, but rather the emission of quanta of deterritorialisation, the passage 
of mutant fl ows (in this sense, every creation is brought about by a war machine)’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 229–30). War machines are those mobile, transformatory, 
‘nomadic’ sites of innovation which might be partially captured by State institutions 
but which are never wholly inside them, their abstract nature as war machines being 
defi ned by their radical exteriority to the State (Patton 2000: 109–15).
Now, from this point of view, it is important for us to bear in mind that there is 
nothing inherently progressive about war machines. Neoliberalism is, as much as any-
thing, an assault by the war machines of fi nance capital on the social-democratic in-
stitutions of the State. ‘A commercial organisation is also a band of pillage, or piracy’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 360): just think of all those corporations profi ting from 
the privatisation of education services and water supplies. Perhaps it is too simple to 
pose capital against the State here. Rather we should say that the institutions of the 
welfare state were always themselves composite assemblages with cutting edges 
that could go either way: potentially engines of collective self-empowerment for the 
subject-groups of workers, refugees, women, and so forth who used them, but also 
potentially institutions of discipline and control. A school can be a place where a 
community fi nds new ways to think and be, beyond the mere demands of the labour 
market and elite culture. It can also be an oppressive institution for the imposition 
of conformity. In its former aspect, a school or any public institution can take on the 
character of a war machine, but in the latter instance it always becomes an instrument 
of the State. This follows as long as we remain within Deleuze and Guattari’s frame 
of reference, of course: from other perspectives the very idea of the State might be 
crude and simplistic (Foucault 2004: 79). But let’s stick with Deleuze and Guattari for 
now, because they provide us with a remarkably productive way of thinking through 
these issues. For example: Raymond Williams’s pioneering New Left analysis of 
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post-war capitalism was precisely focussed on the issue of how to amplify a cer-
tain potential in the reformed and newly invented institutions of the welfare state and 
public education, a potential which could carry them along a vector of transforma-
tion that would make them part of the ‘Long Revolution’ (Williams 1961) against 
capital and discipline, towards a radically democratic horizon. From this perspective, 
we can see that neoliberalism is, precisely the counter-revolution against Williams’s 
Long Revolution’. Neoliberalism is characterised by a specifi c mode of interaction 
between certain institutions of the State (government, central banks, public-sector 
management) and the war machines of fi nance capital against the radical possibili-
ties inherent in some of the institutions of social democracy, an alliance between the 
pirates of fi nance and the new managerial technocracy (see Clarke & Newman 1997; 
Bewes & Gilbert 2000), against the multitude and its war machines.
It is thus proper to State deterritorialisation to moderate the superior deterritorialisation 
of capital and to provide the latter with compensatory reterritorialisations . . .
States are not at all transcendent paradigms of an overcoding but immanent models of 
realisation for an axiomatic of decoding fl ows. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 455)
The New Left always dreamed of a radical democratisation of these institutions from 
a perspective which tended to see democracy as a force that was always working 
against the State, as Miguel Abensour would have it (Abensour 2004). This is one 
reason why so many former radicals have become agents of neoliberalism’s war 
on the social democratic state (most New Labour ministers have espoused radical 
socialism at some point in their youth). The difference between a radical democratic 
deterritorialisation of the welfare state and its capture by neoliberal capital can some-
times be very hard to discern, at fi rst.
So what are the implications of all this? Simply that the social forum should 
be conceptualised not as a model of an alternative State or a reformed State but 
as a mutant assemblage, and that the social forums should be seen not as potential 
political committees of some uniform political movement. Rather they should be 
seen as points of relay, democratic research labs, communicating junctures in a net-
worked assemblage which would aim to let loose war machines against the power 
of neoliberalism and its institutions to codify and territorialise, rather than becom-
ing defensive guardians of the State. In practice, this would have some serious and 
mundane implications. The repeated calls for social forums to take up positions, to 
become themselves proto-parties, would have to be resisted. The loose anti- capitalist 
party, the new international, might be an assemblage of war machines, but to try to 
turn each forum-machine into a party would kill it. Any temptation on the part of 
anti-capitalist forces to fall back on nationalism, parochialism, protectionism, or au-
thoritarianism would have to be resisted. This might sound obvious, but it would be 
all too easy for all opponents of neoliberalism to follow the path which has already 
led many to religious fundamentalism, looking for security, stability and safety from 
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the decoded fl ows of capital by hiding behind God and holy books (Gordon Brown 
recently promised ‘British jobs for British workers’, although the fact that this is 
widely regarded as having been a serious faux pas is some grounds for hope . . . ).
Let’s emphasise here again that the value of the social forum model is not only 
to be derived from the success or failure of the actual social forums to date. Rather 
the value of the social forum model can be derived from the virtual social forum ex-
pressed in the World ‘Social Forum’ charter of principles, which is a kind of diagram 
of a political space which would work to actualise the radical democratic potential of 
the multitude which passes through it. Social forum could be a name for any kind of 
institutional experiment which tries to open such a space: a student council, a works 
committee, a community centre. That such experiments are initiated all the time, all 
over the place, can hardly be doubted. The aim of anti-capitalism as a movement 
would be to create some fi eld of resonance between each of these points (on a differ-
ent frequency to that of the State. See Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 433).
So, we want to proliferate . . . public spaces, social forums, war machines . . . but 
in practice, in the concrete assemblage of British culture that we examined in the 
last chapter, what hopes is there of doing this? In the particular situation of the 
British cultural context and the British political experience, the problem of how to 
imagine anti-capitalism as anything more than a politically irrelevant subculture is 
particularly stark. Arguably, the move from anti-roads protests to self-defi ned anti-
 capitalism at the end of the 1990s involved a shift away from a politics whose pri-
mary function was to politicise previously taken-for-granted aspects of everyday 
life and to widen out the zone of that politicisation (a political war machine), and 
its substitution with a politics of self-defi nition (a paranoid tactic of identity). Dur-
ing this period, the implicit policing of the boundaries of activist subculture became 
much more intense—excluding, for the most part, anyone not committed to full-time 
struggle—just as the targets against which it is ranged became at once narrower and 
less accessible (the entire edifi ce of global capitalism, no less). The question this 
leaves us with is this—what other kinds of political practice could do the opposite? 
What would be needed to help spread and deepen a sense of affi liation, however 
loose, between all those who feel some dissatisfaction with the neoliberal project and 
its consequences, to make possible a common swerving of this abstract swarm away 
from the neoliberal attractor and towards another?
Well, all kinds of things would have to happen, but let’s refl ect on what a few of 
them might be. For one thing—and this is crucially important—there would have to 
be some notions, some ideas, images and affects in circulation concerning what it 
might mean to be a partisan of anti-capitalism but not a full-time activist. Partisan-
ship without identity would be the necessary possibility here. Now, this is a proposal 
that would shock many who themselves identify with the activist imaginary. They 
would no doubt see this as symptomatic of the kind of authoritarian thinking that 
they have always opposed, implying as it does that some people should be really po-
litically active and others should be just passive supporters of the movement, an idea 
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which at its worse implies the split between the professional revolutionary elite and 
the ordinary masses of Leninist theory.
There are several responses to make to this. One is that it is a position which is 
entirely utopian and refuses to learn anything from history. There has never been a 
radical movement which mobilised an entire population for any length of time, and 
those movements which change things invariably do so by winning large-scale sup-
port amongst a diverse public, not all of whom can be full-time activists: altering 
the affective orientation, the molecular composition, of a range of different subjects/
groups/singularities without demanding conformity to a model. Which comes to our 
second point. As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are all kinds of pragmatic 
reasons as to why many people cannot involve themselves heavily in direct political 
activity at a given moment, except in moments of absolute social crisis. A politi-
cal movement which really wants to effect any kind of social change has to fi nd a 
way to include, to attract, to resonate with such people. Inclusion in this sense does 
not necessarily involve taking a direct part in political activity, but a more general 
sharing of attitudes, assumptions and responses—an affective exchange—which can 
translate into active political support at times of real crisis and can become a basis 
for a generalised militancy which does not depend upon the presence of militants 
for its success. For such a shared collection of ideas and affects to become effective, 
however, it has to have some bearing on aspects of people’s lives which are not usu-
ally thought of as directly the provenance of politics.
In fact this is precisely how the most successful of the new social movements have 
achieved what they have. The diffusion of feminist, anti-racist, and green ideas has 
been dependent on just such a rhizomatic process of cultural dissemination, rather 
than on the recruitment of ever-larger numbers to the ranks of activist militancy. 
How exactly this might happen today is not a question I could answer without laps-
ing into prescriptive dogma. Let these remarks stand rather as an invitation to artists, 
philosophers, journalists, media critics, students, teachers, political inactivists and 
anyone else who’s interested: what might enable a radically democratic critique of 
neoliberalism and the ideal of the social forum to proliferate? What new forms and 
contents might we invent for that purpose (if only ever partly or that purpose)?
And what role might cultural studies or cultural theory play? Well, since the 
1970s, cultural studies and the spread of cultural theory throughout the humanities 
and social sciences have clearly played a role in this process. In particular, genera-
tions of graduates, including politicians, policy-makers, journalists and broadcasters 
have clearly been infl uenced by the attention to issues of class, gender, race and 
sexuality in the study of literature, media and visual culture which cultural studies 
helped to popularise. This is not to say that it was cultural studies which caused this 
shift, nor can it be said to have been merely a passive result of some broader cultural 
shift in which it played no part. Rather, we can say that the spread of cultural theory, 
especially via the infl uence of cultural studies, has played a small but important role 
in disseminating a set of political perspectives which have had a decisive impact 
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in re-shaping cultural attitudes and the broad political climate. This is one of the rea-
sons that the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ has had to include a real belief in the value of 
personal freedom and unlimited creativity, why even conservative politicians today 
cannot publicly espouse racist views. Despite the habitual hostility of Oxbridge-edu-
cated journalists to cultural studies, cultural theory, literary theory and media studies, 
despite the relative success of the reactionary myth of political correctness, we can 
still say that such reactions would be entirely superfl uous were it not for the fact 
that these phenomena have been successful in contributing to changes in attitudes, 
behaviours and realities.
Refl ecting on this process tells us a lot about the way in which ideas are dissemi-
nated through a culture, and in particular about the possible relationships between 
academic work and political movements. Both activist and academic culture are often 
suffused with a certain anxiety about these relationships. Academics often worry that 
they do not write for a broad public, whereas activists often condemn academics for 
not producing books which are easy for non-specialists to read. These anxieties only 
make sense if we imagine, mistakenly, that the only way for academic ideas to relate 
to political movements is for them to constitute the basis for manifestos which are 
then enacted directly by the movement, ‘on the streets’. In truth the processes by 
which ideas circulate is much more complex. An academic work may only be read by 
a few hundred people, but those few hundred may all be university teachers who will 
carry some of the work’s ideas into their teaching, which may involve communica-
tions with hundreds of students each. Those students may in turn carry some of those 
idea into other spheres of life, and so on. Furthermore, the job of politically informed 
academic work in the humanities (of which cultural studies is exemplary) is not usu-
ally to inspire activists at all, but either to infl uence and change the academic milieu 
itself in line with the long-term objectives of the political movement, or to gener-
ate analyses which might of use to general sympathisers of the movement. In other 
words, the point of producing a complex feminist analysis of a play by Shakespeare 
might be to contribute to the women’s movement’s understanding of Shakespeare 
(and hence, presumably, many other things), but it might also be to recruit scholars 
and students of Shakespeare to the broad attitudes of the women’s movement. This 
might seem like a very small victory. So it is. But without such small victories, there 
can be no great ones: this is precisely the point on which both Gramsci’s notion of 
the ‘war of position’ and Guattari’s emphasis on ‘molecular politics’ converge. Com-
mitted cultural criticism (feminist studies, of Shakespeare, for example) can play a 
very useful role in helping to think through what it might mean to think from a par-
tisan perspective without having to carry a party card6. At the same time of course, 
generating a committed critical position is not the most important role for intellectual 
work in relation to political projects: even more important is its critical capacity to 
offer some space for refl ection upon the assumptions, refl exes, successes and failures 
of a radical movement, refl ection that the everyday pace of political activism doesn’t 
always allow. Even more than this, however, the historic aim of cultural studies has 
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been to make the best possible analyses of contemporary confi gurations of power 
which might help to plot routes towards more democratic futures.
From this point of view, we might say that radical cultural theory is and always 
has been asking the same question: what does it mean to study culture from a radical 
democratic perspective? Cultural studies has always had the same job: to analyse the 
shifting patterns of contemporary culture, identifying those surfaces of emergence 
which might offer scope for an intensifi cation of democracy and the proliferation of 
difference, keeping a watch on those new forms of stratifi cation and control which 
work to reinforce hierarchy and compulsory individualisation. While this task may 
often be carried out in sympathy with radical movements, they must also involve 
taking those movements themselves as objects of critical refl ection, as well as con-
sidering how their best innovations might be carried forward into other areas. This is 
what this chapter has tried to do.
Notes
1.  Of course, we should not rule out the possibility of both the consequences of 
climate change and the need drastically to reduce carbon emissions provoking 
such a crisis before too long.
2.  The entire Lacanian critique of militancy since 1968 could be activated here, but 
that is not a critique which I wish to endorse.
3. A clinamen.
4.  Whether Hardt and Negri would now stand by this argument, in the light of some 
of the qualifi cations that they have made in Multitude, is not entirely clear.
5.  This should not be confused with the nomadic mode of operation of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ‘war machines’. Gramsci uses the term ‘war of manoeuvre’ specifi cally 
to designate a confl ict in which there is only one central site of contestation.
6.  What might a radical-democratic cultural criticism involve? I’ve refl ected on this 
elsewhere (Gilbert 2001, 2004c, 2006), but others might do it much better.
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Conclusion
Liberating the Collective
If it wants to live up to its potential, cultural studies has to be as proudly, loudly political 
as philosophy is glowingly useless.
Brian Massumi Parables for the Virtual
What can it mean to rise to Massumi’s challenge? On one level, it must always mean 
to put the idea of the political itself into question, as cultural studies and cultural 
theory practitioners are so often so good at doing. And yet, on another level, destabi-
lising concepts like ‘the political’ is the job of philosophy. The question of ‘what the 
political is’ is a crucial one that we can never stop asking: but at the moment when 
we ask it, we’re doing metapolitics, micropolitics, deconstruction, philosophy. This 
is something to be done in hushed voices, deliberately, uncertainly, stammering (De-
leuze & Parnet 1996: 11, 73). To be proudly, loudly political is something different. 
It must involve a certain partisanship; not an adoption of identity, not a Jacobin as-
sumption of a binarised world-view, but a sense that there are, whether we like it or 
not, confl icts which we are touched by and which we touch, unavoidably. We don’t 
choose them. It matters (literally), sometimes, to which sides in these confl icts we lend 
our strength, talents, insights and inventions, our proud, loud voices.
Of course, without dogma to guide us, we cannot know in advance, before we 
start to look, what those confl icts are; between which parties or for what stakes. This 
is why the fi rst task of cultural studies is always an analytical one; to analyse con-
junctures, to measure the balances of force, to fi gure out what the stakes are. Some-
times they will be small and sometimes large. But even if we reject any notion of 
totality (and we do), it remains the case that there will be some confl icts so large, 
involving such extensive constellations of assemblages, that they make themselves 
immanent to countless situations on every conceivable scale. The confl ict between 
neoliberalism and its multiple opponents—many of them willing something at once 
freer and more egalitarian than it can allow—is one such confl ict. It is played out in 
so many innumerable locations (from patented genes to wrecked continental ecosys-
tems) that we cannot help but encounter it and become caught up in it. If we don’t 
think we are, it’s only because we don’t know we are. If we don’t know we are, it’s 
only because we haven’t looked. Looking is part of the point of cultural studies.
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What have we learned? The book set out with the aim of staging a dialogue be-
tween cultural studies and the anti-capitalist movement. As promised, this dialogue 
could often take place only at a high level of abstraction, and if nothing else I hope 
this has produced some useful insights into the relative valencies of important cur-
rents in recent cultural and political theory. But along the way we have also de-
veloped a number of claims about the nature of contemporary capitalism and its 
intersections with particular formations of power and desire: making such claims is 
always an integral task of practicing cultural studies. What has come up a number of 
times in several chapters—although it has not been previously highlighted as a key 
theme—is something about the nature of the current conjuncture and the specifi c role 
of culture in it. That noticeable something is this: the remarkable proximity between 
those zones of innovation and emergence from which alternatives to neoliberal capi-
talism might emerge and the leading edges of that capitalism itself; the remarkable 
proximity between those defensive enclaves which might be transformed into war 
machines and those which are merely apparatuses of control. There is a difference, 
a real difference, and yet a very fi ne line, between the rhizomatic politics of the social 
forums and the connexionist rhetoric of the New Spirit of Capitalism. There is a dif-
ference, a real difference, and yet a very fi ne line, between the Zapatistas’ defence of 
their homeland and the defensiveness of a British xenophobe.
The difference isn’t that hard to discern. It’s about radical democracy on the one 
hand, capital accumulation on the other; becoming-Zapatista on the one hand, England-
belongs-to-me on the other. But discerning it and naming it is the job of cultural 
studies.
Is this just stating the obvious? Is this simply apparent to everyone? Has it always 
been like this?
I don’t think it has always been like this. I’m hardly the fi rst person to observe that 
the relationship between capitalism and culture has changed in recent decades, as 
culture has itself become the main site for the production of value. This is the phe-
nomenon theorised in different ways as the rise of ‘immaterial labour’ (Lazzarato 
1996), the emergence of the knowledge economy, the rise of the creative industries or 
postmodernity. There may have been other points in history when it was like this. To 
some extent, capitalism has always been dependent on the very creative energy which 
could best be turned against it. But that creativity was not always exercised primarily 
in the fi eld of culture, and the cultural machines which capitalism was connected to 
(the churches, the old universities, the mass media) were once very far from those of 
the workers. Richard Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy, the very fi rst book in cultural 
studies, was in part telling the story of a closing gap, a closing gap between the work-
ers’ culture and that of the mass (state/capital) media. That gap has continued to close, 
but it has also mutated, and cultural studies still has the job, fi fty years on, of thinking 
about the consequences. Let’s say we’ve learned this much: this new situation, as 
these various theorists have described it, is real, and really different, and demands 
a certain political attention in conceptual terms that we have tried to draw out.
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Is it obvious? It certainly isn’t obvious to everyone. A certain vein of Marxist anti-
capitalist critique, best represented right now by Slavoj Žižek, assumes that anything 
so proximate to capitalism must be similar to capitalism, and so denounces all of the 
most radical lines-of-fl ight of the day (cultural studies, post-Marxism, postmodern-
ism, deconstruction, Anti-Oedipus, queers, feminists, Marcos . . . the list goes on and 
on) in the name of God-knows-what-alternative to capitalism (Gilbert 2007; Laclau 
2005: 232–9). Similarly, a vein of libertarian futurist pseudo-Taoist nihilism de-
nounces any strategy of defence as merely conservative, majoritarian, communitar-
ian, clinging onto the past. This attitude surfaces in its pure form very rarely: much 
more frequently it takes the form of a nonchalant assertion that anti-consumerism, 
egalitarian politics, or the suggestion that artistic or theoretical practices might 
sometimes reflect on their own politics, are manifestations of an old-fashioned 
left moralism.
Of course we don’t want moralism, we loud, proud, joyful, radically democratic 
anti-capitalists. We just don’t want to be trapped. Artists, scientists, architects, phi-
losophers, media theorists, cultural critics, policy specialists; we may think ourselves 
safe in our workshops, galleries, laboratories, seminar rooms, offi ces, libraries, in 
our spaces of tactical invention. But to what use will the techniques and tactics that 
we invent be put? Do we even want to have a say in this? Do we even care?
If, on some level, however abstract, you are never strategising against Empire, 
capital or the state, then you can be sure that they are strategising against you. You 
may comfort yourself that ‘there is no hegemony’, but Washington knows that there 
is hegemony, and News International knows that there is hegemony. What’s more: 
they don’t care that you don’t believe in their hegemony. They don’t need to he-
gemonise you to get you cornered: they’ve got enough on their side already. They 
don’t need you to believe in them to capture you. All they need to do is to organise 
the space you move in. If you don’t coordinate your singular points of resistance/
escape/becoming with those of others, then you won’t have a chance. All of your key 
coordinates will be determined for you. No line of fl ight will take you far enough to 
escape: the world is round, in case you hadn’t heard.
Let’s go to social forums, publish online for free, organise public workshops, 
give away art, refuse to sign recording contracts, turn down jobs in marketing, build 
houses for co-ops, research collaboratively. Many are doing this already of course: 
let’s salute the heroes of open source, peer-to-peer, and so forth, and see what the rest 
of us can learn from them. Let’s liberate the collective from the trap of commodity-
career-celebrity-mine.
I’m no hero. I’m not doing much of this. But I think we should keep trying. 
Don’t you?
The way lies ahead, in taking the inventive potential released by capitalism so far that 
we become so other so as no longer to act in the perceived “private” interests of a sepa-
rate Self that we have in any case already ceased to be (if we ever were it). We must 
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embrace our collectivity. This requires a global perception of the capitalist relation as 
the constraint that it is, the development of a systematic sensitivity to its axiomatic, and 
shared strategies of resistance to it and its symbiotic despotisms, in a world-wide reso-
nation of desires. The aim would be less to overthrow neoconservatism than to counter-
actualize its residually molar individuals as local-global correlation of becomings-other. 
We are in this together, and the only way out is together, into a supermolecularity where 
no quasicause can follow: a collective ethics beyond good and evil. But most of all, 
beyond greed.
(Massumi 1992: 140–1)
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